Randomised Social Choice Theory


Title: Randomised Social Choice Theory
Author: Manuel Eberl
Submission date: 2016-05-05
Abstract: This work contains a formalisation of basic Randomised Social Choice, including Stochastic Dominance and Social Decision Schemes (SDSs) along with some of their most important properties (Anonymity, Neutrality, ex-post- and SD-Efficiency, SD-Strategy-Proofness) and two particular SDSs – Random Dictatorship and Random Serial Dictatorship (with proofs of the properties that they satisfy). Many important properties of these concepts are also proven – such as the two equivalent characterisations of Stochastic Dominance and the fact that SD-efficiency of a lottery only depends on the support. The entry also provides convenient commands to define Preference Profiles, prove their well-formedness, and automatically derive restrictions that sufficiently nice SDSs need to satisfy on the defined profiles. Currently, the formalisation focuses on weak preferences and Stochastic Dominance, but it should be easy to extend it to other domains – such as strict preferences – or other lottery extensions – such as Bilinear Dominance or Pairwise Comparison.
  author  = {Manuel Eberl},
  title   = {Randomised Social Choice Theory},
  journal = {Archive of Formal Proofs},
  month   = may,
  year    = 2016,
  note    = {\url{https://isa-afp.org/entries/Randomised_Social_Choice.html},
            Formal proof development},
  ISSN    = {2150-914x},
License: BSD License
Depends on: List-Index
Used by: Fishburn_Impossibility, SDS_Impossibility