

Randomised Social Choice

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Abstract

This work contains a formalisation of basic Randomised Social Choice, including Stochastic Dominance and Social Decision Schemes (SDSs) along with some of their most important properties (Anonymity, Neutrality, *SD*-Efficiency, *SD*-Strategy-Proofness) and two particular SDSs – Random Dictatorship and Random Serial Dictatorship (with proofs of the properties that they satisfy). Many important properties of these concepts are also proven – such as the two equivalent characterisations of Stochastic Dominance and the fact that *SD*-efficiency of a lottery only depends on the support.

The entry also provides convenient commands to define Preference Profiles, prove their well-formedness, and automatically derive restrictions that sufficiently nice SDSs need to satisfy on the defined profiles. (cf. [1])

Currently, the formalisation focuses on weak preferences and Stochastic Dominance (*SD*), but it should be easy to extend it to other domains – such as strict preferences – or other lottery extensions – such as Bilinear Dominance or Pairwise Comparison.

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1 Order Relations as Binary Predicates

```
theory Order-Predicates
imports
  Main
  HOL-Library.Disjoint-Sets
  HOL-Combinatorics.Permutations
  List-Index.List-Index
begin
```

1.1 Basic Operations on Relations

The type of binary relations

```
type-synonym 'a relation = 'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool
```

```
definition map-relation :: ('a ⇒ 'b) ⇒ 'b relation ⇒ 'a relation where
  map-relation f R = (λx y. R (f x) (f y))
```

```
definition restrict-relation :: 'a set ⇒ 'a relation ⇒ 'a relation where
  restrict-relation A R = (λx y. x ∈ A ∧ y ∈ A ∧ R x y)
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-restrict-relation [simp]:
  restrict-relation A (restrict-relation B R) = restrict-relation (A ∩ B) R
by (intro ext) (auto simp add: restrict-relation-def)
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-empty [simp]: restrict-relation {} R = (λ- -. False)
by (simp add: restrict-relation-def)
```

```
lemma restrict-relation-UNIV [simp]: restrict-relation UNIV R = R
by (simp add: restrict-relation-def)
```

1.2 Preorders

Preorders are reflexive and transitive binary relations.

```
locale preorder-on =
  fixes carrier :: 'a set
  fixes le :: 'a relation
  assumes not-outside: le x y ⇒ x ∈ carrier le x y ⇒ y ∈ carrier
  assumes refl: x ∈ carrier ⇒ le x x
  assumes trans: le x y ⇒ le y z ⇒ le x z
begin
```

```
lemma carrier-eq: carrier = {x. le x x}
using not-outside refl by auto
```

```
lemma preorder-on-map:
  preorder-on (f -' carrier) (map-relation f le)
by unfold-locales (auto dest: not-outside simp: map-relation-def refl elim: trans)
```

lemma *preorder-on-restrict*:
preorder-on (*carrier* \cap *A*) (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)
by *unfold-locales* (*auto simp: restrict-relation-def refl intro: trans not-outside*)

lemma *preorder-on-restrict-subset*:
 $A \subseteq \text{carrier} \implies \text{preorder-on } A \text{ (restrict-relation } A \text{ le)}$
using *preorder-on-restrict*[*of A*] **by** (*simp add: Int-absorb1*)

lemma *restrict-relation-carrier* [*simp*]:
restrict-relation *carrier* *le* = *le*
using *not-outside* **by** (*intro ext*) (*auto simp add: restrict-relation-def*)

end

1.3 Total preorders

Total preorders are preorders where any two elements are comparable.

locale *total-preorder-on* = *preorder-on* +
assumes *total*: $x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{le } x \ y \ \vee \ \text{le } y \ x$
begin

lemma *total'*: $\neg \text{le } x \ y \implies x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{le } y \ x$
using *total*[*of x y*] **by** *blast*

lemma *total-preorder-on-map*:
total-preorder-on (*f* -' *carrier*) (*map-relation* *f* *le*)
proof -
interpret *R'*: *preorder-on* *f* -' *carrier* *map-relation* *f* *le*
using *preorder-on-map*[*of f*] .
show *?thesis* **by** *unfold-locales* (*simp add: map-relation-def total*)
qed

lemma *total-preorder-on-restrict*:
total-preorder-on (*carrier* \cap *A*) (*restrict-relation* *A* *le*)
proof -
interpret *R'*: *preorder-on* *carrier* \cap *A* *restrict-relation* *A* *le*
by (*rule preorder-on-restrict*)
from *total* **show** *?thesis*
by *unfold-locales* (*auto simp: restrict-relation-def*)
qed

lemma *total-preorder-on-restrict-subset*:
 $A \subseteq \text{carrier} \implies \text{total-preorder-on } A \text{ (restrict-relation } A \text{ le)}$
using *total-preorder-on-restrict*[*of A*] **by** (*simp add: Int-absorb1*)

end

Some fancy notation for order relations

abbreviation (*input*) *weakly-preferred* :: 'a ⇒ 'a relation ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool
 (⟨- ≼[-]⟩ -> [51,10,51] 60) **where**
 $a \preceq[R] b \equiv R a b$

definition *strongly-preferred* (⟨- ≺[-]⟩ -> [51,10,51] 60) **where**
 $a \prec[R] b \equiv (a \preceq[R] b) \wedge \neg(b \preceq[R] a)$

definition *indifferent* (⟨- ∼[-]⟩ -> [51,10,51] 60) **where**
 $a \sim[R] b \equiv (a \preceq[R] b) \wedge (b \preceq[R] a)$

abbreviation (*input*) *weakly-not-preferred* (⟨- ⪢[-]⟩ -> [51,10,51] 60) **where**
 $a \succeq[R] b \equiv b \preceq[R] a$
term $a \succeq[R] b \longleftrightarrow b \preceq[R] a$

abbreviation (*input*) *strongly-not-preferred* (⟨- ⪣[-]⟩ -> [51,10,51] 60) **where**
 $a \succ[R] b \equiv b \prec[R] a$

context *preorder-on*
begin

lemma *strict-trans*: $a \prec[le] b \implies b \prec[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$
unfolding *strongly-preferred-def* **by** (*blast intro: trans*)

lemma *weak-strict-trans*: $a \preceq[le] b \implies b \prec[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$
unfolding *strongly-preferred-def* **by** (*blast intro: trans*)

lemma *strict-weak-trans*: $a \prec[le] b \implies b \preceq[le] c \implies a \prec[le] c$
unfolding *strongly-preferred-def* **by** (*blast intro: trans*)

end

lemma (**in** *total-preorder-on*) *not-weakly-preferred-iff*:
 $a \in \text{carrier} \implies b \in \text{carrier} \implies \neg a \preceq[le] b \longleftrightarrow b \prec[le] a$
using *total[of a b]* **by** (*auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

lemma (**in** *total-preorder-on*) *not-strongly-preferred-iff*:
 $a \in \text{carrier} \implies b \in \text{carrier} \implies \neg a \prec[le] b \longleftrightarrow b \preceq[le] a$
using *total[of a b]* **by** (*auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

1.4 Orders

locale *order-on* = *preorder-on* +
assumes *antisymmetric*: $le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies x = y$

locale *linorder-on* = *order-on carrier le* + *total-preorder-on carrier le* **for** *carrier le*

1.5 Maximal elements

Maximal elements are elements in a preorder for which there exists no strictly greater element.

definition *Max-wrt-among* :: 'a relation \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow 'a set **where**
 $Max-wrt-among\ R\ A = \{x \in A. R\ x\ x \wedge (\forall y \in A. R\ x\ y \longrightarrow R\ y\ x)\}$

lemma *Max-wrt-among-cong*:
assumes *restrict-relation* $A\ R = restrict-relation\ A\ R'$
shows $Max-wrt-among\ R\ A = Max-wrt-among\ R'\ A$

proof –
from *assms* **have** $R\ x\ y \longleftrightarrow R'\ x\ y$ **if** $x \in A\ y \in A$ **for** $x\ y$
using *that by (auto simp: restrict-relation-def fun-eq-iff)*
thus *?thesis* **unfolding** *Max-wrt-among-def* **by** *blast*
qed

definition *Max-wrt* :: 'a relation \Rightarrow 'a set **where**
 $Max-wrt\ R = Max-wrt-among\ R\ UNIV$

lemma *Max-wrt-altdef*: $Max-wrt\ R = \{x. R\ x\ x \wedge (\forall y. R\ x\ y \longrightarrow R\ y\ x)\}$
unfolding *Max-wrt-def* *Max-wrt-among-def* **by** *simp*

context *preorder-on*
begin

lemma *Max-wrt-among-preorder*:
 $Max-wrt-among\ le\ A = \{x \in carrier \cap A. \forall y \in carrier \cap A. le\ x\ y \longrightarrow le\ y\ x\}$
unfolding *Max-wrt-among-def* **using** *not-outside refl* **by** *blast*

lemma *Max-wrt-preorder*:
 $Max-wrt\ le = \{x \in carrier. \forall y \in carrier. le\ x\ y \longrightarrow le\ y\ x\}$
unfolding *Max-wrt-altdef* **using** *not-outside refl* **by** *blast*

lemma *Max-wrt-among-subset*:
 $Max-wrt-among\ le\ A \subseteq carrier\ Max-wrt-among\ le\ A \subseteq A$
unfolding *Max-wrt-among-preorder* **by** *auto*

lemma *Max-wrt-subset*:
 $Max-wrt\ le \subseteq carrier$
unfolding *Max-wrt-preorder* **by** *auto*

lemma *Max-wrt-among-nonempty*:
assumes $B \cap carrier \neq \{\}$ *finite* $(B \cap carrier)$
shows $Max-wrt-among\ le\ B \neq \{\}$
proof –
define A **where** $A = B \cap carrier$
have $A \subseteq carrier$ **by** *(simp add: A-def)*
from *assms(2,1)[folded A-def]* **this** **have** $\{x \in A. (\forall y \in A. le\ x\ y \longrightarrow le\ y\ x)\} \neq \{\}$

proof (*induction A rule: finite-ne-induct*)
case (*singleton x*)
thus *?case* **by** (*auto simp: refl*)
next
case (*insert x A*)
then obtain *y* **where** $y \in A \wedge z. z \in A \implies le\ y\ z \implies le\ z\ y$ **by** *blast*
thus *?case* **using** *insert.prem*s
by (*cases le y x*) (*blast intro: trans*)+
qed
thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: A-def Max-wrt-among-preorder Int-commute*)
qed

lemma *Max-wrt-nonempty*:
 $carrier \neq \{\}$ $\implies finite\ carrier \implies Max-wrt\ le \neq \{\}$
using *Max-wrt-among-nonempty[of UNIV]* **by** (*simp add: Max-wrt-def*)

lemma *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-vimage*:
 $f -' Max-wrt-among\ le\ A \subseteq Max-wrt-among\ (map-relation\ f\ le)\ (f -' A)$
by (*auto simp: Max-wrt-among-def map-relation-def*)

lemma *Max-wrt-map-relation-vimage*:
 $f -' Max-wrt\ le \subseteq Max-wrt\ (map-relation\ f\ le)$
by (*auto simp: Max-wrt-altdef map-relation-def*)

lemma *image-subset-vimage-the-inv-into*:
assumes *inj-on f A B* $B \subseteq A$
shows $f -' B \subseteq the-inv-into\ A\ f -' B$
using *assms* **by** (*auto simp: the-inv-into-f-f*)

lemma *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij-subset*:
assumes *bij* ($f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b$)
shows $f -' Max-wrt-among\ le\ A \subseteq$
 $Max-wrt-among\ (map-relation\ (inv\ f)\ le)\ (f -' A)$
using *assms* *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-vimage[of inv f A]*
by (*simp add: bij-imp-bij-inv inv-inv-eq bij-vimage-eq-inv-image*)

lemma *Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij*:
assumes *bij* *f*
shows $f -' Max-wrt-among\ le\ A = Max-wrt-among\ (map-relation\ (inv\ f)\ le)\ (f -' A)$

proof (*intro equalityI Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij-subset assms*)
interpret *R*: *preorder-on f -' carrier map-relation (inv f) le*
using *preorder-on-map[of inv f] assms*
by (*simp add: bij-imp-bij-inv bij-vimage-eq-inv-image inv-inv-eq*)
show $Max-wrt-among\ (map-relation\ (inv\ f)\ le)\ (f -' A) \subseteq f -' Max-wrt-among\ le\ A$
unfolding *Max-wrt-among-preorder R.Max-wrt-among-preorder*
using *assms bij-is-inj[OF assms]*
by (*auto simp: map-relation-def inv-f-f image-Int [symmetric]*)

qed

lemma *Max-wrt-map-relation-bij*:

bij f \implies f ' Max-wrt le = Max-wrt (map-relation (inv f) le)

proof –

assume *bij: bij f*

interpret *R: preorder-on f ' carrier map-relation (inv f) le*

using *preorder-on-map[of inv f] bij*

by (*simp add: bij-imp-bij-inv bij-vimage-eq-inv-image inv-inv-eq*)

from *bij show ?thesis*

unfolding *R.Max-wrt-preorder Max-wrt-preorder*

by (*auto simp: map-relation-def inv-f-f bij-is-inj*)

qed

lemma *Max-wrt-among-mono*:

le x y \implies x \in Max-wrt-among le A \implies y \in A \implies y \in Max-wrt-among le A

using *not-outside by (auto simp: Max-wrt-among-preorder intro: trans)*

lemma *Max-wrt-mono*:

le x y \implies x \in Max-wrt le \implies y \in Max-wrt le

unfolding *Max-wrt-def using Max-wrt-among-mono[of x y UNIV] by blast*

end

context *total-preorder-on*

begin

lemma *Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*:

Max-wrt-among le A = {x \in carrier \cap A. \forall y \in carrier \cap A. le y x}

unfolding *Max-wrt-among-preorder using total by blast*

lemma *Max-wrt-total-preorder*:

Max-wrt le = {x \in carrier. \forall y \in carrier. le y x}

unfolding *Max-wrt-preorder using total by blast*

lemma *decompose-Max*:

assumes *A: A \subseteq carrier*

defines *M \equiv Max-wrt-among le A*

shows *restrict-relation A le = (λ x y. x \in A \wedge y \in M \vee (y \notin M \wedge restrict-relation (A - M) le x y))*

using *A by (intro ext) (auto simp: M-def Max-wrt-among-total-preorder restrict-relation-def Int-absorb1 intro: trans)*

end

1.6 Weak rankings

inductive *of-weak-ranking :: 'alt set list \Rightarrow 'alt relation where*

$i \leq j \implies i < \text{length } xs \implies j < \text{length } xs \implies x \in xs ! i \implies y \in xs ! j \implies x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } xs] y$

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Nil* [simp]: *of-weak-ranking* [] = ($\lambda - . \text{False}$)
by (*intro ext*) (*simp add: of-weak-ranking.simps*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Nil'* [code]: *of-weak-ranking* [] $x y = \text{False}$
by *simp*

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Cons* [code]:
 $x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } (z\#zs)] y \longleftrightarrow x \in z \wedge y \in \bigcup(\text{set } (z\#zs)) \vee x \succeq[\text{of-weak-ranking } zs] y$
(is ?lhs \longleftrightarrow ?rhs)

proof

assume *?lhs*

then obtain $i j$

where $ij: i < \text{length } (z\#zs) \ j < \text{length } (z\#zs) \ i \leq j \ x \in (z\#zs) ! i \ y \in (z\#zs)$

$! j$

by (*blast elim: of-weak-ranking.cases*)

thus *?rhs* **by** (*cases i; cases j*) (*force intro: of-weak-ranking.intros*)+

next

assume *?rhs*

thus *?lhs*

proof (*elim disjE conjE*)

assume $x \in z \ y \in \bigcup(\text{set } (z \# zs))$

then obtain j **where** $j < \text{length } (z \# zs) \ y \in (z \# zs) ! j$

by (*subst (asm) set-conv-nth*) *auto*

with $\langle x \in z \rangle$ **show** *of-weak-ranking* $(z \# zs) \ y \ x$

by (*intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of 0 j]*) *auto*

next

assume *of-weak-ranking* $zs \ y \ x$

then obtain $i j$ **where** $i < \text{length } zs \ j < \text{length } zs \ i \leq j \ x \in zs ! i \ y \in zs ! j$

by (*blast elim: of-weak-ranking.cases*)

thus *of-weak-ranking* $(z \# zs) \ y \ x$

by (*intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of Suc i Suc j]*) *auto*

qed

qed

lemma *of-weak-ranking-indifference*:

assumes $A \in \text{set } xs \ x \in A \ y \in A$

shows $x \preceq[\text{of-weak-ranking } xs] y$

using *assms* **by** (*induction xs*) (*auto simp: of-weak-ranking-Cons*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-map*:

map-relation f (*of-weak-ranking* xs) = *of-weak-ranking* ($\text{map } ((-') f) \ xs$)

by (*intro ext, induction xs*)

(*simp-all add: map-relation-def of-weak-ranking-Cons*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-permute'*:
assumes f permutes $(\bigcup(\text{set } xs))$
shows $\text{map-relation } f (\text{of-weak-ranking } xs) = \text{of-weak-ranking } (\text{map } ((\cdot) (\text{inv } f)) xs)$
proof –
have $\text{map-relation } f (\text{of-weak-ranking } xs) = \text{of-weak-ranking } (\text{map } ((-\cdot) f) xs)$
by (*rule of-weak-ranking-map*)
also from *assms* **have** $\text{map } ((-\cdot) f) xs = \text{map } ((\cdot) (\text{inv } f)) xs$
by (*intro map-cong refl*) (*simp-all add: bij-vimage-eq-inv-image permutes-bij*)
finally show *?thesis* .
qed

lemma *of-weak-ranking-permute*:
assumes f permutes $(\bigcup(\text{set } xs))$
shows $\text{of-weak-ranking } (\text{map } ((\cdot) f) xs) = \text{map-relation } (\text{inv } f) (\text{of-weak-ranking } xs)$
using *of-weak-ranking-permute'*[*OF permutes-inv[OF assms]*] *assms*
by (*simp add: inv-inv-eq permutes-bij*)

definition *is-weak-ranking where*
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow (\{\} \notin \text{set } xs) \wedge$
 $(\forall i j. i < \text{length } xs \wedge j < \text{length } xs \wedge i \neq j \longrightarrow xs ! i \cap xs ! j = \{\})$

definition *is-finite-weak-ranking where*
 $\text{is-finite-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow \text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge (\forall x \in \text{set } xs. \text{finite } x)$

definition *weak-ranking :: 'alt relation \Rightarrow 'alt set list where*
 $\text{weak-ranking } R = (\text{SOME } xs. \text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge R = \text{of-weak-ranking } xs)$

lemma *is-weak-rankingI* [*intro?*]:
assumes $\{\} \notin \text{set } xs \wedge i j. i < \text{length } xs \Longrightarrow j < \text{length } xs \Longrightarrow i \neq j \Longrightarrow xs ! i \cap xs ! j = \{\}$
shows $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs$
using *assms* **by** (*auto simp add: is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-nonempty*: $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \Longrightarrow \{\} \notin \text{set } xs$
by (*simp add: is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-rankingD*:
assumes $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \ i < \text{length } xs \ j < \text{length } xs \ i \neq j$
shows $xs ! i \cap xs ! j = \{\}$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-iff*:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow \text{distinct } xs \wedge \text{disjoint } (\text{set } xs) \wedge \{\} \notin \text{set } xs$
proof *safe*
assume *wf*: $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs$
from *wf* **show** $\text{disjoint } (\text{set } xs)$
by (*auto simp: disjoint-def is-weak-ranking-def set-conv-nth*)

show *distinct xs*
proof (*subst distinct-conv-nth, safe*)
fix *i j* **assume** *ij: i < length xs j < length xs i ≠ j xs ! i = xs ! j*
then have *xs ! i ∩ xs ! j = {}* **by** (*intro is-weak-rankingD wf*)
with *ij* **have** *xs ! i = {}* **by** *simp*
with *ij* **have** *{ } ∈ set xs* **by** (*auto simp: set-conv-nth*)
moreover from *wf ij* **have** *{ } ∉ set xs* **by** (*intro is-weak-ranking-nonempty wf*)
ultimately show *False* **by** *contradiction*
qed
next
assume *A: distinct xs disjoint (set xs) { } ∉ set xs*
thus *is-weak-ranking xs*
by (*intro is-weak-rankingI*) (*auto simp: disjoint-def distinct-conv-nth*)
qed (*simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-nonempty*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-rev [simp]: is-weak-ranking (rev xs) ⟷ is-weak-ranking xs*
by (*simp add: is-weak-ranking-iff*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-map-inj:*
assumes *is-weak-ranking xs inj-on f (⋃ (set xs))*
shows *is-weak-ranking (map (([∘]) f) xs)*
using *assms* **by** (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-iff distinct-map inj-on-image disjoint-image*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-rev [simp]:*
of-weak-ranking (rev xs) (x::'a) y ⟷ of-weak-ranking xs y x
proof –
have *of-weak-ranking (rev xs) y x* **if** *of-weak-ranking xs x y* **for** *xs* **and** *x y :: 'a*
proof –
from *that* **obtain** *i j* **where** *i < length xs j < length xs x ∈ xs ! i y ∈ xs ! j i ≥ j*
by (*elim of-weak-ranking.cases*) *simp-all*
thus *?thesis*
by (*intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of length xs - i - 1 length xs - j - 1] diff-le-mono2*)
(*auto simp: diff-le-mono2 rev-nth*)
qed
from *this[of xs y x] this[of rev xs x y]* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*intro iffI*) *simp-all*
qed

lemma *is-weak-ranking-Nil [simp, code]: is-weak-ranking []*
by (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-finite-weak-ranking-Nil [simp, code]: is-finite-weak-ranking []*
by (*auto simp: is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-Cons-empty* [simp]:
 $\neg \text{is-weak-ranking } (\{\} \# xs)$ **by** (simp add: *is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-finite-weak-ranking-Cons-empty* [simp]:
 $\neg \text{is-finite-weak-ranking } (\{\} \# xs)$ **by** (simp add: *is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-singleton* [simp]:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } [x] \longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\}$
by (auto simp add: *is-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-finite-weak-ranking-singleton* [simp]:
 $\text{is-finite-weak-ranking } [x] \longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } x$
by (auto simp add: *is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-append*:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } (xs @ ys) \longleftrightarrow$
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge \text{is-weak-ranking } ys \wedge$
 $(\text{set } xs \cap \text{set } ys = \{\} \wedge \bigcup (\text{set } xs) \cap \bigcup (\text{set } ys) = \{\})$
by (simp only: *is-weak-ranking-iff*)
(auto dest: *disjointD disjoint-unionD1 disjoint-unionD2 intro: disjoint-union*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-Cons* [code]:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) \longleftrightarrow$
 $x \neq \{\} \wedge \text{is-weak-ranking } xs \wedge x \cap \bigcup (\text{set } xs) = \{\}$
using *is-weak-ranking-append*[of [x] xs] **by** auto

lemma *is-finite-weak-ranking-Cons* [code]:
 $\text{is-finite-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) \longleftrightarrow$
 $x \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } x \wedge \text{is-finite-weak-ranking } xs \wedge x \cap \bigcup (\text{set } xs) = \{\}$
by (auto simp add: *is-finite-weak-ranking-def is-weak-ranking-Cons*)

primrec *is-weak-ranking-aux* **where**
 $\text{is-weak-ranking-aux } A [] \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$
| $\text{is-weak-ranking-aux } A (x \# xs) \longleftrightarrow x \neq \{\} \wedge$
 $A \cap x = \{\} \wedge \text{is-weak-ranking-aux } (A \cup x) xs$

lemma *is-weak-ranking-aux*:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking-aux } A xs \longleftrightarrow A \cap \bigcup (\text{set } xs) = \{\} \wedge \text{is-weak-ranking } xs$
by (induction xs arbitrary: A) (auto simp: *is-weak-ranking-Cons*)

lemma *is-weak-ranking-code* [code]:
 $\text{is-weak-ranking } xs \longleftrightarrow \text{is-weak-ranking-aux } \{\} xs$
by (subst *is-weak-ranking-aux*) auto

lemma *of-weak-ranking-altdef*:
assumes *is-weak-ranking* xs $x \in \bigcup (\text{set } xs)$ $y \in \bigcup (\text{set } xs)$
shows *of-weak-ranking* xs $x y \longleftrightarrow$
 $\text{find-index } ((\in) x) xs \geq \text{find-index } ((\in) y) xs$

```

proof –
  from assms
    have A: find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs < length xs find-index (( $\in$ ) y) xs < length xs
    by (simp-all add: find-index-less-size-conv)
  from this[THEN nth-find-index]
    have B: x  $\in$  xs ! find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs y  $\in$  xs ! find-index (( $\in$ ) y) xs .
  show ?thesis
  proof
    assume of-weak-ranking xs x y
    then obtain i j where ij: j  $\leq$  i i < length xs j < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i y  $\in$  xs ! j
    by (cases rule: of-weak-ranking.cases) simp-all
    with A B have i = find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs j = find-index (( $\in$ ) y) xs
    using assms(1) unfolding is-weak-ranking-def by blast+
    with ij show find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs  $\geq$  find-index (( $\in$ ) y) xs by simp
  next
    assume find-index (( $\in$ ) x) xs  $\geq$  find-index (( $\in$ ) y) xs
    from this A(2,1) B(2,1) show of-weak-ranking xs x y
    by (rule of-weak-ranking.intros)
  qed
qed

```

```

lemma total-preorder-of-weak-ranking:
  assumes  $\bigcup$  (set xs) = A
  assumes is-weak-ranking xs
  shows total-preorder-on A (of-weak-ranking xs)
  proof
    fix x y assume x  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] y
    with assms show x  $\in$  A y  $\in$  A
    by (auto elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases)
  next
    fix x assume x  $\in$  A
    with assms(1) obtain i where i < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i
    by (auto simp: set-conv-nth)
    thus x  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] x by (auto intro: of-weak-ranking.intros)
  next
    fix x y assume x  $\in$  A y  $\in$  A
    with assms(1) obtain i j where ij: i < length xs j < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i y  $\in$  xs ! j
    by (auto simp: set-conv-nth)
    consider i  $\leq$  j | j  $\leq$  i by force
    thus x  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] y  $\vee$  y  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] x
    by cases (insert ij, (blast intro: of-weak-ranking.intros)+)
  next
    fix x y z
    assume A: x  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] y and B: y  $\preceq$ [of-weak-ranking xs] z
    from A obtain i j
    where ij: i  $\geq$  j i < length xs j < length xs x  $\in$  xs ! i y  $\in$  xs ! j
    by (auto elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases)

```

moreover from B obtain $j' k$
where $j'k$: $j' \geq k \ j' < \text{length } xs \ k < \text{length } xs \ y \in xs \ ! \ j' \ z \in xs \ ! \ k$
by (auto elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases)
moreover from $ij \ j'k$ is-weak-ranking $D[OF \text{ assms}(2), \text{ of } j \ j']$
have $j = j'$ by blast
ultimately show $x \preceq[\text{of-weak-ranking } xs] \ z$ by (auto intro: of-weak-ranking.intros[$\text{of } k \ i]$)
qed

lemma restrict-relation-of-weak-ranking-Cons:
assumes is-weak-ranking $(A \# As)$
shows restrict-relation $(\bigcup(\text{set } As))$ (of-weak-ranking $(A \# As)) = \text{of-weak-ranking } As$
proof –
from assms interpret R : total-preorder-on $\bigcup(\text{set } As)$ of-weak-ranking As
by (intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking)
(simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons)
from assms show ?thesis using $R.\text{not-outside}$
by (intro ext) (auto simp: restrict-relation-def of-weak-ranking-Cons is-weak-ranking-Cons)
qed

lemmas of-weak-ranking-wf =
total-preorder-of-weak-ranking is-weak-ranking-code insert-commute

lemma total-preorder-on $\{1,2,3,4::\text{nat}\}$ (of-weak-ranking $[\{1,3\},\{2\},\{4\}])$
by (simp add: of-weak-ranking-wf)

context
fixes $x :: \text{'alt set}$ and $xs :: \text{'alt set list}$
assumes wf: is-weak-ranking $(x\#xs)$
begin

interpretation R : total-preorder-on $\bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs))$ of-weak-ranking $(x\#xs)$
by (intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking) (simp-all add: wf)

lemma of-weak-ranking-imp-in-set:
assumes of-weak-ranking $xs \ a \ b$
shows $a \in \bigcup(\text{set } xs) \ b \in \bigcup(\text{set } xs)$
using assms by (fastforce elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases)+

lemma of-weak-ranking-Cons':
assumes $a \in \bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs)) \ b \in \bigcup(\text{set } (x\#xs))$

shows *of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$ $a\ b \longleftrightarrow b \in x \vee (a \notin x \wedge \textit{of-weak-ranking}\ xs\ a\ b)$

proof

assume *of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$ $a\ b$
with *wf of-weak-ranking-imp-in-set*[*of a b*]
show $(b \in x \vee a \notin x \wedge \textit{of-weak-ranking}\ xs\ a\ b)$
by (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-Cons of-weak-ranking-Cons*)

next

assume $b \in x \vee a \notin x \wedge \textit{of-weak-ranking}\ xs\ a\ b$
with *assms show of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$ $a\ b$
by (*fastforce simp: of-weak-ranking-Cons*)

qed

lemma *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons1*:

assumes $x \cap A = \{\}$
shows *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$) $A = \textit{Max-wrt-among} (*of-weak-ranking* xs) $A$$

proof –

from *wf interpret R'*: *total-preorder-on* $\bigcup(\textit{set}\ xs)$ *of-weak-ranking* xs
by (*intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking*) (*simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)
from *assms show ?thesis*
by (*auto simp: R.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*
R'.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder of-weak-ranking-Cons)

qed

lemma *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons2*:

assumes $x \cap A \neq \{\}$
shows *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$) $A = x \cap A$

proof –

from *wf interpret R'*: *total-preorder-on* $\bigcup(\textit{set}\ xs)$ *of-weak-ranking* xs
by (*intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking*) (*simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)
from *assms obtain a where* $a \in x \cap A$ **by** *blast*
with *wf R'.not-outside(1)[of a] show ?thesis*
by (*auto simp: R.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder is-weak-ranking-Cons*
R'.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder of-weak-ranking-Cons)

qed

lemma *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons*:

Max-wrt-among (*of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$) $A =$
(if $x \cap A = \{\}$ *then* *Max-wrt-among* (*of-weak-ranking* xs) A *else* $x \cap A$)

using *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons1* *Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons2*
by *simp*

lemma *Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking-Cons*:

Max-wrt (*of-weak-ranking* $(x\#xs)$) $= x$
using *wf by (simp add: is-weak-ranking-Cons Max-wrt-def Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons)*

end

lemma *Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking*:
assumes *is-weak-ranking xs*
shows $\text{Max-wrt (of-weak-ranking xs)} = (\text{if } xs = [] \text{ then } \{\} \text{ else } \text{hd } xs)$
proof (*cases xs*)
case *Nil*
hence *of-weak-ranking xs = (λ- -. False)* **by** (*intro ext simp-all*)
with *Nil* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: Max-wrt-def Max-wrt-among-def*)
next
case (*Cons x xs'*)
with *assms* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking-Cons*)
qed

locale *finite-total-preorder-on = total-preorder-on +*
assumes *finite-carrier [intro]: finite carrier*
begin

lemma *finite-total-preorder-on-map*:
assumes *finite (f -' carrier)*
shows $\text{finite-total-preorder-on (f -' carrier) (map-relation f le)}$
proof -
interpret *R': total-preorder-on f -' carrier map-relation f le*
using *total-preorder-on-map[of f]*.
from *assms* **show** *?thesis* **by** *unfold-locales simp*
qed

function *weak-ranking-aux* :: *'a set* \Rightarrow *'a set list* **where**
weak-ranking-aux $\{\} = []$
 $| A \neq \{\} \Rightarrow A \subseteq \text{carrier} \Rightarrow \text{weak-ranking-aux } A =$
 $\text{Max-wrt-among le } A \# \text{weak-ranking-aux (A - Max-wrt-among le A)}$
 $| \neg(A \subseteq \text{carrier}) \Rightarrow \text{weak-ranking-aux } A = \text{undefined}$
by *blast simp-all*
termination proof (*relation Wellfounded.measure card*)
fix *A*
let *?B = Max-wrt-among le A*
assume *A: A ≠ {} A ⊆ carrier*
moreover from *A(2)* **have** *finite A* **by** (*rule finite-subset*) *blast*
moreover from *A* **have** *?B ≠ {} ?B ⊆ A*
by (*intro Max-wrt-among-nonempty Max-wrt-among-subset; force*)
ultimately have $\text{card (A - ?B)} < \text{card } A$
by (*intro psubset-card-mono*) *auto*
thus $(A - ?B, A) \in \text{measure card}$ **by** *simp*
qed *simp-all*

lemma *weak-ranking-aux-Union*:
 $A \subseteq \text{carrier} \Rightarrow \bigcup (\text{set (weak-ranking-aux } A)) = A$
proof (*induction A rule: weak-ranking-aux.induct [case-names empty nonempty]*)
case (*nonempty A*)
with *Max-wrt-among-subset[of A]* **show** *?case* **by** *auto*

qed *simp-all*

lemma *weak-ranking-aux-wf*:

$A \subseteq \text{carrier} \implies \text{is-weak-ranking } (\text{weak-ranking-aux } A)$

proof (*induction A rule: weak-ranking-aux.induct [case-names empty nonempty]*)

case (*nonempty A*)

have *is-weak-ranking* (*Max-wrt-among le A # weak-ranking-aux (A - Max-wrt-among le A)*)

unfolding *is-weak-ranking-Cons*

proof (*intro conjI*)

from *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps* **show** *Max-wrt-among le A* $\neq \{\}$

by (*intro Max-wrt-among-nonempty*) *auto*

next

from *nonempty.prem*s **show** *is-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking-aux (A - Max-wrt-among le A)*)

by (*intro nonempty.IH*) *blast*

next

from *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps* **have** *Max-wrt-among le A* $\neq \{\}$

by (*intro Max-wrt-among-nonempty*) *auto*

moreover from *nonempty.prem*s

have $\bigcup (\text{set } (\text{weak-ranking-aux } (A - \text{Max-wrt-among le A}))) = A - \text{Max-wrt-among le A}$

by (*intro weak-ranking-aux-Union*) *auto*

ultimately show *Max-wrt-among le A* $\cap \bigcup (\text{set } (\text{weak-ranking-aux } (A - \text{Max-wrt-among le A}))) = \{\}$

by *blast+*

qed

with *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps* **show** *?case* **by** *simp*

qed *simp-all*

lemma *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux'*:

assumes $A \subseteq \text{carrier}$ $x \in A$ $y \in A$

shows *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking-aux A*) $x y \longleftrightarrow \text{restrict-relation } A \text{ le } x y$

using *assms*

proof (*induction A rule: weak-ranking-aux.induct [case-names empty nonempty]*)

case (*nonempty A*)

define *M* **where** $M = \text{Max-wrt-among le A}$

from *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps* **have** $M: M \subseteq A$ **unfolding** *M-def*

by (*intro Max-wrt-among-subset*)

from *nonempty.prem*s **have** *in-MD*: $\text{le } x y$ **if** $x \in A$ $y \in M$ **for** $x y$

using that **unfolding** *M-def Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*

by (*auto simp: Int-absorb1*)

from *nonempty.prem*s **have** *in-MI*: $x \in M$ **if** $y \in M$ $x \in A$ $\text{le } y x$ **for** $x y$

using that **unfolding** *M-def Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*

by (*auto simp: Int-absorb1 intro: trans*)

from *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps*

have *IH*: *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking-aux (A - M)*) $x y =$
 $\text{restrict-relation } (A - M) \text{ le } x y$ **if** $x \notin M$ $y \notin M$

using *that unfolding M-def* **by** (*intro nonempty.IH*) *auto*
from *nonempty.prem*s
interpret *R'*: *total-preorder-on A - M of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux (A - M))*
by (*intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking weak-ranking-aux-wf weak-ranking-aux-Union*)
auto

from *nonempty.prem*s *nonempty.hyps M weak-ranking-aux-Union[of A] R'.not-outside[of x y]*
show *?case*
by (*cases x ∈ M; cases y ∈ M*)
(auto simp: restrict-relation-def of-weak-ranking-Cons IH M-def [symmetric]
intro: in-MD dest: in-MI)
qed *simp-all*

lemma *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux*:
of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier) = le
proof (*intro ext*)
fix *x y*
have *is-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier)* **by** (*rule weak-ranking-aux-wf*)
simp
then interpret *R*: *total-preorder-on carrier of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier)*
by (*intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking weak-ranking-aux-wf weak-ranking-aux-Union*)
(simp-all add: weak-ranking-aux-Union)

show *of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier) x y = le x y*
proof (*cases x ∈ carrier ∧ y ∈ carrier*)
case *True*
thus *?thesis*
using *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux'[of carrier x y]* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
with *R.not-outside* **have** *of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking-aux carrier) x y = False*
by *auto*
also from *not-outside False* **have** *... = le x y* **by** *auto*
finally show *?thesis* .
qed
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-aux-unique'*:
assumes $\bigcup(\text{set } As) \subseteq \text{carrier}$ *is-weak-ranking As*
of-weak-ranking As = restrict-relation ($\bigcup(\text{set } As)$) le
shows *As = weak-ranking-aux ($\bigcup(\text{set } As)$)*
using *assms*
proof (*induction As*)
case (*Cons A As*)
have *restrict-relation ($\bigcup(\text{set } As)$) (of-weak-ranking (A # As)) = of-weak-ranking*

As
by (*intro restrict-relation-of-weak-ranking-Cons Cons.prem*s)
also have $eq1$: *of-weak-ranking* $(A \# As) = restrict-relation (\bigcup (set (A \# As)))$
le **by fact**
finally have eq : *of-weak-ranking* $As = restrict-relation (\bigcup (set As)) le$
by (*simp add: Int-absorb2*)
with *Cons.prem*s **have** $eq2$: *weak-ranking-aux* $(\bigcup (set As)) = As$
by (*intro sym [OF Cons.IH]*) (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)

from $eq1$ **have**
Max-wrt-among $le (\bigcup (set (A \# As))) =$
Max-wrt-among (*of-weak-ranking* $(A \# As)$) $(\bigcup (set (A \# As)))$
by (*intro Max-wrt-among-cong*) *simp-all*
also from *Cons.prem*s **have** $\dots = A$
by (*subst Max-wrt-among-of-weak-ranking-Cons2*)
(simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons)
finally have *Max*: *Max-wrt-among* $le (\bigcup (set (A \# As))) = A$.

moreover from *Cons.prem*s **have** $A \neq \{\}$ **by** (*simp add: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)
ultimately have *weak-ranking-aux* $(\bigcup (set (A \# As))) = A \# weak-ranking-aux$
 $(A \cup \bigcup (set As) - A)$
using *Cons.prem*s **by** *simp*
also from *Cons.prem*s **have** $A \cup \bigcup (set As) - A = \bigcup (set As)$
by (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)
also from $eq2$ **have** *weak-ranking-aux* $\dots = As$.
finally show *?case ..*
qed *simp-all*

lemma *weak-ranking-aux-unique*:
assumes *is-weak-ranking* As *of-weak-ranking* $As = le$
shows $As = weak-ranking-aux carrier$
proof –
interpret R : *total-preorder-on* $\bigcup (set As)$ *of-weak-ranking* As
by (*intro total-preorder-of-weak-ranking assms*) *simp-all*
from *assms* **have** $x \in \bigcup (set As) \iff x \in carrier$ **for** x
using *R.not-outside not-outside R.refl[of x] refl[of x]*
by *blast*
hence eq : $\bigcup (set As) = carrier$ **by** *blast*
from *assms* eq **have** $As = weak-ranking-aux (\bigcup (set As))$
by (*intro weak-ranking-aux-unique'*) *simp-all*
with eq **show** *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-total-preorder*:
is-weak-ranking (*weak-ranking* le) *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking* le) = le
proof –
from *weak-ranking-aux-wf*[*of carrier*] *of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking-aux*
have $\exists x. is-weak-ranking x \wedge le = of-weak-ranking x$ **by** *auto*
hence *is-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking* le) $\wedge le = of-weak-ranking$ (*weak-ranking*

le)
unfolding *weak-ranking-def* **by** (rule *someI-ex*)
thus *is-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking le*) *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking le*) = le
by *simp-all*
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-altdef*:
weak-ranking le = *weak-ranking-aux carrier*
by (*intro weak-ranking-aux-unique weak-ranking-total-preorder*)

lemma *weak-ranking-Union*: $\bigcup (set (weak-ranking le)) = carrier$
by (*simp add: weak-ranking-altdef weak-ranking-aux-Union*)

lemma *weak-ranking-unique*:
assumes *is-weak-ranking As of-weak-ranking As = le*
shows $As = weak-ranking le$
using *assms* **unfolding** *weak-ranking-altdef* **by** (rule *weak-ranking-aux-unique*)

lemma *weak-ranking-permute*:
assumes f *permutes carrier*
shows $weak-ranking (map-relation (inv f) le) = map ((\cdot) f) (weak-ranking le)$
proof –
from *assms* **have** $inv f -' carrier = carrier$
by (*simp add: permutes-vimage permutes-inv*)
then interpret R : *finite-total-preorder-on inv f -' carrier map-relation (inv f)*
 le
by (*intro finite-total-preorder-on-map*) (*simp-all add: finite-carrier*)
from *assms* **have** $is-weak-ranking (map ((\cdot) f) (weak-ranking le))$
by (*intro is-weak-ranking-map-inj*)
(simp-all add: weak-ranking-total-preorder permutes-inj-on)
with *assms* **show** *?thesis*
by (*intro sym[OF R.weak-ranking-unique]*)
(simp-all add: of-weak-ranking-permute weak-ranking-Union weak-ranking-total-preorder)
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-index-unique*:
assumes $is-weak-ranking xs i < length xs j < length xs x \in xs ! i x \in xs ! j$
shows $i = j$
using *assms* **unfolding** *is-weak-ranking-def* **by** *auto*

lemma *weak-ranking-index-unique'*:
assumes $is-weak-ranking xs i < length xs x \in xs ! i$
shows $i = find-index ((\in) x) xs$
using *assms* *find-index-less-size-conv nth-mem*
by (*intro weak-ranking-index-unique[OF assms(1,2) - assms(3)]*)
nth-find-index[of (\in) x] blast+

lemma *weak-ranking-eqclass1*:
assumes $A \in set (weak-ranking le) x \in A y \in A$

shows $le\ x\ y$
proof –
from *assms* **obtain** i **where** *weak-ranking* $le\ !\ i = A\ i < length$ (*weak-ranking* le)
by (*auto simp: set-conv-nth*)
with *assms* **have** *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking* le) $x\ y$
by (*intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of i i]*) *auto*
thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: weak-ranking-total-preorder*)
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-eqclass2*:

assumes $A: A \in set$ (*weak-ranking* le) $x \in A$ **and** $le: le\ x\ y\ le\ y\ x$
shows $y \in A$
proof –
define xs **where** $xs = weak-ranking\ le$
have $wf: is-weak-ranking\ xs$ **by** (*simp add: xs-def weak-ranking-total-preorder*)
let $?le' = of-weak-ranking\ xs$
from le **have** $le': ?le'\ x\ y\ ?le'\ y\ x$ **by** (*simp-all add: weak-ranking-total-preorder xs-def*)
from $le'(1)$ **obtain** $i\ j$
where $ij: j \leq i\ i < length\ xs\ j < length\ xs\ x \in xs\ !\ i\ y \in xs\ !\ j$
by (*cases rule: of-weak-ranking.cases*)
from $le'(2)$ **obtain** $i'\ j'$
where $i'j': j' \leq i'\ i' < length\ xs\ j' < length\ xs\ x \in xs\ !\ j'\ y \in xs\ !\ i'$
by (*cases rule: of-weak-ranking.cases*)
from $ij\ i'j'$ **have** $eq: i = j'\ j = i'$
by (*intro weak-ranking-index-unique[OF wf]; simp*)
moreover from A **obtain** k **where** $k: k < length\ xs\ A = xs\ !\ k$
by (*auto simp: xs-def set-conv-nth*)
ultimately have $k = i$ **using** $ij\ i'j'\ A$
by (*intro weak-ranking-index-unique[OF wf, of - - x]*) *auto*
with $ij\ i'j'\ k\ eq$ **show** *?thesis* **by** (*auto simp: xs-def*)
qed

lemma *hd-weak-ranking*:

assumes $x \in hd$ (*weak-ranking* le) $y \in carrier$
shows $le\ y\ x$
proof –
from *weak-ranking-Union* *assms* **obtain** i
where $i < length$ (*weak-ranking* le) $y \in weak-ranking\ le\ !\ i$
by (*auto simp: set-conv-nth*)
moreover from *assms(2)* *weak-ranking-Union* **have** *weak-ranking* $le \neq []$ **by** *auto*
ultimately have *of-weak-ranking* (*weak-ranking* le) $y\ x$ **using** *assms(1)*
by (*intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of 0 i]*) (*auto simp: hd-conv-nth*)
thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: weak-ranking-total-preorder*)
qed

lemma *last-weak-ranking*:

```

assumes  $x \in \text{last } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ y \in \text{carrier}$ 
shows  $le \ x \ y$ 
proof –
  from weak-ranking-Union assms obtain  $i$ 
    where  $i < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ y \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ i$ 
    by (auto simp: set-conv-nth)
  moreover from assms(2) weak-ranking-Union have  $\text{weak-ranking } le \neq []$  by
auto
  ultimately have of-weak-ranking  $(\text{weak-ranking } le) \ x \ y$  using assms(1)
    by (intro of-weak-ranking.intros[of i length (weak-ranking le) - 1])
    (auto simp: last-conv-nth)
  thus ?thesis by (simp add: weak-ranking-total-preorder)
qed

```

The index in weak ranking of a given alternative. An element with index 0 is first-ranked; larger indices correspond to less-preferred alternatives.

definition *weak-ranking-index* :: $'a \Rightarrow \text{nat}$ **where**
weak-ranking-index $x = \text{find-index } (\lambda A. x \in A) (\text{weak-ranking } le)$

lemma *nth-weak-ranking-index*:

```

assumes  $x \in \text{carrier}$ 
shows  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le)$ 
 $x \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ \text{weak-ranking-index } x$ 
proof –
  from assms weak-ranking-Union show  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le)$ 
  unfolding weak-ranking-index-def by (auto simp add: find-index-less-size-conv)
  thus  $x \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ \text{weak-ranking-index } x$  unfolding weak-ranking-index-def
  by (rule nth-find-index)
qed

```

lemma *ranking-index-eqI*:

```

 $i < \text{length } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \implies x \in \text{weak-ranking } le \ ! \ i \implies \text{weak-ranking-index } x = i$ 
using weak-ranking-index-unique'[of weak-ranking le i x]
by (simp add: weak-ranking-index-def weak-ranking-total-preorder)

```

lemma *ranking-index-le-iff* [*simp*]:

```

assumes  $x \in \text{carrier} \ y \in \text{carrier}$ 
shows  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x \geq \text{weak-ranking-index } y \iff le \ x \ y$ 
proof –
  have  $le \ x \ y \iff \text{of-weak-ranking } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ x \ y$ 
  by (simp add: weak-ranking-total-preorder)
  also have  $\dots \iff \text{weak-ranking-index } x \geq \text{weak-ranking-index } y$ 
  proof
    assume  $\text{weak-ranking-index } x \geq \text{weak-ranking-index } y$ 
    thus  $\text{of-weak-ranking } (\text{weak-ranking } le) \ x \ y$ 
    by (rule of-weak-ranking.intros) (simp-all add: nth-weak-ranking-index assms)
  next

```

```

assume of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking le) x y
then obtain i j where
  i ≤ j i < length (weak-ranking le) j < length (weak-ranking le)
  x ∈ weak-ranking le ! j y ∈ weak-ranking le ! i
  by (elim of-weak-ranking.cases) blast
with ranking-index-eqI[of i] ranking-index-eqI[of j]
  show weak-ranking-index x ≥ weak-ranking-index y by simp
qed
finally show ?thesis ..
qed

end

lemma weak-ranking-False [simp]: weak-ranking (λ- -. False) = []
proof –
  interpret finite-total-preorder-on {} λ- -. False
  by unfold-locales simp-all
  have [] = weak-ranking (λ- -. False) by (rule weak-ranking-unique) simp-all
  thus ?thesis ..
qed

lemmas of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking =
  finite-total-preorder-on.weak-ranking-total-preorder(2)

lemma finite-total-preorder-on-iff:
  finite-total-preorder-on A R  $\longleftrightarrow$  total-preorder-on A R  $\wedge$  finite A
  by (simp add: finite-total-preorder-on-def finite-total-preorder-on-axioms-def)

lemma finite-total-preorder-of-weak-ranking:
  assumes  $\bigcup$  (set xs) = A is-finite-weak-ranking xs
  shows finite-total-preorder-on A (of-weak-ranking xs)
proof –
  from assms(2) have is-weak-ranking xs by (simp add: is-finite-weak-ranking-def)
  from assms(1) and this interpret total-preorder-on A (of-weak-ranking xs)
  by (rule total-preorder-of-weak-ranking)
  from assms(2) show ?thesis
  by unfold-locales (simp add: assms(1)[symmetric] is-finite-weak-ranking-def)
qed

lemma weak-ranking-of-weak-ranking:
  assumes is-finite-weak-ranking xs
  shows weak-ranking (of-weak-ranking xs) = xs
proof –
  from assms interpret finite-total-preorder-on  $\bigcup$  (set xs) of-weak-ranking xs
  by (intro finite-total-preorder-of-weak-ranking) simp-all
  from assms show ?thesis
  by (intro sym[OF weak-ranking-unique]) (simp-all add: is-finite-weak-ranking-def)
qed

```


lemma *weak-ranking-eqD*:
assumes *finite-total-preorder-on alts R1*
assumes *finite-total-preorder-on alts R2*
assumes *weak-ranking R1 = weak-ranking R2*
shows $R1 = R2$
proof –
from *assms* **have** *of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking R1) = of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking R2)* **by** *simp*
with *assms(1,2)* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: of-weak-ranking-weak-ranking*)
qed

lemma *weak-ranking-eq-iff*:
assumes *finite-total-preorder-on alts R1*
assumes *finite-total-preorder-on alts R2*
shows *weak-ranking R1 = weak-ranking R2* \longleftrightarrow $R1 = R2$
using *assms weak-ranking-eqD* **by** *auto*

definition *preferred-alts* :: 'alt relation \Rightarrow 'alt \Rightarrow 'alt set **where**
preferred-alts R x = {y. y \succeq [R] x}

lemma (**in** *preorder-on*) *preferred-alts-refl* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier} \implies x \in \text{preferred-alts } le \ x$
by (*simp add: preferred-alts-def refl*)

lemma (**in** *preorder-on*) *preferred-alts-altdef*:
preferred-alts le x = {y \in carrier. y \succeq [le] x}
by (*auto simp: preferred-alts-def intro: not-outside*)

lemma (**in** *preorder-on*) *preferred-alts-subset*: *preferred-alts le x \subseteq carrier*
unfolding *preferred-alts-def* **using** *not-outside* **by** *blast*

1.7 Rankings

definition *ranking* :: 'a relation \Rightarrow 'a list **where**
ranking R = map the-elem (weak-ranking R)

locale *finite-linorder-on* = *linorder-on* +
assumes *finite-carrier* [*intro*]: *finite carrier*
begin

sublocale *finite-total-preorder-on carrier le*
by *unfold-locales (fact finite-carrier)*

lemma *singleton-weak-ranking*:
assumes $A \in \text{set}$ (*weak-ranking le*)
shows *is-singleton A*
proof (*rule is-singletonI'*)

```

from assms show  $A \neq \{\}$ 
  using weak-ranking-total-preorder(1) is-weak-ranking-iff by auto
next
  fix  $x\ y$  assume  $x \in A\ y \in A$ 
  with assms
  have  $x \preceq$ [of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking le)]  $y\ y \preceq$ [of-weak-ranking (weak-ranking le)]  $x$ 
  by (auto intro!: of-weak-ranking-indifference)
  with weak-ranking-total-preorder(2)
  show  $x = y$  by (intro antisymmetric simp-all)
qed

```

```

lemma weak-ranking-ranking: weak-ranking le = map ( $\lambda x. \{x\}$ ) (ranking le)
  unfolding ranking-def map-map o-def
proof (rule sym, rule map-idI)
  fix  $A$  assume  $A \in \text{set}$  (weak-ranking le)
  hence is-singleton A by (rule singleton-weak-ranking)
  thus  $\{the\text{-elem } A\} = A$  by (auto elim: is-singletonE)
qed

```

end

end

2 Preference Profiles

```

theory Preference-Profiles
imports
  Main
  Order-Predicates
  HOL-Library.Multiset
  HOL-Library.Disjoint-Sets
begin

```

The type of preference profiles

```

type-synonym ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile = 'agent  $\Rightarrow$  'alt relation

```

```

locale preorder-family =
  fixes dom :: 'a set and carrier :: 'b set and R :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b relation
  assumes nonempty-dom: dom  $\neq \{\}$ 
  assumes in-dom [simp]: i  $\in$  dom  $\implies$  preorder-on carrier (R i)
  assumes not-in-dom [simp]: i  $\notin$  dom  $\implies$   $\neg R\ i\ x\ y$ 
begin

```

```

lemma not-in-dom': i  $\notin$  dom  $\implies$  R i = ( $\lambda - . False$ )
  by (simp add: fun-eq-iff)

```

end

```

locale pref-profile-wf =
  fixes agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and R :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile
  assumes nonempty-agents [simp]: agents ≠ {} and nonempty-alts [simp]: alts ≠ {}
  assumes prefs-wf [simp]:  $i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{finite-total-preorder-on } \text{alts } (R \ i)$ 
  assumes prefs-undefined [simp]:  $i \notin \text{agents} \implies \neg R \ i \ x \ y$ 
begin

lemma finite-alts [simp]: finite alts
proof –
  from nonempty-agents obtain i where  $i \in \text{agents}$  by blast
  then interpret finite-total-preorder-on alts R i by simp
  show ?thesis by (rule finite-carrier)
qed

lemma prefs-wf' [simp]:
   $i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{total-preorder-on } \text{alts } (R \ i) \ i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{preorder-on } \text{alts } (R \ i)$ 
  using prefs-wf[of i]
  by (simp-all add: finite-total-preorder-on-def total-preorder-on-def del: prefs-wf)

lemma not-outside:
  assumes  $x \preceq[R \ i] \ y$ 
  shows  $i \in \text{agents} \ x \in \text{alts} \ y \in \text{alts}$ 
proof –
  from assms show  $i \in \text{agents}$  by (cases i ∈ agents) auto
  then interpret preorder-on alts R i by simp
  from assms show  $x \in \text{alts} \ y \in \text{alts}$  by (simp-all add: not-outside)
qed

sublocale preorder-family agents alts R
  by (intro preorder-family.intro) simp-all

lemmas prefs-undefined' = not-in-dom'

lemma wf-update:
  assumes  $i \in \text{agents} \ \text{total-preorder-on } \text{alts } Ri'$ 
  shows pref-profile-wf agents alts (R(i := Ri'))
proof –
  interpret total-preorder-on alts Ri' by fact
  from finite-alts have finite-total-preorder-on alts Ri' by unfold-locales
  with assms show ?thesis
  by (auto intro!: pref-profile-wf.intro split: if-splits)
qed

lemma wf-permute-agents:
  assumes  $\sigma$  permutes agents
  shows pref-profile-wf agents alts (R ∘ σ)
  unfolding o-def using permutes-in-image[OF assms(1)]

```

by (intro pref-profile-wf.intro prefs-wf) simp-all

lemma (in $-$) *pref-profile-eqI*:

assumes *pref-profile-wf agents alts R1 pref-profile-wf agents alts R2*

assumes $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{agents} \implies R1\ x = R2\ x$

shows $R1 = R2$

proof

interpret *R1: pref-profile-wf agents alts R1* **by fact**

interpret *R2: pref-profile-wf agents alts R2* **by fact**

fix *x* show $R1\ x = R2\ x$

by (cases $x \in \text{agents}$; intro ext) (simp-all add: assms(3))

qed

end

Permutes a preference profile w.r.t. alternatives in the way described in the paper. This is needed for the definition of neutrality.

definition *permute-profile* **where**

$\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R = (\lambda i\ x\ y. R\ i\ (\text{inv } \sigma\ x)\ (\text{inv } \sigma\ y))$

lemma *permute-profile-map-relation*:

$\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R = (\lambda i. \text{map-relation } (\text{inv } \sigma)\ (R\ i))$

by (simp add: *permute-profile-def map-relation-def*)

lemma *permute-profile-compose* [simp]:

$\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ (R \circ \pi) = \text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R \circ \pi$

by (auto simp: *fun-eq-iff permute-profile-def o-def*)

lemma *permute-profile-id* [simp]: *permute-profile id R = R*

by (simp add: *permute-profile-def*)

lemma *permute-profile-o*:

assumes *bij f bij g*

shows $\text{permute-profile } f\ (\text{permute-profile } g\ R) = \text{permute-profile } (f \circ g)\ R$

using *assms* **by** (simp add: *permute-profile-def o-inv-distrib*)

lemma (in *pref-profile-wf*) *wf-permute-alts*:

assumes σ *permutes alts*

shows *pref-profile-wf agents alts (permute-profile σ R)*

proof (rule *pref-profile-wf.intro*)

fix *i* assume $i \in \text{agents}$

with *assms* **interpret** *R: finite-total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*

from *assms* **have** [simp]: $\text{inv } \sigma\ x \in \text{alts} \longleftrightarrow x \in \text{alts}$ **for** *x*

by (simp add: *permutes-in-image permutes-inv*)

show *finite-total-preorder-on alts (permute-profile σ R i)*

proof

fix *x y* assume $\text{permute-profile } \sigma\ R\ i\ x\ y$

```

thus  $x \in \text{alts } y \in \text{alts}$ 
  using  $R.\text{not-outside}[of \text{inv } \sigma \ x \ \text{inv } \sigma \ y]$ 
  by (auto simp: permute-profile-def)
next
  fix  $x \ y \ z$  assume  $\text{permute-profile } \sigma \ R \ i \ x \ y \ \text{permute-profile } \sigma \ R \ i \ y \ z$ 
  thus  $\text{permute-profile } \sigma \ R \ i \ x \ z$ 
    using  $R.\text{trans}[of \ \text{inv } \sigma \ x \ \text{inv } \sigma \ y \ \text{inv } \sigma \ z]$ 
    by (simp-all add: permute-profile-def)
  qed (insert R.total R.refl R.finite-carrier, simp-all add: permute-profile-def)
qed (insert assms, simp-all add: permute-profile-def pref-profile-wf-def)

```

This shows that the above definition is equivalent to that in the paper.

```

lemma permute-profile-iff [simp]:
  fixes  $R :: ('agent, 'alt) \text{pref-profile}$ 
  assumes  $\sigma \ \text{permutes alts } x \in \text{alts } y \in \text{alts}$ 
  defines  $R' \equiv \text{permute-profile } \sigma \ R$ 
  shows  $\sigma \ x \preceq[R' \ i] \sigma \ y \iff x \preceq[R \ i] \ y$ 
  using assms by (simp add: permute-profile-def permutes-inverses)

```

2.1 Pareto dominance

```

definition Pareto :: ('agent  $\Rightarrow$  'alt relation)  $\Rightarrow$  'alt relation where
   $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] \ y \iff (\exists j. x \preceq[R \ j] \ x) \wedge (\forall i. x \preceq[R \ i] \ x \longrightarrow x \preceq[R \ i] \ y)$ 

```

A Pareto loser is an alternative that is Pareto-dominated by some other alternative.

```

definition pareto-losers :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set where
   $\text{pareto-losers } R = \{x. \exists y. y \succ[\text{Pareto}(R)] \ x\}$ 

```

```

lemma pareto-losersI [intro?, simp]:  $y \succ[\text{Pareto}(R)] \ x \implies x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$ 
  by (auto simp: pareto-losers-def)

```

```

context preorder-family
begin

```

```

lemma Pareto-iff:
   $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] \ y \iff (\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R \ i] \ y)$ 

```

```

proof
  assume  $A: x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] \ y$ 
  then obtain  $j$  where  $j: x \preceq[R \ j] \ x$  by (auto simp: Pareto-def)
  hence  $j': j \in \text{dom}$  by (cases j \in dom auto)
  then interpret preorder-on carrier R j by simp
  from  $j$  have  $x \in \text{carrier}$  by (auto simp: carrier-eq)
  with  $A$  preorder-on.refl[OF in-dom]
    show  $(\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R \ i] \ y)$  by (auto simp: Pareto-def)
next
  assume  $A: (\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R \ i] \ y)$ 
  from nonempty-dom obtain  $j$  where  $j: j \in \text{dom}$  by blast
  then interpret preorder-on carrier R j by simp

```

from $j A$ **have** $x \preceq[R j] y$ **by** *simp*
hence $x \preceq[R j] x$ **using** *not-outside refl* **by** *blast*
with A **show** $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$ **by** (*auto simp: Pareto-def*)
qed

lemma *Pareto-strict-iff*:
 $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in \text{dom}. x \preceq[R i] y) \wedge (\exists i \in \text{dom}. x \prec[R i] y)$
by (*auto simp: strongly-preferred-def Pareto-iff nonempty-dom*)

lemma *Pareto-strictI*:
assumes $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{dom} \implies x \preceq[R i] y$ $i \in \text{dom}$ $x \prec[R i] y$
shows $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$
using *assms* **by** (*auto simp: Pareto-strict-iff*)

lemma *Pareto-strictI'*:
assumes $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{dom} \implies x \preceq[R i] y$ $i \in \text{dom}$ $\neg x \succeq[R i] y$
shows $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$
proof –
from *assms* **interpret** *preorder-on carrier R i* **by** *simp*
from *assms* **have** $x \prec[R i] y$ **by** (*simp add: strongly-preferred-def*)
with *assms* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*auto simp: Pareto-strict-iff*)
qed

sublocale *Pareto: preorder-on carrier Pareto(R)*

proof –
have *preorder-on carrier (R i)* **if** $i \in \text{dom}$ **for** i **using** *that* **by** *simp-all*
note $A = \text{preorder-on.not-outside}[OF \text{this}(1)] \text{preorder-on.refl}[OF \text{this}(1)]$
 $\text{preorder-on.trans}[OF \text{this}(1)]$
from *nonempty-dom* **obtain** i **where** $i \in \text{dom}$ **by** *blast*
show *preorder-on carrier (Pareto R)*
proof
fix $x y$ **assume** $x \preceq[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$
with $A(1,2)[OF i]$ i **show** $x \in \text{carrier}$ $y \in \text{carrier}$ **by** (*auto simp: Pareto-iff*)
qed (*auto simp: Pareto-iff intro: A*)
qed

lemma *pareto-loser-in-alts*:
assumes $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$
shows $x \in \text{carrier}$
proof –
from *assms* **obtain** y i **where** $i \in \text{dom}$ $x \prec[R i] y$
by (*auto simp: pareto-losers-def Pareto-strict-iff*)
then **interpret** *preorder-on carrier R i* **by** *simp*
from $\langle x \prec[R i] y \rangle$ **have** $x \preceq[R i] y$ **by** (*simp add: strongly-preferred-def*)
thus $x \in \text{carrier}$ **using** *not-outside* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *pareto-losersE*:

```

assumes  $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$ 
obtains  $y$  where  $y \in \text{carrier } y \succ [Pareto(R)] x$ 
proof –
  from assms obtain  $y$  where  $y: y \succ [Pareto(R)] x$  unfolding pareto-losers-def
by blast
  with Pareto.not-outside[of x y] have  $y \in \text{carrier}$ 
    by (simp add: strongly-preferred-def)
  with  $y$  show ?thesis using that by blast
qed

end

```

2.2 Preferred alternatives

```

context pref-profile-wf
begin

```

```

lemma preferred-alts-subset-alts:  $\text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x \subseteq \text{alts } (\text{is } ?A)$ 
  and finite-preferred-alts [simp,intro!]:  $\text{finite } (\text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x) \ (\text{is } ?B)$ 
proof –
  have  $?A \wedge ?B$ 
  proof (cases i \in agents)
    assume  $i \in \text{agents}$ 
    then interpret total-preorder-on alts R i by simp
    have  $\text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x \subseteq \text{alts}$  using not-outside
    by (auto simp: preferred-alts-def)
    thus ?thesis by (auto dest: finite-subset)
  qed (auto simp: preferred-alts-def)
  thus  $?A \ ?B$  by blast+
qed

```

```

lemma preferred-alts-altdef:
   $i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x = \{y \in \text{alts}. y \succeq [R \ i] x\}$ 
  by (simp add: preorder-on.preferred-alts-altdef)

```

end

2.3 Favourite alternatives

```

definition favorites :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  'agent  $\Rightarrow$  'alt where
  favorites R i = Max-wrt (R i)

```

```

definition favorite :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  'agent  $\Rightarrow$  'alt where
  favorite R i = the-elem (favorites R i)

```

```

definition has-unique-favorites :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  has-unique-favorites R  $\longleftrightarrow (\forall i. \text{favorites } R \ i = \{\}) \vee \text{is-singleton } (\text{favorites } R \ i)$ 

```

```

context pref-profile-wf

```

begin

lemma *favorites-altdef*:

favorites R i = *Max-wrt-among* (R i) *alts*

proof (*cases* $i \in \text{agents}$)

assume $i \in \text{agents}$

then interpret *total-preorder-on alts* R i **by** *simp*

show *?thesis*

by (*simp* *add: favorites-def Max-wrt-total-preorder Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*)

qed (*simp-all add: favorites-def Max-wrt-def Max-wrt-among-def pref-profile-wf-def*)

lemma *favorites-no-agent* [*simp*]: $i \notin \text{agents} \implies \text{favorites } R \ i = \{\}$

by (*auto simp: favorites-def Max-wrt-def Max-wrt-among-def*)

lemma *favorites-altdef'*:

favorites R i = $\{x \in \text{alts}. \forall y \in \text{alts}. x \succeq [R \ i] \ y\}$

proof (*cases* $i \in \text{agents}$)

assume $i \in \text{agents}$

then interpret *finite-total-preorder-on alts* R i **by** *simp*

show *?thesis using Max-wrt-among-nonempty[of alts] Max-wrt-among-subset[of alts]*

by (*auto simp: favorites-altdef Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*)

qed *simp-all*

lemma *favorites-subset-alts*: *favorites* R $i \subseteq \text{alts}$

by (*auto simp: favorites-altdef'*)

lemma *finite-favorites* [*simp, intro*]: *finite* (*favorites* R i)

using *favorites-subset-alts finite-alts* **by** (*rule finite-subset*)

lemma *favorites-nonempty*: $i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{favorites } R \ i \neq \{\}$

proof –

assume $i \in \text{agents}$

then interpret *finite-total-preorder-on alts* R i **by** *simp*

show *?thesis unfolding favorites-def by (intro Max-wrt-nonempty) simp-all*

qed

lemma *favorites-permute*:

assumes $i: i \in \text{agents}$ **and** $\text{perm}: \sigma$ *permutes alts*

shows *favorites* (*permute-profile* σ R) i = σ ‘ *favorites* R i

proof –

from i **interpret** *finite-total-preorder-on alts* R i **by** *simp*

from perm **show** *?thesis*

unfolding *favorites-def*

by (*subst Max-wrt-map-relation-bij*)

(*simp-all add: permute-profile-def map-relation-def permutes-bij*)

qed

lemma *has-unique-favorites-altdef*:

$has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\ R \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in agents. is\text{-}singleton\ (favorites\ R\ i))$
proof safe
fix i **assume** $has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\ R\ i \in agents$
thus $is\text{-}singleton\ (favorites\ R\ i)$ **using** $favorites\text{-}nonempty[of\ i]$
by $(auto\ simp: has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\text{-}def)$
next
assume $\forall i \in agents. is\text{-}singleton\ (favorites\ R\ i)$
hence $is\text{-}singleton\ (favorites\ R\ i) \vee favorites\ R\ i = \{\}$ **for** i
by $(cases\ i \in agents)\ (simp\ add: favorites\text{-}nonempty, simp\ add: favorites\text{-}altdef')$
thus $has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\ R$ **by** $(auto\ simp: has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\text{-}def)$
qed
end

locale $pref\text{-}profile\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites = pref\text{-}profile\text{-}wf\ agents\ alts\ R$
for $agents :: 'agent\ set$ **and** $alts :: 'alt\ set$ **and** $R +$
assumes $unique\text{-}favorites'$: $has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\ R$
begin

lemma $unique\text{-}favorites: i \in agents \implies favorites\ R\ i = \{favorite\ R\ i\}$
using $unique\text{-}favorites'$
by $(auto\ simp: favorite\text{-}def\ has\text{-}unique\text{-}favorites\text{-}altdef\ is\text{-}singleton\text{-}the\text{-}elem)$

lemma $favorite\text{-}in\text{-}alts: i \in agents \implies favorite\ R\ i \in alts$
using $favorites\text{-}subset\text{-}alts[of\ i]$ **by** $(simp\ add: unique\text{-}favorites)$

end

2.4 Anonymous profiles

type-synonym $('agent, 'alt) apref\text{-}profile = 'alt\ set\ list\ multiset$

definition $anonymous\text{-}profile :: ('agent, 'alt) pref\text{-}profile \Rightarrow ('agent, 'alt) apref\text{-}profile$

where $anonymous\text{-}profile\text{-}auxdef:$
 $anonymous\text{-}profile\ R = image\text{-}mset\ (weak\text{-}ranking \circ R)\ (mset\text{-}set\ \{i. R\ i \neq (\lambda\ -. False)\})$

lemma $(in\ pref\text{-}profile\text{-}wf)\ agents\text{-}eq:$
 $agents = \{i. R\ i \neq (\lambda\ -. False)\}$

proof safe

fix i **assume** $i: i \in agents$ **and** $Ri: R\ i = (\lambda\ -. False)$
from i **interpret** $preorder\text{-}on\ alts\ R\ i$ **by** $simp$
from $carrier\text{-}eq\ Ri\ nonempty\text{-}alts$ **show** $False$ **by** $simp$

next

fix i **assume** $R\ i \neq (\lambda\ -. False)$
thus $i \in agents$ **using** $prefs\text{-}undefined'[of\ i]$ **by** $(cases\ i \in agents)\ auto$
qed

lemma (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-def*:
anonymous-profile $R = \text{image-mset } (\text{weak-ranking} \circ R) \text{ (mset-set agents)}$
by (*simp only: agents-eq anonymous-profile-axdef*)

lemma (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-permute*:
assumes σ *permutes alts* *finite agents*
shows *anonymous-profile* (*permute-profile* σ R) =
image-mset (*map* ((\cdot) σ)) (*anonymous-profile* R)

proof –
from *assms* (1) **interpret** R' : *pref-profile-wf agents alts permute-profile* σ R
by (*rule wf-permute-alts*)
have *anonymous-profile* (*permute-profile* σ R) =
 $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } (\text{map-relation } (\text{inv } \sigma) (R \ x)). \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set agents} \# \}$
unfolding $R'.\text{anonymous-profile-def}$
by (*simp add: multiset.map-comp permute-profile-map-relation o-def*)
also from *assms* **have** $\dots = \{\# \text{map } ((\cdot) \ \sigma) (\text{weak-ranking } (R \ x)). \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set agents} \# \}$
by (*intro image-mset-cong*)
(*simp add: finite-total-preorder-on.weak-ranking-permute[of alts]*)
also have $\dots = \text{image-mset } (\text{map } ((\cdot) \ \sigma)) (\text{anonymous-profile } R)$
by (*simp add: anonymous-profile-def multiset.map-comp o-def*)
finally show *?thesis* .

qed

lemma (in *pref-profile-wf*) *anonymous-profile-update*:
assumes $i: i \in \text{agents}$ **and** *fin* [*simp*]: *finite agents* **and** *total-preorder-on alts*
 Ri'
shows *anonymous-profile* ($R(i := Ri')$) =
anonymous-profile $R - \{\# \text{weak-ranking } (R \ i) \# \} + \{\# \text{weak-ranking}$
 $Ri' \# \}$

proof –
from *assms* **interpret** R' : *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R(i := Ri')$
by (*simp add: finite-total-preorder-on-iff wf-update*)
have *anonymous-profile* ($R(i := Ri')$) =
 $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } (\text{if } x = i \text{ then } Ri' \text{ else } R \ x). \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set agents} \# \}$
by (*simp add: R'.anonymous-profile-def o-def*)
also have $\dots = \{\# \text{if } x = i \text{ then weak-ranking } Ri' \text{ else weak-ranking } (R \ x). \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set agents} \# \}$
by (*intro image-mset-cong simp-all*)
also have $\dots = \{\# \text{weak-ranking } Ri'. \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set } \{x \in \text{agents}. \ x = i\} \# \} +$
 $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } (R \ x). \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set } \{x \in \text{agents}. \ x \neq i\} \# \}$
by (*subst image-mset-If*) (*(subst filter-mset-mset-set, simp)+, rule refl*)
also from i **have** $\{x \in \text{agents}. \ x = i\} = \{i\}$ **by** *auto*
also have $\{x \in \text{agents}. \ x \neq i\} = \text{agents} - \{i\}$ **by** *auto*
also have $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } Ri'. \ x \in \# \text{ mset-set } \{i\} \# \} = \{\# \text{weak-ranking } Ri' \# \}$
by *simp*
also from i **have** $\text{mset-set } (\text{agents} - \{i\}) = \text{mset-set agents} - \{\# i \# \}$
by (*simp add: mset-set-Diff*)

also from i
have $\{\#weak-ranking (R x). x \in \# \dots \#\} =$
 $\{\#weak-ranking (R x). x \in \# mset-set agents \#\} - \{\#weak-ranking (R$
 $i) \#\}$
by (*subst image-mset-Diff*) (*simp-all add: in-multiset-in-set mset-subset-eq-single*)
also have $\{\#weak-ranking Ri' \#\} + \dots =$
 $anonymous-profile R - \{\#weak-ranking (R i) \#\} + \{\#weak-ranking$
 $Ri' \#\}$
by (*simp add: anonymous-profile-def add-ac o-def*)
finally show *?thesis* .
qed

2.5 Preference profiles from lists

definition *prefs-from-table* :: ('agent × 'alt set list) list ⇒ ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile
where

prefs-from-table xss = ($\lambda i. case-option (\lambda -. False) of-weak-ranking (map-of xss i)$)

definition *prefs-from-table-wf* **where**

prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss $\longleftrightarrow agents \neq \{\} \wedge alts \neq \{\} \wedge distinct (map$
 $fst xss) \wedge$
 $set (map fst xss) = agents \wedge (\forall xs \in set (map snd xss). \bigcup (set xs) = alts \wedge$
 $is-finite-weak-ranking xs)$

lemma *prefs-from-table-wfI*:

assumes $agents \neq \{\} alts \neq \{\} distinct (map fst xss)$
assumes $set (map fst xss) = agents$
assumes $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set (map snd xss) \implies \bigcup (set xs) = alts$
assumes $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set (map snd xss) \implies is-finite-weak-ranking xs$
shows *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*
using *assms unfolding prefs-from-table-wf-def* **by** *auto*

lemma *prefs-from-table-wfD*:

assumes *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*
shows $agents \neq \{\} alts \neq \{\} distinct (map fst xss)$
and $set (map fst xss) = agents$
and $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set (map snd xss) \implies \bigcup (set xs) = alts$
and $\bigwedge xs. xs \in set (map snd xss) \implies is-finite-weak-ranking xs$
using *assms unfolding prefs-from-table-wf-def* **by** *auto*

lemma *pref-profile-from-tableI*:

prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss $\implies pref-profile-wf agents alts (prefs-from-table$
 $xss)$

proof (*intro pref-profile-wf.intro*)

assume *wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*

fix i **assume** $i: i \in agents$

with *wf* **have** $i \in set (map fst xss)$ **by** (*simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)

then obtain xs **where** $xs: xs \in set (map snd xss) prefs-from-table xss i =$

of-weak-ranking xs
by (*cases map-of xss i*)
 (*fastforce dest: map-of-SomeD simp: prefs-from-table-def map-of-eq-None-iff*)+
with *wf show finite-total-preorder-on alts (prefs-from-table xss i)*
by (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def intro!: finite-total-preorder-of-weak-ranking*)
next
assume *wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss*
fix *i x y assume i: i ∉ agents*
with *wf have i ∉ set (map fst xss) by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)*
hence *map-of xss i = None by (simp add: map-of-eq-None-iff)*
thus \neg *prefs-from-table xss i x y by (simp add: prefs-from-table-def)*
qed (*simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)

lemma *prefs-from-table-eqI:*
assumes *distinct (map fst xs) distinct (map fst ys) set xs = set ys*
shows *prefs-from-table xs = prefs-from-table ys*
proof –
from *assms have map-of xs = map-of ys by (subst map-of-inject-set) simp-all*
thus *?thesis by (simp add: prefs-from-table-def)*
qed

lemma *prefs-from-table-undef:*
assumes *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss i ∉ agents*
shows *prefs-from-table xss i = (λ-. False)*
proof –
from *assms have i ∉ fst ` set xss*
by (*simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)
hence *map-of xss i = None by (simp add: map-of-eq-None-iff)*
thus *?thesis by (simp add: prefs-from-table-def)*
qed

lemma *prefs-from-table-map-of:*
assumes *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss i ∈ agents*
shows *prefs-from-table xss i = of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xss i))*
using *assms*
by (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-def map-of-eq-None-iff prefs-from-table-wf-def split: option.splits*)

lemma *prefs-from-table-update:*
fixes *x xs*
assumes *i ∈ set (map fst xs)*
defines *xs' ≡ map (λ(j,y). if j = i then (j, x) else (j, y)) xs*
shows *(prefs-from-table xs)(i := of-weak-ranking x) =*
prefs-from-table xs' (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof
have *xs': set (map fst xs') = set (map fst xs) by (force simp: xs'-def)*
fix *k*
consider *k = i | k ∉ set (map fst xs) | k ≠ i k ∈ set (map fst xs) by blast*
thus *?lhs k = ?rhs k*

proof *cases*
assume $k: k = i$
moreover from k **have** $y = x$ **if** $(i, y) \in \text{set } xs'$ **for** y
using that by (*auto simp: xs'-def split: if-splits*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *assms(1)* k xs'
by (*auto simp add: prefs-from-table-def map-of-eq-None-iff*
dest!: map-of-SomeD split: option.splits)
next
assume $k: k \notin \text{set } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)$
with *assms(1)* **have** $k': k \neq i$ **by** *auto*
with k xs' **have** $\text{map-of } xs \ k = \text{None}$ $\text{map-of } xs' \ k = \text{None}$
by (*simp-all add: map-of-eq-None-iff*)
thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: prefs-from-table-def k'*)
next
assume $k: k \neq i \ k \in \text{set } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)$
with $k(1)$ **have** $\text{map-of } xs \ k = \text{map-of } xs' \ k$ **unfolding** *xs'-def*
by (*induction xs*) *fastforce+*
with k **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: prefs-from-table-def*)
qed
qed

lemma *prefs-from-table-swap*:
 $x \neq y \implies \text{prefs-from-table } ((x,x')\#(y,y')\#xs) = \text{prefs-from-table } ((y,y')\#(x,x')\#xs)$
by (*intro ext*) (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-def*)

lemma *permute-prefs-from-table*:
assumes σ *permutes fst ' set xs*
shows $\text{prefs-from-table } xs \circ \sigma = \text{prefs-from-table } (\text{map } (\lambda(x,y). (\text{inv } \sigma \ x, \ y)) \ xs)$
proof
fix i
have $(\text{prefs-from-table } xs \circ \sigma) \ i =$
 $(\text{case } \text{map-of } xs \ (\sigma \ i) \ \text{of}$
 $\quad \text{None} \Rightarrow \lambda _ . \ \text{False}$
 $\quad | \ \text{Some } x \Rightarrow \text{of-weak-ranking } x)$
by (*simp add: prefs-from-table-def o-def*)
also have $\text{map-of } xs \ (\sigma \ i) = \text{map-of } (\text{map } (\lambda(x,y). (\text{inv } \sigma \ x, \ y)) \ xs) \ i$
using *map-of-permute[OF assms]* **by** (*simp add: o-def fun-eq-iff*)
finally show $(\text{prefs-from-table } xs \circ \sigma) \ i = \text{prefs-from-table } (\text{map } (\lambda(x,y). (\text{inv } \sigma \ x, \ y)) \ xs) \ i$
by (*simp only: prefs-from-table-def*)
qed

lemma *permute-profile-from-table*:
assumes $wf: \text{prefs-from-table-wf agents alts } xss$
assumes $\text{perm}: \sigma$ *permutes alts*
shows $\text{permute-profile } \sigma \ (\text{prefs-from-table } xss) =$
 $\text{prefs-from-table } (\text{map } (\lambda(x,y). (x, \ \text{map } ((\cdot) \ \sigma) \ y)) \ xss) \ (\text{is } ?f = ?g)$
proof

```

fix i
have wf': prefs-from-table-wf agents alts (map (λ(x, y). (x, map ((·) σ) y)) xss)
proof (intro prefs-from-table-wfI, goal-cases)
  case (5 xs)
  then obtain y where y ∈ set xss xs = map ((·) σ) (snd y)
  by (auto simp add: o-def case-prod-unfold)
  with assms show ?case
  by (simp add: image-Union [symmetric] prefs-from-table-wf-def permutes-image
o-def case-prod-unfold)
next
  case (6 xs)
  then obtain y where y ∈ set xss xs = map ((·) σ) (snd y)
  by (auto simp add: o-def case-prod-unfold)
  with assms show ?case
  by (auto simp: is-finite-weak-ranking-def is-weak-ranking-iff prefs-from-table-wf-def
distinct-map permutes-inj-on inj-on-image intro!: disjoint-image)
qed (insert assms, simp-all add: image-Union [symmetric] prefs-from-table-wf-def
permutes-image o-def case-prod-unfold)
show ?f i = ?g i
proof (cases i ∈ agents)
  assume i ∉ agents
  with assms wf' show ?thesis
  by (simp add: permute-profile-def prefs-from-table-undef)
next
  assume i: i ∈ agents
  define xs where xs = the (map-of xss i)
  from i wf have xs: map-of xss i = Some xs
  by (cases map-of xss i (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def xs-def))
  have xs-in-xss: xs ∈ snd ` set xss
  using xs by (force dest!: map-of-SomeD)
  with wf have set-xs: ⋃ (set xs) = alts
  by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wfD)

  from i have prefs-from-table (map (λ(x,y). (x, map ((·) σ) y)) xss) i =
of-weak-ranking (the (map-of (map (λ(x,y). (x, map ((·) σ) y)) xss)
i))
  using wf' by (intro prefs-from-table-map-of) simp-all
  also have ... = of-weak-ranking (map ((·) σ) xs)
  by (subst map-of-map) (simp add: xs)
  also have ... = (λa b. of-weak-ranking xs (inv σ a) (inv σ b))
  by (intro ext) (simp add: of-weak-ranking-permute map-relation-def set-xs
perm)
  also have ... = permute-profile σ (prefs-from-table xss) i
  by (simp add: prefs-from-table-def xs permute-profile-def)
  finally show ?thesis ..
qed
qed

```

2.6 Automatic evaluation of preference profiles

lemma *eval-prefs-from-table* [simp]:

prefs-from-table [] $i = (\lambda - . \text{False})$

prefs-from-table ((i, y) # xs) $i = \text{of-weak-ranking } y$

$i \neq j \implies \text{prefs-from-table } ((j, y) \# xs) i = \text{prefs-from-table } xs i$

by (*simp-all add: prefs-from-table-def*)

lemma *eval-of-weak-ranking* [simp]:

$a \notin \bigcup(\text{set } xs) \implies \neg \text{of-weak-ranking } xs a b$

$b \in x \implies a \in \bigcup(\text{set } (x \# xs)) \implies \text{of-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) a b$

$b \notin x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking } (x \# xs) a b \longleftrightarrow \text{of-weak-ranking } xs a b$

by (*induction xs*) (*simp-all add: of-weak-ranking-Cons*)

lemma *prefs-from-table-cong* [cong]:

assumes *prefs-from-table* $xs = \text{prefs-from-table } ys$

shows *prefs-from-table* ($x \# xs$) = *prefs-from-table* ($x \# ys$)

proof

fix i

show *prefs-from-table* ($x \# xs$) $i = \text{prefs-from-table } (x \# ys) i$

using *assms* **by** (*cases x, cases i = fst x*) *simp-all*

qed

definition *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* **where**

of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge $xs x = \{y. \text{of-weak-ranking } xs y x\}$

lemma *eval-Collect-of-weak-ranking*:

Collect (*of-weak-ranking* $xs x$) = *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* (*rev xs*) x

by (*simp add: of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-empty* [simp]:

of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge [] $x = \{\}$

by (*simp add: of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-Cons* [simp]:

$y \in x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } (x \# xs) y = \bigcup(\text{set } (x \# xs))$

$y \notin x \implies \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } (x \# xs) y = \text{of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge } xs y$

by (*auto simp: of-weak-ranking-Cons of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def*)

lemma *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-Cons'*:

of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge ($x \# xs$) = ($\lambda y.$

(*if* $y \in x$ *then* $\bigcup(\text{set } (x \# xs))$ *else* *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge* $xs y$)

by (*auto simp: of-weak-ranking-Cons of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def fun-eq-iff*)

lemma *anonymise-prefs-from-table*:

assumes *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*

shows *anonymous-profile* (*prefs-from-table* xs) = *mset* (*map snd* xs)

proof –

from *assms* **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts prefs-from-table xs*

by (*simp add: pref-profile-from-tableI*)

```

from assms have agents: agents = fst ‘ set xs
  by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
hence [simp]: finite agents by auto
have anonymous-profile (prefs-from-table xs) =
  {#weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs x). x ∈# mset-set agents#}
  by (simp add: o-def anonymous-profile-def)
also from assms have ... = {#the (map-of xs i). i ∈# mset-set agents#}
proof (intro image-mset-cong)
  fix i assume i: i ∈# mset-set agents
  from i assms
    have weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs i) =
      weak-ranking (of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xs i)))
    by (simp add: prefs-from-table-map-of)
  also from assms i have ... = the (map-of xs i)
    by (intro weak-ranking-of-weak-ranking)
      (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  finally show weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs i) = the (map-of xs i) .
qed
also from agents have mset-set agents = mset-set (set (map fst xs)) by simp
also from assms have ... = mset (map fst xs)
  by (intro mset-set-set) (simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
also from assms have {#the (map-of xs i). i ∈# mset (map fst xs)#} = mset
(map snd xs)
  by (intro image-mset-map-of) (simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

```

```

lemma prefs-from-table-agent-permutation:
  assumes wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts ys
  assumes mset-eq: mset (map snd xs) = mset (map snd ys)
  obtains  $\pi$  where  $\pi$  permutes agents prefs-from-table xs  $\circ$   $\pi$  = prefs-from-table
ys
proof –
  from wf(1) have agents: agents = set (map fst xs)
    by (simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  from wf(2) have agents': agents = set (map fst ys)
    by (simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  from agents agents' wf(1) wf(2) have mset (map fst xs) = mset (map fst ys)
    by (subst set-eq-iff-mset-eq-distinct [symmetric]) (simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wfD)
  hence same-length: length xs = length ys by (auto dest: mset-eq-length simp del:
mset-map)

```

```

  from  $\langle$ mset (map fst xs) = mset (map fst ys) $\rangle$ 
    obtain g where g: g permutes {..length ys} permute-list g (map fst ys) =
map fst xs
    by (auto elim: mset-eq-permutation simp: same-length simp del: mset-map)

```

```

from mset-eq g
  have mset (map snd ys) = mset (permute-list g (map snd ys)) by simp

```


with *mset-eq* **obtain** *f*
where *f*: *f* permutes $\{..
 $permute-list\ f\ (permute-list\ g\ (map\ snd\ ys)) = map\ snd\ xs$
by (*auto elim*: *mset-eq-permutation simp*: *same-length simp del*: *mset-map*)
from *permutes-in-image*[*OF f(1)*]
have [*simp*]: $f\ x < length\ xs \longleftrightarrow x < length\ xs$
 $f\ x < length\ ys \longleftrightarrow x < length\ ys$ **for** *x* **by** (*simp-all add*: *same-length*)$

define *idx unidx* **where** *idx* = *index* (*map fst xs*) **and** *unidx* *i* = *map fst xs* ! *i*
for *i*
from *wf(1)* **have** *bij-betw idx agents* $\{0.. **unfolding** *idx-def*
by (*intro bij-betw-index*) (*simp-all add*: *prefs-from-table-wf-def*)
hence *bij-betw-idx*: *bij-betw idx agents* $\{.. **by** (*simp add*: *atLeast0LessThan*)
have [*simp*]: *idx* $x < length\ xs$ **if** $x \in agents$ **for** *x*
using *that* **by** (*simp add*: *idx-def agents*)
have [*simp*]: *unidx* $i \in agents$ **if** $i < length\ xs$ **for** *i*
using *that* **by** (*simp add*: *agents unidx-def*)$$

have *unidx-idx*: *unidx* (*idx* *x*) = *x* **if** $x \in agents$ **for** *x*
using *x* **unfolding** *idx-def unidx-def* **using** *nth-index*[*of x map fst xs*]
by (*simp add*: *agents set-map* [*symmetric*] *nth-map* [*symmetric*] *del*: *set-map*)
have *idx-unidx*: *idx* (*unidx* *i*) = *i* **if** $i < length\ xs$ **for** *i*
unfolding *idx-def unidx-def* **using** *wf(1)* *index-nth-id*[*of map fst xs i*] *i*
by (*simp add*: *prefs-from-table-wfD(3)*)

define π **where** $\pi\ x = (if\ x \in agents\ then\ (unidx\ \circ\ f\ \circ\ idx)\ x\ else\ x)$ **for** *x*
define π' **where** $\pi'\ x = (if\ x \in agents\ then\ (unidx\ \circ\ inv\ f\ \circ\ idx)\ x\ else\ x)$ **for** *x*
have *bij-betw* (*unidx* \circ *f* \circ *idx*) *agents* *agents* (**is** *?P*) **unfolding** *unidx-def*
by (*rule bij-betw-trans bij-betw-idx permutes-imp-bij f g bij-betw-nth*) +
(*insert wf(1) g, simp-all add*: *prefs-from-table-wf-def same-length*)
also **have** *?P* \longleftrightarrow *bij-betw* π *agents* *agents*
by (*intro bij-betw-cong*) (*simp add*: π -*def*)
finally **have** *perm*: π permutes *agents*
by (*intro bij-imp-permutes*) (*simp-all add*: π -*def*)

define *h* **where** $h = g \circ f$
from *f g* **have** *h*: *h* permutes $\{.. **unfolding** *h-def*
by (*intro permutes-compose*) (*simp-all add*: *same-length*)$

have *inv- π* : *inv* $\pi = \pi'$
proof (*rule permutes-invI*[*OF perm*])
fix *x* **assume** $x \in agents$
with *f(1)* **show** π' ($\pi\ x$) = *x*
by (*simp add*: π -*def* π' -*def* *idx-unidx unidx-idx inv-f-f permutes-inj*)
qed (*simp add*: π -*def* π' -*def*)
with *perm* **have** *inv- π'* : *inv* $\pi' = \pi$ **by** (*auto simp*: *inv-inv-eq permutes-bij*)

from *wf h* **have** *prefs-from-table* *ys* = *prefs-from-table* (*permute-list h ys*)
by (*intro prefs-from-table-eqI*)

(*simp-all add: prefs-from-table-wfD permute-list-map [symmetric]*)
also have $\text{permute-list } h \text{ } ys = \text{permute-list } h \text{ } (\text{zip } (\text{map } \text{fst } ys) \text{ } (\text{map } \text{snd } ys))$
 by (*simp add: zip-map-fst-snd*)
also from *same-length f g*
 have $\text{permute-list } h \text{ } (\text{zip } (\text{map } \text{fst } ys) \text{ } (\text{map } \text{snd } ys)) =$
 $\text{zip } (\text{permute-list } f \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)) \text{ } (\text{map } \text{snd } xs)$
 by (*subst permute-list-zip[OF h]*) (*simp-all add: h-def permute-list-compose*)
also {
 fix *i* **assume** $i < \text{length } xs$
from *i* **have** $\text{permute-list } f \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) ! i = \text{unidx } (f \text{ } i)$
 using *permutes-in-image[OF f(1)] f(1)*
 by (*subst permute-list-nth*) (*simp-all add: same-length unidx-def*)
also from *i* **have** $\dots = \pi \text{ } (\text{unidx } i)$ **by** (*simp add: π -def idx-unidx*)
also from *i* **have** $\dots = \text{map } \pi \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) ! i$ **by** (*simp add: unidx-def*)
finally have $\text{permute-list } f \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) ! i = \text{map } \pi \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) ! i$.
 }
hence $\text{permute-list } f \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) = \text{map } \pi \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)$
 by (*intro nth-equalityI*) *simp-all*
also have $\text{zip } (\text{map } \pi \text{ } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)) \text{ } (\text{map } \text{snd } xs) = \text{map } (\lambda(x,y). (\text{inv } \pi' \text{ } x, y))$
xs
 by (*induction xs*) (*simp-all add: case-prod-unfold inv- π'*)
also from *permutes-inv[OF perm] inv- π* **have** $\text{prefs-from-table } \dots = \text{prefs-from-table}$
 $xs \circ \pi'$
 by (*intro permute-prefs-from-table [symmetric]*) (*simp-all add: agents*)
finally have $\text{prefs-from-table } xs \circ \pi' = \text{prefs-from-table } ys$..
with *that[of π'] permutes-inv[OF perm] inv- π* **show** *?thesis* **by** *auto*
qed

lemma *permute-list-distinct*:

assumes $f \text{ } \{..<\text{length } xs\} \subseteq \{..<\text{length } xs\}$ *distinct xs*
shows $\text{permute-list } f \text{ } xs = \text{map } (\lambda x. xs ! f \text{ } (\text{index } xs \text{ } x)) \text{ } xs$
using *assms* **by** (*intro nth-equalityI*) (*auto simp: index-nth-id permute-list-def*)

lemma *image-mset-eq-permutation*:

assumes $\{\#f \text{ } x. x \in \# \text{ mset-set } A\# \} = \{\#g \text{ } x. x \in \# \text{ mset-set } A\# \}$ *finite A*
obtains π **where** $\pi \text{ permutes } A \wedge x. x \in A \implies g \text{ } (\pi \text{ } x) = f \text{ } x$

proof –

from *assms(2)* **obtain** *xs* **where** $xs : A = \text{set } xs$ *distinct xs*

using *finite-distinct-list* **by** *blast*

with *assms* **have** $\text{mset } (\text{map } f \text{ } xs) = \text{mset } (\text{map } g \text{ } xs)$

by (*simp add: mset-set-set*)

from *mset-eq-permutation[OF this]* **obtain** π **where**

$\pi : \pi \text{ permutes } \{0..<\text{length } xs\}$ $\text{permute-list } \pi \text{ } (\text{map } g \text{ } xs) = \text{map } f \text{ } xs$

by (*auto simp: atLeast0LessThan*)

define π' **where** $\pi' \text{ } x = (\text{if } x \in A \text{ then } (!) \text{ } xs \circ \pi \circ \text{index } xs \text{ } x \text{ else } x)$ **for** *x*

have *bij-betw* $(!) \text{ } xs \circ \pi \circ \text{index } xs \text{ } A \text{ } A$ (*is ?P*)

by (*rule bij-betw-trans bij-betw-index xs refl permutes-imp-bij π bij-betw-nth*) +
(simp-all add: atLeast0LessThan xs)

also have $?P \longleftrightarrow \text{bij-betw } \pi' \text{ } A \text{ } A$

by (*intro bij-betw-cong*) (*simp-all add: π' -def*)
finally have π' *permutes* A
 by (*rule bij-imp-permutes*) (*simp-all add: π' -def*)
moreover from π $xs(1)$ [*symmetric*] $xs(2)$ **have** $g(\pi' x) = f x$ **if** $x \in A$ **for** x
 by (*simp add: permute-list-map permute-list-distinct*
permutes-image π' -def that atLeast0LessThan)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by** (*rule that*)
qed

lemma *anonymous-profile-agent-permutation:*

assumes *eq: anonymous-profile* $R1 = \text{anonymous-profile } R2$

assumes *wf: pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R1$ *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R2$

assumes *fin: finite agents*

obtains π **where** π *permutes agents* $R2 \circ \pi = R1$

proof –

interpret $R1$: *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R1$ **by fact**

interpret $R2$: *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R2$ **by fact**

from *eq* **have** $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } (R1\ x).\ x \in \# \text{mset-set agents}\#\} =$
 $\{\# \text{weak-ranking } (R2\ x).\ x \in \# \text{mset-set agents}\#\}$

by (*simp add: R1.anonymous-profile-def R2.anonymous-profile-def o-def*)

from *image-mset-eq-permutation[OF this fin]* **obtain** π

where π : π *permutes agents*

$\wedge x. x \in \text{agents} \implies \text{weak-ranking } (R2\ (\pi\ x)) = \text{weak-ranking } (R1\ x)$ **by auto**

from π **have** wf' : *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $(R2 \circ \pi)$

by (*intro R2.wf-permute-agents*)

then interpret $R2'$: *pref-profile-wf agents alts* $R2 \circ \pi$.

have $R2 \circ \pi = R1$

proof (*intro pref-profile-eqI[OF wf' wf(1)]*)

fix x **assume** $x: x \in \text{agents}$

with π **have** $\text{weak-ranking } ((R2 \circ \pi)\ x) = \text{weak-ranking } (R1\ x)$ **by simp**

with $wf'\ wf(1)\ x$ **show** $(R2 \circ \pi)\ x = R1\ x$

by (*intro weak-ranking-eqD[of alts] R2'.prefs-wf*) *simp-all*

qed

from $\pi(1)$ **and this show** *?thesis* **by** (*rule that*)

qed

end

theory *Elections*

imports *Preference-Profiles*

begin

An election consists of a finite set of agents and a finite non-empty set of alternatives.

locale *election* =

fixes $\text{agents} :: \text{'agent set}$ **and** $\text{alts} :: \text{'alt set}$

assumes *finite-agents* [*simp, intro*]: *finite agents*

assumes *finite-alts* [*simp, intro*]: *finite alts*

assumes *nonempty-agents* [*simp*]: $\text{agents} \neq \{\}$

assumes *nonempty-alts* [*simp*]: $alts \neq \{\}$
begin

abbreviation *is-pref-profile* \equiv *pref-profile-wf agents alts*

lemma *finite-total-preorder-on-iff'* [*simp*]:
finite-total-preorder-on alts R \longleftrightarrow *total-preorder-on alts R*
by (*simp add: finite-total-preorder-on-iff*)

lemma *pref-profile-wfI'* [*intro?*]:
 $(\bigwedge i. i \in agents \implies total-preorder-on alts (R i)) \implies$
 $(\bigwedge i. i \notin agents \implies R i = (\lambda -. False)) \implies is-pref-profile R$
by (*simp add: pref-profile-wf-def*)

lemma *is-pref-profile-update* [*simp,intro*]:
assumes *is-pref-profile R total-preorder-on alts Ri' i* $\in agents$
shows *is-pref-profile (R(i := Ri'))*
using *assms* **by** (*auto intro!: pref-profile-wf.wf-update*)

lemma *election* [*simp,intro*]: *election agents alts*
by (*rule election-axioms*)

context

fixes *R* **assumes** *R: total-preorder-on alts R*
begin

interpretation *R: total-preorder-on alts R* **by** *fact*

lemma *Max-wrt-prefs-finite: finite (Max-wrt R)*
unfolding *R.Max-wrt-preorder* **by** *simp*

lemma *Max-wrt-prefs-nonempty: Max-wrt R* $\neq \{\}$
using *R.Max-wrt-nonempty* **by** *simp*

lemma *maximal-imp-preferred:*
 $x \in alts \implies Max-wrt R \subseteq preferred-alts R x$
using *R.total*
by (*auto simp: R.Max-wrt-total-preorder preferred-alts-def strongly-preferred-def*)

end

end

end

3 Auxiliary facts about PMFs

theory *Lotteries*

imports *Complex-Main HOL-Probability.Probability*
begin

The type of lotteries (a probability mass function)

type-synonym *'alt lottery = 'alt pmf*

definition *lotteries-on :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a lottery set* **where**
lotteries-on A = {p. set-pmf p \subseteq A}

lemma *pmf-of-set-lottery:*

A \neq {} \Longrightarrow finite A \Longrightarrow A \subseteq B \Longrightarrow pmf-of-set A \in lotteries-on B

unfolding *lotteries-on-def* **by** *auto*

lemma *pmf-of-list-lottery:*

pmf-of-list-wf xs \Longrightarrow set (map fst xs) \subseteq A \Longrightarrow pmf-of-list xs \in lotteries-on A

using *set-pmf-of-list[of xs]* **by** *(auto simp: lotteries-on-def)*

lemma *return-pmf-in-lotteries-on [simp,intro]:*

x \in A \Longrightarrow return-pmf x \in lotteries-on A

by *(simp add: lotteries-on-def)*

end

theory *Utility-Functions*

imports

Complex-Main

HOL-Probability.Probability

Lotteries

Preference-Profiles

begin

3.1 Definition of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions

locale *vnm-utility = finite-total-preorder-on +*

fixes *u :: 'a \Rightarrow real*

assumes *utility-le-iff: x \in carrier \Longrightarrow y \in carrier \Longrightarrow u x \leq u y \longleftrightarrow x \preceq [le] y*

begin

lemma *utility-le: x \preceq [le] y \Longrightarrow u x \leq u y*

using *not-outside[of x y] utility-le-iff* **by** *simp*

lemma *utility-less-iff:*

x \in carrier \Longrightarrow y \in carrier \Longrightarrow u x $<$ u y \longleftrightarrow x \prec [le] y

using *utility-le-iff[of x y] utility-le-iff[of y x]*

by *(auto simp: strongly-preferred-def)*

lemma *utility-less: x \prec [le] y \Longrightarrow u x $<$ u y*

using *not-outside[of x y] utility-less-iff* **by** *(simp add: strongly-preferred-def)*

The following lemma allows us to compute the expected utility by summing

over all indifference classes, using the fact that alternatives in the same indifference class must have the same utility.

lemma *expected-utility-weak-ranking*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$

shows $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u =$

$$\left(\sum A \leftarrow \text{weak-ranking } le. \ u \ (SOME \ x. \ x \in A) \ * \ \text{measure-pmf.prob } p \ A \right)$$

proof –

from *assms* **have** $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u = \left(\sum a \in \text{carrier}. \ u \ a \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ a \right)$

by (*subst integral-measure-pmf[OF finite-carrier]*)

(*auto simp: lotteries-on-def ac-simps*)

also have $\text{carrier} = \bigcup (\text{set } (\text{weak-ranking } le))$ **by** (*simp add: weak-ranking-Union*)

also from *carrier* **have** *finite*: $\text{finite } A$ **if** $A \in \text{set } (\text{weak-ranking } le)$ **for** A

using *that* **by** (*blast intro!: finite-subset[OF - finite-carrier, of A]*)

hence $\left(\sum a \in \bigcup (\text{set } (\text{weak-ranking } le)). \ u \ a \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ a \right) =$

$$\left(\sum A \leftarrow \text{weak-ranking } le. \ \sum a \in A. \ u \ a \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ a \right) \ (\text{is } = \text{sum-list } ?xs)$$

using *weak-ranking-total-preorder*

by (*subst sum.Union-disjoint*)

(*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-iff disjoint-def sum.distinct-set-conv-list*)

also have $?xs = \text{map } (\lambda A. \ \sum a \in A. \ u \ (SOME \ a. \ a \in A) \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ a)$ (*weak-ranking le*)

proof (*intro map-cong HOL.refl sum.cong*)

fix $x \ A$ **assume** $x \in A$ **and** $A \in \text{set } (\text{weak-ranking } le)$

have $(SOME \ x. \ x \in A) \in A$ **by** (*rule someI-ex*) (*insert x, blast*)

from *weak-ranking-eqclass1[OF A x this]* *weak-ranking-eqclass1[OF A this x]* *x this A*

have $u \ x = u \ (SOME \ x. \ x \in A)$

by (*intro antisym; subst utility-le-iff*) (*auto simp: carrier*)

thus $u \ x \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ x = u \ (SOME \ x. \ x \in A) \ * \ \text{pmf } p \ x$ **by** *simp*

qed

also have $\dots = \text{map } (\lambda A. \ u \ (SOME \ a. \ a \in A) \ * \ \text{measure-pmf.prob } p \ A)$ (*weak-ranking le*)

using *finite* **by** (*intro map-cong HOL.refl*)

(*auto simp: sum-distrib-left measure-measure-pmf-finite*)

finally show *?thesis* .

qed

lemma *scaled*: $c > 0 \implies \text{vnm-utility carrier } le \ (\lambda x. \ c \ * \ u \ x)$

by *unfold-locale* (*insert utility-le-iff, auto*)

lemma *add-right*:

assumes $\bigwedge x \ y. \ le \ x \ y \implies f \ x \leq f \ y$

shows $\text{vnm-utility carrier } le \ (\lambda x. \ u \ x + f \ x)$

proof

fix $x \ y$ **assume** xy : $x \in \text{carrier } y \in \text{carrier}$

from *assms*[*of x y*] *utility-le-iff*[*OF xy*] *assms*[*of y x*] *utility-le-iff*[*OF xy(2,1)*]

show $(u \ x + f \ x \leq u \ y + f \ y) = le \ x \ y$ **by** *auto*

qed

lemma *add-left*:

$(\bigwedge x y. le\ x\ y \implies f\ x \leq f\ y) \implies vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. f\ x + u\ x)$
by (*subst add.commute*) (*rule add-right*)

Given a consistent utility function, any function that assigns equal values to equivalent alternatives can be added to it (scaled with a sufficiently small ε), again yielding a consistent utility function.

lemma *add-epsilon*:

assumes $A: \bigwedge x y. le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies f\ x = f\ y$
shows $\exists \varepsilon > 0. vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x)$

proof –

let $?A = \{(u\ y - u\ x) / (f\ x - f\ y) \mid x\ y. x \prec[le]\ y \wedge f\ x > f\ y\}$

have $?A = (\lambda(x,y). (u\ y - u\ x) / (f\ x - f\ y)) \text{ ‘ } \{(x,y) \mid x\ y. x \prec[le]\ y \wedge f\ x > f\ y\}$
by *auto*

also have *finite* $\{(x,y) \mid x\ y. x \prec[le]\ y \wedge f\ x > f\ y\}$

by (*rule finite-subset[of - carrier × carrier]*)

(*insert not-outside, auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

hence *finite* $((\lambda(x,y). (u\ y - u\ x) / (f\ x - f\ y)) \text{ ‘ } \{(x,y) \mid x\ y. x \prec[le]\ y \wedge f\ x > f\ y\})$

by *simp*

finally have *finite*: *finite* $?A$.

define ε **where** $\varepsilon = \text{Min}(\text{insert } 1\ ?A) / 2$

from *finite* **have** $\text{Min}(\text{insert } 1\ ?A) > 0$

by (*auto intro!: divide-pos-pos simp: utility-less*)

hence $\varepsilon: \varepsilon > 0$ **unfolding** $\varepsilon\text{-def}$ **by** *simp*

have *mono*: $u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x < u\ y + \varepsilon * f\ y$ **if** $xy: x \prec[le]\ y$ **for** $x\ y$

proof (*cases* $f\ x > f\ y$)

assume *less*: $f\ x > f\ y$

from ε **have** $\varepsilon < \text{Min}(\text{insert } 1\ ?A)$ **unfolding** $\varepsilon\text{-def}$ **by** *linarith*

also from *less* *xy* *finite* **have** $\text{Min}(\text{insert } 1\ ?A) \leq (u\ y - u\ x) / (f\ x - f\ y)$

unfolding $\varepsilon\text{-def}$

by (*intro Min-le*) *auto*

finally show *?thesis* **using** *less* **by** (*simp add: field-simps*)

next

assume $\neg f\ x > f\ y$

with *utility-less[OF xy]* ε **show** *?thesis*

by (*simp add: algebra-simps not-less add-less-le-mono*)

qed

have *eq*: $u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x = u\ y + \varepsilon * f\ y$ **if** $xy: x \preceq[le]\ y\ y \preceq[le]\ x$ **for** $x\ y$

using *xy[THEN utility-le]* *A[OF xy]* **by** *simp*

have *vnm-utility carrier* $le\ (\lambda x. u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x)$

proof

fix $x\ y$ **assume** $xy: x \in \text{carrier}\ y \in \text{carrier}$

show $(u\ x + \varepsilon * f\ x \leq u\ y + \varepsilon * f\ y) \longleftrightarrow le\ x\ y$

using *total[OF xy]* *mono[of x y]* *mono[of y x]* *eq[of x y]*

by (*cases* $le\ x\ y$; *cases* $le\ y\ x$) (*auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

qed

from ε *this* **show** *?thesis* **by** *blast*

qed

lemma *diff-epsilon*:

assumes $\bigwedge x y. le\ x\ y \implies le\ y\ x \implies f\ x = f\ y$

shows $\exists \varepsilon > 0. vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. u\ x - \varepsilon * f\ x)$

proof –

from *assms* **have** $\exists \varepsilon > 0. vnm\text{-utility\ carrier}\ le\ (\lambda x. u\ x + \varepsilon * -f\ x)$

by (*intro add-epsilon*) (*subst neg-equal-iff-equal*)

thus *?thesis* **by** *simp*

qed

end

end

4 Stochastic Dominance

theory *Stochastic-Dominance*

imports

Complex-Main

HOL-Probability.Probability

Lotteries

Preference-Profiles

Utility-Functions

begin

4.1 Definition of Stochastic Dominance

This is the definition of stochastic dominance. It lifts a preference relation on alternatives to the stochastic dominance ordering on lotteries.

definition *SD* :: 'alt relation \Rightarrow 'alt lottery relation **where**

$p \succeq[SD(R)]\ q \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\} \wedge$
 $(\forall x. R\ x\ x \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.prob } p\ \{y. y \succeq[R]\ x\} \geq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q\ \{y. y \succeq[R]\ x\})$

lemma *SD-empty* [*simp*]: $SD\ (\lambda - . False) = (\lambda - . False)$

by (*auto simp: fun-eq-iff SD-def lotteries-on-def set-pmf-not-empty*)

Stochastic dominance over any relation is a preorder.

lemma *SD-refl*: $p \preceq[SD(R)]\ p \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. R\ x\ x\}$

by (*simp add: SD-def*)

lemma *SD-trans* [*simp, trans*]: $p \preceq[SD(R)]\ q \implies q \preceq[SD(R)]\ r \implies p \preceq[SD(R)]\ r$

r

unfolding *SD-def* **by** (*auto intro: order.trans*)

lemma *SD-is-preorder*: *preorder-on* (*lotteries-on* $\{x. R\ x\ x\}$) (*SD R*)

by *unfold-locales* (*auto simp: SD-def intro: order.trans*)

context *preorder-on*

begin

lemma *SD-preorder*:

$p \succeq[SD(le)] q \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge$
 $(\forall x \in \text{carrier}. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x) \geq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x))$
by (*simp add: SD-def preferred-alts-def carrier-eq*)

lemma *SD-preorderI* [*intro?*]:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$
assumes $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{carrier} \implies$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x) \geq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q$
(*preferred-alts le x*)
shows $p \succeq[SD(le)] q$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: SD-preorder*)

lemma *SD-preorderD*:

assumes $p \succeq[SD(le)] q$
shows $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$
and $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{carrier} \implies$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x) \geq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q$
(*preferred-alts le x*)
using *assms* **unfolding** *SD-preorder* **by** *simp-all*

lemma *SD-refl'* [*simp*]: $p \preceq[SD(le)] p \iff p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$

by (*simp add: SD-def carrier-eq*)

lemma *SD-is-preorder'*: *preorder-on* (*lotteries-on carrier*) (*SD(le)*)

using *SD-is-preorder[of le]* **by** (*simp add: carrier-eq*)

lemma *SD-singleton-left*:

assumes $x \in \text{carrier} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$
shows $\text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)] q \iff (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. x \preceq[le] y)$
proof
assume *SD*: $\text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)] q$
from *assms* *SD-preorderD*(\exists)[*OF SD, of x*]
have $\text{measure-pmf.prob } (\text{return-pmf } x) (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x) \leq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x)$ **by** *simp*
also from *assms* **have** $\text{measure-pmf.prob } (\text{return-pmf } x) (\text{preferred-alts } le \ x) =$
1
by (*simp add: indicator-def*)
finally have $\text{AE } y \text{ in } q. y \succeq[le] x$
by (*simp add: measure-pmf.measure-ge-1-iff measure-pmf.prob-eq-1 preferred-alts-def*)
thus $\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. y \succeq[le] x$ **by** (*simp add: AE-measure-pmf-iff*)
next
assume *A*: $\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. x \preceq[le] y$
show $\text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)] q$

```

proof (rule SD-preorderI)
  fix y assume y: y ∈ carrier
  show measure-pmf.prob (return-pmf x) (preferred-alts le y)
    ≤ measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts le y)
  proof (cases y ≤[le] x)
    case True
      from True A have measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts le y) = 1
      by (auto simp: AE-measure-pmf-iff measure-pmf.prob-eq-1 preferred-alts-def
intro: trans)
      thus ?thesis by simp
    qed (simp-all add: preferred-alts-def indicator-def measure-nonneg)
  qed (insert assms, simp-all add: lotteries-on-def)
qed

```

lemma *SD-singleton-right*:

```

assumes x: x ∈ carrier and q: q ∈ lotteries-on carrier
shows q ≤[SD(le)] return-pmf x ↔ (∀ y ∈ set-pmf q. y ≤[le] x)
proof safe
  fix y assume SD: q ≤[SD(le)] return-pmf x and y: y ∈ set-pmf q
  from y assms have [simp]: y ∈ carrier by (auto simp: lotteries-on-def)

  from y have 0 < measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts le y)
    by (rule measure-pmf-posI) simp-all
  also have ... ≤ measure-pmf.prob (return-pmf x) (preferred-alts le y)
    by (rule SD-preorderD(3)[OF SD]) simp-all
  finally show y ≤[le] x
    by (auto simp: indicator-def preferred-alts-def split: if-splits)
next
  assume A: ∀ y ∈ set-pmf q. y ≤[le] x
  show q ≤[SD(le)] return-pmf x
  proof (rule SD-preorderI)
    fix y assume y: y ∈ carrier
    show measure-pmf.prob q (preferred-alts le y) ≤
      measure-pmf.prob (return-pmf x) (preferred-alts le y)
    proof (cases y ≤[le] x)
      case False
        with A show ?thesis
          by (auto simp: preferred-alts-def indicator-def measure-le-0-iff
measure-pmf.prob-eq-0 AE-measure-pmf-iff intro: trans)
        qed (simp-all add: indicator-def preferred-alts-def)
      qed (insert assms, simp-all add: lotteries-on-def)
    qed

```

lemma *SD-strict-singleton-left*:

```

assumes x ∈ carrier q ∈ lotteries-on carrier
shows return-pmf x <[SD(le)] q ↔ (∀ y ∈ set-pmf q. x ≤[le] y) ∧ (∃ y ∈ set-pmf
q. (x <[le] y))
using assms by (auto simp add: strongly-preferred-def SD-singleton-left SD-singleton-right)

```

lemma *SD-strict-singleton-right*:
assumes $x \in \text{carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$
shows $q \prec[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } x \longleftrightarrow (\forall y \in \text{set-pmf } q. y \preceq[le] x) \wedge (\exists y \in \text{set-pmf } q. (y \prec[le] x))$
using *assms* **by** (*auto simp add: strongly-preferred-def SD-singleton-left SD-singleton-right*)

lemma *SD-singleton [simp]*:
 $x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{return-pmf } x \preceq[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } y \longleftrightarrow x \preceq[le] y$
by (*subst SD-singleton-left (simp-all add: lotteries-on-def)*)

lemma *SD-strict-singleton [simp]*:
 $x \in \text{carrier} \implies y \in \text{carrier} \implies \text{return-pmf } x \prec[SD(le)] \text{return-pmf } y \longleftrightarrow x \prec[le] y$
by (*simp add: strongly-preferred-def*)

end

context *pref-profile-wf*
begin

context
fixes i **assumes** $i \in \text{agents}$
begin

interpretation Ri : *preorder-on alts* $R i$ **by** (*simp add: i*)

lemmas $SD\text{-singleton-left} = Ri.SD\text{-singleton-left}$
lemmas $SD\text{-singleton-right} = Ri.SD\text{-singleton-right}$
lemmas $SD\text{-strict-singleton-left} = Ri.SD\text{-strict-singleton-left}$
lemmas $SD\text{-strict-singleton-right} = Ri.SD\text{-strict-singleton-right}$
lemmas $SD\text{-singleton} = Ri.SD\text{-singleton}$
lemmas $SD\text{-strict-singleton} = Ri.SD\text{-strict-singleton}$

end
end

lemmas (**in** *pref-profile-wf*) [*simp*] = *SD-singleton SD-strict-singleton*

4.2 Stochastic Dominance for preference profiles

context *pref-profile-wf*
begin

lemma *SD-pref-profile*:
assumes $i \in \text{agents}$
shows $p \succeq[SD(R i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge$
 $(\forall x \in \text{alts. measure-pmf.prob } p (\text{preferred-alts } (R i) x) \geq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q (\text{preferred-alts } (R i) x))$

proof –
from *assms* **interpret** *total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*
have *preferred-alts (R i) x = {y. y \succeq [R i] x}* **for** *x* **using** *not-outside*
by (*auto simp: preferred-alts-def*)
thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: SD-preorder preferred-alts-def*)
qed

lemma *SD-pref-profileI* [*intro?*]:
assumes *i ∈ agents p ∈ lotteries-on alts q ∈ lotteries-on alts*
assumes $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \implies$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ (preferred-alts (R i) x)} \geq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q \text{ (preferred-alts (R i) x)}$
shows *p \succeq [SD(R i)] q*
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: SD-pref-profile*)

lemma *SD-pref-profileD*:
assumes *i ∈ agents p \succeq [SD(R i)] q*
shows *p ∈ lotteries-on alts q ∈ lotteries-on alts*
and $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \implies$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ (preferred-alts (R i) x)} \geq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob } q \text{ (preferred-alts (R i) x)}$
using *assms* **by** (*simp-all add: SD-pref-profile*)

end

4.3 SD efficient lotteries

definition *SD-efficient* :: (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile* \Rightarrow *'alt lottery* \Rightarrow *bool* **where**
SD-efficient-auxdef:
 $\text{SD-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow \neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. \exists i. R \ i \ x \ x\}. q \succ[\text{Pareto (SD} \circ R)] p)$

context *pref-profile-wf*
begin

sublocale *SD: preorder-family agents lotteries-on alts SD \circ R* **unfolding** *o-def*
by (*intro preorder-family.intro SD-is-preorder*)
(*simp-all add: preorder-on.SD-is-preorder' prefs-undefined'*)

A lottery is considered SD-efficient if there is no other lottery such that all agents weakly prefer the other lottery (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) and at least one agent strongly prefers the other lottery.

lemma *SD-efficient-def*:
 $\text{SD-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow \neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}. q \succ[\text{Pareto (SD} \circ R)] p)$
proof –
have $\text{SD-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow \neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on } \{x. \exists i. R \ i \ x \ x\}. q \succ[\text{Pareto (SD} \circ R)] p)$
unfolding *SD-efficient-auxdef* ..
also from *nonempty-agents* **obtain** *i* **where** *i: i ∈ agents* **by** *blast*

with *preorder-on.refl*[of alts R i]
have $\{x. \exists i. R \ i \ x\} = \text{alts}$ **by** (*auto intro!*: *exI*[of - i] *not-outside*)
finally show *?thesis* .
qed

lemma *SD-efficient-def'*:
 $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p \longleftrightarrow$
 $\neg(\exists q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}. (\forall i \in \text{agents}. q \succeq[SD(R \ i)] \ p) \wedge (\exists i \in \text{agents}. q \succ[SD(R \ i)] \ p))$
unfolding *SD-efficient-def* *SD.Pareto-iff strongly-preferred-def* [*abs-def*] **by** *auto*

lemma *SD-inefficientI*:
assumes $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
 $i \in \text{agents} \ q \succ[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
shows $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$
using *assms* **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'* **by** *blast*

lemma *SD-inefficientI'*:
assumes $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
 $\exists i \in \text{agents}. q \succ[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
shows $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$
using *assms* **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'* **by** *blast*

lemma *SD-inefficientE*:
assumes $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ p$
obtains $q \ i$ **where**
 $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
 $i \in \text{agents} \ q \succ[SD(R \ i)] \ p$
using *assms* **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'* **by** *blast*

lemma *SD-efficientD*:
assumes $SD\text{-efficient } R \ p \ q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
and $\wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq[SD(R \ i)] \ p \ \exists i \in \text{agents}. \neg(q \preceq[SD(R \ i)] \ p)$
shows *False*
using *assms* **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'* *strongly-preferred-def* **by** *blast*

lemma *SD-efficient-singleton-iff*:
assumes [*simp*]: $x \in \text{alts}$
shows $SD\text{-efficient } R \ (\text{return-pmf } x) \longleftrightarrow x \notin \text{pareto-losers } R$
proof –
{
assume $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$
then obtain y **where** $y \in \text{alts} \ x \prec[\text{Pareto}] \ y$
by (*rule* *pareto-losersE*)
then have $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ (\text{return-pmf } x)$
by (*intro* *SD-inefficientI'*[of *return-pmf* y]) (*force* *simp*: *Pareto-strict-iff*) +
} **moreover** {
assume $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R \ (\text{return-pmf } x)$

```

from SD-inefficientE[OF this] obtain  $q\ i$ 
  where  $q$ :
     $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ 
     $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{SD}(R\ i)\ (\text{return-pmf } x)\ q$ 
     $i \in \text{agents}$ 
     $\text{return-pmf } x \prec[\text{SD}(R\ i)]\ q$ 
  by blast
from  $q$  obtain  $y$  where  $y \in \text{set-pmf } q\ y \succ[R\ i]\ x$ 
  by (auto simp: SD-strict-singleton-left)
with  $q$  have  $y \succ[\text{Pareto}(R)]\ x$ 
  by (fastforce simp: Pareto-strict-iff SD-singleton-left)
  hence  $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$  by simp
}
ultimately show ?thesis by blast
qed

end

```

4.4 Equivalence proof

We now show that a lottery is preferred w.r.t. Stochastic Dominance iff it yields more expected utility for all compatible utility functions.

```

context finite-total-preorder-on
begin

```

```

abbreviation is-vnm-utility  $\equiv$  vnm-utility carrier le

```

```

lemma utility-weak-ranking-index:

```

```

  is-vnm-utility  $(\lambda x. \text{real}(\text{length}(\text{weak-ranking } le) - \text{weak-ranking-index } x))$ 

```

```

proof

```

```

  fix  $x\ y$  assume  $xy$ :  $x \in \text{carrier } y \in \text{carrier}$ 

```

```

  with this[THEN nth-weak-ranking-index(1)] this[THEN nth-weak-ranking-index(2)]

```

```

    show  $(\text{real}(\text{length}(\text{weak-ranking } le) - \text{weak-ranking-index } x))$ 
       $\leq \text{real}(\text{length}(\text{weak-ranking } le) - \text{weak-ranking-index } y) \iff le\ x\ y$ 

```

```

    by (simp add: le-diff-iff')

```

```

qed

```

```

lemma SD-iff-expected-utilities-le:

```

```

  assumes  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$ 

```

```

  shows  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)]\ q \iff$ 

```

```

     $(\forall u. \text{is-vnm-utility } u \implies \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p\ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation } q\ u)$ 

```

```

proof safe

```

```

  fix  $u$  assume SD:  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)]\ q$  and is-utility: is-vnm-utility  $u$ 

```

```

  from is-utility interpret vnm-utility carrier le  $u$  .

```

```

  define  $xs$  where  $xs = \text{weak-ranking } le$ 

```

```

  have le: is-weak-ranking  $xs\ le = \text{of-weak-ranking } xs$ 

```

```

    by (simp-all add: xs-def weak-ranking-total-preorder)

```

```

let ?pref =  $\lambda p x. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p \{y. x \preceq[le] y\}$  and
    ?pref' =  $\lambda p x. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p \{y. x \prec[le] y\}$ 
define f where f i = (SOME x. x  $\in$  xs ! i) for i
have xs-wf: is-weak-ranking xs
  by (simp add: xs-def weak-ranking-total-preorder)
hence f: f i  $\in$  xs ! i if i < length xs for i
  using that unfolding f-def is-weak-ranking-def
  by (intro someI-ex[of  $\lambda x. x \in xs ! i$ ]) (auto simp: set-conv-nth)
have f': f i  $\in$  carrier if i < length xs for i
  using that f weak-ranking-Union unfolding xs-def by (auto simp: set-conv-nth)
define n where n = length xs - 1
from assms weak-ranking-Union have carrier-nonempty: carrier  $\neq$  {} and xs  $\neq$ 
[]
  by (auto simp: xs-def lotteries-on-def set-pmf-not-empty)
hence n: length xs = Suc n and xs-nonempty: xs  $\neq$  [] by (auto simp add: n-def)
have SD': ?pref p (f i)  $\leq$  ?pref q (f i) if i < length xs for i
  using f'[OF that] SD by (auto simp: SD-preorder preferred-alt-def)
have f-le: le (f i) (f j)  $\longleftrightarrow$  i  $\geq$  j if i < length xs j < length xs for i j
  using that weak-ranking-index-unique[OF xs-wf that(1) - f]
    weak-ranking-index-unique[OF xs-wf that(2) - f]
  by (auto simp add: le intro: f elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases intro!: of-weak-ranking.intros)

have measure-pmf.expectation p u =
  ( $\sum i < n. (u (f i) - u (f (Suc i))) * ?pref p (f i) + u (f n)$ )
if p: p  $\in$  lotteries-on carrier for p
proof -
  from p have measure-pmf.expectation p u =
    ( $\sum i < \text{length } xs. u (f i) * \text{measure-pmf.prob } p (xs ! i)$ )
  by (simp add: f-def expected-utility-weak-ranking xs-def sum-list-sum-nth
atLeast0LessThan)
  also have ... = ( $\sum i < \text{length } xs. u (f i) * (?pref p (f i) - ?pref' p (f i))$ )
  proof (intro sum.cong HOL.refl)
    fix i assume i: i  $\in$  {.. $\text{length } xs$ }
    have ?pref p (f i) - ?pref' p (f i) =
      measure-pmf.prob p ({y. f i  $\preceq[le]$  y} - {y. f i  $\prec[le]$  y})
    by (subst measure-pmf.finite-measure-Diff [symmetric])
      (auto simp: strongly-preferred-def)
    also have {y. f i  $\preceq[le]$  y} - {y. f i  $\prec[le]$  y} =
      {y. f i  $\preceq[le]$  y  $\wedge$  y  $\preceq[le]$  f i} (is - = ?A)
    by (auto simp: strongly-preferred-def)
    also have ... = xs ! i
  proof safe
    fix x assume le: le (f i) x le x (f i)
    from i f show x  $\in$  xs ! i
      by (intro weak-ranking-egclass2[OF - - le]) (auto simp: xs-def)
  next
    fix x assume x  $\in$  xs ! i
    from weak-ranking-egclass1[OF - this f] weak-ranking-egclass1[OF - f this] i

```

show $le\ x\ (f\ i)\ le\ (f\ i)\ x$ **by** (*simp-all add: xs-def*)
qed
finally show $u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{measure-pmf.prob}\ p\ (xs\ !\ i) =$
 $u\ (f\ i)\ * (\text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i) - \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ i))$ **by** *simp*
qed
also have $\dots = (\sum_{i < \text{length}\ xs} u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i)) -$
 $(\sum_{i < \text{length}\ xs} u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ i))$
by (*simp add: sum-subtractf ring-distrib*)
also have $(\sum_{i < \text{length}\ xs} u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i)) =$
 $(\sum_{i < n} u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i)) + u\ (f\ n)\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ n)$ (**is - = ?sum**)
by (*simp add: n*)
also have $(\sum_{i < \text{length}\ xs} u\ (f\ i)\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ i)) =$
 $(\sum_{i < n} u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))) + u\ (f\ 0)\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ 0)$
simp
unfolding $n\ \text{sum.lessThan-Suc-shift}$ **by** *simp*
also have $(\sum_{i < n} u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))) =$
 $(\sum_{i < n} u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i))$
proof (*intro sum.cong HOL.refl*)
fix i **assume** $i: i \in \{..<n\}$
have $f\ (\text{Suc}\ i) \prec[le]\ y \longleftrightarrow f\ i \preceq[le]\ y$ **for** y
proof (*cases y \in carrier*)
assume $y \in \text{carrier}$
with *weak-ranking-Union* **obtain** j **where** $j: j < \text{length}\ xs\ y \in xs\ !\ j$
by (*auto simp: set-conv-nth xs-def*)
with *weak-ranking-eqclass1[OF - f j(2)] weak-ranking-eqclass1[OF - j(2) f]*
have *iff: le y z \longleftrightarrow le (f j) z le z y \longleftrightarrow le z (f j)* **for** z
by (*auto intro: trans simp: xs-def*)
thus *?thesis* **using** $i\ j$ **unfolding** $n\text{-def}$
by (*auto simp: iff f-le strongly-preferred-def*)
qed (*insert not-outside, auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)
thus $u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i)) = u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i))\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i)$ **by**
simp
qed
also have $\text{?sum} - (\dots + u\ (f\ 0)\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ 0)) =$
 $(\sum_{i < n} (u\ (f\ i) - u\ (f\ (\text{Suc}\ i)))\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ i)) -$
 $u\ (f\ 0)\ * \text{?pref}'\ p\ (f\ 0) + u\ (f\ n)\ * \text{?pref}\ p\ (f\ n)$
by (*simp add: ring-distrib sum-subtractf*)
also have $\{y. f\ 0 \prec[le]\ y\} = \{\}$
using *hd-weak-ranking[of f 0] xs-nonempty f not-outside*
by (*auto simp: hd-conv-nth xs-def strongly-preferred-def*)
also have $\{y. le\ (f\ n)\ y\} = \text{carrier}$
using *last-weak-ranking[of f n] xs-nonempty f not-outside*
by (*auto simp: last-conv-nth xs-def n-def*)
also from p **have** *measure-pmf.prob p carrier = 1*
by (*subst measure-pmf.prob-eq-1*)
(auto simp: AE-measure-pmf-iff lotteries-on-def)
finally show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed


```

from assms[THEN this] show measure-pmf.expectation p u ≤ measure-pmf.expectation
q u
  unfolding SD-preorder n-def using f'
  by (auto intro!: sum-mono mult-left-mono SD' simp: utility-le-iff f-le)

next
assume  $\forall u. \text{is-vnm-utility } u \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation}$ 
q u
hence expected-utility-le: measure-pmf.expectation p u ≤ measure-pmf.expectation
q u
  if is-vnm-utility u for u using that by blast
  define xs where xs = weak-ranking le
  have le: le = of-weak-ranking xs and [simp]: is-weak-ranking xs
    by (simp-all add: xs-def weak-ranking-total-preorder)
  have carrier: carrier =  $\bigcup$ (set xs)
    by (simp add: xs-def weak-ranking-Union)
  from assms have carrier-nonempty: carrier  $\neq$   $\{\}$ 
    by (auto simp: lotteries-on-def set-pmf-not-empty)

  {
    fix x assume x: x  $\in$  carrier
    let ?idx =  $\lambda y. \text{length } xs - \text{weak-ranking-index } y$ 
    have preferred-subset-carrier:  $\{y. \text{le } x \ y\} \subseteq \text{carrier}$ 
      using not-outside x by auto
    have measure-pmf.prob p  $\{y. \text{le } x \ y\} / \text{real (length } xs) \leq$ 
      measure-pmf.prob q  $\{y. \text{le } x \ y\} / \text{real (length } xs)$ 
    proof (rule field-le-epsilon)
      fix  $\varepsilon :: \text{real}$  assume  $\varepsilon: \varepsilon > 0$ 
      define u where u y = indicator  $\{y. y \succeq[\text{le}] x\} y + \varepsilon * ?idx \ y$  for y
      have is-utility: is-vnm-utility u unfolding u-def xs-def
      proof (intro vnm-utility.add-left vnm-utility.scaled utility-weak-ranking-index)
        fix y z assume le y z
        thus indicator  $\{y. y \succeq[\text{le}] x\} y \leq (\text{indicator } \{y. y \succeq[\text{le}] x\} z :: \text{real})$ 
          by (auto intro: trans simp: indicator-def split: if-splits)
      qed fact+

    have  $(\sum y | \text{le } x \ y. \text{pmf } p \ y) \leq$ 
       $(\sum y | \text{le } x \ y. \text{pmf } p \ y) + \varepsilon * (\sum y \in \text{carrier}. ?idx \ y * \text{pmf } p \ y)$ 
      using  $\varepsilon$  by (auto intro!: mult-nonneg-nonneg sum-nonneg pmf-nonneg)
    also from expected-utility-le is-utility have
      measure-pmf.expectation p u ≤ measure-pmf.expectation q u .
    with assms
      have  $(\sum a \in \text{carrier}. u \ a * \text{pmf } p \ a) \leq (\sum a \in \text{carrier}. u \ a * \text{pmf } q \ a)$ 
      by (subst (asm) (1 2) integral-measure-pmf[OF finite-carrier])
      (auto simp: lotteries-on-def set-pmf-eq ac-simps)
    hence  $(\sum y | \text{le } x \ y. \text{pmf } p \ y) + \varepsilon * (\sum y \in \text{carrier}. ?idx \ y * \text{pmf } p \ y) \leq$ 
       $(\sum y | \text{le } x \ y. \text{pmf } q \ y) + \varepsilon * (\sum y \in \text{carrier}. ?idx \ y * \text{pmf } q \ y)$ 
      using x preferred-subset-carrier not-outside
      by (simp add: u-def sum.distrib finite-carrier algebra-simps sum-distrib-left)
  }

```

Int-absorb1 cong: rev-conj-cong
also have $(\sum_{y \in \text{carrier}} ?\text{id}x\ y * \text{pmf}\ q\ y) \leq (\sum_{y \in \text{carrier}} \text{length}\ xs * \text{pmf}\ q\ y)$
by (*intro sum-mono mult-right-mono*) (*simp-all add: pmf-nonneg*)
also have $\dots = \text{measure-pmf.expectation}\ q\ (\lambda\ \cdot. \text{length}\ xs)$
using *assms* **by** (*subst integral-measure-pmf[OF finite-carrier]*)
(auto simp: lotteries-on-def set-pmf-eq ac-simps)
also have $\dots = \text{length}\ xs$ **by** *simp*
also have $(\sum_{y \mid \text{le}\ x\ y} \text{pmf}\ p\ y) = \text{measure-pmf.prob}\ p\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\}$
using *finite-subset[OF preferred-subset-carrier finite-carrier]*
by (*simp add: measure-measure-pmf-finite*)
also have $(\sum_{y \mid \text{le}\ x\ y} \text{pmf}\ q\ y) = \text{measure-pmf.prob}\ q\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\}$
using *finite-subset[OF preferred-subset-carrier finite-carrier]*
by (*simp add: measure-measure-pmf-finite*)
finally show $\text{measure-pmf.prob}\ p\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\} / \text{length}\ xs \leq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob}\ q\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\} / \text{length}\ xs + \varepsilon$
using ε **by** (*simp add: divide-simps*)
qed
moreover from *carrier-nonempty carrier* **have** $xs \neq []$ **by** *auto*
ultimately have $\text{measure-pmf.prob}\ p\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\} \leq$
 $\text{measure-pmf.prob}\ q\ \{y. \text{le}\ x\ y\}$
by (*simp add: field-simps*)
}
with *assms* **show** $p \preceq_{[SD(le)]} q$ **unfolding** *SD-preorder preferred-alt-def* **by**
blast
qed

lemma *not-strict-SD-iff*:
assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on}\ \text{carrier}\ q \in \text{lotteries-on}\ \text{carrier}$
shows $\neg(p \prec_{[SD(le)]} q) \longleftrightarrow$
 $(\exists u. \text{is-vnm-utility}\ u \wedge \text{measure-pmf.expectation}\ q\ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation}\ p\ u)$
proof
let $?E = \text{measure-pmf.expectation} :: 'a\ \text{pmf} \Rightarrow \text{real}$
assume $\exists u. \text{is-vnm-utility}\ u \wedge ?E\ p\ u \geq ?E\ q\ u$
then obtain u **where** $u: \text{is-vnm-utility}\ u \wedge ?E\ p\ u \geq ?E\ q\ u$ **by** *blast*
interpret $u: \text{vnm-utility}\ \text{carrier}\ \text{le}\ u$ **by** *fact*

show $\neg p \prec_{[SD\ le]} q$
proof
assume *less*: $p \prec_{[SD\ le]} q$
with *assms* **have** $?E\ p\ u \leq ?E\ q\ u$ **if** *is-vnm-utility* u **for** u
using *that* **by** (*auto simp: SD-iff-expected-utilities-le strongly-preferred-def*)
with u **have** $u\text{-eq}: ?E\ p\ u = ?E\ q\ u$ **by** (*intro antisym*) *simp-all*
from *less* *assms* **obtain** u' **where** $u': \text{is-vnm-utility}\ u' \wedge ?E\ p\ u' < ?E\ q\ u'$
by (*auto simp: SD-iff-expected-utilities-le strongly-preferred-def not-le*)
interpret $u': \text{vnm-utility}\ \text{carrier}\ \text{le}\ u'$ **by** *fact*

have $\exists \varepsilon > 0. \text{is-vnm-utility}\ (\lambda x. u\ x - \varepsilon * u'\ x)$

by (intro u.diff-epsilon antisym u'.utility-le)
 then obtain ε where $\varepsilon: \varepsilon > 0$ is-vnm-utility $(\lambda x. u x - \varepsilon * u' x)$ by auto
 define u'' where $u'' x = u x - \varepsilon * u' x$ for x
 interpret u'' : vnm-utility carrier le u'' unfolding u'' -def by fact
 have $\text{exp-}u''$: $?E p u'' = ?E p u - \varepsilon * ?E p u'$ if $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$ for p
 using that
 by (subst (1 2 3) integral-measure-pmf[of carrier])
 (auto simp: lotteries-on-def u'' -def algebra-simps sum-subtractf sum-distrib-left)
 from $\text{assms } \varepsilon$ have $?E p u'' > ?E q u''$
 by (simp-all add: $\text{exp-}u''$ algebra-simps u-eq u')
 with $\text{pq}[OF u''.vnm-utility-axioms]$ show False by simp
 qed
 qed (insert $\text{assms utility-weak-ranking-index}$,
 auto simp: strongly-preferred-def SD-iff-expected-utilities-le not-le not-less intro:
 antisym)

lemma strict-SD-iff:
 assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$
 shows $(p \prec[SD(le)] q) \longleftrightarrow$
 $(\forall u. \text{is-vnm-utility } u \longrightarrow \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p u < \text{measure-pmf.expectation } q u)$
 using not-strict-SD-iff[OF assms] by auto

end

end

theory SD-Efficiency
 imports Complex-Main Preference-Profiles Lotteries Stochastic-Dominance
 begin

context pref-profile-wf
 begin

lemma SD-inefficient-support-subset:
 assumes inefficient: $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R p'$
 assumes support: $\text{set-pmf } p' \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p$
 assumes lotteries: $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
 shows $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R p$
 proof –
 from assms have p' -wf: $p' \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ by (simp add: lotteries-on-def)
 from inefficient obtain $q' i$ where $q': q' \in \text{lotteries-on alts } i \in \text{agents}$
 $\wedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q' \succeq[SD(R i)] p' q' \succ[SD(R i)] p'$
 unfolding SD-efficient-def' by blast
 have subset: $\{x. \text{pmf } p' x > \text{pmf } q' x\} \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p'$ by (auto simp: set-pmf-eq)

also have $\dots \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p$ **by fact**
also have $\dots \subseteq \text{alts}$ **using** *lotteries* **by** (*simp add: lotteries-on-def*)
finally have *finite*: $\text{finite } \{x. \text{pmf } p' x > \text{pmf } q' x\}$
using *finite-alts* **by** (*rule finite-subset*)

define ε **where** $\varepsilon = \text{Min } (\text{insert } 1 \ \{\text{pmf } p x / (\text{pmf } p' x - \text{pmf } q' x) \mid x. \text{pmf } p' x > \text{pmf } q' x\})$
define *supp* **where** $\text{supp} = \text{set-pmf } p \cup \text{set-pmf } q'$
from *lotteries finite-alts* $q'(1)$ **have** *finite-supp*: *finite* *supp*
by (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def supp-def dest: finite-subset*)
from *support* **have** [*simp*]: $\text{pmf } p x = 0 \ \text{pmf } p' x = 0 \ \text{pmf } q' x = 0$ **if** $x \notin \text{supp}$
for x
using *that* **by** (*auto simp: supp-def set-pmf-eq*)

from *finite support subset* **have** $\varepsilon: \varepsilon > 0$ **unfolding** $\varepsilon\text{-def}$
by (*auto simp: field-simps set-pmf-eq'*)
have *nonneg*: $\text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x) \geq 0$ **for** x
proof (*cases pmf p' x > pmf q' x*)
case *True*
with *finite* **have** $\varepsilon \leq \text{pmf } p x / (\text{pmf } p' x - \text{pmf } q' x)$
unfolding $\varepsilon\text{-def}$ **by** (*intro Min-le*) *auto*
with *True* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: field-simps*)
next
case *False*
with *pmf-nonneg[of p x]* ε **show** *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed

define q **where** $q = \text{embed-pmf } (\lambda x. \text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x))$
have $(\int^+ x. \text{ennreal } (\text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x))) \ \partial \text{count-space UNIV} = 1$
proof (*subst nn-integral-count-space'*)
have $(\sum x \in \text{supp}. \text{ennreal } (\text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x))) =$
 $\text{ennreal } ((\sum x \in \text{supp}. \text{pmf } p x) + \varepsilon * ((\sum x \in \text{supp}. \text{pmf } q' x) - (\sum x \in \text{supp}. \text{pmf } p' x)))$
by (*subst sum-ennreal[OF nonneg]*, *rule ennreal-cong*)
(auto simp: sum-subtractf ring-distrib sum.distrib sum-distrib-left)
also from *finite-supp support* **have** $\dots = 1$
by (*subst (1 2 3) sum-pmf-eq-1*) (*auto simp: supp-def*)
finally show $(\sum x \in \text{supp}. \text{ennreal } (\text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x))) = 1$
qed (*insert nonneg finite-supp, simp-all*)

with *nonneg* **have** *pmf-q*: $\text{pmf } q x = \text{pmf } p x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q' x - \text{pmf } p' x)$ **for** x
unfolding *q-def* **by** (*intro pmf-embed-pmf*) *simp-all*
with *support* **have** *support-q*: $\text{set-pmf } q \subseteq \text{supp}$
unfolding *supp-def* **by** (*auto simp: set-pmf-eq*)
with *lotteries support q'(1)* **have** *q-wf*: $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
by (*auto simp add: lotteries-on-def supp-def*)

from *support-q support* **have** *expected-utility*:

$\text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u = \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u +$
 $\varepsilon * (\text{measure-pmf.expectation } q' \ u - \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p' \ u)$ **for** u
by (*subst (1 2 3 4) integral-measure-pmf[OF finite-supp]*)
(auto simp: pmf-q supp-def sum.distrib sum-distrib-left
sum-distrib-right sum-subtractf algebra-simps)

have $q \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ p$ **if** $i: i \in \text{agents}$ **for** i

proof –

from i **interpret** *finite-total-preorder-on alts* $R \ i$ **by** *simp*
from i *lotteries* $q'(1) \ q'(\beta)[OF \ i] \ q\text{-wf} \ p'\text{-wf} \ \varepsilon$ **show** *?thesis*
by (*fastforce simp: SD-iff-expected-utilities-le expected-utility*)

qed

moreover from $\langle i \in \text{agents} \rangle$ **interpret** *finite-total-preorder-on alts* $R \ i$ **by** *simp*

from *lotteries* $q'(1,4) \ q\text{-wf} \ p'\text{-wf} \ \varepsilon$ **have** $q \succ [SD(R \ i)] \ p$
by (*force simp: SD-iff-expected-utilities-le expected-utility not-le strongly-preferred-def*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** $q\text{-wf} \ \langle i \in \text{agents} \rangle$ **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'*

by *blast*

qed

lemma *SD-efficient-support-subset*:

assumes *SD-efficient* $R \ p \ \text{set-pmf } p' \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p \ p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows *SD-efficient* $R \ p'$
using *SD-inefficient-support-subset[OF - assms(2,3)] assms(1)* **by** *blast*

lemma *SD-efficient-same-support*:

assumes $\text{set-pmf } p = \text{set-pmf } p' \ p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows *SD-efficient* $R \ p \longleftrightarrow \text{SD-efficient}$ $R \ p'$
using *SD-inefficient-support-subset[of p p'] SD-inefficient-support-subset[of p' p]*

assms

by (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def*)

lemma *SD-efficient-iff*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows *SD-efficient* $R \ p \longleftrightarrow \text{SD-efficient}$ $R \ (\text{pmf-of-set } (\text{set-pmf } p))$
using *assms finite-alts*

by (*intro SD-efficient-same-support*)

(simp, subst set-pmf-of-set,

auto simp: set-pmf-not-empty lotteries-on-def intro: finite-subset[OF - finite-alts])

lemma *SD-efficient-no-pareto-loser*:

assumes *efficient: SD-efficient* $R \ p$ **and** $p\text{-wf}: p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows $\text{set-pmf } p \cap \text{pareto-losers } R = \{\}$

proof –

have $x \notin \text{pareto-losers } R$ **if** $x: x \in \text{set-pmf } p$ **for** x

proof –

from x **have** $\text{set-pmf } (\text{return-pmf } x) \subseteq \text{set-pmf } p$ **by** *auto*
from *efficient this p-wf* **have** *SD-efficient* $R \ (\text{return-pmf } x)$
by (*rule SD-efficient-support-subset*)

moreover from $assms$ $x \in alts$ **by** (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def*)
ultimately show $x \notin \text{pareto-losers } R$ **by** (*simp add: SD-efficient-singleton-iff*)
qed
thus *?thesis* **by** *blast*
qed

Given two lotteries with the same support where one is strictly Pareto-SD-preferred to the other, one can construct a third lottery that is weakly Pareto-SD-preferred to the better lottery (and therefore strictly Pareto-SD-preferred to the worse lottery) and whose support is a strict subset of the original supports.

lemma *improve-lottery-support-subset*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on}$ $alts$ $q \in \text{lotteries-on}$ $alts$ $q \succ [Pareto(SD \circ R)] p$
 $set\text{-pmf } p = set\text{-pmf } q$

obtains r **where** $r \in \text{lotteries-on}$ $alts$ $r \succeq [Pareto(SD \circ R)] q$ $set\text{-pmf } r \subset set\text{-pmf } p$

proof –

have $subset: \{x. pmf\ p\ x > pmf\ q\ x\} \subseteq set\text{-pmf } p$ **by** (*auto simp: set-pmf-eq*)

also have $\dots \subseteq alts$ **using** $assms$ **by** (*simp add: lotteries-on-def*)

finally have $finite: finite\ \{x. pmf\ p\ x > pmf\ q\ x\}$

using $finite\text{-alts}$ **by** (*rule finite-subset*)

from $assms$ **have** $q \neq p$ **by** (*auto simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

hence $ex\text{-less}: \exists x. pmf\ p\ x > pmf\ q\ x$ **by** (*rule pmf-neq-exists-less*)

define ε **where** $\varepsilon = Min\ \{pmf\ p\ x / (pmf\ p\ x - pmf\ q\ x) \mid x. pmf\ p\ x > pmf\ q\ x\}$

define $supp$ **where** $supp = set\text{-pmf } p$

from $assms$ $finite\text{-alts}$ **have** $finite\text{-supp}: finite\ supp$

by (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def supp-def dest: finite-subset*)

from $assms$ **have** $[simp]: pmf\ p\ x = 0 \wedge pmf\ q\ x = 0$ **if** $x \notin supp$ **for** x

using $that$ **by** (*auto simp: supp-def set-pmf-eq*)

from $finite\ subset\ ex\text{-less}$ **have** $\varepsilon: \varepsilon \geq 1$ **unfolding** $\varepsilon\text{-def}$

by (*intro Min.boundedI*) (*auto simp: field-simps pmf-nonneg*)

have $nonneg: pmf\ p\ x + \varepsilon * (pmf\ q\ x - pmf\ p\ x) \geq 0$ **for** x

proof (*cases pmf p x > pmf q x*)

case *True*

with $finite$ **have** $\varepsilon \leq pmf\ p\ x / (pmf\ p\ x - pmf\ q\ x)$

unfolding $\varepsilon\text{-def}$ **by** (*intro Min-le*) *auto*

with *True* **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: field-simps*)

next

case *False*

with $pmf\text{-nonneg}[of\ p\ x]\ \varepsilon$ **show** *?thesis* **by** *simp*

qed

define r **where** $r = embed\text{-pmf}\ (\lambda x. pmf\ p\ x + \varepsilon * (pmf\ q\ x - pmf\ p\ x))$

have $(\int^+ x. ennreal\ (pmf\ p\ x + \varepsilon * (pmf\ q\ x - pmf\ p\ x))\ \partial count\text{-space}\ UNIV) = 1$

proof (*subst nn-integral-count-space'*)
have $(\sum_{x \in \text{supp.}} \text{ennreal} (\text{pmf } p \ x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q \ x - \text{pmf } p \ x))) =$
 $\text{ennreal} ((\sum_{x \in \text{supp.}} \text{pmf } p \ x) + \varepsilon * ((\sum_{x \in \text{supp.}} \text{pmf } q \ x) - (\sum_{x \in \text{supp.}} \text{pmf } p \ x)))$
by (*subst sum-ennreal[OF nonneg], rule ennreal-cong*)
(auto simp: sum-subtractf ring-distrib sum.distrib sum-distrib-left)
also from *finite-supp* **have** $\dots = 1$
by (*subst (1 2 3) sum-pmf-eq-1*) (*auto simp: supp-def assms*)
finally show $(\sum_{x \in \text{supp.}} \text{ennreal} (\text{pmf } p \ x + \varepsilon * (\text{pmf } q \ x - \text{pmf } p \ x))) = 1$.
qed (*insert nonneg finite-supp, simp-all*)
with *nonneg* **have** *pmf-r: pmf r x = pmf p x + ε * (pmf q x - pmf p x)* **for** *x*
unfolding *r-def* **by** (*intro pmf-embed-pmf*) *simp-all*

with *assms* **have** $\text{set-pmf } r \subseteq \text{supp}$
unfolding *supp-def* **by** (*auto simp: set-pmf-eq*)
from *finite ex-less* **have** $\varepsilon \in \{\text{pmf } p \ x / (\text{pmf } p \ x - \text{pmf } q \ x) \mid x. \text{pmf } p \ x > \text{pmf } q \ x\}$
unfolding *ε-def* **by** (*intro Min-in*) *auto*
then obtain *x* **where** $\varepsilon = \text{pmf } p \ x / (\text{pmf } p \ x - \text{pmf } q \ x)$ $\text{pmf } p \ x > \text{pmf } q \ x$
by *blast*
hence $\text{pmf } r \ x = 0$ **by** (*simp add: pmf-r field-simps*)
moreover from $\langle \text{pmf } p \ x > \text{pmf } q \ x \rangle$ *pmf-nonneg[of q x]*
have $\text{pmf } p \ x > 0$ **by** *linarith*
ultimately have $x \in \text{set-pmf } p - \text{set-pmf } r$ **by** (*auto simp: set-pmf-iff*)
with $\langle \text{set-pmf } r \subseteq \text{supp} \rangle$ **have** *support-r: set-pmf r ⊂ set-pmf p* **unfolding**
supp-def **by** *blast*
from *this assms* **have** *r-wf: r ∈ lotteries-on alts* **by** (*simp add: lotteries-on-def*)

have $r \succeq [\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] \ q$ **unfolding** *SD.Pareto-iff* **unfolding** *o-def*
proof
fix *i* **assume** $i \in \text{agents}$
then interpret *finite-total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*
show $r \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ q$
proof (*subst SD-iff-expected-utilities-le; safe?*)
fix *u* **assume** $u: \text{is-vnm-utility } u$
from *support-r* **have** *expected-utility-r:*
 $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } r \ u = \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u +$
 $\varepsilon * (\text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u - \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u)$
by (*subst (1 2 3 4) integral-measure-pmf[OF finite-supp]*)
(auto simp: supp-def assms pmf-r sum.distrib sum-distrib-left
sum-distrib-right sum-subtractf algebra-simps)
from *assms i* **have** $q \succeq [SD(R \ i)] \ p$ **by** (*simp add: SD.Pareto-strict-iff*)
with *assms u* **have** $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u \geq \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u$
by (*simp add: SD-iff-expected-utilities-le r-wf*)
hence $(\varepsilon - 1) * \text{measure-pmf.expectation } p \ u \leq (\varepsilon - 1) * \text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u$
using ε **by** (*intro mult-left-mono*) *simp-all*
thus $\text{measure-pmf.expectation } q \ u \leq \text{measure-pmf.expectation } r \ u$

by (simp add: algebra-simps expected-utility-r)
 qed fact+
 qed
 from that[OF r-wf this support-r] show ?thesis .
 qed

4.5 Existence of SD-efficient lotteries

In this section, we will show that any lottery can be ‘improved’ to an SD-efficient lottery, i.e. for any lottery, there exists an SD-efficient lottery that is weakly SD-preferred to the original one by all agents.

context

fixes $p :: \text{'alt lottery}$
 assumes $\text{lott: } p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$

begin

private definition *improve-lottery* :: *'alt lottery* \Rightarrow *'alt lottery* **where**

improve-lottery $q = (\text{let } A = \{r \in \text{lotteries-on alts. } r \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q\} \text{ in}$
 $(\text{SOME } r. r \in A \wedge \neg(\exists r' \in A. \text{set-pmf } r' \subset \text{set-pmf } r)))$

private lemma *improve-lottery*:

assumes $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R \ q$

defines $r \equiv \text{improve-lottery } q$

shows $r \in \text{lotteries-on alts } r \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q$

$\bigwedge r'. r' \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \Longrightarrow r' \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q \Longrightarrow \neg(\text{set-pmf } r' \subset \text{set-pmf } r)$

proof –

define A **where** $A = \{r \in \text{lotteries-on alts. } r \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q\}$

have *subset-alts*: $X \subseteq \text{alts}$ **if** $X \in \text{set-pmf}' A$ **for** X **using** *that*

by (auto simp: A-def lotteries-on-def)

have *r-altdef*: $r = (\text{SOME } r. r \in A \wedge \neg(\exists r' \in A. \text{set-pmf } r' \subset \text{set-pmf } r))$

unfolding *r-def improve-lottery-def Let-def A-def* **by** *simp*

from *assms* **have** *nonempty*: $A \neq \{\}$ **by** (auto simp: A-def SD-efficient-def)

hence *nonempty'*: $\text{set-pmf}' A \neq \{\}$ **by** *simp*

have *set-pmf'* $A \subseteq \text{Pow alts}$ **by** (auto simp: A-def lotteries-on-def)

from *finite-alts* **have** *wf*: $\text{wf } \{(X, Y). X \subset Y \wedge Y \subseteq \text{alts}\}$

by (rule finite-subset-wf)

obtain X

where $X \in \text{set-pmf}' A \wedge Y. Y \subset X \wedge X \subseteq \text{alts} \Longrightarrow Y \notin \text{set-pmf}' A$

by (rule wfE-min'[OF wf nonempty']) *simp-all*

hence $\exists r. r \in A \wedge \neg(\exists r' \in A. \text{set-pmf } r' \subset \text{set-pmf } r)$

by (auto simp: subset-alts[of X])

from *someI-ex*[OF this, folded *r-altdef*]

show $r \in \text{lotteries-on alts } r \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q$

$\bigwedge r'. r' \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \Longrightarrow r' \succ [\text{Pareto}(\text{SD} \circ R)] q \Longrightarrow \neg(\text{set-pmf } r' \subset \text{set-pmf } r)$

unfolding *A-def* **by** *blast+*

qed


```

private fun sd-chain :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'alt lottery option where
  sd-chain 0 = Some p
| sd-chain (Suc n) =
  (case sd-chain n of
    None  $\Rightarrow$  None
  | Some p  $\Rightarrow$  if SD-efficient R p then None else Some (improve-lottery p))

private lemma sd-chain-None-propagate:
   $m \geq n \Rightarrow \text{sd-chain } n = \text{None} \Rightarrow \text{sd-chain } m = \text{None}$ 
by (induction rule: inc-induct) simp-all

private lemma sd-chain-Some-propagate:
   $m \geq n \Rightarrow \text{sd-chain } m = \text{Some } q \Rightarrow \exists q'. \text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } q'$ 
by (cases sd-chain n) (auto simp: sd-chain-None-propagate)

private lemma sd-chain-NoneD:
   $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{None} \Rightarrow \exists n p. \text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } p \wedge \text{SD-efficient } R p$ 
by (induction n) (auto split: option.splits if-splits)

private lemma sd-chain-lottery:  $\text{sd-chain } n = \text{Some } q \Rightarrow q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ 
by (induction n) (insert lott, auto split: option.splits if-splits simp: improve-lottery)

private lemma sd-chain-Suc:
  assumes sd-chain m = Some q
  assumes sd-chain (Suc m) = Some r
  shows  $q \prec [\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] r$ 
  using assms by (auto split: if-splits simp: improve-lottery)

private lemma sd-chain-strictly-preferred:
  assumes  $m < n$ 
  assumes sd-chain m = Some q
  assumes sd-chain n = Some s
  shows  $q \prec [\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] s$ 
  using assms
proof (induction arbitrary: q rule: strict-inc-induct)
  case (base k q)
  with sd-chain-Suc[of k q s] show ?case by (simp del: sd-chain.simps add: o-def)
next
  case (step k q)
  from step.hyps have  $\text{Suc } k \leq n$  by simp
  from sd-chain-Some-propagate[OF this, of s] step.prems obtain r
  where  $r: \text{sd-chain } (\text{Suc } k) = \text{Some } r$  by (auto simp del: sd-chain.simps)
  with step.prems have  $q \prec [\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] r$  by (intro sd-chain-Suc)
  moreover from r step.prems have  $r \prec [\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] s$  by (intro step.IH)
  simp-all
  ultimately show ?case by (rule SD.Pareto.strict-trans)
qed

```

```

private lemma sd-chain-preferred:
  assumes  $m \leq n$ 
  assumes  $sd\text{-chain } m = \text{Some } q$ 
  assumes  $sd\text{-chain } n = \text{Some } s$ 
  shows  $q \preceq[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] s$ 
proof (cases  $m < n$ )
  case True
  from sd-chain-strictly-preferred[OF this assms(2,3)] show ?thesis
    by (simp add: strongly-preferred-def)
  next
  case False
  with assms show ?thesis by (auto intro: SD.Pareto.refl sd-chain-lottery)
qed

lemma SD-efficient-lottery-exists:
  obtains  $q$  where  $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \succeq[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] p$  SD-efficient  $R$   $q$ 
proof -
  consider  $\exists n. sd\text{-chain } n = \text{None} \mid \forall n. \exists q. sd\text{-chain } n = \text{Some } q$ 
  using option.exhaust by metis
  thus ?thesis
proof cases
  case 1
  define  $m$  where  $m = (\text{LEAST } m. sd\text{-chain } m = \text{None})$ 
  define  $k$  where  $k = m - 1$ 
  from LeastI-ex[OF 1] have  $m: sd\text{-chain } m = \text{None}$  by (simp add: m-def)
  from  $m$  have  $nz: m \neq 0$  by (intro notI) simp-all
  from  $nz$  have  $m\text{-altdef}: m = \text{Suc } k$  by (simp add: k-def)
  from  $nz$  Least-le[of  $\lambda m. sd\text{-chain } m = \text{None } m - 1$ , folded m-def]
  obtain  $q$  where  $q: sd\text{-chain } k = \text{Some } q$  by (cases  $sd\text{-chain } (m - 1)$ ) (auto
simp: k-def)
  from sd-chain-preferred[OF - sd-chain.simps(1) this] have  $q \succeq[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)]$ 
 $p$  by simp
  moreover from  $q$  have  $q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$  by (simp add: sd-chain-lottery)
  moreover from  $q$   $m$  have SD-efficient  $R$   $q$  by (auto split: if-splits simp:
m-altdef)
  ultimately show ?thesis using that[of  $q$ ] by blast
next
  case 2
  have  $\text{range } (set\text{-pmf } \circ the \circ sd\text{-chain}) \subseteq \text{Pow alts}$  unfolding o-def
  proof safe
    fix  $n$   $x$  assume  $A: x \in set\text{-pmf } (the (sd\text{-chain } n))$ 
    from 2 obtain  $q$  where  $sd\text{-chain } n = \text{Some } q$  by auto
    with sd-chain-lottery[of  $n$   $q$ ] have  $set\text{-pmf } (the (sd\text{-chain } n)) \subseteq \text{alts}$ 
      by (simp add: lotteries-on-def)
    with  $A$  show  $x \in \text{alts}$  by blast
  qed
  hence  $\text{finite } (\text{range } (set\text{-pmf } \circ the \circ sd\text{-chain}))$  by (rule finite-subset) simp-all
  from pigeonhole-infinite[OF infinite-UNIV-nat this]
  obtain  $m$  where  $\text{infinite } \{n. set\text{-pmf } (the (sd\text{-chain } n)) = set\text{-pmf } (the$ 

```

```

(sd-chain m))}
  by auto
  hence infinite ({n. set-pmf (the (sd-chain n)) = set-pmf (the (sd-chain m))}
- {k. ¬(k > m)})
  by (simp add: not-less)
  hence ({n. set-pmf (the (sd-chain n)) = set-pmf (the (sd-chain m))} - {k.
¬(k > m)}) ≠ {}
  by (intro notI) simp-all
  then obtain n where mn: n > m set-pmf (the (sd-chain n)) = set-pmf (the
(sd-chain m))
  by blast
  from 2 obtain p q where pq: sd-chain m = Some p sd-chain n = Some q by
blast
  from mn pq have supp-eq: set-pmf p = set-pmf q by simp
  from mn(1) pq have less: p ≺[Pareto(SD◦R)] q by (rule sd-chain-strictly-preferred)

  from ⟨m < n⟩ have n > 0 by simp
  with ⟨sd-chain n = Some q⟩ sd-chain.simps(2)[of n - 1]
  obtain r where r: ¬SD-efficient R r q = improve-lottery r
  by (auto simp del: sd-chain.simps split: if-splits option.splits)

  from pq have p ∈ lotteries-on alts q ∈ lotteries-on alts
  by (simp-all add: sd-chain-lottery)
  from improve-lottery-support-subset[OF this less supp-eq]
  obtain s where s: s ∈ lotteries-on alts Pareto (SD ◦ R) q s set-pmf s ⊂ set-pmf
p .
  from improve-lottery(2)[of r] r s have s ≻[Pareto(SD◦R)] r
  by (auto intro: SD.Pareto.strict-weak-trans)
  from improve-lottery(3)[OF r(1) s(1) this] supp-eq r
  have ¬set-pmf s ⊂ set-pmf p by simp
  with s(3) show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
qed
end

lemma
  assumes p ∈ lotteries-on alts
  shows ∃ q ∈ lotteries-on alts. q ≽[Pareto(SD◦R)] p ∧ SD-efficient R q
  using SD-efficient-lottery-exists[OF assms] by blast

end

end

```

5 Social Decision Schemes

```

theory Social-Decision-Schemes
imports

```

Complex-Main
HOL-Probability.Probability
Preference-Profiles
Elections
Order-Predicates
Stochastic-Dominance
SD-Efficiency
begin

5.1 Basic Social Choice definitions

context *election*
begin

The set of lotteries, i.e. the probability mass functions on the type *'alt* whose support is a subset of the alternative set.

abbreviation *lotteries* **where**
lotteries \equiv *lotteries-on alts*

The probability that a lottery returns an alternative that is in the given set

abbreviation *lottery-prob* :: *'alt lottery* \Rightarrow *'alt set* \Rightarrow *real* **where**
lottery-prob \equiv *measure-pmf.prob*

lemma *lottery-prob-alts-superset*:

assumes $p \in$ *lotteries alts* \subseteq *A*

shows *lottery-prob p A* = 1

using *assms* **by** (*subst measure-pmf.prob-eq-1*) (*auto simp: AE-measure-pmf-iff lotteries-on-def*)

lemma *lottery-prob-alts*: $p \in$ *lotteries* \implies *lottery-prob p alts* = 1

by (*rule lottery-prob-alts-superset*) *simp-all*

end

In the context of an election, a preference profile is a function that assigns to each agent her preference relation (which is a total preorder)

5.2 Social Decision Schemes

In the context of an election, a Social Decision Scheme (SDS) is a function that maps preference profiles to lotteries on the alternatives.

locale *social-decision-scheme* = *election agents alts*

for *agents* :: *'agent set* **and** *alts* :: *'alt set* +

fixes *sds* :: (*'agent, 'alt*) *pref-profile* \Rightarrow *'alt lottery*

assumes *sds-wf*: *is-pref-profile R* \implies *sds R* \in *lotteries*

5.3 Anonymity

An SDS is anonymous if permuting the agents in the input does not change the result.

```
locale anonymous-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds +
  assumes anonymous:  $\pi$  permutes agents  $\implies$  is-pref-profile R  $\implies$  sds ( $R \circ \pi$ ) =
sds R
begin
```

```
lemma anonymity-prefs-from-table:
```

```
  assumes prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts ys
```

```
  assumes mset (map snd xs) = mset (map snd ys)
```

```
  shows sds (prefs-from-table xs) = sds (prefs-from-table ys)
```

```
proof –
```

```
  from assms obtain  $\pi$  where  $\pi$  permutes agents prefs-from-table xs  $\circ \pi =$ 
prefs-from-table ys
```

```
    by (rule prefs-from-table-agent-permutation)
```

```
  with anonymous[of  $\pi$ , of prefs-from-table xs] assms(1) show ?thesis
```

```
    by (simp add: pref-profile-from-tableI)
```

```
qed
```

```
context
```

```
begin
```

```
qualified lemma anonymity-prefs-from-table-aux:
```

```
  assumes R1 = prefs-from-table xs prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs
```

```
  assumes R2 = prefs-from-table ys prefs-from-table-wf agents alts ys
```

```
  assumes mset (map snd xs) = mset (map snd ys)
```

```
  shows sds R1 = sds R2 unfolding assms(1,2)
```

```
  by (rule anonymity-prefs-from-table) (simp-all add: assms del: mset-map)
```

```
end
```

```
end
```

5.4 Neutrality

An SDS is neutral if permuting the alternatives in the input does not change the result, modulo the equivalent permutation in the output lottery.

```
locale neutral-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds
```

```
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds +
```

```
  assumes neutral:  $\sigma$  permutes alts  $\implies$  is-pref-profile R  $\implies$ 
```

```
    sds (permute-profile  $\sigma$  R) = map-pmf  $\sigma$  (sds R)
```

```
begin
```

Alternative formulation of neutrality that shows that our definition is equivalent to that in the paper.

```
lemma neutral':
```

```
  assumes  $\sigma$  permutes alts
```

```

assumes is-pref-profile R
assumes  $a \in \text{alts}$ 
shows  $\text{pmf} (\text{sds} (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R)) (\sigma a) = \text{pmf} (\text{sds } R) a$ 
proof –
  from assms have  $A: \text{set-pmf} (\text{sds } R) \subseteq \text{alts}$  using sds-wf
    by (simp add: lotteries-on-def)
  from assms(1,2) have  $\text{pmf} (\text{sds} (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R)) (\sigma a) = \text{pmf} (\text{map-pmf}$ 
 $\sigma (\text{sds } R)) (\sigma a)$ 
    by (subst neutral) simp-all
  also from assms have  $\dots = \text{pmf} (\text{sds } R) a$ 
    by (intro pmf-map-inj') (simp-all add: permutes-inj)
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

end

```

```

locale an-sds =
  anonymous-sds agents alts sds + neutral-sds agents alts sds
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds
begin

```

```

lemma sds-anonymous-neutral:
  assumes perm:  $\sigma$  permutes alts and wf: is-pref-profile R1 is-pref-profile R2
  assumes eq: anonymous-profile R1 =
     $\text{image-mset} (\text{map} ((\cdot) \sigma)) (\text{anonymous-profile } R2)$ 
  shows  $\text{sds } R1 = \text{map-pmf } \sigma (\text{sds } R2)$ 
proof –
  interpret R1: pref-profile-wf agents alts R1 by fact
  interpret R2: pref-profile-wf agents alts R2 by fact
  from perm have wf': is-pref-profile (permute-profile  $\sigma R2$ )
    by (rule R2.wf-permute-alts)
  from eq perm have anonymous-profile R1 = anonymous-profile (permute-profile
 $\sigma R2)$ 
    by (simp add: R2.anonymous-profile-permute)
  from anonymous-profile-agent-permutation[OF this wf(1) wf']
    obtain  $\pi$  where  $\pi$  permutes agents permute-profile  $\sigma R2 \circ \pi = R1$  by auto
  have  $\text{sds} (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R2 \circ \pi) = \text{sds} (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R2)$ 
    by (rule anonymous) fact+
  also have  $\dots = \text{map-pmf } \sigma (\text{sds } R2)$ 
    by (rule neutral) fact+
  also have permute-profile  $\sigma R2 \circ \pi = R1$  by fact
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

```

```

lemma sds-anonymous-neutral':
  assumes perm:  $\sigma$  permutes alts and wf: is-pref-profile R1 is-pref-profile R2
  assumes eq: anonymous-profile R1 =

```

$$\text{image-mset } (\text{map } ((\cdot) \sigma)) (\text{anonymous-profile } R2)$$
shows $\text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) (\sigma x) = \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) x$
proof –
have $\text{sds } R1 = \text{map-pmf } \sigma (\text{sds } R2)$ **by** (*intro sds-anonymous-neutral*) *fact+*
also have $\text{pmf } \dots (\sigma x) = \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) x$ **by** (*intro pmf-map-inj' permutes-inj* [*OF perm*])
finally show *?thesis* .
qed

lemma *sds-automorphism*:
assumes *perm*: σ *permutes alts* **and** *wf*: *is-pref-profile* *R*
assumes *eq*: $\text{image-mset } (\text{map } ((\cdot) \sigma)) (\text{anonymous-profile } R) = \text{anonymous-profile } R$
shows $\text{map-pmf } \sigma (\text{sds } R) = \text{sds } R$
using *sds-anonymous-neutral* [*OF perm wf wf eq [symmetric]*] ..

end

lemma *an-sds-automorphism-aux*:
assumes *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts yss R* \equiv *prefs-from-table yss*
assumes *an*: *an-sds agents alts sds*
assumes *eq*: $\text{mset } (\text{map } ((\text{map } ((\cdot) (\text{permutation-of-list } xs)))) \circ \text{snd}) \text{ yss} = \text{mset } (\text{map } \text{snd } \text{ yss})$
assumes *perm*: $\text{set } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs) \subseteq \text{alts set } (\text{map } \text{snd } xs) = \text{set } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)$
 $\text{distinct } (\text{map } \text{fst } xs)$
and *x*: $x \in \text{alts } y = \text{permutation-of-list } xs \ x$
shows $\text{pmf } (\text{sds } R) x = \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R) y$
proof –
note *perm* = *list-permutesI* [*OF perm*]
let *?σ* = *permutation-of-list xs*
note *perm'* = *permutation-of-list-permutes* [*OF perm*]
from *wf* **have** *wf'*: *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* **by** (*simp add: pref-profile-from-tableI*)
then interpret *R*: *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* .
from *perm'* **interpret** *R'*: *pref-profile-wf agents alts permute-profile ?σ R*
by (*simp add: R.wf-permute-alts*)
from *an* **interpret** *an-sds agents alts sds* .

from *eq wf* **have** *eq'*: $\text{image-mset } (\text{map } ((\cdot) ?\sigma)) (\text{anonymous-profile } R) = \text{anonymous-profile } R$
by (*simp add: anonymise-prefs-from-table mset-map multiset.map-comp*)
from *perm' x* **have** $\text{pmf } (\text{sds } R) x = \text{pmf } (\text{map-pmf } ?\sigma (\text{sds } R)) (?σ x)$
by (*simp add: pmf-map-inj' permutes-inj*)
also from *eq' x wf' perm'* **have** $\text{map-pmf } ?\sigma (\text{sds } R) = \text{sds } R$
by (*intro sds-automorphism*)
(simp-all add: R.anonymous-profile-permute pref-profile-from-tableI)
finally show *?thesis using x by simp*
qed

5.5 Ex-post efficiency

locale *ex-post-efficient-sds* = *social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*
for *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +
assumes *ex-post-efficient*:
is-pref-profile $R \implies \text{set-pmf } (sds\ R) \cap \text{pareto-losers } R = \{\}$
begin

lemma *ex-post-efficient'*:
assumes *is-pref-profile* $R\ y \succ [Pareto(R)]\ x$
shows $\text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$
using *ex-post-efficient*[of R] *assms*
by (*auto simp: set-pmf-eq pareto-losers-def*)

lemma *ex-post-efficient''*:
assumes *is-pref-profile* $R\ i \in \text{agents}\ \forall i \in \text{agents}. y \succeq [R\ i]\ x \neg y \preceq [R\ i]\ x$
shows $\text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$
proof –
from *assms*(1) **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* .
from *assms*(2–) **show** ?thesis
by (*intro ex-post-efficient'[OF assms(1), of - y]*)
(*auto simp: Pareto-iff strongly-preferred-def*)
qed

end

5.6 SD efficiency

An SDS is SD-efficient if it returns an SD-efficient lottery for every preference profile, i.e. if the SDS outputs a lottery, it is never the case that there is another lottery that is weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred by at least one agent.

locale *sd-efficient-sds* = *social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*
for *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +
assumes *SD-efficient*: *is-pref-profile* $R \implies \text{SD-efficient } R\ (sds\ R)$
begin

An alternative formulation of SD-efficiency that is somewhat more convenient to use.

lemma *SD-efficient'*:
assumes *is-pref-profile* $R\ q \in \text{lotteries}$
assumes $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies q \succeq [SD(R\ i)]\ sds\ R\ i \in \text{agents}\ q \succ [SD(R\ i)]\ sds\ R$
shows P
proof –
interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* **by** *fact*
show ?thesis
using *SD-efficient*[of R] *sds-wf*[OF *assms*(1)] *assms* **unfolding** *SD-efficient-def'*
by *blast*

qed

Any SD-efficient SDS is also ex-post efficient.

sublocale *ex-post-efficient-sds*

proof *unfold-locales*

fix $R :: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile}$ **assume** $R\text{-wf}: \text{is-pref-profile } R$

interpret $\text{pref-profile-wf agents alts } R$ **by fact**

from $R\text{-wf}$ **show** $\text{set-pmf } (sds\ R) \cap \text{pareto-losers } R = \{\}$

by (*intro SD-efficient-no-pareto-loser SD-efficient sds-wf*)

qed

The following rule can be used to derive facts from inefficient supports: If a set of alternatives is an inefficient support, at least one of the alternatives in it must receive probability 0.

lemma *SD-inefficient-support*:

assumes $A: A \neq \{\}$ $A \subseteq \text{alts}$ **and** *inefficient*: $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R$ (*pmf-of-set } A*)

assumes $wf: \text{is-pref-profile } R$

shows $\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$

proof (*rule ccontr*)

interpret $\text{pref-profile-wf agents alts } R$ **by fact**

assume $\neg(\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0)$

with A **have** $\text{set-pmf } (\text{pmf-of-set } A) \subseteq \text{set-pmf } (sds\ R)$

by (*subst set-pmf-of-set*) (*auto simp: set-pmf-eq intro: finite-subset[OF - finite-alts]*)

from *inefficient and this* **have** $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R$ ($sds\ R$)

by (*rule SD-inefficient-support-subset*) (*simp add: wf sds-wf*)

moreover from *SD-efficient wf* **have** $\text{SD-efficient } R$ ($sds\ R$) .

ultimately show *False* **by contradiction**

qed

lemma *SD-inefficient-support'*:

assumes $wf: \text{is-pref-profile } R$

assumes $A: A \neq \{\}$ $A \subseteq \text{alts}$ **and**

wit: $p \in \text{lotteries} \forall i \in \text{agents}. p \succeq_{[SD(R\ i)]} \text{pmf-of-set } A\ i \in \text{agents}$

$\neg p \preceq_{[SD(R\ i)]} \text{pmf-of-set } A$

shows $\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$

proof (*rule SD-inefficient-support*)

from wf **interpret** $\text{pref-profile-wf agents alts } R$.

from *wit* **show** $\neg \text{SD-efficient } R$ ($\text{pmf-of-set } A$)

by (*intro SD-inefficientI'*) (*auto intro!: bexI[of - i] simp: strongly-preferred-def*)

qed *fact+*

end

5.7 Weak strategyproofness

context *social-decision-scheme*

begin

The SDS is said to be manipulable for a particular preference profile, a particular agent, and a particular alternative preference ordering for that agent if the lottery obtained if the agent submits the alternative preferences strictly SD-dominates that obtained if the original preferences are submitted. (SD-dominated w.r.t. the original preferences)

definition *manipulable-profile*

$:: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow 'agent \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
manipulable-profile $R \ i \ Ri' \longleftrightarrow \text{sds } (R(i := Ri')) \succ_{[SD (R \ i)]} \text{sds } R$

end

An SDS is weakly strategyproof (or just strategyproof) if it is not manipulable for any combination of preference profiles, agents, and alternative preference relations.

locale *strategyproof-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*

for *agents* $:: 'agent \text{ set}$ **and** *alts* $:: 'alt \text{ set}$ **and** *sds* $+$

assumes *strategyproof*:

is-pref-profile $R \Longrightarrow i \in \text{agents} \Longrightarrow \text{total-preorder-on alts } Ri' \Longrightarrow$
 $\neg \text{manipulable-profile } R \ i \ Ri'$

5.8 Strong strategyproofness

context *social-decision-scheme*

begin

The SDS is said to be strongly strategyproof for a particular preference profile, a particular agent, and a particular alternative preference ordering for that agent if the lottery obtained if the agent submits the alternative preferences is SD-dominated by the one obtained if the original preferences are submitted. (SD-dominated w.r.t. the original preferences)

In other words: the SDS is strategyproof w.r.t the preference profile R and the agent i and the alternative preference relation R'_i if the lottery for obtained for R is at least as good for i as the lottery obtained when i misrepresents her preferences as R'_i .

definition *strongly-strategyproof-profile*

$:: ('agent, 'alt) \text{ pref-profile} \Rightarrow 'agent \Rightarrow 'alt \text{ relation} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
strongly-strategyproof-profile $R \ i \ Ri' \longleftrightarrow \text{sds } R \succeq_{[SD (R \ i)]} \text{sds } (R(i := Ri'))$

lemma *strongly-strategyproof-profileI* [*intro*]:

assumes *is-pref-profile* R *total-preorder-on alts* $Ri' \ i \in \text{agents}$

assumes $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{alts} \Longrightarrow \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri'))) \text{ (preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x)$

$\leq \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \text{ (preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x)$

shows *strongly-strategyproof-profile* $R \ i \ Ri'$

proof –

interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts* R **by fact**

show *?thesis*

unfolding *strongly-strategyproof-profile-def*
 by rule (auto intro!: sds-wf assms pref-profile-wf.wf-update)
 qed

lemma *strongly-strategyproof-imp-not-manipulable*:
 assumes *strongly-strategyproof-profile R i Ri'*
 shows \neg *manipulable-profile R i Ri'*
 using assms **unfolding** *strongly-strategyproof-profile-def manipulable-profile-def*
 by (auto simp: *strongly-preferred-def*)

end

An SDS is strongly strategyproof if it is strongly strategyproof for all combinations of preference profiles, agents, and alternative preference relations.

locale *strongly-strategyproof-sds = social-decision-scheme agents alts sds*
 for *agents* :: 'agent set and *alts* :: 'alt set and *sds* +
 assumes *strongly-strategyproof*:
 $is\text{-pref-profile } R \implies i \in agents \implies total\text{-preorder-on } alts Ri' \implies$
 $strongly\text{-strategyproof-profile } R i Ri'$

begin

Any SDS that is strongly strategyproof is also weakly strategyproof.

sublocale *strategyproof-sds*
 by *unfold-locales*
 (simp add: *strongly-strategyproof-imp-not-manipulable strongly-strategyproof*)

end

locale *strategyproof-an-sds =*
strategyproof-sds agents alts sds + an-sds agents alts sds
 for *agents* :: 'agent set and *alts* :: 'alt set and *sds*

end

6 Lowering Social Decision Schemes

theory *SDS-Lowering*
imports *Social-Decision-Schemes*
begin

definition *lift-pref-profile* ::
 $'agent\ set \Rightarrow 'alt\ set \Rightarrow 'agent\ set \Rightarrow 'alt\ set \Rightarrow$
 $('agent, 'alt)\ pref\text{-profile} \Rightarrow ('agent, 'alt)\ pref\text{-profile}$ **where**
lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' R = $(\lambda i\ x\ y.$
 $x \in alts' \wedge y \in alts' \wedge i \in agents' \wedge$
 $(x = y \vee x \notin alts' \vee i \notin agents' \vee (y \in alts \wedge R\ i\ x\ y)))$

lemma *lift-pref-profile-wf*:
assumes *pref-profile-wf agents alts R*
assumes $agents \subseteq agents'$ $alts \subseteq alts'$ *finite alts'*
defines $R' \equiv lift\text{-}pref\text{-}profile\ agents\ alts\ agents'\ alts'\ R$
shows *pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R'*
proof –
from *assms interpret R: pref-profile-wf agents alts by simp*
have *finite-total-preorder-on alts' (R' i)*
if $i: i \in agents'$ **for** i
proof (*cases i ∈ agents*)
case *True*
then interpret *finite-total-preorder-on alts R i by simp*
from *True assms show ?thesis*
by *unfold-locales (auto simp: lift-pref-profile-def dest: total intro: trans)*
next
case *False*
with *assms i show ?thesis*
by *unfold-locales (simp-all add: lift-pref-profile-def)*
qed
moreover **have** $R' i = (\lambda - . False)$ **if** $i \notin agents'$ **for** i
unfolding *lift-pref-profile-def R'-def using that by simp*
ultimately show *?thesis unfolding pref-profile-wf-def using assms by auto*
qed

lemma *lift-pref-profile-permute-agents*:
assumes π *permutes agents agents' $agents \subseteq agents'$*
shows *lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' (R ∘ π) =*
lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' R ∘ π
using *assms permutes-subset[OF assms]*
by (*auto simp add: lift-pref-profile-def o-def permutes-in-image*)

lemma *lift-pref-profile-permute-alts*:
assumes σ *permutes alts alts' $alts \subseteq alts'$*
shows *lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' (permute-profile σ R) =*
permute-profile σ (lift-pref-profile agents alts agents' alts' R)
proof –
from *assms have inv: inv σ permutes alts by (intro permutes-inv)*
from *this assms(2) have inv σ permutes alts' by (rule permutes-subset)*
with *inv show ?thesis using assms permutes-inj[OF <inv σ permutes alts>]*
by (*fastforce simp add: lift-pref-profile-def permutes-in-image*
permute-profile-def fun-eq-iff dest: injD)
qed

lemma *lotteries-on-subset: $A \subseteq B \implies p \in lotteries\text{-}on\ A \implies p \in lotteries\text{-}on\ B$*
unfolding *lotteries-on-def by blast*

lemma *lottery-prob-carrier: $p \in lotteries\text{-}on\ A \implies measure\text{-}pmf.\text{prob}\ p\ A = 1$*
by (*auto simp: measure-pmf.prob-eq-1 lotteries-on-def AE-measure-pmf-iff*)

context

fixes $agents\ alts\ R\ agents'\ alts'\ R'$

assumes $R\text{-wf}$: $pref\text{-profile}\text{-wf}\ agents\ alts\ R$

assumes $election$: $agents \subseteq agents'\ alts \subseteq alts'\ alts \neq \{\}$ $agents \neq \{\}$ $finite\ alts'$

defines $R' \equiv lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\ agents\ alts\ agents'\ alts'\ R$

begin

interpretation R : $pref\text{-profile}\text{-wf}\ agents\ alts\ R$ **by fact**

interpretation R' : $pref\text{-profile}\text{-wf}\ agents'\ alts'\ R'$

using $election\ R\text{-wf}$ **by** ($simp\ add$: $R'\text{-def}\ lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-wf}$)

lemma $lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-strict}\text{-iff}$:

$x \prec[lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\ agents\ alts\ agents'\ alts'\ R\ i] y \longleftrightarrow$

$i \in agents \wedge ((y \in alts \wedge x \in alts' - alts) \vee x \prec[R\ i] y)$

proof ($cases\ i \in agents$)

case $True$

then interpret $total\text{-preorder}\text{-on}\ alts\ R\ i$ **by** $simp$

show $?thesis$ **using** $not\text{-outside}\ election$

by ($auto\ simp$: $lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-def}\ strongly\text{-preferred}\text{-def}$)

qed ($simp\text{-all}\ add$: $lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-def}\ strongly\text{-preferred}\text{-def}$)

lemma $preferred\text{-alts}\text{-lift}\text{-pref}\text{-profile}$:

assumes i : $i \in agents'$ **and** x : $x \in alts'$

shows $preferred\text{-alts}\ (R'\ i)\ x =$

$(if\ i \in agents \wedge x \in alts\ then\ preferred\text{-alts}\ (R\ i)\ x\ else\ alts')$

proof ($cases\ i \in agents$)

assume i : $i \in agents$

then interpret Ri : $total\text{-preorder}\text{-on}\ alts\ R\ i$ **by** $simp$

show $?thesis$

using $i\ x\ election\ Ri.\text{not}\text{-outside}$

by ($auto\ simp$: $preferred\text{-alts}\text{-def}\ R'\text{-def}\ lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-def}\ Ri.\text{refl}$)

qed ($auto\ simp$: $preferred\text{-alts}\text{-def}\ R'\text{-def}\ lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-def}\ i\ x$)

lemma $lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-Pareto}\text{-iff}$:

$x \preceq[Pareto(R')] y \longleftrightarrow x \in alts' \wedge y \in alts' \wedge (x \notin alts \vee x \preceq[Pareto(R)] y)$

proof –

from $R.\text{nonempty}\text{-agents}$ **obtain** i **where** i : $i \in agents$ **by** $blast$

then interpret Ri : $finite\text{-total}\text{-preorder}\text{-on}\ alts\ R\ i$ **by** $simp$

show $?thesis$ **unfolding** $R'.\text{Pareto}\text{-iff}\ Ri.\text{Pareto}\text{-iff}$ **unfolding** $R'\text{-def}\ lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-def}$

using $election\ i$ **by** ($auto\ simp$: $preorder\text{-on}.\text{refl}[OF\ R.\text{in}\text{-dom}]$)

$simp\ del$: $R.\text{nonempty}\text{-alts}\ R.\text{nonempty}\text{-agents}\ intro$: $Ri.\text{not}\text{-outside}$)

qed

lemma $lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-Pareto}\text{-strict}\text{-iff}$:

$x \prec[Pareto(R')] y \longleftrightarrow x \in alts' \wedge y \in alts' \wedge (x \notin alts \wedge y \in alts \vee x \prec[Pareto(R)] y)$

proof

by ($auto\ simp$: $strongly\text{-preferred}\text{-def}\ lift\text{-pref}\text{-profile}\text{-Pareto}\text{-iff}\ Ri.\text{Pareto}.\text{not}\text{-outside}$)

lemma *pareto-losers-lift-pref-profile*:
shows *pareto-losers* $R' = \text{pareto-losers } R \cup (\text{alts}' - \text{alts})$
proof –
have $A: x \in \text{alts } y \in \text{alts}$ **if** $x \prec[\text{Pareto}(R)] y$ **for** $x y$
using *that* $R.\text{Pareto.not-outside}$ **unfolding** *strongly-preferred-def* **by** *auto*
have $B: x \in \text{alts}'$ **if** $x \in \text{alts}$ **for** x **using** *election that* **by** *blast*
from $R.\text{nonempty-alt}$ **obtain** x **where** $x: x \in \text{alts}$ **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **unfolding** *pareto-losers-def lift-pref-profile-Pareto-strict-iff* [*abs-def*]
by (*auto dest: A B*)
qed

context

begin

private lemma *lift-SD-iff-agent*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ **and** $i: i \in \text{agents}$

shows $p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \preceq[\text{SD}(R i)] q$

proof –

from i **interpret** $Ri: \text{preorder-on alts } R i$ **by** *simp*

from i **election** **have** $i': i \in \text{agents}'$ **by** *blast*

then interpret $R'i: \text{preorder-on alts}' R' i$ **by** *simp*

from *assms election* **have** $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}' q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}'$

by (*auto intro: lotteries-on-subset*)

with *assms election i'* **show** *?thesis*

by (*auto simp: Ri.SD-preorder R'i.SD-preorder*

*preferred-alt**s-lift-pref-profile lottery-prob-carrier*)

qed

private lemma *lift-SD-iff-nonagent*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ **and** $i: i \in \text{agents}' - \text{agents}$

shows $p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q$

proof –

from i **election** **have** $i': i \in \text{agents}'$ **by** *blast*

then interpret $R'i: \text{preorder-on alts}' R' i$ **by** *simp*

from *assms election* **have** $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}' q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}'$

by (*auto intro: lotteries-on-subset*)

with *assms election i'* **show** *?thesis*

by (*auto simp: R'i.SD-preorder preferred-alt**s-lift-pref-profile lottery-prob-carrier*)

qed

lemmas *lift-SD-iff = lift-SD-iff-agent lift-SD-iff-nonagent*

lemma *lift-SD-iff'*:

$p \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \implies q \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \implies i \in \text{agents}' \implies$

$p \preceq[\text{SD}(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow i \notin \text{agents} \vee p \preceq[\text{SD}(R i)] q$

by (*cases* $i \in \text{agents}$) (*simp-all add: lift-SD-iff*)

end

lemma *lift-SD-strict-iff*:

assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ **and** $i: i \in \text{agents}$
shows $p \prec[SD(R' i)] q \longleftrightarrow p \prec[SD(R i)] q$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: strongly-preferred-def lift-SD-iff*)

lemma *lift-Pareto-SD-iff*:
assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows $p \preceq[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] q \longleftrightarrow p \preceq[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] q$
using *assms* **election** **by** (*auto simp: R.SD.Pareto-iff R'.SD.Pareto-iff lift-SD-iff'*)

lemma *lift-Pareto-SD-strict-iff*:
assumes $p \in \text{lotteries-on alts } q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows $p \prec[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] q \longleftrightarrow p \prec[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] q$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: strongly-preferred-def lift-Pareto-SD-iff*)

lemma *lift-SD-efficient-iff*:
assumes $p: p \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$
shows $SD\text{-efficient } R' p \longleftrightarrow SD\text{-efficient } R p$
proof
assume *eff*: $SD\text{-efficient } R' p$
have $\neg(q \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] p)$ **if** $q: q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ **for** q
proof –
from q **election** **have** $q': q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}'$ **by** (*blast intro: lotteries-on-subset*)
with *eff* **have** $\neg(q \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] p)$ **by** (*simp add: R'.SD-efficient-def*)
with $p q$ **show** *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: lift-Pareto-SD-strict-iff*)
qed
thus $SD\text{-efficient } R p$ **by** (*simp add: R.SD-efficient-def*)
next
assume *eff*: $SD\text{-efficient } R p$
have $\neg(q \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] p)$ **if** $q: q \in \text{lotteries-on alts}'$ **for** q
proof
assume *less*: $q \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] p$
from $R'.SD\text{-efficient-lottery-exists}[OF q]$
obtain q' **where** $q': q' \in \text{lotteries-on alts}'$ $\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R') q q' SD\text{-efficient}$
 $R' q'$.
have $x \notin \text{set-pmf } q'$ **if** $x: x \in \text{alts}' - \text{alts}$ **for** x
proof –
from x **have** $x \in \text{pareto-losers } R'$ **by** (*simp add: pareto-losers-lift-pref-profile*)
with $R'.SD\text{-efficient-no-pareto-loser}[OF q'(3,1)]$ **show** $x \notin \text{set-pmf } q'$ **by**
blast
qed
with q' **have** $q' \in \text{lotteries-on alts}$ **by** (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def*)
moreover **from** q' **less** **have** $q' \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R')] p$
by (*auto intro: R'.SD.Pareto.strict-weak-trans*)
with $\langle q' \in \text{lotteries-on alts} \rangle p$ **have** $q' \succ[\text{Pareto}(SD \circ R)] p$
by (*subst (asm) lift-Pareto-SD-strict-iff*)
ultimately **have** $\neg SD\text{-efficient } R p$ **by** (*auto simp: R.SD-efficient-def*)
with *eff* **show** *False* **by** *contradiction*
qed
thus $SD\text{-efficient } R' p$ **by** (*simp add: R'.SD-efficient-def*)

qed

end

locale *sds-lowering* =

ex-post-efficient-sds agents alts sds

for *agents* :: 'agent set **and** *alts* :: 'alt set **and** *sds* +

fixes *agents'* *alts'*

assumes *agents'-subset*: $agents' \subseteq agents$ **and** *alts'-subset*: $alts' \subseteq alts$

and *agents'-nonempty* [*simp*]: $agents' \neq \{\}$ **and** *alts'-nonempty* [*simp*]: $alts' \neq \{\}$

begin

lemma *finite-agents'* [*simp*]: *finite agents'*

using *agents'-subset finite-agents* **by** (rule *finite-subset*)

lemma *finite-alts'* [*simp*]: *finite alts'*

using *alts'-subset finite-alts* **by** (rule *finite-subset*)

abbreviation *lift* :: ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile* \Rightarrow ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile* **where**

lift \equiv *lift-pref-profile agents' alts' agents alts*

definition *lowered* :: ('agent, 'alt) *pref-profile* \Rightarrow 'alt *lottery* **where**

lowered = *sds* \circ *lift*

lemma *lift-wf* [*simp*, *intro*]:

pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R \Longrightarrow *is-pref-profile (lift R)*

using *alts'-subset agents'-subset* **by** (*intro lift-pref-profile-wf*) *simp-all*

sublocale *lowered*: *election agents' alts'*

by *unfold-locales simp-all*

lemma *preferred-alts-lift*:

lowered.is-pref-profile R \Longrightarrow $i \in agents \Longrightarrow x \in alts \Longrightarrow$

preferred-alts (lift R i) x =

(if $i \in agents' \wedge x \in alts'$ then *preferred-alts (R i) x* else *alts*)

using *alts'-subset agents'-subset*

by (*intro preferred-alts-lift-pref-profile*) *simp-all*

lemma *pareto-losers-lift*:

lowered.is-pref-profile R \Longrightarrow *pareto-losers (lift R)* = *pareto-losers R* \cup (*alts* – *alts'*)

using *agents'-subset alts'-subset* **by** (*intro pareto-losers-lift-pref-profile*) *simp-all*

lemma *lowered-lotteries*: *lowered.lotteries* \subseteq *lotteries*

unfolding *lotteries-on-def* **using** *alts'-subset* **by** *blast*

sublocale *lowered*: *social-decision-scheme agents' alts' lowered*

proof
fix R **assume** $R\text{-wf}$: *pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R*
from $R\text{-wf}$ **have** $R'\text{-wf}$: *pref-profile-wf agents alts (lift R)* **by** (*rule lift-wf*)
show $\text{lowered } R \in \text{lowered.lotteries}$ **unfolding** *lotteries-on-def*
proof safe
fix x **assume** $x \in \text{set-pmf (lowered } R)$
hence x : $x \in \text{set-pmf (sds (lift R))}$ **by** (*simp add: lowered-def*)
with *ex-post-efficient[OF R'-wf]*
have $x \notin \text{pareto-losers (lift R)}$ **by** *blast*
with *pareto-losers-lift[OF R-wf]*
have $x \notin \text{alts} - \text{alts}'$ **by** *blast*
moreover from x **have** $x \in \text{alts}$ **using** *sds-wf[OF R'-wf]*
by (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def*)
ultimately show $x \in \text{alts}'$ **by** *simp*
qed
qed

sublocale *ex-post-efficient-sds agents' alts' lowered*

proof
fix R **assume** $R\text{-wf}$: *lowered.is-pref-profile R*
hence *is-pref-profile (lift R)* **by** *simp*
have $\text{set-pmf (lowered } R) \cap \text{pareto-losers (lift R)} = \{\}$
unfolding *lowered-def o-def* **by** (*intro ex-post-efficient lift-wf R-wf*)
also have $\text{pareto-losers (lift R)} = \text{pareto-losers } R \cup (\text{alts} - \text{alts}')$
by (*intro pareto-losers-lift R-wf*)
finally show $\text{set-pmf (lowered } R) \cap \text{pareto-losers } R = \{\}$ **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *lowered-in-lotteries [simp]: lowered.is-pref-profile R \implies lowered R \in lotteries*

using *lowered.sds-wf[of R] lowered-lotteries* **by** *blast*

end

locale *sds-lowering-anonymous =*
anonymous-sds agents alts sds +
sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'
for $\text{agents} :: \text{'agent set}$ **and** $\text{alts} :: \text{'alt set}$ **and** $\text{sds agents' alts}'$
begin

sublocale *lowered: anonymous-sds agents' alts' lowered*

proof
fix π R **assume** perm : π *permutes agents'* **and** $R\text{-wf}$: *lowered.is-pref-profile R*
from perm **have** $\text{lift (} R \circ \pi) = \text{lift } R \circ \pi$
using *agents'-subset* **by** (*rule lift-pref-profile-permute-agents*)
hence $\text{sds (lift (} R \circ \pi)) = \text{sds (lift } R \circ \pi)$ **by** *simp*
also from perm $R\text{-wf}$ **have** π *permutes agents is-pref-profile (lift R)*

```

    using agents'-subset by (auto dest: permutes-subset)
    from anonymous[OF this] have sds (lift R ◦ π) = sds (lift R)
    by (simp add: lowered-def)
    finally show lowered (R ◦ π) = lowered R unfolding lowered-def o-def .
qed

end

locale sds-lowering-neutral =
  neutral-sds agents alts sds +
  sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds agents' alts'
begin

sublocale lowered: neutral-sds agents' alts' lowered
proof
  fix σ R assume perm: σ permutes alts' and R-wf: lowered.is-pref-profile R
  from perm alts'-subset
  have lift (permute-profile σ R) = permute-profile σ (lift R)
  by (rule lift-pref-profile-permute-alts)
  hence sds (lift (permute-profile σ R)) = sds (permute-profile σ (lift R)) by simp
  also from R-wf perm have is-pref-profile (lift R) by simp
  with perm alts'-subset
  have sds (permute-profile σ (lift R)) = map-pmf σ (sds (lift R))
  by (intro neutral) (auto intro: permutes-subset)
  finally show lowered (permute-profile σ R) = map-pmf σ (lowered R)
  by (simp add: lowered-def o-def)
qed

end

locale sds-lowering-sd-efficient =
  sd-efficient-sds agents alts sds +
  sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds agents' alts'
begin

sublocale sd-efficient-sds agents' alts' lowered
proof
  fix R assume R-wf: lowered.is-pref-profile R
  interpret R: pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R by fact
  from R-wf agents'-subset alts'-subset show SD-efficient R (lowered R)
  unfolding lowered-def o-def
  by (subst lift-SD-efficient-iff [symmetric])
  (insert SD-efficient R-wf lowered.sds-wf[OF R-wf], auto simp: lowered-def)
qed

end

```

```

locale sds-lowering-strategyproof =
  strategyproof-sds agents alts sds +
  sds-lowering agents alts sds agents' alts'
  for agents :: 'agent set and alts :: 'alt set and sds agents' alts'
begin

sublocale strategyproof-sds agents' alts' lowered
proof (unfold-locales, safe)
  fix R i Ri'
  assume R-wf: lowered.is-pref-profile R and i: i ∈ agents'
  assume Ri': total-preorder-on alts' Ri'
  assume manipulable: lowered.manipulable-profile R i Ri'
  from i agents'-subset have i': i ∈ agents by blast
  interpret R: pref-profile-wf agents' alts' R by fact
  from R-wf interpret liftR: pref-profile-wf agents alts lift R by simp

  define lift-Ri'
    where lift-Ri' x y  $\longleftrightarrow x \in \text{alts} \wedge y \in \text{alts} \wedge (x = y \vee x \notin \text{alts}' \vee (y \in \text{alts}' \wedge Ri' x y))$ 
    for x y
  define S where S = (lift R)(i := lift-Ri')
  from Ri' interpret Ri': total-preorder-on alts' Ri' .
  have wf-lift-Ri': total-preorder-on alts lift-Ri' using Ri'.total
    by unfold-locales (auto simp: lift-Ri'-def intro: Ri'.trans)
  from agents'-subset i have S-altdef: S = lift (R(i := Ri'))
    by (auto simp: fun-eq-iff lift-pref-profile-def lift-Ri'-def S-def)
  have lowered (R(i := Ri')) ∈ lowered.lotteries
    by (intro lowered.sds-wf R.wf-update i Ri')
  hence sds-S-wf: sds S ∈ lowered.lotteries by (simp add: S-altdef lowered-def)

  from manipulable have lowered R  $\prec[SD (R i)]$  sds (lift (R(i := Ri')))
    unfolding lowered.manipulable-profile-def by (simp add: lowered-def)
  also note S-altdef [symmetric]
  finally have lowered R  $\prec[SD (lift R i)]$  sds S
    using R-wf i lowered.sds-wf[OF R-wf] sds-S-wf
    by (subst lift-SD-strict-iff) (simp-all add: agents'-subset alts'-subset)
  hence manipulable-profile (lift R) i lift-Ri'
    by (simp add: manipulable-profile-def lowered-def S-def)
  with strategyproof[OF lift-wf[OF R-wf] i' wf-lift-Ri'] show False by contradiction
qed

end

```

```

locale sds-lowering-anonymous-neutral-sdeff-stratproof =
  sds-lowering-anonymous + sds-lowering-neutral +
  sds-lowering-sd-efficient + sds-lowering-strategyproof

```

end

7 Random Dictatorship

```
theory Random-Dictatorship
imports
  Complex-Main
  Social-Decision-Schemes
begin
```

We define Random Dictatorship as a social decision scheme on total preorders (i.e. agents are allowed to have ties in their rankings) by first selecting an agent uniformly at random and then selecting one of that agents' most preferred alternatives uniformly at random. Note that this definition also works for weak preferences.

```
definition random-dictatorship :: 'agent set  $\Rightarrow$  'alt set  $\Rightarrow$  ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile
 $\Rightarrow$  'alt lottery where
  random-dictatorship-auxdef:
  random-dictatorship agents alts R =
    do {
      i  $\leftarrow$  pmf-of-set agents;
      pmf-of-set (Max-wrt-among (R i) alts)
    }
```

```
context election
begin
```

```
abbreviation RD :: ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile  $\Rightarrow$  'alt lottery where
  RD  $\equiv$  random-dictatorship agents alts
```

```
lemma random-dictatorship-def:
assumes is-pref-profile R
shows RD R =
  do {
    i  $\leftarrow$  pmf-of-set agents;
    pmf-of-set (favorites R i)
  }
```

```
proof -
from assms interpret pref-profile-wf agents alts R .
show ?thesis by (simp add: random-dictatorship-auxdef favorites-altdef)
qed
```

```
lemma random-dictatorship-unique-favorites:
assumes is-pref-profile R has-unique-favorites R
shows RD R = map-pmf (favorite R) (pmf-of-set agents)
proof -
from assms(1) interpret pref-profile-wf agents alts R .
```

from *assms*(2) **interpret** *pref-profile-unique-favorites agents alts R* **by** *unfold-locales*
show *?thesis unfolding random-dictatorship-def[OF assms(1)] map-pmf-def*
by (*intro bind-pmf-cong*) (*auto simp: unique-favorites pmf-of-set-singleton*)
qed

lemma *random-dictatorship-unique-favorites'*:
assumes *is-pref-profile R has-unique-favorites R*
shows $RD\ R = pmf\ of\ multiset\ (image\ mset\ (favorite\ R)\ (mset\ set\ agents))$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add: random-dictatorship-unique-favorites map-pmf-of-set*)

lemma *pmf-random-dictatorship*:
assumes *is-pref-profile R*
shows $pmf\ (RD\ R)\ x =$

$$\frac{(\sum_{i \in agents}. indicator\ (favorites\ R\ i)\ x / real\ (card\ (favorites\ R\ i)))}{real\ (card\ agents)}$$

proof –
from *assms*(1) **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* .
from *nonempty-dom* **have** $card\ agents > 0$ **by** (*auto simp del: nonempty-agents*)
hence $ennreal\ (pmf\ (RD\ R)\ x) =$

$$ennreal\ ((\sum_{i \in agents}. pmf\ (pmf\ of\ set\ (favorites\ R\ i))\ x) / real\ (card\ agents))$$

(is $=\ ennreal\ (?p / -)$ **unfolding** *random-dictatorship-def[OF assms]*
by (*simp-all add: ennreal-pmf-bind nn-integral-pmf-of-set max-def*
divide-ennreal [symmetric] ennreal-of-nat-eq-real-of-nat sum-nonneg)
also have $?p = (\sum_{i \in agents}. indicator\ (favorites\ R\ i)\ x / real\ (card\ (favorites\ R\ i)))$
by (*intro sum.cong*) (*simp-all add: favorites-nonempty*)
finally show *?thesis*
by (*subst (asm) ennreal-inj*) (*auto intro!: sum-nonneg divide-nonneg-nonneg*)
qed

sublocale *RD: social-decision-scheme agents alts RD*

proof
fix *R* **assume** *R-wf: is-pref-profile R*
then interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* .
from *R-wf* **show** $RD\ R \in lotteries$
using *favorites-subset-alts favorites-nonempty*
by (*auto simp: lotteries-on-def random-dictatorship-def*)
qed

We now show that Random Dictatorship fulfils anonymity, neutrality, and strong strategyproofness. At the very least, this shows that the definitions of these notions are consistent.

7.1 Anonymity

The following proof is essentially the following: In Random Dictatorship, permuting the agents in the preference profile is the same as applying the

permutation to the agent that was picked uniformly at random in the first step. However, uniform distributions are invariant under permutation, therefore the outcome is totally unchanged.

sublocale RD : *anonymous-sds agents alts* RD

proof

fix $R \pi$ **assume** wf : *is-pref-profile* R **and** $perm$: π *permutes agents*

interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts* R **by** *fact*

from *wf-permute-agents*[OF $perm$]

have $RD (R \circ \pi) = \text{map-pmf } \pi (\text{pmf-of-set } agents) \gg= (\lambda i. \text{pmf-of-set } (favorites R i))$

by (*simp add: bind-map-pmf random-dictatorship-def o-def favorites-def*)

also from $perm$ wf **have** $\dots = RD R$

by (*simp add: map-pmf-of-set-inj permutes-inj-on permutes-image random-dictatorship-def*)

finally show $RD (R \circ \pi) = RD R$.

qed

7.2 Neutrality

The proof of neutrality is similar to that of anonymity. We have proven elsewhere that the most preferred alternatives of an agent in a profile with permuted alternatives are simply the image of the originally preferred alternatives. Since we pick one alternative from the most preferred alternatives of the selected agent uniformly at random, this means that we effectively pick an agent, then pick one of her most preferred alternatives, and then apply the permutation to that alternative, which is simply Random Dictatorship transformed with the permutation.

sublocale RD : *neutral-sds agents alts* RD

proof

fix σR

assume $perm$: σ *permutes alts* **and** R - wf : *is-pref-profile* R

from R - wf **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts* R .

from *wf-permute-alts*[OF $perm$] R - wf $perm$ **show** $RD (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R) = \text{map-pmf } \sigma (RD R)$

by (*subst random-dictatorship-def*)

(*auto intro!: bind-pmf-cong simp: random-dictatorship-def map-bind-pmf*

favorites-permute map-pmf-of-set-inj permutes-inj-on favorites-nonempty)

qed

7.3 Strong strategyproofness

The argument for strategyproofness is quite simple: Since the preferences submitted by an agent i only influence the outcome when that agent is picked in the first process, it suffices to focus on this case. When the agent i submits her true preferences, the probability of obtaining a result at least as good as x (for any alternative x) is 1, since the outcome will always be one of her most-preferred alternatives. Obviously, the probability of obtaining such

a result cannot exceed 1 no matter what preferences she submits instead, and thus, RD is strategyproof.

```

sublocale RD: strongly-strategyproof-sds agents alts RD
proof (unfold-locales, unfold RD.strongly-strategyproof-profile-def)
  fix R i Ri' assume R-wf: is-pref-profile R and i: i ∈ agents
    and Ri'-wf: total-preorder-on alts Ri'
  interpret R: pref-profile-wf agents alts R by fact
  from R-wf Ri'-wf i have R'-wf: is-pref-profile (R(i := Ri'))
    by (simp add: R.wf-update)
  interpret R': pref-profile-wf agents alts R(i := Ri') by fact

  show SD (R i) (RD (R(i := Ri'))) (RD R)
  proof (rule R.SD-pref-profileI)
    fix x assume x ∈ alts
    hence emeasure (measure-pmf (RD (R(i := Ri')))) (preferred-alts (R i) x)
       $\leq$  emeasure (measure-pmf (RD R)) (preferred-alts (R i) x)
    using Ri'-wf maximal-imp-preferred[of R i x]
    by (auto intro!: card-mono nn-integral-mono-AE
      simp: random-dictatorship-def R-wf R'-wf AE-measure-pmf-iff
      Max-wrt-prefs-finite
      emeasure-pmf-of-set Int-absorb2 favorites-def
      Max-wrt-prefs-nonempty card-gt-0-iff)
    thus lottery-prob (RD (R(i := Ri'))) (preferred-alts (R i) x)
       $\leq$  lottery-prob (RD R) (preferred-alts (R i) x)
    by (simp add: measure-pmf.emeasure-eq-measure)
  qed (insert R-wf R'-wf, simp-all add: RD.sds-wf i)
qed

end

end

```

8 Random Serial Dictatorship

```

theory Random-Serial-Dictatorship
imports
  Complex-Main
  Social-Decision-Schemes
  Random-Dictatorship
begin

```

Random Serial Dictatorship is an anonymous, neutral, strongly strategy-proof, and ex-post efficient Social Decision Scheme that extends Random Dictatorship to the domain of weak preferences.

We define RSD using a fold over a random permutation. Effectively, we choose a random order of the agents (in the form of a list) and then traverse that list from left to right, where each agent in turn removes all the

alternatives that are not top-ranked among the remaining ones.

definition *random-serial-dictatorship* ::

'agent set \Rightarrow 'alt set \Rightarrow ('agent, 'alt) pref-profile \Rightarrow 'alt lottery **where**
random-serial-dictatorship agents alts $R =$
fold-bind-random-permutation (λi alts. *Max-wrt-among* (R i) alts) *pmf-of-set*
 alts agents

The following two facts correspond give an alternative recursive definition to the above definition, which uses random permutations and list folding.

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-empty* [simp]:

random-serial-dictatorship {} alts $R =$ *pmf-of-set* alts
by (*simp* add: *random-serial-dictatorship-def*)

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-nonempty*:

finite agents \Longrightarrow agents \neq {} \Longrightarrow
random-serial-dictatorship agents alts $R =$
 do {
 $i \leftarrow$ *pmf-of-set* agents;
 random-serial-dictatorship (agents - { i }) (*Max-wrt-among* (R i) alts) R
 }
by (*simp* add: *random-serial-dictatorship-def*)

We define the RSD winners w.r.t. a given set of alternatives and a fixed permutation (i.e. list) of agents. In contrast to the above definition, the RSD winners are determined by traversing the list of agents from right to left. This may seem strange, but it makes induction much easier, since induction over *foldr* does not require generalisation over the set of alternatives and is therefore much easier than over *foldl*.

definition *rsd-winners* **where**

rsd-winners R alts agents = *foldr* (λi alts. *Max-wrt-among* (R i) alts) agents alts

lemma *rsd-winners-empty* [simp]: *rsd-winners* R alts [] = alts

by (*simp* add: *rsd-winners-def*)

lemma *rsd-winners-Cons* [simp]:

rsd-winners R alts ($i \#$ agents) = *Max-wrt-among* (R i) (*rsd-winners* R alts agents)

by (*simp* add: *rsd-winners-def*)

lemma *rsd-winners-map* [simp]:

rsd-winners R alts (*map* f agents) = *rsd-winners* ($R \circ f$) alts agents

by (*simp* add: *rsd-winners-def* *foldr-map* *o-def*)

There is now another alternative definition of RSD in terms of the RSD winners. This will mostly be used for induction.

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-altdef*:

assumes *finite* agents

shows *random-serial-dictatorship* *agents* *alts* $R =$
do {
 agents' \leftarrow *pmf-of-set* (*permutations-of-set* *agents*);
 pmf-of-set (*rsd-winners* R *alts* *agents'*)
}

by (*simp* *add: random-serial-dictatorship-def*
fold-bind-random-permutation-foldr *assms* *rsd-winners-def*)

The following lemma shows that folding from left to right yields the same distribution. This is probably the most commonly used definition in the literature, along with the recursive one.

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-foldl*:
assumes *finite* *agents*
shows *random-serial-dictatorship* *agents* *alts* $R =$
do {
 agents' \leftarrow *pmf-of-set* (*permutations-of-set* *agents*);
 pmf-of-set (*foldl* (λ *alts* *i*. *Max-wrt-among* (R *i*) *alts*) *alts* *agents'*)
}

by (*simp* *add: random-serial-dictatorship-def* *fold-bind-random-permutation-foldl*
assms)

8.1 Auxiliary facts about RSD

8.1.1 Pareto-equivalence classes

First of all, we introduce the auxiliary notion of a Pareto-equivalence class. A non-empty set of alternatives is a Pareto equivalence class if all agents are indifferent between all alternatives in it, and if some alternative x is contained in the set, any other alternative y is contained in it if and only if, to all agents, y is at least as good as x . The importance of this notion lies in the fact that the set of RSD winners is always a Pareto-equivalence class, which we will later use to show ex-post efficiency and strategy-proofness.

definition *RSD-pareto-eclass* **where**

$$RSD\text{-pareto-eclass } agents \ alts \ R \ A \longleftrightarrow \\
A \neq \{\} \wedge A \subseteq alts \wedge (\forall x \in A. \forall y \in alts. y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in agents. R \ i \ x \ y))$$

lemma *RSD-pareto-eclassI*:

assumes $A \neq \{\}$ $A \subseteq alts \wedge x \ y. x \in A \implies y \in alts \implies y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in agents. R \ i \ x \ y)$

shows *RSD-pareto-eclass* *agents* *alts* $R \ A$

using *assms* **unfolding** *RSD-pareto-eclass-def* **by** *simp-all*

lemma *RSD-pareto-eclassD*:

assumes *RSD-pareto-eclass* *agents* *alts* $R \ A$

shows $A \neq \{\}$ $A \subseteq alts \wedge x \ y. x \in A \implies y \in alts \implies y \in A \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in agents. R \ i \ x \ y)$

using *assms* **unfolding** *RSD-pareto-eclass-def* **by** *simp-all*

lemma *RSD-pareto-eqclass-indiff-set*:
assumes *RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts R A i ∈ agents x ∈ A y ∈ A*
shows $R\ i\ x\ y$
using *assms unfolding RSD-pareto-eqclass-def* **by** *blast*

lemma *RSD-pareto-eqclass-empty* [*simp, intro!*]:
 $alts \neq \{\}$ \implies *RSD-pareto-eqclass* $\{\}$ *alts R alts*
by (*auto intro!: RSD-pareto-eqclassI*)

lemma (*in pref-profile-wf*) *RSD-pareto-eqclass-insert*:
assumes *RSD-pareto-eqclass agents' alts R A finite alts*
 $i \in agents\ agents' \subseteq agents$
shows *RSD-pareto-eqclass (insert i agents')* *alts R (Max-wrt-among (R i) A)*
proof –
from *assms interpret total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*
show *?thesis*
proof (*intro RSD-pareto-eqclassI Max-wrt-among-nonempty Max-wrt-among-subset, goal-cases*)
case ($\exists\ x\ y$)
with *RSD-pareto-eqclassD[OF assms(1)]*
show *?case unfolding Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*
by (*blast intro: trans*)
qed (*insert RSD-pareto-eqclassD[OF assms(1)] assms(2), simp-all add: Int-absorb1 Int-absorb2 finite-subset*)[2]
qed

8.1.2 Facts about RSD winners

context *pref-profile-wf*
begin

Any RSD winner is a valid alternative.

lemma *rsd-winners-subset*:
assumes *set agents' ⊆ agents*
shows *rsd-winners R alts' agents' ⊆ alts'*
proof –
{
fix *i* **assume** $i \in agents$
then **interpret** *total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*
have *Max-wrt-among (R i) A ⊆ A* **for** *A*
using *Max-wrt-among-subset* **by** *blast*
} note $A = this$

from $\langle set\ agents' \subseteq agents \rangle$ **show** *rsd-winners R alts' agents' ⊆ alts'*
using *A* **by** (*induction agents'*) *auto*
qed

There is always at least one RSD winner.

lemma *rsd-winners-nonempty*:

```

assumes finite: finite alts and alts' ≠ {} set agents' ⊆ agents alts' ⊆ alts
shows rsd-winners R alts' agents' ≠ {}
proof –
{
  fix i assume i ∈ agents
  then interpret total-preorder-on alts R i by simp
  have Max-wrt-among (R i) A ≠ {} if A ⊆ alts A ≠ {} for A
  using that assms by (intro Max-wrt-among-nonempty) (auto simp: Int-absorb)
note B = this

  with ⟨set agents' ⊆ agents⟩ ⟨alts' ⊆ alts⟩ ⟨alts' ≠ {}⟩
  show rsd-winners R alts' agents' ≠ {}
  proof (induction agents')
  case (Cons i agents')
  with B[of i rsd-winners R alts' agents'] rsd-winners-subset[of agents' alts'] finite
  wf
  show ?case by auto
qed simp
qed

```

Obviously, the set of RSD winners is always finite.

lemma *rsd-winners-finite:*

```

assumes set agents' ⊆ agents finite alts alts' ⊆ alts
shows finite (rsd-winners R alts' agents')
by (rule finite-subset[OF subset-trans[OF rsd-winners-subset]]) fact+

```

lemmas *rsd-winners-wf =*

```

rsd-winners-subset rsd-winners-nonempty rsd-winners-finite

```

The set of RSD winners is a Pareto-equivalence class.

lemma *RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners-aux:*

```

assumes finite: finite alts and alts ≠ {} and set agents' ⊆ agents
shows RSD-pareto-eqclass (set agents') alts R (rsd-winners R alts agents')
using ⟨set agents' ⊆ agents⟩
proof (induction agents')
case (Cons i agents')
from Cons.prem show ?case
  by (simp only: set-simps rsd-winners-Cons,
    intro RSD-pareto-eqclass-insert[OF Cons.IH finite]) simp-all
qed (insert assms, simp-all)

```

lemma *RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners:*

```

assumes finite: finite alts and alts ≠ {} and set agents' = agents
shows RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts R (rsd-winners R alts agents')
using RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners-aux[of agents'] assms by simp

```

For the proof of strategy-proofness, we need to define indifference sets and lift preference relations to sets in a specific way.

context

begin

An indifference set for a given preference relation is a non-empty set of alternatives such that the agent is indifferent over all of them.

private definition *indiff-set* **where**

$$\text{indiff-set } S A \longleftrightarrow A \neq \{\} \wedge (\forall x \in A. \forall y \in A. S x y)$$

private lemma *indiff-set-mono*: $\text{indiff-set } S A \implies B \subseteq A \implies B \neq \{\} \implies \text{indiff-set } S B$

unfolding *indiff-set-def* **by** *blast*

Given an arbitrary set of alternatives A and an indifference set B , we say that B is set-preferred over A w.r.t. the preference relation R if all (or, equivalently, any) of the alternatives in B are preferred over all alternatives in A .

private definition *RSD-set-rel* **where**

$$\text{RSD-set-rel } S A B \longleftrightarrow \text{indiff-set } S B \wedge (\forall x \in A. \forall y \in B. S x y)$$

The most-preferred alternatives (w.r.t. R) among any non-empty set of alternatives form an indifference set w.r.t. R .

private lemma *indiff-set-Max-wrt-among*:

assumes *finite carrier* $A \subseteq \text{carrier } A \neq \{\}$ *total-preorder-on carrier* S

shows $\text{indiff-set } S (\text{Max-wrt-among } S A)$

unfolding *indiff-set-def*

proof

from *assms(4)* **interpret** *total-preorder-on carrier* S .

from *assms(1-3)*

show $\text{Max-wrt-among } S A \neq \{\}$ **by** (*intro Max-wrt-among-nonempty*) *auto*

from *assms(1-3)* **show** $\forall x \in \text{Max-wrt-among } S A. \forall y \in \text{Max-wrt-among } S A. S x y$

by (*auto simp: indiff-set-def Max-wrt-among-total-preorder*)

qed

We now consider the set of RSD winners in the setting of a preference profile R and a manipulated profile $R(i := Ri')$. This theorem shows that the set of RSD winners in the outcome is either the same in both cases or the outcome for the truthful profile is an indifference set that is set-preferred over the outcome for the manipulated profile.

lemma *rsd-winners-manipulation-aux*:

assumes *wf*: *total-preorder-on alts* Ri'

and $i: i \in \text{agents}$ **and** *set agents'* $\subseteq \text{agents}$ *finite agents*

and *finite*: *finite alts* **and** $\text{alts} \neq \{\}$

defines [*simp*]: $w' \equiv \text{rsd-winners } (R(i := Ri'))$ *alts* **and** [*simp*]: $w \equiv \text{rsd-winners } R$ *alts*

shows $w' \text{ agents}' = w \text{ agents}' \vee \text{RSD-set-rel } (R i) (w' \text{ agents}') (w \text{ agents}')$

using $\langle \text{set agents}' \subseteq \text{agents} \rangle$

proof (*induction agents'*)

```

case (Cons j agents')
from wf i interpret Ri: total-preorder-on alts R i by simp
from wf Cons.premis interpret Rj: total-preorder-on alts R j by simp
from wf interpret Ri': total-preorder-on alts Ri' .
from wf assms Cons.premis
  have indiff-set: indiff-set (R i) (Max-wrt-among (R i) (rsd-winners R alts agents'))
  by (intro indiff-set-Max-wrt-among[OF finite] rsd-winners-wf) simp-all

show ?case
proof (cases j = i)
  assume j [simp]: j = i
  from indiff-set Cons have RSD-set-rel (R i) (w' (j # agents')) (w (j # agents'))
  unfolding RSD-set-rel-def
  by (auto simp: Ri.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder Ri'.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder)
  thus ?case ..
next
  assume j [simp]: j ≠ i
  from Cons have w' agents' = w agents' ∨ RSD-set-rel (R i) (w' agents') (w agents') by simp
  thus ?case
  proof
    assume rel: RSD-set-rel (R i) (w' agents') (w agents')
    hence indiff-set: indiff-set (R i) (w agents') by (simp add: RSD-set-rel-def)
    moreover from Cons.premis finite <alts ≠ {}>
      have w agents' ⊆ alts w agents' ≠ {} unfolding w-def
      by (intro rsd-winners-wf; simp)+
    with finite have Max-wrt-among (R j) (w agents') ≠ {}
      by (intro Rj.Max-wrt-among-nonempty) auto
    ultimately have indiff-set (R i) (w (j # agents'))
      by (intro indiff-set-mono[OF indiff-set] Rj.Max-wrt-among-subset)
      (simp-all add: Rj.Max-wrt-among-subset)
    moreover from rel have  $\forall x \in w' (j \# agents'). \forall y \in w (j \# agents'). R i x y$ 
      by (auto simp: RSD-set-rel-def Rj.Max-wrt-among-total-preorder)
    ultimately have RSD-set-rel (R i) (w' (j # agents')) (w (j # agents'))
      unfolding RSD-set-rel-def ..
    thus ?case ..
  qed simp-all
qed
qed simp-all

```

The following variant of the previous theorem is slightly easier to use. We eliminate the case where the two outcomes are the same by observing that the original outcome is then also set-preferred to the manipulated one. In essence, this means that no matter what manipulation is done, the original outcome is always set-preferred to the manipulated one.

lemma *rsd-winners-manipulation:*

```

assumes wf: total-preorder-on alts Ri'
  and i: i ∈ agents and set agents' = agents finite agents

```

and *finite*: *finite alts and alts* $\neq \{\}$
defines [*simp*]: $w' \equiv \text{rsd-winner} (R(i := Ri)) \text{ alts}$ **and** [*simp*]: $w \equiv \text{rsd-winner} R \text{ alts}$
shows $\forall x \in w' \text{ agents}'. \forall y \in w \text{ agents}'. x \preceq [R \ i] \ y$
proof –
have $w' \text{ agents}' = w \text{ agents}' \vee \text{RSD-set-rel} (R \ i) (w' \text{ agents}') (w \text{ agents}')$
using *rsd-winner-manipulation-aux*[*OF* *assms*(1–2) - *assms*(4–6)] *assms*(3)
by *simp*
thus *?thesis*
proof
assume *eq*: $w' \text{ agents}' = w \text{ agents}'$
from *assms* **have** *RSD-pareto-eclass* (*set agents'*) *alts* *R* (*w agents'*) **unfolding**
w-def
by (*intro RSD-pareto-eclass-rsd-winner-aux*) *simp-all*
from *RSD-pareto-eclass-indiff-set*[*OF* *this*, *of i*] *i eq assms*(3) **show** *?thesis*
by *auto*
qed (*auto simp: RSD-set-rel-def*)
qed
end

The lottery that RSD yields is well-defined.

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-support*:

assumes *finite agents finite alts agents' \subseteq agents alts' $\neq \{\}$ alts' \subseteq alts*
shows *set-pmf* (*random-serial-dictatorship agents' alts' R*) \subseteq *alts'*
proof –
from *assms* **have** [*simp*]: *finite agents'* **by** (*auto intro: finite-subset*)
have *A*: *set-pmf* (*pmf-of-set* (*rsd-winner R alts' agents'*)) \subseteq *alts'*
if *agents'' \in permutations-of-set agents' for agents''*
using *that assms rsd-winner-wf*[**where** *alts' = alts' and agents' = agents''*]
by (*auto simp: permutations-of-set-def*)
from *assms* **show** *?thesis*
by (*auto dest!: A simp add: random-serial-dictatorship-altdef*)
qed

Permutation of alternatives commutes with RSD winners.

lemma *rsd-winner-permute-profile*:

assumes *perm*: σ *permutes alts and set agents' \subseteq agents*
shows *rsd-winner* (*permute-profile* σ *R*) *alts agents' = σ ' rsd-winner R alts agents'*
using $\langle \text{set agents}' \subseteq \text{agents} \rangle$
proof (*induction agents'*)
case *Nil*
from *perm* **show** *?case* **by** (*simp add: permutes-image*)
next
case (*Cons i agents'*)
from *wf Cons* **interpret** *total-preorder-on alts R i* **by** *simp*
from *perm Cons* **show** *?case*
by (*simp add: permute-profile-map-relation Max-wrt-among-map-relation-bij*)

permutes-bij)
qed

lemma *random-serial-dictatorship-singleton*:

assumes *finite agents finite alts agents' \subseteq agents $x \in$ alts*

shows *random-serial-dictatorship agents' {x} R = return-pmf x (is ?d = -)*

proof –

from *assms* **have** *set-pmf ?d \subseteq {x}*

by (*intro random-serial-dictatorship-support*) *simp-all*

thus *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: set-pmf-subset-singleton*)

qed

end

8.2 Proofs of properties

With all the facts that we have proven about the RSD winners, the hard work is mostly done. We can now simply fix some arbitrary order of the agents, apply the theorems about the RSD winners, and show the properties we want to show without doing much reasoning about probabilities.

context *election*
begin

abbreviation *RSD \equiv random-serial-dictatorship agents alts*

8.2.1 Well-definedness

sublocale *RSD: social-decision-scheme agents alts RSD*

using *pref-profile-wf.random-serial-dictatorship-support[of agents alts]*

by *unfold-locales (simp-all add: lotteries-on-def)*

8.2.2 RD extension

lemma *RSD-extends-RD*:

assumes *wf: is-pref-profile R and unique: has-unique-favorites R*

shows *RSD R = RD R*

proof –

from *wf* **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts R* .

from *unique* **interpret** *pref-profile-unique-favorites* **by** *unfold-locales*

have *RSD R = pmf-of-set agents \gg*

(λi . random-serial-dictatorship (agents - {i}) (favorites R i) R)

by (*simp add: random-serial-dictatorship-nonempty favorites-altdef Max-wrt-def*)

also from *assms* **have** *... = pmf-of-set agents \gg (λi . return-pmf (favorite R i))*

by (*intro bind-pmf-cong refl, subst random-serial-dictatorship-singleton [symmetric]*)

(auto simp: unique-favorites favorite-in-alts)

also from *assms* **have** *... = RD R*

by (*simp add: random-dictatorship-unique-favorites map-pmf-def*)

finally show *?thesis* .

qed

8.2.3 Anonymity

Anonymity is a direct consequence of the fact that we randomise over all permutations in a uniform way.

sublocale *RSD: anonymous-sds agents alts RSD*

proof

fix π R **assume** *perm*: π permutes agents **and** *wf*: is-pref-profile R

let $?f = \lambda \text{agents}'. \text{pmf-of-set (rsd-winners } R \text{ alts agents')}$

from *perm wf* **have** $RSD (R \circ \pi) = \text{map-pmf (map } \pi) (\text{pmf-of-set (permutations-of-set agents)}) \gg=?f$

by (*simp add: random-serial-dictatorship-altdef bind-map-pmf*)

also from *perm* **have** $\dots = RSD R$

by (*simp add: map-pmf-of-set-inj permutes-inj-on inj-on-mapI permutations-of-set-image-permutes random-serial-dictatorship-altdef*)

finally show $RSD (R \circ \pi) = RSD R$.

qed

8.2.4 Neutrality

Neutrality follows from the fact that the RSD winners of a permuted profile are simply the image of the original RSD winners under the permutation.

sublocale *RSD: neutral-sds agents alts RSD*

proof

fix σ R **assume** *perm*: σ permutes alts **and** *wf*: is-pref-profile R

from *wf* **interpret** *pref-profile-wf agents alts* R .

from *perm* **show** $RSD (\text{permute-profile } \sigma R) = \text{map-pmf } \sigma (RSD R)$

by (*auto intro!: bind-pmf-cong dest!: permutations-of-setD(1)*)

simp: random-serial-dictatorship-altdef rsd-winners-permute-profile

map-bind-pmf map-pmf-of-set-inj permutes-inj-on rsd-winners-wf)

qed

8.2.5 Ex-post efficiency

Ex-post efficiency follows from the fact that the set of RSD winners is a Pareto-equivalence class.

sublocale *RSD: ex-post-efficient-sds agents alts RSD*

proof

fix R **assume** *wf*: is-pref-profile R

then interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts* R .

{

fix x **assume** $x: x \in \text{set-pmf (RSD } R) \wedge x \in \text{pareto-losers } R$

from $x(2)$ **obtain** y **where** [*simp*]: $y \in \text{alts}$ **and** *pareto*: $y \succ [Pareto(R)] x$

by (*cases rule: pareto-losersE*)

from x **have** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{alts}$ **using** *pareto-loser-in-alts* **by** *simp*


```

from  $x(1)$  obtain  $agents'$  where  $agents'$ :  $set\ agents' = agents$  and
   $x \in set\ pmf\ (pmf\ of\ set\ (rsd\ winners\ R\ alts\ agents'))$ 
by  $(auto\ simp:\ random\ serial\ dictatorship\ altdef\ dest:\ permutations\ of\ setD)$ 
with  $wf$  have  $x'$ :  $x \in rsd\ winners\ R\ alts\ agents'$ 
using  $rsd\ winners\ wf$  [where  $alts' = alts$  and  $agents' = agents$ ]
by  $(subst\ (asm)\ set\ pmf\ of\ set)\ (auto\ simp:\ permutations\ of\ setD)$ 

from  $wf\ agents'$ 
have  $RSD\ pareto\ eqclass\ agents\ alts\ R\ (rsd\ winners\ R\ alts\ agents')$ 
by  $(intro\ RSD\ pareto\ eqclass\ rsd\ winners)\ simp\ all$ 
hence  $winner\ iff$ :  $y \in rsd\ winners\ R\ alts\ agents' \longleftrightarrow (\forall i \in agents.\ x \preceq [R\ i]\ y)$ 
if  $x \in rsd\ winners\ R\ alts\ agents'$   $y \in alts$  for  $x\ y$ 
using that unfolding  $RSD\ pareto\ eqclass\ def$  by  $blast$ 
from  $x'$   $pareto\ winner\ iff$  [ $of\ x\ y$ ]  $winner\ iff$  [ $of\ y\ x$ ] have  $False$ 
by  $(force\ simp:\ strongly\ preferred\ def\ Pareto\ iff)$ 
}
thus  $set\ pmf\ (RSD\ R) \cap pareto\ losers\ R = \{\}$  by  $blast$ 
qed

```

8.2.6 Strong strategy-proofness

Strong strategy-proofness is slightly more difficult to show. We have already shown that the set of RSD winners for the truthful profile is always set-preferred (by the manipulating agent) to the RSD winners for the manipulated profile. This can now be used to show strategy-proofness: We recall that the set of RSD winners is always an indifference class. Therefore, given any fixed alternative x and considering a fixed order of the agents, either all of the RSD winners in the original profile are at least as good as x or none of them are, and, since the original RSD winners are set-preferred to the manipulated ones, none of the RSD winners in the manipulated case are at least as good than x either in that case. This means that for a fixed order of agents, either the probability that the original outcome is at least as good as x is 1 or the probability that the manipulated outcome is at least as good as x is 0. Therefore, the original lottery is clearly SD-preferred to the manipulated one.

```

sublocale  $RSD$ :  $strongly\ strategyproof\ sds\ agents\ alts\ RSD$ 
proof  $(unfold\ locales,\ rule)$ 
  fix  $R\ i\ Ri'\ x$ 
  assume  $wf$ :  $is\ pref\ profile\ R$  and  $i$  [ $simp$ ]:  $i \in agents$  and  $x$ :  $x \in alts$  and
     $wf'$ :  $total\ preorder\ on\ alts\ Ri'$ 
  interpret  $R$ :  $pref\ profile\ wf\ agents\ alts\ R$  by  $fact$ 
  define  $R'$  where  $R' = R\ (i := Ri')$ 
  from  $wf\ wf'$  have  $is\ pref\ profile\ R'$  by  $(simp\ add:\ R'\ def\ R.\ wf\ update)$ 
  then interpret  $R'$ :  $pref\ profile\ wf\ agents\ alts\ R'$  .
  note  $wf = wf\ wf'$ 
  let  $?A = preferred\ alts\ (R\ i)\ x$ 
  from  $wf$  interpret  $Ri$ :  $total\ preorder\ on\ alts\ R\ i$  by  $simp$ 

```

```

{
  fix agents' assume agents': agents' ∈ permutations-of-set agents
  from agents' have [simp]: set agents' = agents
  by (simp add: permutations-of-set-def)

  let ?W = rsd-winners R alts agents' and ?W' = rsd-winners R' alts agents'
  have indiff-set: RSD-pareto-eqclass agents alts R ?W
  by (rule R.RSD-pareto-eqclass-rsd-winners; simp add: wf)+
  from R.rsd-winners-wf R'.rsd-winners-wf
  have winners: ?W ⊆ alts ?W ≠ {} finite ?W ?W' ⊆ alts ?W' ≠ {} finite
  ?W'
  by simp-all

  from ⟨?W ≠ {}⟩ obtain y where y: y ∈ ?W by blast
  with winners have [simp]: y ∈ alts by blast
  from wf' i have mono: ∀ x ∈ ?W'. ∀ y ∈ ?W. R i x y unfolding R'-def
  by (intro R.rsd-winners-manipulation) simp-all

  have lottery-prob (pmf-of-set ?W) ?A ≥ lottery-prob (pmf-of-set ?W') ?A
  proof (cases y ≥ [R i] x)
  case True
  with y RSD-pareto-eqclass-indiff-set[OF indiff-set(1), of i] winners
  have ?W ⊆ preferred-alts (R i) x
  by (auto intro: Ri.trans simp: preferred-alts-def)
  with winners show ?thesis
  by (subst (2) measure-pmf-of-set) (simp-all add: Int-absorb2)
  next
  case False
  with y mono have ?W' ∩ preferred-alts (R i) x = {}
  by (auto intro: Ri.trans simp: preferred-alts-def)
  with winners show ?thesis
  by (subst (1) measure-pmf-of-set)
  (simp-all add: Int-absorb2 one-ereal-def measure-nonneg)
  qed
  hence emeasure (measure-pmf (pmf-of-set ?W)) ?A ≥ emeasure (measure-pmf
  (pmf-of-set ?W')) ?A
  by (simp add: measure-pmf.emeasure-eq-measure)
  }
  hence emeasure (measure-pmf (RSD R)) ?A ≥ emeasure (measure-pmf (RSD
  R')) ?A
  by (auto simp: random-serial-dictatorship-altdef AE-measure-pmf-iff
  intro!: nn-integral-mono-AE)
  thus lottery-prob (RSD R) ?A ≥ lottery-prob (RSD R') ?A
  by (simp add: measure-pmf.emeasure-eq-measure)
qed
end

```

```

end
theory Randomised-Social-Choice
imports
  Complex-Main
  SDS-Lowering
  Random-Dictatorship
  Random-Serial-Dictatorship
begin

end

```

9 Automatic definition of Preference Profiles

```

theory Preference-Profile-Cmd
imports
  Complex-Main
  ../Elections
keywords
  preference-profile :: thy-goal
begin

```

ML-file \langle preference-profiles.ML \rangle

```

context election
begin

```

```

lemma preferred-alts-prefs-from-table:
  assumes prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs i  $\in$  set (map fst xs)
  shows preferred-alts (prefs-from-table xs i) x =
    of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev (the (map-of xs i))) x
proof -
  interpret pref-profile-wf agents alts prefs-from-table xs
  by (intro pref-profile-from-tableI assms)
  from assms have [simp]: i  $\in$  agents by (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  have of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev (the (map-of xs i))) x =
    Collect (of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xs i)) x)
  by (rule eval-Collect-of-weak-ranking [symmetric])
  also from assms(2) have the (map-of xs i)  $\in$  set (map snd xs)
  by (cases map-of xs i) (force simp: map-of-eq-None-iff dest: map-of-SomeD)+
  from prefs-from-table-wfD(5)[OF assms(1) this]
  have Collect (of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xs i)) x) =
    {y $\in$ alts. of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xs i)) x y}
  by safe (force elim!: of-weak-ranking.cases)
  also from assms
  have of-weak-ranking (the (map-of xs i)) = prefs-from-table xs i
  by (subst prefs-from-table-map-of[OF assms(1)])
    (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  finally show ?thesis by (simp add: of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def preferred-alts-altdef)

```

qed

lemma *favorites-prefs-from-table*:

assumes *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs* **and** *i*: $i \in \text{agents}$

shows *favorites* (*prefs-from-table xs*) *i* = *hd* (*the* (*map-of xs i*))

proof (*cases map-of xs i*)

case *None*

with *assms* **show** *?thesis*

by (*auto simp: map-of-eq-None-iff prefs-from-table-wf-def*)

next

case (*Some y*)

with *assms* **have** *is-finite-weak-ranking y y* $\neq []$

by (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)

with *Some* **show** *?thesis*

unfolding *favorites-def* **using** *assms*

by (*simp add: prefs-from-table-def is-finite-weak-ranking-def*
Max-wrt-of-weak-ranking prefs-from-table-wfD)

qed

lemma *has-unique-favorites-prefs-from-table*:

assumes *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*

shows *has-unique-favorites* (*prefs-from-table xs*) =

list-all ($\lambda z. \text{is-singleton} (\text{hd} (\text{snd } z))$) *xs*

proof –

interpret *pref-profile-wf agents alts prefs-from-table xs*

by (*intro pref-profile-from-tableI assms*)

from *wf* **have** *agents = set* (*map fst xs*) *distinct* (*map fst xs*)

by (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)

thus *?thesis*

unfolding *has-unique-favorites-altdef* **using** *assms*

by (*auto simp: favorites-prefs-from-table list-all-iff*)

qed

end

9.1 Automatic definition of preference profiles from tables

function *favorites-prefs-from-table* **where**

$i = j \implies \text{favorites-prefs-from-table } ((j,x)\#xs) \ i = \text{hd } x$

$| \ i \neq j \implies \text{favorites-prefs-from-table } ((j,x)\#xs) \ i =$
favorites-prefs-from-table xs i

$| \ \text{favorites-prefs-from-table } [] \ i = \{\}$

by (*metis list.exhaust old.prod.exhaust*) *auto*

termination **by** *lexicographic-order*

lemma (*in election*) *eval-favorites-prefs-from-table*:

assumes *prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs*

shows *favorites-prefs-from-table xs i* =

favorites (*prefs-from-table xs*) *i*

```

proof (cases i ∈ agents)
  assume i: i ∈ agents
  with assms have favorites (prefs-from-table xs) i = hd (the (map-of xs i))
    by (simp add: favorites-prefs-from-table)
  also from assms i have i ∈ set (map fst xs)
    by (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  hence hd (the (map-of xs i)) = favorites-prefs-from-table xs i
    by (induction xs i rule: favorites-prefs-from-table.induct) simp-all
  finally show ?thesis ..
next
  assume i: i ∉ agents
  with assms have i': i ∉ set (map fst xs)
    by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  hence map-of xs i = None
    by (simp add: map-of-eq-None-iff)
  hence prefs-from-table xs i = (λ- -. False)
    by (intro ext) (auto simp: prefs-from-table-def)
  hence favorites (prefs-from-table xs) i = {}
    by (simp add: favorites-def Max-wrt-altdef)
  also from i' have ... = favorites-prefs-from-table xs i
    by (induction xs i rule: favorites-prefs-from-table.induct) simp-all
  finally show ?thesis ..
qed

function weak-ranking-prefs-from-table where
  i ≠ j ⇒ weak-ranking-prefs-from-table ((i,x)#xs) j = weak-ranking-prefs-from-table
  xs j
| i = j ⇒ weak-ranking-prefs-from-table ((i,x)#xs) j = x
| weak-ranking-prefs-from-table [] j = []
  by (metis list.exhaust old.prod.exhaust) auto
termination by lexicographic-order

lemma eval-weak-ranking-prefs-from-table:
  assumes prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xs
  shows weak-ranking-prefs-from-table xs i = weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs
  i)
proof (cases i ∈ agents)
  assume i: i ∈ agents
  with assms have weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs i) = the (map-of xs i)
    by (auto simp: prefs-from-table-def prefs-from-table-wf-def weak-ranking-of-weak-ranking
    split: option.splits)
  also from assms i have i ∈ set (map fst xs)
    by (auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
  hence the (map-of xs i) = weak-ranking-prefs-from-table xs i
    by (induction xs i rule: weak-ranking-prefs-from-table.induct) simp-all
  finally show ?thesis ..
next
  assume i: i ∉ agents
  with assms have i': i ∉ set (map fst xs)

```

by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)
 hence map-of xs i = None
 by (simp add: map-of-eq-None-iff)
 hence prefs-from-table xs i = (λ- -. False)
 by (intro ext) (auto simp: prefs-from-table-def)
 hence weak-ranking (prefs-from-table xs i) = [] by simp
 also from i' have ... = weak-ranking-prefs-from-table xs i
 by (induction xs i rule: weak-ranking-prefs-from-table.induct) simp-all
 finally show ?thesis ..
 qed

lemma eval-prefs-from-table-aux:

assumes $R \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xs \text{ prefs-from-table-wf agents alts } xs$
 shows $R \ i \ a \ b \longleftrightarrow \text{prefs-from-table } xs \ i \ a \ b$
 $a \prec[R \ i] \ b \longleftrightarrow \text{prefs-from-table } xs \ i \ a \ b \wedge \neg \text{prefs-from-table } xs \ i \ b \ a$
 anonymous-profile $R = \text{mset } (\text{map snd } xs)$
 election agents alts $\implies i \in \text{set } (\text{map fst } xs) \implies$
 preferred-alts $(R \ i) \ x =$
 of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge $(\text{rev } (\text{the } (\text{map-of } xs \ i))) \ x$
 election agents alts $\implies i \in \text{set } (\text{map fst } xs) \implies$
 favorites $R \ i = \text{favorites-prefs-from-table } xs \ i$
 election agents alts $\implies i \in \text{set } (\text{map fst } xs) \implies$
 weak-ranking $(R \ i) = \text{weak-ranking-prefs-from-table } xs \ i$
 election agents alts $\implies i \in \text{set } (\text{map fst } xs) \implies$
 favorite $R \ i = \text{the-elem } (\text{favorites-prefs-from-table } xs \ i)$
 election agents alts \implies
 has-unique-favorites $R \longleftrightarrow \text{list-all } (\lambda z. \text{is-singleton } (\text{hd } (\text{snd } z))) \ xs$
 using assms prefs-from-table-wfD[OF assms(2)]
 by (simp-all add: strongly-preferred-def favorite-def anonymise-prefs-from-table
 election.preferred-alts-prefs-from-table election.eval-favorites-prefs-from-table
 election.has-unique-favorites-prefs-from-table eval-weak-ranking-prefs-from-table)

lemma pref-profile-from-tableI':

assumes $R1 \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xss \text{ prefs-from-table-wf agents alts } xss$
 shows pref-profile-wf agents alts $R1$
 using assms by (simp add: pref-profile-from-tableI)

ML <

signature PREFERENCE-PROFILES-CMD =
sig

type info

val preference-profile :

(term * term) * ((binding * (term * term list list) list) list) -> Proof.context
-> Proof.state

```

val preference-profile-cmd :
  (string * string) * ((binding * (string * string list list) list) list) ->
  Proof.context -> Proof.state

val get-info : term -> Proof.context -> info
val add-info : term -> info -> Context.generic -> Context.generic
val transform-info : info -> morphism -> info

end

structure Preference-Profiles-Cmd : PREFERENCE-PROFILES-CMD =
struct

open Preference-Profiles

type info =
  { term : term, def-thm : thm, wf-thm : thm, wf-raw-thm : thm, binding : binding,
    raw : (term * term list list) list, eval-thms : thm list }

fun transform-info ({term = t, binding, def-thm, wf-thm, wf-raw-thm, raw, eval-thms}
: info) phi =
  let
    val thm = Morphism.thm phi
    val fact = Morphism.fact phi
    val term = Morphism.term phi
    val bdg = Morphism.binding phi
  in
    { term = term t, binding = bdg binding, def-thm = thm def-thm, wf-thm =
thm wf-thm,
      wf-raw-thm = thm wf-raw-thm, raw = map (fn (a, bss) => (term a, map
(map term) bss)) raw,
      eval-thms = fact eval-thms }
  end

structure Data = Generic-Data
(
  type T = (term * info) Item-Net.T
  val empty = Item-Net.init (op aconv o apply2 fst) (single o fst)
  val merge = Item-Net.merge
);

fun get-info term lthy =
  Item-Net.retrieve (Data.get (Context.Proof lthy)) term |> the-single |> snd

fun add-info term info lthy =
  Data.map (Item-Net.update (term, info)) lthy

fun add-infos infos lthy =

```

```

Data.map (fold Item-Net.update infos) lthy

fun preference-profile-aux agents alts (binding, args) lthy =
  let
    val dest-Type' = Term.dest-Type #> snd #> hd
    val (agentT, altT) = apply2 (dest-Type' o fastype-of) (agents, alts)
    val alt-setT = HOLogic.mk-setT altT
    fun define t =
      Local-Theory.define ((binding, NoSyn),
        ((Binding.suffix-name -def binding, @{attributes [code]}), t)) lthy
    val ty = HOLogic.mk-prodT (agentT, HOLogic.listT (HOLogic.mk-setT altT))
    val args' =
      args |> map (fn x => x ||> map (HOLogic.mk-set altT) ||> HOLogic.mk-list
alt-setT)
    val t-raw =
      args'
      |> map HOLogic.mk-prod
      |> HOLogic.mk-list ty
    val t = Const (@{const-name prefs-from-table},
      HOLogic.listT ty --> pref-profileT agentT altT) $ t-raw
    val ((prefs, prefs-def), lthy) = define t
    val prefs-from-table-wf-const =
      Const (@{const-name prefs-from-table-wf}, HOLogic.mk-setT agentT -->
HOLogic.mk-setT altT -->
      HOLogic.listT (HOLogic.mk-prodT (agentT, HOLogic.listT (HOLogic.mk-setT
altT)))) -->
      HOLogic.boolT)
    val wf-prop = (prefs-from-table-wf-const $ agents $ alts $ t-raw) |> HO-
Logic.mk-Trueprop

  in
    ((prefs, wf-prop, prefs-def), lthy)
  end

fun fold-accum f xs s =
  let
    fun fold-accum-aux - [] s acc = (rev acc, s)
      | fold-accum-aux f (x::xs) s acc =
        case f x s of (y, s') => fold-accum-aux f xs s' (y::acc)
  in
    fold-accum-aux f xs s []
  end

fun preference-profile ((agents, alts), args) lthy =
  let
    fun qualify pref suff = Binding.qualify true (Binding.name-of pref) (Binding.name
suff)
    val (results, lthy) = fold-accum (preference-profile-aux agents alts) args lthy
    val prefs-terms = map #1 results
  end

```



```

val wf-props = map #2 results
val defs = map (snd o #3) results
val raws = map snd args
val bindings = map fst args

fun tac lthy =
  let
    val lthy' = put-simpset HOL-ss lthy addsimps
      @{thms list.set Union-insert Un-insert-left insert-not-empty Int-empty-left
Int-empty-right
insert-commute Un-empty-left Un-empty-right insert-absorb2 Union-empty
is-weak-ranking-Cons is-weak-ranking-Nil finite-insert finite.emptyI
Set.singleton-iff Set.empty-iff Set.ball-simps}
    in
      Local-Defs.unfold-tac lthy defs
      THEN ALLGOALS (resolve-tac lthy [@{thm prefs-from-table-wfI}])
      THEN Local-Defs.unfold-tac lthy @{{thms is-finite-weak-ranking-def list.set
insert-iff
empty-iff simp-thms list.map snd-conv fst-conv}
      THEN ALLGOALS (TRY o REPEAT-ALL-NEW (eresolve-tac lthy
@{thms disjE}))
      THEN ALLGOALS (TRY o Hypsubst.hyp-subst-tac lthy)
      THEN ALLGOALS (Simplifier.asm-full-simp-tac lthy')
      THEN ALLGOALS (TRY o REPEAT-ALL-NEW (resolve-tac lthy
@{thms conjI}))
      THEN distinct-subgoals-tac
    end

  fun after-qed [wf-thms-raw] lthy =
    let
      fun prep-thms attrs suffix (thms : thm list) binding =
        (((qualify binding suffix, attrs), [(thms, [])]))
      fun prep-thmss simp suffix thmss = map2 (prep-thms simp suffix) thmss
    bindings
      fun notes thmss suffix attrs lthy =
        Local-Theory.notes (prep-thmss attrs suffix thmss) lthy |> snd
      fun note thms suffix attrs lthy = notes (map single thms) suffix attrs lthy
      val eval-thmss = map2 (fn def => fn wf =>
        map (fn thm => thm OF [def, wf]) @{{thms eval-prefs-from-table-aux}}
        defs wf-thms-raw
      val wf-thms = map2 (fn def => fn wf =>
        @{{thm pref-profile-from-tableI'}} OF [def, wf]) defs wf-thms-raw
      val mk-infos =
        let
          fun aux acc (bdg::bdgs) (t::ts) (r::raws) (def::def-thms) (wf::wf-thms)
            (wf-raw::wf-raw-thms) (evals::eval-thmss) =
            aux ((t, {binding = bdg, term = t, raw = r, def-thm = def, wf-thm =
wf,
wf-raw-thm = wf-raw, eval-thms = evals}) :: acc)
        end
    end

```

```

      bdgs ts raws def-thms wf-thms wf-raw-thms eval-thmss
    | aux acc [] - - - - - = (acc : (term * info) list)
    | aux - - - - - = raise Match
  in
    aux []
  end
  val infos = mk-infos bindings prefs-terms raws defs wf-thms wf-thms-raw
eval-thmss
  in
    lthy
    |> note wf-thms-raw wf-raw []
    |> note wf-thms wf @ {attributes [simp]}
    |> notes eval-thmss eval []
    |> Local-Theory.declaration {syntax = false, pervasive = false, pos = here }
    (fn m => add-infos (map (fn (t,i) => (Morphism.term m t, transform-info
i m)) infos))
  end
  | after-qed - - = raise Match

  in
    Proof.theorem NONE after-qed [map (fn prop => (prop, [])) wf-props] lthy
    |> Proof.refine-singleton (Method.Basic (SIMPLE-METHOD o tac))
  end

fun preference-profile-cmd ((agents, alts), argss) lthy =
  let
    val read = Syntax.read-term lthy
    fun read' ty t = Syntax.parse-term lthy t |> Type.constraint ty |> Syntax.check-term
lthy
    val agentT = agents' |> fastype-of |> dest-Type |> snd |> hd
    val altT = alts' |> fastype-of |> dest-Type |> snd |> hd
    fun read-pref-elem ts = map (read' altT) ts
    fun read-prefs prefs = map read-pref-elem prefs
    fun prep (binding, args) =
      (binding, map (fn (agent, prefs) => (read' agentT agent, read-prefs prefs))
args)
  in
    preference-profile ((agents', alts'), map prep argss) lthy
  end

val parse-prefs =
  let
    val parse-pref-elem =
      (Args.bracks (Parse.list1 Parse.term)) ||
      Parse.term >> single
  in
    Parse.list1 parse-pref-elem
  end

```

```

end

val parse-pref-profile =
  Parse.binding --| Args.$$$ = -- Scan.repeat1 (Parse.term --| Args.colon --
  parse-prefs)

val - =
  Outer-Syntax.local-theory-to-proof @ {command-keyword preference-profile}
  construct preference profiles from a table
  (Args.$$$ agents |-- Args.colon |-- Parse.term --| Args.$$$ alts --|
  Args.colon
  -- Parse.term --| Args.$$$ where --
  Parse.and-list1 parse-pref-profile >> preference-profile-cmd);

end
>

end
theory QSOpt-Exact
imports Complex-Main
begin

```

ML <

```

signature RAT-UTILS =
sig
  val rat-to-string : Rat.rat -> string
  val pretty-rat : Rat.rat -> string
  val string-to-rat : string -> Rat.rat option
  val mk-rat-number : typ -> Rat.rat -> term
  val dest-rat-number : term -> Rat.rat
end

structure Rat-Utills : RAT-UTILS =
struct

fun rat-to-string r =
  case Rat.dest r of
    (a, 1) => Int.toString a
  | (a, b) => (if a < 0 then ~ else) ^ Int.toString (abs a) ^ / ^ Int.toString b

fun pretty-rat r =
  case Rat.dest r of
    (a, 1) => (if a < 0 then - else) ^ Int.toString a
  | (a, b) => (if a < 0 then - else) ^ Int.toString (abs a) ^ / ^ Int.toString b

fun string-to-rat s =

```

```

let
  val (s1, s2') = s |> Substring.full |> Substring.splitl (fn x => x <> #/)
  val (s1, s2) = (s1, s2') |> apsnd (Substring.triml 1) |> apply2 Substring.string
in
  if Substring.isEmpty s2' then
    Option.map Rat.of-int (Int.fromString s1)
  else
    Option.mapPartial (fn x => Option.map (fn y => Rat.make (x, y))
      (Int.fromString s2)) (Int.fromString s1)
end

fun dest-num x =
  case x of
    Const (@{const-name Code-Numeral.int-of-integer}, -) $ x => dest-num x
  | - => HOLogic.dest-number x

fun dest-rat-number t =
  case t of
    (Const (@{const-name Rings.divide-class.divide},-) $ a $ b
     => Rat.make (snd (dest-num a), snd (dest-num b))
   | (Const (@{const-name Groups.uminus-class.uminus},-) $ a
     => ~ (dest-rat-number a)
   | (Const (@{const-name Rat.field-char-0-class.of-rat},-) $ a => dest-rat-number
     a
   | (Const (@{const-name Rat.Frct}, -) $ (Const (@{const-name Product-Type.Pair},
     -) $ a $ b))
     => Rat.make (snd (dest-num a), snd (dest-num b))
   | - => Rat.of-int (snd (dest-num t));

fun mk-rat-number ty r =
  case Rat.dest r of
    (a, 1) => HOLogic.mk-number ty a
  | (a, b) =>
    Const (@{const-name Rings.divide-class.divide}, ty --> ty --> ty) $
    HOLogic.mk-number ty a $ HOLogic.mk-number ty b

end

>

ML <

signature LP-PARAMS =
sig

type T
val print : T -> string
val read : string -> T option
val compare : (T * T) -> General.order

```

```

val negate : T -> T
val from-int : int -> T

end;

signature LINEAR-PROGRAM-COMMON =
sig
  exception QSOpt-Parse
  datatype 'a infty = Finite of 'a | Pos-Infty | Neg-Infty;
  datatype comparison = LEQ | EQ | GEQ
  datatype optimization-mode = MAXIMIZE | MINIMIZE
  datatype 'a result = Optimal of 'a * (string * 'a) list | Unbounded | Infeasible |
Unknown
  type var = string
  type 'a bound = 'a infty * var * 'a infty
  type 'a linterm = ('a * var) list
  type 'a constraint = 'a linterm * comparison * 'a
  type 'a prog = optimization-mode * 'a linterm * 'a constraint list * 'a bound list

  val is-finite : 'a infty -> bool
  val map-infty : ('a -> 'b) -> 'a infty -> 'b infty

  val print-infty : ('a -> string) -> 'a infty -> string
  val print-comparison : comparison -> string
  val print-optimization-mode : optimization-mode -> string

  val gen-print-bound : ('a -> string) -> 'a bound -> string
  val gen-print-linterm :
    (('a * 'a -> General.order) * (int -> 'a) * ('a -> string) * ('a -> 'a)) ->
    'a linterm -> string
  val gen-print-constraint :
    (('a * 'a -> General.order) * (int -> 'a) * ('a -> string) * ('a -> 'a)) ->
    'a constraint -> string
  val gen-print-program :
    (('a * 'a -> General.order) * (int -> 'a) * ('a -> string) * ('a -> 'a)) ->
    'a prog -> string
  val gen-read-result : (string -> 'a option) -> string -> 'a result

end;

signature LINEAR-PROGRAM =
sig
  include LINEAR-PROGRAM-COMMON
  type T

  val print-bound : T bound -> string
  val print-linterm : T linterm -> string
  val print-constraint : T constraint -> string
  val print-program : T prog -> string

```

```

val save-program : Path.T -> T prog -> unit
val solve-program : T prog -> T result
val read-result : string -> T result

end;

structure Linear-Program-Common : LINEAR-PROGRAM-COMMON =
struct

exception QSOpt-Parse
datatype 'a infty = Finite of 'a | Pos-Infty | Neg-Infty;
datatype comparison = LEQ | EQ | GEQ
datatype optimization-mode = MAXIMIZE | MINIMIZE
datatype 'a result = Optimal of 'a * (string * 'a) list | Unbounded | Infeasible |
Unknown
type var = string

type 'a bound = 'a infty * var * 'a infty
type 'a linterm = ('a * var) list
type 'a constraint = 'a linterm * comparison * 'a
type 'a prog = optimization-mode * 'a linterm * 'a constraint list * 'a bound list

fun is-finite (Finite _) = true
  | is-finite _ = false

fun map-infty f (Finite x) = Finite (f x)
  | map-infty _ Pos-Infty = Pos-Infty
  | map-infty _ Neg-Infty = Neg-Infty

fun print-infty _ Neg-Infty = -INF
  | print-infty _ Pos-Infty = INF
  | print-infty f (Finite x) = f x

fun print-comparison LEQ = <=
  | print-comparison EQ = =
  | print-comparison GEQ = >=

fun print-optimization-mode MINIMIZE = MINIMIZE
  | print-optimization-mode MAXIMIZE = MAXIMIZE

fun gen-print-bound - (Neg-Infty, v, Pos-Infty) = v ^ free
  | gen-print-bound f (Neg-Infty, v, u) = v ^ <= ^ print-infty f u
  | gen-print-bound f (l, v, Pos-Infty) = print-infty f l ^ <= ^ v
  | gen-print-bound f (l, v, u) = print-infty f l ^ <= ^ v ^ <= ^ print-infty f u

fun gen-print-summand (cmp, from-int, print, negate) first c v =
  let

```

```

val neg = (cmp (c, from-int 0) = LESS)
fun eq x = (cmp (c, x) = EQUAL)
val one = eq (from-int 1)
val mone = eq (from-int (~1))
val c' =
  if first andalso one then
  else if first andalso mone then -
  else if first then print c ^
  else if mone then -
  else if one then +
  else if neg then - ^ print (negate c) ^
  else + ^ print c ^
in
  c' ^ v
end

fun gen-print-linterm ops t =
  let
    val n = length t
    val print-summand = gen-print-summand ops
    fun go (c, v) (i, acc) = (i+1, print-summand (i = n) c v ^ acc)
  in
    snd (fold go (rev t) (1, ))
  end

fun gen-print-constraint (ops as (-, -, print, -)) (lhs, cmp, rhs) =
  gen-print-linterm ops lhs ^ ^ print-comparison cmp ^ ^ print rhs

fun gen-print-program (ops as (-, -, print, -)) (mode, obj, condrs, bnds) =
  let
    val padding = replicate-string 4
    fun mk-block s f xs = (s :: map (prefix padding o f) xs)
    fun mk-block' s f xs = if null xs then [] else mk-block s f xs
    val lines =
      mk-block (print-optimization-mode mode) (gen-print-linterm ops) [obj] @
      mk-block' ST (gen-print-constraint ops) condrs @
      mk-block' BOUNDS (gen-print-bound print) bnds @ [END, ]
  in
    cat-lines lines
  end

exception QSOpt-Parse

fun read-status x =
  if String.isPrefix status x andalso not (String.isPrefix status = x) then
  let
    val statuses = [OPTIMAL, INFEASIBLE, UNBOUNDED]

```

```

    in
      case find-first (fn s => String.isPrefix (status ^ s) x) statuses of
        NONE => SOME UNKNOWN
      | SOME y => SOME y
    end
  else
    NONE

fun apply - - [] = NONE
| apply abort f (x :: xs) =
  if abort x then
    NONE
  else case f x of
    NONE => apply abort f xs
  | SOME y => SOME (y, xs)

fun apply-repeat abort (f : string -> 'a option) : string list -> 'a list * string list
=
  let
    fun go acc xs =
      case apply abort f xs of
        NONE => (rev acc, xs)
      | SOME (y,xs) => go (y :: acc) xs
    in
      go []
    end

fun the-apply f xs =
  case apply (K false) f xs of
    NONE => raise QSOpt-Parse
  | SOME y => y

fun apply-unit p xs =
  case apply (not o p) (K (SOME ())) xs of
    NONE => raise QSOpt-Parse
  | SOME (-, xs) => xs

fun gen-read-value read x =
  let
    val x = unprefix Value = x
  in
    read x
  end
  handle Fail - => NONE

val trim =
  let
    fun chop [] = []
      | chop (l as (x::xs)) = if Char.isSpace x then chop xs else l
  end

```



```

in
  String.implode o chop o rev o chop o rev o String.explode
end

fun gen-read-assignment read x : (string * 'a) option =
  x |> try (
    Substring.full
    #> Substring.splitl (fn x => x <> #=)
    #> apply2 Substring.string
    #> apsnd (unprefix =)
    #> apply2 trim)
  |> Option.mapPartial (fn (x,y) => Option.map (fn y => (x, y)) (read y))

fun gen-read-result read s =
  let
    val s = s |> split-lines |> map trim
    val (status, s) = the-apply read-status s
    val (result, _) =
      if status = OPTIMAL then
        let
          val (value, s) = the-apply (gen-read-value read) s
          val s = apply-unit (fn x => x = VARS:) s
          val (vars, s) = apply-repeat (String.isSuffix :) (gen-read-assignment read) s
        in
          (Optimal (value, vars), s)
        end
      else if status = INFEASIBLE then
        (Infeasible, s)
      else if status = UNBOUNDED then
        (Unbounded, s)
      else
        (Unknown, s)
    in
      result
    end
end;

functor Linear-Program(LP-Params : LP-PARAMS) : LINEAR-PROGRAM =
  struct

    open Linear-Program-Common;

    local
      open LP-Params;
      val ops = (compare, from-int, print, negate)
    in
      type T = T
    end
  end

```

```

    val print-bound = gen-print-bound print
    val print-linterm = gen-print-linterm ops
    val print-constraint = gen-print-constraint ops
    val print-program = gen-print-program ops
end

fun save-program filename prog =
  File.write filename (print-program prog)

val read-result = gen-read-result LP-Params.read

fun solve-program prog =
  Isabelle-System.with-tmp-file prog lp (fn lpname =>
    Isabelle-System.with-tmp-file prog sol (fn resultname =>
      let
        val - = save-program lpname prog
        val esolver-path = getenv QSOPT-EXACT-PATH
        val esolver = if esolver-path = then esolver else esolver-path
        val command = Bash.string esolver ^ -O ^ File.bash-path resultname ^
          ^ File.bash-path lpname
        val res = Isabelle-System.bash-process (Bash.script command)
        in
          if not (Process-Result.ok res) then
            raise Fail (QSopt-exact returned with an error (return code ^
              Int.toString (Process-Result.rc res) ^):\n ^ Process-Result.err res)
          else read-result (File.read resultname)
        end))
      end)

structure Rat-Linear-Program = Linear-Program(
  struct

    type T = Rat.rat

    val print = Rat-Utills.rat-to-string
    val read = Rat-Utills.string-to-rat
    val compare = Rat.ord
    val from-int = Rat.of-int
    val negate = Rat.neg

    end)

```

end

10 Automatic Fact Gathering for Social Decision Schemes

```
theory SDS-Automation
  imports
    Preference-Profile-Cmd
    QSOpt-Exact
    ../Social-Decision-Schemes
  keywords
    derive-orbit-equations
    derive-support-conditions
    derive-ex-post-conditions
    find-inefficient-supports
    prove-inefficient-supports
    derive-strategyproofness-conditions :: thy-goal
begin
```

We now provide the following commands to automatically derive restrictions on the results of Social Decision Schemes satisfying Anonymity, Neutrality, Efficiency, or Strategy-Proofness:

derive-orbit-equations to derive equalities arising from automorphisms of the given profiles due to Anonymity and Neutrality

derive-ex-post-conditions to find all Pareto losers and the given profiles and derive the facts that they must be assigned probability 0 by any *ex-post*-efficient SDS

find-inefficient-supports to use Linear Programming to find all minimal SD-inefficient (but not *ex-post*-inefficient) supports in the given profiles and output a corresponding witness lottery for each of them

prove-inefficient-supports to prove a specified set of support conditions arising from *ex-post*- or *SD*-Efficiency. For conditions arising from *SD*-Efficiency, a witness lottery must be specified (e.g. as computed by **derive-orbit-equations**).

derive-support-conditions to automatically find and prove all support conditions arising from *ex-post*- and *SD*-Efficiency

derive-strategyproofness-conditions to automatically derive all conditions arising from weak Strategy-Proofness and any manipulations between the given preference profiles. An optional maximum manipulation size can be specified.

All commands except **find-inefficient-supports** open a proof state and leave behind proof obligations for the user to discharge. This should always be possible using the Simplifier, possibly with a few additional rules, depending on the context.

lemma *disj-False-right*: $P \vee \text{False} \longleftrightarrow P$ **by** *simp*

lemmas *multiset-add-ac* = *add-ac*[**where** $?'a = 'a$ *multiset*]

lemma *less-or-eq-real*:

$(x::\text{real}) < y \vee x = y \longleftrightarrow x \leq y$ $x < y \vee y = x \longleftrightarrow x \leq y$ **by** *linarith+*

lemma *multiset-Diff-single-normalize*:

fixes $a\ c$ **assumes** $a \neq c$

shows $(\{ \#a \# \} + B) - \{ \#c \# \} = \{ \#a \# \} + (B - \{ \#c \# \})$

using *assms* **by** *auto*

lemma *ex-post-efficient-aux*:

assumes *prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss* $R \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xss$

assumes $i \in \text{agents} \forall i \in \text{agents}. y \succeq [\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i] x \neg y \preceq [\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i] x$

shows *ex-post-efficient-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* $\longrightarrow \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$

proof

assume *ex-post*: *ex-post-efficient-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds*

from *assms*(1,2) **have** *wf*: *pref-profile-wf* *agents* *alts* R

by (*simp* *add*: *pref-profile-from-tableI'*)

from *ex-post* **interpret** *ex-post-efficient-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* .

from *assms*(2-) **show** $\text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0$

by (*intro* *ex-post-efficient''*[*OF* *wf*, *of* $i\ x\ y$]) *simp-all*

qed

lemma *SD-inefficient-support-aux*:

assumes R : *prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss* $R \equiv \text{prefs-from-table } xss$

assumes *as*: $as \neq []$ *set* $as \subseteq \text{alts}$ *distinct* *as* $A = \text{set } as$

assumes *ys*: $\forall x \in \text{set } (map\ snd\ ys). 0 \leq x$ *sum-list* $(map\ snd\ ys) = 1$ *set* $(map\ fst\ ys) \subseteq \text{alts}$

assumes i : $i \in \text{agents}$

assumes *SD1*: $\forall i \in \text{agents}. \forall x \in \text{alts}.$

$\text{sum-list } (map\ snd\ (filter\ (\lambda y. \text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x\ (fst\ y))\ ys)) \geq$

$\text{real } (\text{length } (filter\ (\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x)\ as)) / \text{real } (\text{length } as)$

assumes *SD2*: $\exists x \in \text{alts}. \text{sum-list } (map\ snd\ (filter\ (\lambda y. \text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x\ (fst\ y))\ ys)) >$

$\text{real } (\text{length } (filter\ (\text{prefs-from-table } xss\ i\ x)\ as)) / \text{real } (\text{length } as)$

shows *sd-efficient-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* $\longrightarrow (\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds\ R)\ x = 0)$

proof

assume *sd-efficient-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds*

from R **have** *wf*: *pref-profile-wf* *agents* *alts* R

by (*simp* *add*: *pref-profile-from-tableI'*)

then **interpret** *pref-profile-wf* *agents* *alts* R .

```

interpret sd-efficient-sds agents alts sds by fact
from ys have ys': pmf-of-list-wf ys by (intro pmf-of-list-wfI) auto

{
  fix i x assume  $x \in \text{alts } i \in \text{agents}$ 
  with ys' have lottery-prob (pmf-of-list ys) (preferred-alts (R i) x) =
    sum-list (map snd (filter ( $\lambda y. \text{prefs-from-table } xss \ i \ x \ (\text{fst } y)$ ) ys))
    by (subst measure-pmf-of-list) (simp-all add: preferred-alts-def R)
} note A = this
{
  fix i x assume  $x \in \text{alts } i \in \text{agents}$ 
  with as have lottery-prob (pmf-of-set (set as)) (preferred-alts (R i) x) =
    real (card ( $\text{set } as \cap \text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x$ )) / real (card (set as))
    by (subst measure-pmf-of-set) simp-all
  also have  $\text{set } as \cap \text{preferred-alts } (R \ i) \ x = \text{set } (\text{filter } (\lambda y. R \ i \ x \ y) \ as)$ 
    by (auto simp add: preferred-alts-def)
  also have  $\text{card } \dots = \text{length } (\text{filter } (\lambda y. R \ i \ x \ y) \ as)$ 
    by (intro distinct-card distinct-filter assms)
  also have  $\text{card } (\text{set } as) = \text{length } as$  by (intro distinct-card assms)
  finally have lottery-prob (pmf-of-set (set as)) (preferred-alts (R i) x) =
    real (length (filter (prefs-from-table xss i x as))) / real (length as)
    by (simp add: R)
} note B = this

from wf show  $\exists x \in A. \text{pmf } (sds \ R) \ x = 0$ 
proof (rule SD-inefficient-support')
  from ys ys' show lottery1: pmf-of-list ys  $\in$  lotteries by (intro pmf-of-list-lottery)
  show i: i  $\in$  agents by fact
  from as have lottery2: pmf-of-set (set as)  $\in$  lotteries
    by (intro pmf-of-set-lottery) simp-all
  from i as SD2 lottery1 lottery2 show  $\neg SD \ (R \ i) \ (\text{pmf-of-list } ys) \ (\text{pmf-of-set } A)$ 
    by (subst preorder-on.SD-preorder[of alts]) (auto simp: A B not-le)
  from as SD1 lottery1 lottery2
    show  $\forall i \in \text{agents}. SD \ (R \ i) \ (\text{pmf-of-set } A) \ (\text{pmf-of-list } ys)$ 
    by (safe) (auto simp: preorder-on.SD-preorder[of alts] A B)
qed (insert as, simp-all)
qed

```

definition *pref-classes* where
pref-classes alts le = *preferred-alts le 'alts - {alts}*

primrec *pref-classes-lists* where
pref-classes-lists [] = {}
| *pref-classes-lists (xs#xss)* = *insert* ($\bigcup (\text{set } (xs\#xss))$) (*pref-classes-lists xss*)

fun *pref-classes-lists-aux* where

$\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } [] = \{\}$
 $| \text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } (xs \# xss) = \text{insert } \text{acc } (\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } (\text{acc } \cup xs) xss)$

lemma *pref-classes-lists-append*:

$\text{pref-classes-lists } (xs @ ys) = (\cup) (\cup (\text{set } ys)) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } xs \cup \text{pref-classes-lists } ys$

by (*induction xs*) *auto*

lemma *pref-classes-lists-aux*:

assumes *is-weak-ranking xss acc* $\cap (\cup (\text{set } xss)) = \{\}$

shows $\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } xss =$

$(\text{insert } \text{acc } ((\lambda A. A \cup \text{acc})) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } xss)) - \{\text{acc } \cup \cup (\text{set } xss)\}$

using *assms*

proof (*induction acc xss rule: pref-classes-lists-aux.induct [case-names Nil Cons]*)

case (*Cons acc xs xss*)

from *Cons.prem*s **have** $A: \text{acc } \cap (xs \cup \cup (\text{set } xss)) = \{\} \text{ } xs \neq \{\}$

by (*simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)

from *Cons.prem*s **have** $\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } (\text{acc } \cup xs) xss =$

$\text{insert } (\text{acc } \cup xs) ((\lambda A. A \cup (\text{acc } \cup xs)) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } xss)) -$
 $\{\text{acc } \cup xs \cup \cup (\text{set } xss)\}$

by (*intro Cons.IH*) (*auto simp: is-weak-ranking-Cons*)

with *Cons.prem*s **have** $\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } (xs \# xss) =$

$\text{insert } \text{acc } (\text{insert } (\text{acc } \cup xs) ((\lambda A. A \cup (\text{acc } \cup xs)) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } xss)) -$
 $\{\text{acc } \cup (xs \cup \cup (\text{set } xss))\})$

by (*simp-all add: is-weak-ranking-Cons pref-classes-lists-append image-image Un-ac*)

also from A **have** $\dots = \text{insert } \text{acc } (\text{insert } (\text{acc } \cup xs) ((\lambda x. x \cup (\text{acc } \cup xs)) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } xss))) - \{\text{acc } \cup (xs \cup \cup (\text{set } xss))\}$

by *blast*

finally show *?case*

by (*simp-all add: pref-classes-lists-append image-image Un-ac*)

qed *simp-all*

lemma *pref-classes-list-aux-hd-tl*:

assumes *is-weak-ranking xss xss* $\neq []$

shows $\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } (\text{hd } xss) (\text{tl } xss) = \text{pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } xss) - \{\cup (\text{set } xss)\}$

proof –

from *assms* **have** $A: xss = \text{hd } xss \# \text{tl } xss$ **by** *simp*

from *assms* **have** $\text{hd } xss \cap \cup (\text{set } (\text{tl } xss)) = \{\} \wedge \text{is-weak-ranking } (\text{tl } xss)$

by (*subst (asm) A, subst (asm) is-weak-ranking-Cons*) *simp-all*

hence $\text{pref-classes-lists-aux } (\text{hd } xss) (\text{tl } xss) =$

$\text{insert } (\text{hd } xss) ((\lambda A. A \cup \text{hd } xss) \text{ 'pref-classes-lists } (\text{rev } (\text{tl } xss))) -$
 $\{\text{hd } xss \cup \cup (\text{set } (\text{tl } xss))\}$ **by** (*intro pref-classes-lists-aux simp-all*)

also have $hd\ xss \cup \bigcup (set\ (tl\ xss)) = \bigcup (set\ xss)$ **by** $(subst\ (\beta)\ A, subst\ set\ simp)$
simp-all
also have $insert\ (hd\ xss)\ ((\lambda A. A \cup hd\ xss)\ 'pref\ classes\ lists\ (rev\ (tl\ xss))) =$
 $pref\ classes\ lists\ (rev\ (tl\ xss)\ @\ [hd\ xss])$
by $(subst\ pref\ classes\ lists\ append)\ auto$
also have $rev\ (tl\ xss)\ @\ [hd\ xss] = rev\ xss$ **by** $(subst\ (\beta)\ A)\ (simp\ only:\ rev.\ simp)$
finally show $?thesis$.
qed

lemma *pref-classes-of-weak-ranking-aux:*
assumes *is-weak-ranking xss*
shows *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge xss ' ($\bigcup (set\ xss)$) = pref-classes-lists xss*
proof *safe*
fix $X\ x$ **assume** $x \in X\ X \in set\ xss$
with *assms* **show** *of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge xss x \in pref-classes-lists xss*
by $(induction\ xss)\ (auto\ simp:\ is\ weak\ ranking\ Cons\ of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ Cons')$
next
fix x **assume** $x \in pref\ classes\ lists\ xss$
with *assms* **show** $x \in of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ xss\ ' \bigcup (set\ xss)$
proof $(induction\ xss)$
case $(Cons\ xs\ xss)$
from *Cons.prem*s **consider** $x = xs \cup \bigcup (set\ xss) \mid x \in pref\ classes\ lists\ xss$ **by**
auto
thus $?case$
proof *cases*
assume $x = xs \cup \bigcup (set\ xss)$
with *Cons.prem*s **show** $?thesis$
by $(auto\ simp:\ is\ weak\ ranking\ Cons\ of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ Cons')$
next
assume $x: x \in pref\ classes\ lists\ xss$
from *Cons.prem*s x **have** $x \in of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ xss\ ' \bigcup (set\ xss)$
by $(intro\ Cons.IH)\ (simp\ all\ add:\ is\ weak\ ranking\ Cons)$
moreover from *Cons.prem*s **have** $xs \cap \bigcup (set\ xss) = \{\}$
by $(simp\ add:\ is\ weak\ ranking\ Cons)$
ultimately have $x \in of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ xss\ ' \bigcup (set\ xss)$
 $((xs \cup \bigcup (set\ xss)) \cap \{x.\ x \notin xs\})$ **by** *blast*
thus $?thesis$ **by** $(simp\ add:\ of\ weak\ ranking\ Collect\ ge\ Cons')$
qed
qed *simp-all*
qed

lemma *eval-pref-classes-of-weak-ranking:*
assumes $\bigcup (set\ xss) = alts\ is\ weak\ ranking\ xss\ alts \neq \{\}$
shows $pref\ classes\ alts\ (of\ weak\ ranking\ xss) = pref\ classes\ lists\ aux\ (hd\ xss)\ (tl\ xss)$
proof $-$
have $pref\ classes\ alts\ (of\ weak\ ranking\ xss) =$
 $preferred\ alts\ (of\ weak\ ranking\ xss)\ ' (\bigcup (set\ (rev\ xss))) - \{\bigcup (set\ xss)\}$
by $(simp\ add:\ pref\ classes\ def\ assms)$

```

also {
  have of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev xss) ‘ $(\bigcup(\text{set}(\text{rev } xss))) = \text{pref-classes-lists}(\text{rev } xss)$ ’
  using assms by (intro pref-classes-of-weak-ranking-aux) simp-all
  also have of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge (rev xss) = preferred-alts (of-weak-ranking xss)
  by (intro ext) (simp-all add: of-weak-ranking-Collect-ge-def preferred-alts-def)
  finally have preferred-alts (of-weak-ranking xss) ‘ $(\bigcup(\text{set}(\text{rev } xss))) = \text{pref-classes-lists}(\text{rev } xss)$ ’ .
}
also from assms have pref-classes-lists (rev xss) –  $\{\bigcup(\text{set } xss)\} = \text{pref-classes-lists-aux}(\text{hd } xss)(\text{tl } xss)$ 
  by (intro pref-classes-list-aux-hd-tl [symmetric]) auto
finally show ?thesis by simp
qed

```

```

context preorder-on
begin

```

```

lemma SD-iff-pref-classes:
  assumes  $p \in \text{lotteries-on carrier } q \in \text{lotteries-on carrier}$ 
  shows  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)] q \iff (\forall A \in \text{pref-classes carrier } le. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p A \leq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q A)$ 
proof safe
  fix A assume  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)] q A \in \text{pref-classes carrier } le$ 
  thus  $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p A \leq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q A$ 
  by (auto simp: SD-preorder pref-classes-def)
next
  assume  $A: \forall A \in \text{pref-classes carrier } le. \text{measure-pmf.prob } p A \leq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q A$ 
  show  $p \preceq[\text{SD}(le)] q$ 
  proof (rule SD-preorderI)
    fix x assume  $x: x \in \text{carrier}$ 
    show  $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p(\text{preferred-alts } le x) \leq \text{measure-pmf.prob } q(\text{preferred-alts } le x)$ 
  proof (cases preferred-alts le x = carrier)
    case False
    with x have preferred-alts le x  $\in \text{pref-classes carrier } le$ 
    unfolding pref-classes-def by (intro DiffI imageI) simp-all
    with A show ?thesis by simp
  next
    case True
    from assms have  $\text{measure-pmf.prob } p \text{ carrier} = 1 \text{ measure-pmf.prob } q \text{ carrier} = 1$ 
    by (auto simp: measure-pmf.prob-eq-1 lotteries-on-def AE-measure-pmf-iff)
    with True show ?thesis by simp
  qed
qed

```


qed (*insert assms, simp-all*)
qed

end

lemma (*in strategyproof-an-sds*) *strategyproof'*:

assumes *wf*: *is-pref-profile* *R* *total-preorder-on* *alts* *Ri'* **and** *i*: *i* ∈ *agents*
shows $(\exists A \in \text{pref-classes } \text{alts } (R \ i). \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri')))) \ A <$
 $\text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \ A) \vee$
 $(\forall A \in \text{pref-classes } \text{alts } (R \ i). \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R(i := Ri')))) \ A =$
 $\text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } R) \ A)$

proof –

from *wf*(1) **interpret** *R*: *pref-profile-wf* *agents* *alts* *R* .
from *i* **interpret** *total-preorder-on* *alts* *R* *i* **by** *simp*
from *assms* **have** \neg *manipulable-profile* *R* *i* *Ri'* **by** (*intro strategyproof*)
moreover from *wf* *i* **have** *sds* *R* ∈ *lotteries* *sds* $(R(i := Ri'))$ ∈ *lotteries*
by (*simp-all add: sds-wf*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*fastforce simp: manipulable-profile-def strongly-preferred-def*
SD-iff-pref-classes not-le not-less)

qed

lemma *pref-classes-lists-aux-finite*:

$A \in \text{pref-classes-lists-aux } \text{acc } \text{xss} \implies \text{finite } \text{acc} \implies (\bigwedge A. A \in \text{set } \text{xss} \implies \text{finite } A)$
 $\implies \text{finite } A$
by (*induction acc xss rule: pref-classes-lists-aux.induct*) *auto*

lemma *strategyproof-aux*:

assumes *wf*: *prefs-from-table-wf* *agents* *alts* *xss1* *R1* = *prefs-from-table* *xss1*
prefs-from-table-wf *agents* *alts* *xss2* *R2* = *prefs-from-table* *xss2*
assumes *sds*: *strategyproof-an-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* **and** *i*: *i* ∈ *agents* **and** *j*: *j* ∈ *agents*
assumes *eq*: $R1(i := R2 \ j) = R2$ *the* (*map-of* *xss1* *i*) = *xs*
pref-classes-lists-aux (*hd* *xs*) (*tl* *xs*) = *ps*
shows $(\exists A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ x) < (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x)) \vee$
 $(\forall A \in \text{ps}. (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R2) \ x) = (\sum x \in A. \text{pmf } (\text{sds } R1) \ x))$

proof –

from *sds* **interpret** *strategyproof-an-sds* *agents* *alts* *sds* .
let *?Ri'* = *R2* *j*
from *wf* *j* **have** *wf'*: *is-pref-profile* *R1* *total-preorder-on* *alts* *?Ri'*
by (*auto intro: pref-profile-from-tableI pref-profile-wf.prefs-wf'(1)*)

from *wf*(1) *i* **have** *i* ∈ *set* (*map fst* *xss1*) **by** (*simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)
with *prefs-from-table-wfD*(3)[*OF wf*(1)] *eq*
have *xs* ∈ *set* (*map snd* *xss1*) **by** *force*
note *xs* = *prefs-from-table-wfD*(2)[*OF wf*(1)] *prefs-from-table-wfD*(5,6)[*OF wf*(1)
this]

```

{
  fix p A assume A: A ∈ pref-classes-lists-aux (hd xs) (tl xs)
  from xs have xs ≠ [] by auto
  with xs have finite A
    by (intro pref-classes-lists-aux-finite[OF A])
      (auto simp: is-finite-weak-ranking-def list.set-sel)
  hence lottery-prob p A = (∑ x∈A. pmf p x)
    by (rule measure-measure-pmf-finite)
} note A = this

from strategyproof'[OF wf' i] eq have
  (∃ A∈pref-classes alts (R1 i). lottery-prob (sds R2) A < lottery-prob (sds R1)
A) ∨
  (∀ A∈pref-classes alts (R1 i). lottery-prob (sds R2) A = lottery-prob (sds R1)
A)
  by simp
  also from wf eq i have R1 i = of-weak-ranking xs
    by (simp add: prefs-from-table-map-of)
  also from xs have pref-classes alts (of-weak-ranking xs) = pref-classes-lists-aux
(hd xs) (tl xs)
    unfolding is-finite-weak-ranking-def by (intro eval-pref-classes-of-weak-ranking)
  simp-all
  finally show ?thesis by (simp add: A eq)
qed

```

lemma strategyproof-aux':

```

  assumes wf: prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss1 R1 ≡ prefs-from-table xss1
           prefs-from-table-wf agents alts xss2 R2 ≡ prefs-from-table xss2
  assumes sds: strategyproof-an-sds agents alts sds and i: i ∈ agents and j: j ∈
agents
  assumes perm: list-permutes ys alts
  defines σ ≡ permutation-of-list ys and σ' ≡ inverse-permutation-of-list ys
  defines xs ≡ the (map-of xss1 i)
  defines xs': xs' ≡ map ((·) σ) (the (map-of xss2 j))
  defines Ri' ≡ of-weak-ranking xs'
  assumes distinct-ps: ∀ A∈ps. distinct A
  assumes eq: mset (map snd xss1) - {#the (map-of xss1 i)#} + {#xs'#} =
             mset (map (map ((·) σ) ∘ snd) xss2)
             pref-classes-lists-aux (hd xs) (tl xs) = set ' ps
  shows list-permutes ys alts ∧
        ((∃ A∈ps. (∑ x←A. pmf (sds R2) (σ' x)) < (∑ x←A. pmf (sds R1) x))
∨
        (∀ A∈ps. (∑ x←A. pmf (sds R2) (σ' x)) = (∑ x←A. pmf (sds R1)
x)))
  (is - ∧ ?th)

```

proof

```

  from perm have perm': σ permutes alts by (simp add: σ-def)
  from sds interpret strategyproof-an-sds agents alts sds .
  from wf(3) j have j ∈ set (map fst xss2) by (simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def)

```

with *prefs-from-table-wfD*(3)[*OF wf*(3)]
have *xs'-aux*: *the (map-of xss2 j) ∈ set (map snd xss2)* **by force**
with *wf*(3) **have** *xs'-aux'*: *is-finite-weak-ranking (the (map-of xss2 j))*
by (*auto simp: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)
hence *: *is-weak-ranking xs'* **unfolding** *xs'*
by (*intro is-weak-ranking-map-inj permutes-inj-on[OF perm']*)
(*auto simp add: is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)
moreover from * *xs'-aux'* **have** *is-finite-weak-ranking xs'*
by (*auto simp: xs' is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)
moreover from *prefs-from-table-wfD*(5)[*OF wf*(3) *xs'-aux*]
have $\bigcup (\text{set } xs')$ = *alts* **unfolding** *xs'*
by (*simp add: image-Union [symmetric] permutes-image[OF perm']*)
ultimately have *wf-xs'*: *is-weak-ranking xs' is-finite-weak-ranking xs' $\bigcup (\text{set } xs')$*
= *alts*
by (*simp-all add: is-finite-weak-ranking-def*)
from *this wf j* **have** *wf'*: *is-pref-profile R1 total-preorder-on alts Ri'*
is-pref-profile R2 finite-total-preorder-on alts Ri'
unfolding *Ri'-def* **by** (*auto intro: pref-profile-from-tableI pref-profile-wf.prefs-wf'(1)*)
total-preorder-of-weak-ranking)

interpret *R1: pref-profile-wf agents alts R1* **by fact**

interpret *R2: pref-profile-wf agents alts R2* **by fact**

from *wf*(1) *i* **have** *i ∈ set (map fst xss1)* **by** (*simp add: prefs-from-table-wf-def*)
with *prefs-from-table-wfD*(3)[*OF wf*(1)] *eq*(2)
have *xs ∈ set (map snd xss1)* **unfolding** *xs-def* **by force**
note *xs = prefs-from-table-wfD*(2)[*OF wf*(1)] *prefs-from-table-wfD*(5,6)[*OF wf*(1)
this]

from *wf i wf' wf-xs' xs eq*
have *eq'*: *anonymous-profile (R1(i := Ri')) = image-mset (map ((·) σ))*
(*anonymous-profile R2*)
by (*subst R1.anonymous-profile-update*)
(*simp-all add: Ri'-def weak-ranking-of-weak-ranking mset-map multiset.map-comp*
xs-def
anonymise-prefs-from-table prefs-from-table-map-of)

{
fix *p A* **assume** *A: A ∈ pref-classes-lists-aux (hd xs) (tl xs)*
from *xs* **have** *xs ≠ []* **by auto**
with *xs* **have** *finite A*
by (*intro pref-classes-lists-aux-finite[OF A]*)
(*auto simp: is-finite-weak-ranking-def list.set-sel*)
hence *lottery-prob p A = (∑ x∈A. pmf p x)*
by (*rule measure-measure-pmf-finite*)
} **note** *A = this*

from *strategyproof'[OF wf'(1,2) i] eq'* **have**
($\exists A \in \text{pref-classes alts } (R1\ i). \text{lottery-prob } (\text{sds } (R1(i := Ri')))$) *A < lottery-prob*

$(sds\ R1)\ A) \vee$
 $(\forall A \in \text{pref-classes}\ \text{alts}\ (R1\ i). \text{lottery-prob}\ (sds\ (R1\ (i := Ri')))\ A = \text{lottery-prob}$
 $(sds\ R1)\ A)$
by *simp*
also from *eq' i* **have** $sds\ (R1\ (i := Ri')) = \text{map-pmf}\ \sigma\ (sds\ R2)$
unfolding σ -def **by** (*intro sds-anonymous-neutral permutation-of-list-permutes*
perm wf'
 $\text{pref-profile-wf.wf-update}\ eq)$
also from *wf eq i* **have** $R1\ i = \text{of-weak-ranking}\ xs$
by (*simp add: prefs-from-table-map-of xs-def*)
also from *xs* **have** $\text{pref-classes}\ \text{alts}\ (\text{of-weak-ranking}\ xs) = \text{pref-classes-lists-aux}$
 $(hd\ xs)\ (tl\ xs)$
unfolding *is-finite-weak-ranking-def* **by** (*intro eval-pref-classes-of-weak-ranking*)
simp-all
finally have $(\exists A \in ps. (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf}\ (\text{map-pmf}\ \sigma\ (sds\ R2))\ x) < (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf}$
 $(sds\ R1)\ x)) \vee$
 $(\forall A \in ps. (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf}\ (\text{map-pmf}\ \sigma\ (sds\ R2))\ x) = (\sum x \leftarrow A. \text{pmf}$
 $(sds\ R1)\ x))$
using *distinct-ps*
by (*simp add: A eq sum.distinct-set-conv-list del: measure-map-pmf*)
also from *perm'* **have** $\text{pmf}\ (\text{map-pmf}\ \sigma\ (sds\ R2)) = (\lambda x. \text{pmf}\ (sds\ R2)\ (inv\ \sigma$
 $x))$
using *pmf-map-inj'* [*of* σ - *inv* σ *x* **for** *x*]
by (*simp add: fun-eq-iff permutes-inj permutes-inverses*)
also from *perm* **have** $inv\ \sigma = \sigma'$ **unfolding** σ -def σ' -def
by (*rule inverse-permutation-of-list-correct [symmetric]*)
finally show *?th* .
qed *fact+*

ML-file $\langle \text{randomised-social-choice.ML} \rangle$

ML-file $\langle \text{sds-automation.ML} \rangle$

end

References

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