

A Formalization of Declassification with WHAT&WHERE-Security

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Abstract

Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information leaks within programs from private sources to public sinks. Noninterference captures this intuition by requiring that no information whatsoever flows from private sources to public sinks. However, in practice this definition is often too strict: Depending on the intuitive desired security policy, the controlled declassification of certain private information (WHAT) at certain points in the program (WHERE) might not result in an undesired information leak.

We present an Isabelle/HOL formalization of such a security property for controlled declassification, namely WHAT&WHERE-security from [2]. The formalization includes compositionality proofs for and a soundness proof for a security type system that checks for programs in a simple while language with dynamic thread creation.

Our formalization of the security type system is abstract in the language for expressions and in the semantic side conditions for expressions. It can easily be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these side conditions. The soundness proof of such an instantiation boils down to showing that these syntactic approximations imply the semantic side conditions.

This Isabelle/HOL formalization uses theories from the entry Strong-Security (see proof document for details).

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1 Preliminary definitions

1.1 Type synonyms

The formalization is parametric in different aspects. Notably, it is parametric in the security lattice it supports.

For better readability, we use the following type synonyms in our formalization (from the entry Strong-Security):

```
theory Types
imports Main
begin
```

```
— type parameters:
— 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
— 'val: values
— 'id: identifier names
— 'com: commands
— 'd: domains
```

This is a collection of type synonyms. Note that not all of these type synonyms are used within Strong-Security - some are used in WHATandWHERE-Security.

```
— type for memory states - map ids to values
type-synonym ('id, 'val) State = 'id  $\Rightarrow$  'val
```

```
— type for evaluation functions mapping expressions to a values depending on a
state
type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction =
  'exp  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  'val
```

```
— define configurations with threads as pair of commands and states
type-synonym ('id, 'val, 'com) TConfig = 'com  $\times$  ('id, 'val) State
```

```
— define configurations with thread pools as pair of command lists (thread pool)
and states
```

type-synonym ('id, 'val, 'com) *TPConfig* =
 ('com list) × ('id, 'val) *State*

— type for program states (including the set of commands and a symbol for terminating - None)

type-synonym 'com *ProgramState* = 'com option

— type for configurations with program states

type-synonym ('id, 'val, 'com) *PSConfig* =
 'com *ProgramState* × ('id, 'val) *State*

— type for labels with a list of spawned threads

type-synonym 'com *Label* = 'com list

— type for step relations from single commands to a program state, with a label

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TLSteps* =
 (('id, 'val, 'com) *TConfig* × 'com *Label*
 × ('id, 'val, 'com) *PSConfig*) set

— curried version of previously defined type

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TLSteps-curry* =
 'com ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ 'com *Label* ⇒ 'com *ProgramState*
 ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

— type for step relations from thread pools to thread pools

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TPSteps* =
 (('id, 'val, 'com) *TPConfig* × ('id, 'val, 'com) *TPConfig*) set

— curried version of previously defined type

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TPSteps-curry* =
 'com list ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ 'com list ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

— define type of step relations for single threads to thread pools

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TSteps* =
 (('id, 'val, 'com) *TConfig* × ('id, 'val, 'com) *TPConfig*) set

— define the same type as TSteps, but in a curried version (allowing syntax abbreviations)

type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TSteps-curry* =
 'com ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ 'com list ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

— type for simple domain assignments; 'd has to be an instance of order (partial order)

type-synonym ('id, 'd) *DomainAssignment* = 'id ⇒ 'd::order

type-synonym 'com *Bisimulation-type* = (('com list) × ('com list)) set

— type for escape hatches

type-synonym ('d, 'exp) *Hatch* = 'd × 'exp

— type for sets of escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) *Hatches* = (('d, 'exp) *Hatch*) *set*

— type for local escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) *lHatch* = 'd × 'exp × nat

— type for sets of local escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) *lHatches* = (('d, 'exp) *lHatch*) *set*

end

2 WHAT&WHERE-security

2.1 Definition of WHAT&WHERE-security

The definition of WHAT&WHERE-security is parametric in a security lattice ('d) and in a programming language ('com).

theory *WHATWHERE-Security*
imports ../Strong-Security/Types
begin

locale *WHATWHERE* =
fixes *SR* :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TLSteps*
and *E* :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) *Evalfunction*
and *pp* :: 'com ⇒ nat
and *DA* :: ('id, 'd::order) *DomainAssignment*
and *lH* :: ('d::order, 'exp) *lHatches*

begin

— define when two states are indistinguishable for an observer on domain d

definition *d-equal* :: 'd::order ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State*
⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

where
d-equal d m m' ≡ ∀ x. ((DA x) ≤ d ⟶ (m x) = (m' x))

abbreviation *d-equal'* :: ('id, 'val) *State*
⇒ 'd::order ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool
((- =- -))

where
m =_d m' ≡ *d-equal* d m m'

— transitivity of d-equality

lemma *d-equal-trans*:
[[m =_d m'; m' =_d m'']] ⟹ m =_d m''

by (*simp add: d-equal-def*)

abbreviation $SRabbr :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) \rightarrow TLSteps\text{-}curry$
 $((1 \langle -, / - \rangle) \rightarrow \triangleleft - \triangleright / (1 \langle -, / - \rangle) [0, 0, 0, 0, 0] 81)$
where
 $\langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle \equiv ((c, m), \alpha, (p, m')) \in SR$

— function for obtaining the unique memory (state) after one step for a command and a memory (state)

definition $NextMem :: 'com \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State$
 $(\llbracket - \rrbracket'(-))$
where
 $\llbracket c \rrbracket(m) \equiv (THE\ m'. (\exists p\ \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle))$

— function getting all escape hatches for some location

definition $htchLoc :: nat \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches$
where
 $htchLoc\ \iota \equiv \{(d, e). (d, e, \iota) \in lH\}$

— function for getting all escape hatches for some set of locations

definition $htchLocSet :: nat\ set \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches$
where
 $htchLocSet\ PP \equiv \bigcup \{h. (\exists \iota \in PP. h = htchLoc\ \iota)\}$

— predicate for (d,H)-equality

definition $dH\text{-}equal :: 'd \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches$
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $dH\text{-}equal\ d\ H\ m\ m' \equiv (m =_d m' \wedge$
 $(\forall (d', e) \in H. (d' \leq d \longrightarrow (E\ e\ m = E\ e\ m'))))$

abbreviation $dH\text{-}equal' :: ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow 'd \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches$
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow bool$
 $(\sim_{d,H})$
where
 $m \sim_{d,H} m' \equiv dH\text{-}equal\ d\ H\ m\ m'$

— predicate indicating that a command is not a d-declassification command

definition $NDC :: 'd \Rightarrow 'com \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $NDC\ d\ c \equiv (\forall m\ m'. m =_d m' \longrightarrow \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m'))$

— predicate indicating an 'immediate d-declassification command' for a set of escape hatches

definition $IDC :: 'd \Rightarrow 'com \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $IDC\ d\ c\ H \equiv (\exists m\ m'. m =_d m' \wedge$

$$(\neg \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m')) \\ \wedge (\forall m m'. m \sim_{d,H} m' \longrightarrow \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m'))$$

definition *stepResultsinR* :: 'com ProgramState $\Rightarrow$ 'com ProgramState
 $\Rightarrow$ 'com Bisimulation-type $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

$$\text{stepResultsinR } p \ p' \ R \equiv (p = \text{None} \wedge p' = \text{None}) \vee \\ (\exists c \ c'. (p = \text{Some } c \wedge p' = \text{Some } c' \wedge ([c], [c']) \in R))$$

definition *dhequality-alternative* :: 'd $\Rightarrow$ nat set $\Rightarrow$ nat
 $\Rightarrow$ ('id, 'val) State $\Rightarrow$ ('id, 'val) State $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

$$\text{dhequality-alternative } d \ PP \ \iota \ m \ m' \equiv m \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m' \vee \\ (\neg (\text{htchLoc } \iota) \subseteq (\text{htchLocSet } PP))$$

definition *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation* :: 'd $\Rightarrow$ nat set
 $\Rightarrow$ 'com Bisimulation-type $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

$$\text{Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation } d \ PP \ R \equiv \\ (\text{sym } R) \wedge (\text{trans } R) \wedge \\ (\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V') \wedge \\ (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \\ ((\text{NDC } d \ (V!i)) \vee \\ (\text{IDC } d \ (V!i) \ (\text{htchLoc } (pp \ (V!i))))) \wedge \\ (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 \ m1' \ m2 \ \alpha \ p. \\ (\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\triangleleft \alpha} \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m1') \\ \longrightarrow (\exists p' \ \alpha' \ m2'. (\langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow_{\triangleleft \alpha'} \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \\ (\text{stepResultsinR } p \ p' \ R) \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge \\ (\text{dhequality-alternative } d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2')))))$$

— predicate to define when a program is strongly secure

definition *WHATWHERE-Secure* :: 'com list $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

$$\text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V \equiv (\forall d \ PP. \\ (\exists R. \text{Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation } d \ PP \ R \wedge (V, V) \in R))$$

— auxiliary lemma to obtain central strong (d,lH,PP)-Bisimulation property as Lemma in meta logic (allows instantiating all the variables manually if necessary)

lemma *strongdlHPPB-aux*:

$$\bigwedge V \ V' \ m1 \ m1' \ m2 \ p \ i \ \alpha. \llbracket \text{Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation } d \ PP \ R; \\ i < \text{length } V; (V, V') \in R; \\ \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\triangleleft \alpha} \langle p, m2 \rangle; m1 \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m1' \rrbracket \\ \implies (\exists p' \ \alpha' \ m2'. \langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow_{\triangleleft \alpha'} \langle p', m2' \rangle \\ \wedge \text{stepResultsinR } p \ p' \ R \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge \\ (\text{dhequality-alternative } d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2')) \\ \text{by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, fastforce)}$$

— auxiliary lemma to obtain 'NDC or IDC' from strong (d,lH,PP)-Bisimulation as lemma in meta logic allowing instantiation of the variables

lemma *strongdlHPPB-NDCIDCaux*:
 $\bigwedge V V' i. \llbracket \text{Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation } d \text{ PP } R; \text{ } (V, V') \in R; i < \text{length } V \rrbracket$
 $\implies (\text{NDC } d \text{ (V!i)} \vee \text{IDC } d \text{ (V!i)} (\text{htchLoc } (pp \text{ (V!i)})))$
by (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto*)

lemma *WHATWHERE-empty*:
WHATWHERE-Secure []
by (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto,*
rule-tac x={([],[])} in exI,
simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def sym-def trans-def)

end

end

2.2 Proof technique for compositionality results

For proving compositionality results for WHAT&WHERE-security, we formalize the following “up-to technique” and prove it sound:

theory *Up-To-Technique*
imports *WHATWHERE-Security*
begin

context *WHATWHERE*
begin

abbreviation *SdlHPPB* **where** *SdlHPPB* $\equiv$ *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation*

— define the ‘reflexive part’ of a relation (sets of elements which are related with themselves by the given relation)

definition *Areft* :: $('a \times 'a) \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$

where

Areft *R* = {*e*. (*e*,*e*) $\in$ *R*}

lemma *commonAreft-subset-commonDomain*:
 $(\text{Areft } R1 \cap \text{Areft } R2) \subseteq (\text{Domain } R1 \cap \text{Domain } R2)$
by (*simp add: Areft-def, auto*)

— define disjoint strong (d,lH,PP)-bisimulation up-to-R’ for a relation R

definition *disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'* ::

$'d \Rightarrow \text{nat set} \Rightarrow 'com \text{ Bisimulation-type}$

$\Rightarrow 'com \text{ Bisimulation-type} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-}R' \text{ d } PP \text{ } R' \text{ } R \equiv \\
& \quad SdlHPPB \text{ d } PP \text{ } R' \wedge (\text{sym } R) \wedge (\text{trans } R) \\
& \quad \wedge (\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V') \wedge \\
& \quad (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \\
& \quad \quad ((NDC \text{ d } (V!i)) \vee \\
& \quad \quad (IDC \text{ d } (V!i) (\text{htchLoc } (pp \text{ } (V!i)))))) \wedge \\
& \quad (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 \text{ } m1' \text{ } m2 \text{ } \alpha \text{ } p. \\
& \quad \quad (\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d, (\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m1' \wedge \\
& \quad \quad \rightarrow (\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \\
& \quad \quad (\text{stepResultsinR } p \text{ } p' (R \cup R')) \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in (R \cup R') \wedge \\
& \quad \quad (\text{dhequality-alternative } d \text{ } PP \text{ } (pp \text{ } (V!i)) \text{ } m2 \text{ } m2'))))
\end{aligned}$$

— lemma about the transitivity of the union of symmetric and transitive relations under certain circumstances

lemma *trans-RuR'*:

assumes *transR*: *trans R*
assumes *symR*: *sym R*
assumes *transR'*: *trans R'*
assumes *symR'*: *sym R'*
assumes *eqLenR*: $\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$
assumes *eqLenR'*: $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$
assumes *AreflAssump*: $(\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R') \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$
shows *trans* $(R \cup R')$

proof —

```

{
  fix V V' V''
  assume p1: (V, V') ∈ (R ∪ R')
  assume p2: (V', V'') ∈ (R ∪ R')

  from p1 p2 have (V, V'') ∈ (R ∪ R')
  proof (auto)
    assume inR1: (V, V') ∈ R
    assume inR2: (V', V'') ∈ R
    from inR1 inR2 transR show (V, V'') ∈ R
      unfolding trans-def
      by blast
  next
    assume inR'1: (V, V') ∈ R'
    assume inR'2: (V', V'') ∈ R'
    assume notinR': (V, V'') ∉ R'
    from inR'1 inR'2 transR' have inR': (V, V'') ∈ R'
      unfolding trans-def
      by blast
    from notinR' inR' have False
      by auto
    thus (V, V'') ∈ R ..
  next
    assume inR1: (V, V') ∈ R
    assume inR'2: (V', V'') ∈ R'

```

```

from inR1 symR transR have  $(V, V) \in R \wedge (V', V') \in R$ 
  unfolding sym-def trans-def
  by blast
hence AreflR:  $\{V, V'\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)
from inR'2 symR' transR' have  $(V', V') \in R' \wedge (V'', V'') \in R'$ 
  unfolding sym-def trans-def
  by blast
hence AreflR':  $\{V', V''\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R'$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)

from AreflR AreflR' Areflassump have V'empty:  $V' = \square$ 
  by (simp add: Arefl-def, blast)
with inR'2 eqLenR' have  $V' = V''$  by auto
with inR1 show  $(V, V'') \in R$  by auto
next
  assume inR'1:  $(V, V') \in R'$ 
  assume inR2:  $(V', V'') \in R$ 
  from inR'1 symR' transR' have  $(V, V) \in R' \wedge (V', V') \in R'$ 
    unfolding sym-def trans-def
    by blast
  hence AreflR':  $\{V, V'\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R'$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)
  from inR2 symR transR have  $(V', V') \in R \wedge (V'', V'') \in R$ 
    unfolding sym-def trans-def
    by blast
  hence AreflR:  $\{V', V''\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)

  from AreflR AreflR' Areflassump have V'empty:  $V' = \square$ 
    by (simp add: Arefl-def, blast)
  with inR'1 eqLenR' have  $V' = V$  by auto
  with inR2 show  $(V, V'') \in R$  by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by force

qed

lemma Up-To-Technique:
 $\llbracket \text{disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-}R' \text{ d PP } R' R; \text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R' \subseteq \{\square\} \rrbracket$ 
 $\implies \text{SdlHPPB d PP } (R \cup R')$ 
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def
  Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
  assume symR': sym R'
  assume symR: sym R
  with symR' show sym  $(R \cup R')$ 
    by (simp add: sym-def)
next
  assume symR': sym R'
  assume symR: sym R
  assume transR': trans R'

```

assume $\text{trans}R$: $\text{trans } R$
assume $\text{eqLen}R'$: $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$
assume $\text{eqLen}R$: $\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$
assume areflassump : $\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R' \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$
from $\text{sym}R' \text{ sym}R \text{ trans}R' \text{ trans}R \text{ eqLen}R' \text{ eqLen}R \text{ areflassump trans-Ru}R'$
show $\text{trans } (R \cup R')$
by *blast*
— condition about IDC and NDC and equal length already proven above by auto
tactic!
next
fix $V V' i m1 m1' m2 \alpha p$
assume $\text{in}R'$: $(V, V') \in R'$
assume irange : $i < \text{length } V$
assume step : $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$
assume dhequal : $m1 \sim_{d, (\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m1'$
assume disjBisimUpTo : $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 m1' m2 \alpha p.$
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d, (\text{htchLocSet } PP)} m1' \longrightarrow$
 $(\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$
 $\text{stepResultsin}R p p' R' \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R' \wedge$
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2')$
from $\text{in}R' \text{ irange step dhequal disjBisimUpTo}$ **show** $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$
 $\langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \text{stepResultsin}R p p' (R \cup R') \wedge$
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R') \wedge$
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce*)
qed

lemma *Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim*:
 $\llbracket \text{SdlHPPB } d PP R; \text{SdlHPPB } d PP R' \rrbracket$
 $\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R' \subseteq \{\emptyset\} \rrbracket$
 $\implies \text{SdlHPPB } d PP (R \cup R')$
by (*rule Up-To-Technique, simp-all add:*
disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def
Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

lemma *adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB*:
assumes SdlHPP : $\text{SdlHPPB } d PP R$
shows $\text{SdlHPPB } d PP (R \cup \{(\emptyset, \emptyset)\})$
proof —
have SdlHPPemp : $\text{SdlHPPB } d PP \{(\emptyset, \emptyset)\}$
by (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def sym-def trans-def*)

have commonDom : $\text{Domain } R \cap \text{Domain } \{(\emptyset, \emptyset)\} \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$
by *auto*

with $\text{commonArefl-subset-commonDomain}$ **have** Areflassump :
 $\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } \{(\emptyset, \emptyset)\} \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$

```

    by force

    with SdlHPP SdlHPPemp Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim show
      SdlHPPB d PP (R  $\cup$  {( $\square$ ,  $\square$ )})
    by force
  qed

end

end

```

2.3 Proof of parallel compositionality

We prove that WHAT&WHERE-security is preserved under composition of WHAT&WHERE-secure threads.

```

theory Parallel-Composition
imports Up-To-Technique MWLs
begin

locale WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs =
  L? : MWLs-semantics E BMap
+ WVs? : WHATWHERE MWLsSteps-det E pp DA lH
for E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
and BMap :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool
and DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment
and lH :: ('d, 'exp) lHatches
begin

lemma SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB:
  assumes SdlHPPB: SdlHPPB d PP R'
  assumes inR': (V, V)  $\in$  R'
  assumes Rdef: R = {(V', V''). (V', V'')  $\in$  R'}
     $\wedge$  set (PPV V')  $\subseteq$  set (PPV V)
     $\wedge$  set (PPV V'')  $\subseteq$  set (PPV V)}
  shows SdlHPPB d PP R
proof (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
  from SdlHPPB have sym R'
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  with Rdef show sym R
    by (simp add: sym-def)
next
  from SdlHPPB have trans R'
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  with Rdef show trans R
    by (simp add: trans-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V''
  assume inR-part: (V', V'')  $\in$  R

```

```

with SdlHPPB Rdef show length V' = length V''
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V'' i
  assume inR-part: (V', V'') ∈ R
  assume irange: i < length V'
  assume notIDC:
    ¬ IDC d (V'!i) (htchLoc (pp (V'!i)))
  with SdlHPPB inR-part irange Rdef
  show NDC d (V'!i)
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V'' i α p m1 m1' m2
  assume inR-part: (V', V'') ∈ R
  assume irange: i < length V'
  assume step: ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ →Δα⟨p, m2⟩
  assume dhequal: m1 ~d, (htchLocSet PP) m1'

from inR-part SdlHPPB Rdef have eqlen: length V' = length V''
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

from inR-part Rdef
have set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPV V'') ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by auto

with irange PPc-in-PPV-version eqlen
have PPc-Vs-at-i:
  set (PPc (V'!i)) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPc (V''!i)) ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by (metis subset-trans)

from SdlHPPB inR-part Rdef irange step dhequal
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP R' i
    V' V'' m1 α p m2 m1']
obtain p' α' m2' where stepreq: ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ →Δα'⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' R' ∧ (α, α') ∈ R' ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
have Rpp': stepResultsinR p p' R
proof -
  {
    fix c c'
    assume step1: ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ →Δα⟨Some c, m2⟩
    assume step2: ⟨V''!i, m1'⟩ →Δα'⟨Some c', m2'⟩
    assume inR'-res: ([c], [c']) ∈ R'

    from PPc-Vs-at-i step1 step2 PPsc-of-step
    have set (PPc c) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPc c') ⊆ set (PPV V)
    by (metis (no-types) option.sel xt1(6))
  }

```

```

    with inR'-res Rdef have ([c],[c']) ∈ R
    by auto
  }
  thus ?thesis
    by (metis step stepResultsinR-def stepreq)
qed

have Rαα': (α,α') ∈ R
proof -
  from PPc-Vs-at-i step stepreq PPα-of-step have
    set (PPV α) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPV α') ⊆ set (PPV V)
    by (metis (no-types) xt1(6))
  with stepreq Rdef show ?thesis
    by auto
qed

from stepreq Rpp' Rαα' show
  ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' R ∧ (α,α') ∈ R ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
qed

theorem parallel-composition:
  [ [ ∀ i < length V. WHATWHERE-Secure [V!i]; unique-PPV V ]
  ⇒ WHATWHERE-Secure V
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, induct V, auto)
  fix d PP
  from WHATWHERE-empty
  show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([],[]) ∈ R
    by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def)
next
  fix c V d PP
  assume IH: [ [ ∀ i < length V.
    ∃ d PP. ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([V!i],[V!i]) ∈ R;
    unique-PPV V ]
    ⇒ ∃ d PP. ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ (V,V) ∈ R
  assume ISassump: ∀ i < Suc (length V).
    ∃ d PP. ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([c#V]!i,[c#V]!i) ∈ R
  assume uniPPcV: unique-PPV (c#V)

  hence IHassump1: unique-PPV V
    by (simp add: unique-PPV-def)

  from uniPPcV have nocommonPP: set (PPc c) ∩ set (PPV V) = {}
    by (simp add: unique-PPV-def)

  from ISassump have IHassump2: ∀ i < length V.

```

$\forall d \text{ PP}. \exists R. \text{SdlHPPB } d \text{ PP } R \wedge ([V!i],[V!i]) \in R$
by *auto*

with *IHassump1 IH* **obtain** *RV'* **where** *RV'assump*:
 $\text{SdlHPPB } d \text{ PP } RV' \wedge (V, V) \in RV'$
by *blast*

def *RV* $\equiv \{(V', V''). (V', V'') \in RV' \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPV \ V) \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V'') \subseteq \text{set } (PPV \ V)\}$

with *RV'assump RV-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB*
have *SdlHPPRV*: $\text{SdlHPPB } d \text{ PP } RV$
by *force*

from *ISassump* **obtain** *Rc'* **where** *Rc'assump*:
 $\text{SdlHPPB } d \text{ PP } Rc' \wedge ([c],[c]) \in Rc'$
by (*metis append-Nil drop-Nil neq0-conv not-Cons-self nth-append-length Cons-nth-drop-Suc zero-less-Suc*)

def *Rc* $\equiv \{(V', V''). (V', V'') \in Rc' \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V'') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c)\}$

with *Rc'assump Rc-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB*
have *SdlHPPRc*: $\text{SdlHPPB } d \text{ PP } Rc$
by *force*

from *nocommonPP* **have** $\text{Domain } RV \cap \text{Domain } Rc \subseteq \{\}\}$
by (*simp add: RV-def Rc-def, auto, metis Int-mono inf-commute inf-idem le-bot nocommonPP unique-V-uneq*)

with *commonArefl-subset-commonDomain*
have *Areflassump1*: $\text{Arefl } RV \cap \text{Arefl } Rc \subseteq \{\}\}$
by *force*

def *R* $\equiv \{(V', V''). \exists c \ c' \ W \ W'. V' = c \# W \wedge V'' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq \square \wedge W' \neq \square \wedge ([c],[c']) \in Rc \wedge (W, W') \in RV\}$

with *RV-def RV'assump Rc-def Rc'assump* **have** *inR*:
 $V \neq \square \implies (c \# V, c \# V) \in R$
by *auto*

from *R-def Rc-def RV-def nocommonPP*
have $\text{Domain } R \cap \text{Domain } (Rc \cup RV) = \{\}$
by (*simp add: R-def Rc-def RV-def, auto, metis inf-bot-right le-inf-iff subset-empty unique-V-uneq, metis (hide-lams, no-types) inf-absorb1 inf-bot-right le-inf-iff unique-c-uneq*)

with *commonArefl-subset-commonDomain*
have *Areflassump2*: $\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } (Rc \cup RV) \subseteq \{\}\}$

by force

have *disjuptoR*:

disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP (Rc $\cup$ RV) R

proof (simp add: *disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def*, auto)

from *Areflassump1 SdlHPPRc SdlHPPRV Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim*

show *SdlHPPB* d PP (Rc $\cup$ RV)

by force

next

from *SdlHPPRV* have *symRV*: *sym* RV

by (simp add: *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)

from *SdlHPPRc* have *symRc*: *sym* Rc

by (simp add: *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)

with *symRV* *R-def* show *sym* R

by (simp add: *sym-def*, auto)

next

from *SdlHPPRV* have *transRV*: *trans* RV

by (simp add: *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)

from *SdlHPPRc* have *transRc*: *trans* Rc

by (simp add: *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)

show *trans* R

proof –

{

fix V V' V''

assume *p1*: (V, V') $\in$ R

assume *p2*: (V', V'') $\in$ R

have (V, V'') $\in$ R

proof –

from *p1 R-def* obtain c c' W W' where *p1assump*:

V = c # W $\wedge$ V' = c' # W' $\wedge$ W $\neq \square \wedge$ W' $\neq \square \wedge$

([c], [c']) $\in$ Rc $\wedge$ (W, W') $\in$ RV

by auto

with *p2 R-def* obtain c'' W'' where *p2assump*:

V'' = c'' # W'' $\wedge$ W'' $\neq \square \wedge$

([c'], [c'']) $\in$ Rc $\wedge$ (W', W'') $\in$ RV

by auto

with *p1assump transRc transRV* have

trans-assump: ([c], [c'']) $\in$ Rc $\wedge$ (W, W'') $\in$ RV

by (simp add: *trans-def*, blast)

with *p1assump p2assump R-def* show ?thesis

by auto

qed

}

thus ?thesis unfolding *trans-def* by blast

qed

next

fix V V'

assume (V, V') $\in$ R

with *R-def SdlHPPRV* show *length* V = *length* V'

by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
 next
 fix $V V' i$
 assume inR: $(V, V') \in R$
 assume irange: $i < \text{length } V$
 assume notIDC: $\neg IDC \ d \ (V!i)$
 (htchLoc (pp (V!i)))
 from inR R-def obtain $c \ c' \ W \ W'$ where $VV'assump$:
 $V = c \# W \wedge V' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq [] \wedge W' \neq [] \wedge$
 $([c], [c']) \in Rc \wedge (W, W') \in RV$
 by auto
 — Case separation for i
 from $VV'assump \ SdlHPPRc$ have Case-i0:
 $i = 0 \implies (NDC \ d \ (V!i) \vee$
 $IDC \ d \ (V!i) \ (htchLoc \ (pp \ (V!i))))$
 by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

 from $VV'assump \ SdlHPPRV$ have $\forall i < \text{length } W.$
 $(NDC \ d \ (W!i) \vee$
 $IDC \ d \ (W!i) \ (htchLoc \ (pp \ (W!i))))$
 by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

 with irange $VV'assump$ have Case-in0:
 $i > 0 \implies (NDC \ d \ (V!i) \vee$
 $IDC \ d \ (V!i) \ (htchLoc \ (pp \ (V!i))))$
 by simp
 from notIDC Case-i0 Case-in0
 show $NDC \ d \ (V!i)$
 by auto
 next
 fix $V V' m1 \ m1' \ m2 \ \alpha \ p \ i$
 assume inR: $(V, V') \in R$
 assume irange: $i < \text{length } V$
 assume step: $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$
 assume dhequal: $m1 \sim_{d, (htchLocSet \ PP)} m1'$

 from inR R-def obtain $c \ c' \ W \ W'$ where $VV'assump$:
 $V = c \# W \wedge V' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq [] \wedge W' \neq [] \wedge$
 $([c], [c']) \in Rc \wedge (W, W') \in RV$
 by auto
 — Case separation for i
 from $VV'assump \ SdlHPPRc \ strongdlHPPB-aux$ [of $d \ PP$
 $Rc \ 0 \ [c] \ [c']$] step dhequal
 have Case-i0:
 $i = 0 \implies \exists p' \ \alpha' \ m2'.$
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$
 $stepResultsinR \ p \ p' \ (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$
 $dhequality-alternative \ d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$

```

    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, blast)

from step VV'assump irange have rewV:
   $i > 0 \implies (i - \text{Suc } 0) < \text{length } W \wedge V!i = W!(i - \text{Suc } 0)$ 
by simp

with irange VV'assump step dhequal SdlHPPRV
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP RV - W W']
have Case-in0:
   $i > 0 \implies \exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
   $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
   $\text{stepResultsinR } p \ p' (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$ 
   $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$ 
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, blast)

from Case-i0 Case-in0
show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
   $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
   $\text{stepResultsinR } p \ p' (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$ 
   $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$ 
  by auto
qed
with Areflassump2 Rc'assump Up-To-Technique
show  $\exists R. \text{SdlHPPB } d \ PP \ R \wedge (c \# V, c \# V) \in R$ 
  by (metis UnCI inR)

qed

end

end

```

3 Example language and compositionality proofs

3.1 Example language with dynamic thread creation

As in [2], we instantiate the language with a simple while language that supports dynamic thread creation via a spawn command (Multi-threaded While Language with spawn, MWLs). Note that the language is still parametric in the language used for Boolean and arithmetic expressions (*'exp*).

```

theory MWLs
imports ../Strong-Security/Types
begin

```

— type parameters not instantiated:

— 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
 — 'val: numbers, boolean constants....
 — 'id: identifier names

— SYNTAX

```
datatype ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  = Skip nat (skip_ [50] 70)
  | Assign 'id nat 'exp
    (:=_ - [70,50,70] 70)

  | Seq ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
    ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
    (-;_ [61,60] 60)

  | If-Else nat 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
    ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
    (if_ - then - else - fi [50,80,79,79] 70)

  | While-Do nat 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
    (while_ - do - od [50,80,79] 70)

  | Spawn nat (('exp, 'id) MWLsCom) list
    (spawn_ - [50,70] 70)
```

— function for obtaining the program point of some MWLsloc command

```
primrec pp :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom  $\Rightarrow$  nat
where
  pp (skip $\iota$ ) =  $\iota$  |
  pp (x := $\iota$  e) =  $\iota$  |
  pp (c1;c2) = pp c1 |
  pp (if $\iota$  b then c1 else c2 fi) =  $\iota$  |
  pp (while $\iota$  b do c od) =  $\iota$  |
  pp (spawn $\iota$  V) =  $\iota$ 
```

— mutually recursive functions to collect program points of commands and thread pools

```
primrec PPc :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom  $\Rightarrow$  nat list
and PPV :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom list  $\Rightarrow$  nat list
where
  PPc (skip $\iota$ ) = [ $\iota$ ] |
  PPc (x := $\iota$  e) = [ $\iota$ ] |
  PPc (c1;c2) = (PPc c1) @ (PPc c2) |
  PPc (if $\iota$  b then c1 else c2 fi) = [ $\iota$ ] @ (PPc c1) @ (PPc c2) |
  PPc (while $\iota$  b do c od) = [ $\iota$ ] @ (PPc c) |
  PPc (spawn $\iota$  V) = [ $\iota$ ] @ (PPV V) |

  PPV [] = [] |
  PPV (c#V) = (PPc c) @ (PPV V)
```

— predicate indicating that a command only contains unique program points

definition *unique-PPc* :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

unique-PPc c = *distinct* (PPc c)

— predicate indicating that a thread pool only contains unique program points

definition *unique-PPV* :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom list $\Rightarrow$ bool

where

unique-PPV V = *distinct* (PPV V)

lemma *PPc-nonempty*: PPc c $\neq$ []

by (*induct* c) *auto*

lemma *unique-c-uneq*: set (PPc c) $\cap$ set (PPc c') = {} $\implies$ c $\neq$ c'

by (*insert* *PPc-nonempty*, *force*)

lemma *V-nonempty-PPV-nonempty*: V $\neq$ [] $\implies$ PPV V $\neq$ []

by (*auto*, *induct* V, *simp-all*, *insert* *PPc-nonempty*, *force*)

lemma *unique-V-uneq*:

$\llbracket V \neq []; V' \neq []; \text{set } (PPV V) \cap \text{set } (PPV V') = \{\} \rrbracket \implies V \neq V'$

by (*auto*, *induct* V, *simp-all*, *insert* *V-nonempty-PPV-nonempty*, *auto*)

lemma *PPc-in-PPV*: c $\in$ set V $\implies$ set (PPc c) $\subseteq$ set (PPV V)

by (*induct* V, *auto*)

lemma *listindices-aux*: i < length V $\implies$ (V!i) $\in$ set V

by (*metis* *nth-mem*)

lemma *PPc-in-PPV-version*:

i < length V $\implies$ set (PPc (V!i)) $\subseteq$ set (PPV V)

by (*rule* *PPc-in-PPV*, *erule* *listindices-aux*)

lemma *uniPPV-uniPPc*: *unique-PPV* V $\implies$ ($\forall i < \text{length } V. \text{unique-PPc } (V!i)$)

by (*auto*, *simp* *add: unique-PPV-def*, *induct* V,

auto *simp* *add: unique-PPc-def*,

metis *in-set-conv-nth* *length-Suc-conv* *set-ConsD*)

— SEMANTICS

locale *MWLs-semantics* =

fixes E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction

and BMap :: 'val $\Rightarrow$ bool

begin

— steps semantics, set of deterministic steps from commands to program states

inductive-set

MWLsSteps-det ::

$(\text{'exp', 'id', 'val', ('exp', 'id') MWLsCom}) \text{ TLSteps}$
and $\text{MWLslocSteps-det} ::$
 $(\text{'exp', 'id', 'val', ('exp', 'id') MWLsCom}) \text{ TLSteps-curry}$
 $((1 \langle -, / - \rangle) \rightarrow \triangleleft \triangleright / (1 \langle -, / - \rangle) [0, 0, 0, 0, 0] \text{ 81})$
where
 $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle c2, m2 \rangle \equiv ((c1, m1), \alpha, (c2, m2)) \in \text{MWLsSteps-det} \mid$
 $\text{skip}: \langle \text{skip}_\iota, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle \mid$
 $\text{assign}: (E \ e \ m) = v \implies$
 $\langle x :=_\iota e, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m(x := v) \rangle \mid$
 $\text{seq1}: \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m^\wedge \rangle \implies$
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2, m^\wedge \rangle \mid$
 $\text{seq2}: \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c1', m^\wedge \rangle \implies$
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c1'; c2), m^\wedge \rangle \mid$
 $\text{iftrue}: \text{BMap } (E \ b \ m) = \text{True} \implies$
 $\langle \text{if}_\iota b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c1, m \rangle \mid$
 $\text{iffalse}: \text{BMap } (E \ b \ m) = \text{False} \implies$
 $\langle \text{if}_\iota b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2, m \rangle \mid$
 $\text{whiletrue}: \text{BMap } (E \ b \ m) = \text{True} \implies$
 $\langle \text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c; (\text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od})), m \rangle \mid$
 $\text{whilefalse}: \text{BMap } (E \ b \ m) = \text{False} \implies$
 $\langle \text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \square \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle \mid$
 $\text{spawn}: \langle \text{spawn}_\iota V, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft V \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle$

inductive-cases $\text{MWLsSteps-det-cases}$:

$\langle \text{skip}_\iota, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$
 $\langle x :=_\iota e, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{if}_\iota b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{spawn}_\iota V, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m^\wedge \rangle$

— non-deterministic, possibilistic system step (added for intuition, not used in the proofs)

inductive-set

$\text{MWLsSteps-ndet} ::$

$(\text{'exp', 'id', 'val', ('exp', 'id') MWLsCom}) \text{ TPSteps}$
and $\text{MWLsSteps-ndet} ::$
 $(\text{'exp', 'id', 'val', ('exp', 'id') MWLsCom}) \text{ TPSteps-curry}$
 $((1 \langle -, / - \rangle) \Rightarrow / (1 \langle -, / - \rangle) [0, 0, 0, 0] \text{ 81})$

where

$\langle V, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle V', m^\wedge \rangle \equiv ((V, m), (V', m^\wedge)) \in \text{MWLsSteps-ndet} \mid$
 $\text{stepthreadi1}: \langle ci, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m^\wedge \rangle \implies$
 $\langle cf @ [ci] @ ca, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle cf @ \alpha @ ca, m^\wedge \rangle \mid$
 $\text{stepthreadi2}: \langle ci, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c', m^\wedge \rangle \implies$
 $\langle cf @ [ci] @ ca, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle cf @ [c'] @ \alpha @ ca, m^\wedge \rangle$

— lemma about existence and uniqueness of next memory of a step

lemma *nextmem-exists-and-unique*:

$\exists m' p \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
 $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$
by (*induct* *c*, *auto*, *metis* *MWLSSteps-det.skip* *MWLSSteps-det-cases*(1),
metis *MWLSSteps-det-cases*(2) *MWLSSteps-det.assign*,
metis (*no-types*) *MWLSSteps-det.seq1* *MWLSSteps-det.seq2*
MWLSSteps-det-cases(3) *not-Some-eq*,
metis *MWLSSteps-det.iffalse* *MWLSSteps-det.iftrue*
MWLSSteps-det-cases(4),
metis *MWLSSteps-det.whilefalse* *MWLSSteps-det.whiletrue*
MWLSSteps-det-cases(5),
metis *MWLSSteps-det.spawn* *MWLSSteps-det-cases*(6))

lemma *PPsc-of-step*:
 $\llbracket \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle; \exists c'. p = \text{Some } c' \rrbracket$
 $\implies \text{set } (PPc \text{ (the } p)) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \text{ } c)$
by (*induct rule*: *MWLSSteps-det.induct*, *auto*)

lemma *PPsα-of-step*:
 $\langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
 $\implies \text{set } (PPV \alpha) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \text{ } c)$
by (*induct rule*: *MWLSSteps-det.induct*, *auto*)

end

end

3.2 Proofs of atomic compositionality results

We prove for each atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is not composed out of other commands) that it is strongly secure if the expressions involved are indistinguishable for an observer on security level *d*.

theory *WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip-Assign*
imports *Parallel-Composition*
begin

context *WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs*
begin

abbreviation *NextMem'*
 $(\llbracket - \rrbracket)'(-)$
where
 $\llbracket c \rrbracket(m) \equiv \text{NextMem } c \text{ } m$

— define when two expressions are indistinguishable with respect to a domain *d*

definition *d-indistinguishable* :: '*d*::order $\Rightarrow$ '*exp* $\Rightarrow$ '*exp* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$d\text{-indistinguishable } d \ e1 \ e2 \equiv \forall m \ m'. ((m =_d m') \longrightarrow ((E \ e1 \ m) = (E \ e2 \ m')))$

abbreviation $d\text{-indistinguishable}' :: 'exp \Rightarrow 'd :: order \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$
 $(\ (- \equiv_- \ -) \)$

where

$e1 \equiv_d e2 \equiv d\text{-indistinguishable } d \ e1 \ e2$

— symmetry of d-indistinguishable

lemma $d\text{-indistinguishable-sym}$:

$e \equiv_d e' \Longrightarrow e' \equiv_d e$

by ($\text{simp add: } d\text{-indistinguishable-def } d\text{-equal-def, } \text{metis}$)

— transitivity of d-indistinguishable

lemma $d\text{-indistinguishable-trans}$:

$\llbracket e \equiv_d e'; e' \equiv_d e'' \rrbracket \Longrightarrow e \equiv_d e''$

by ($\text{simp add: } d\text{-indistinguishable-def } d\text{-equal-def, } \text{metis}$)

— predicate for dH-indistinguishable

definition $dH\text{-indistinguishable} :: 'd \Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) \text{ Hatches}$
 $\Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$

where

$dH\text{-indistinguishable } d \ H \ e1 \ e2 \equiv (\forall m \ m'. m \sim_{d,H} m' \longrightarrow (E \ e1 \ m = E \ e2 \ m'))$

abbreviation $dH\text{-indistinguishable}' :: 'exp \Rightarrow 'd$

$\Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) \text{ Hatches} \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$

$(\ (- \equiv_{-,-} \ -) \)$

where

$e1 \equiv_{d,H} e2 \equiv dH\text{-indistinguishable } d \ H \ e1 \ e2$

lemma $\text{empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable}$:

$(e \equiv_{d,\{\}} e') = (e \equiv_d e')$

by ($\text{simp add: } d\text{-indistinguishable-def } dH\text{-indistinguishable-def } dH\text{-equal-def } d\text{-equal-def}$)

theorem $WHATWHERE\text{-Secure-Skip}$:

$WHATWHERE\text{-Secure } [skip_\iota]$

proof ($\text{simp add: } WHATWHERE\text{-Secure-def, } \text{auto}$)

fix $d \ PP$

def $R \equiv \{ (V :: ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLsCom } list, V' :: ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLsCom } list). \\ V = V' \wedge (V = [] \vee V = [skip_\iota]) \}$

have $\text{inR: } ([skip_\iota], [skip_\iota]) \in R$

by ($\text{simp add: } R\text{-def}$)

```

have SdlHPPB d PP R
proof (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def R-def sym-def trans-def
  NDC-def NextMem-def, auto)
  fix m1 m1'
  assume dequal: m1 =d m1'
  have nextm1: (THE m2. (∃ p α. ⟨skipℓ, m1⟩ →Δα ⟨p, m2⟩)) = m1
    by (insert MWLSteps-det.simps[of skipℓ m1],
      force)

  have nextm1':
    (THE m2'. (∃ p α. ⟨skipℓ, m1'⟩ →Δα ⟨p, m2'⟩)) = m1'
    by (insert MWLSteps-det.simps[of skipℓ m1'],
      force)

  with dequal nextm1 show
    THE m2. ∃ p α. ⟨skipℓ, m1⟩ →Δα ⟨p, m2⟩ =d
    THE m2'. ∃ p α. ⟨skipℓ, m1'⟩ →Δα ⟨p, m2'⟩
    by auto
  next
  fix p m1 m1' m2 α
  assume dequal: m1 ∼d, (htchLocSet PP) m1'
  assume skipstep: ⟨skipℓ, m1⟩ →Δα ⟨p, m2⟩
  with MWLSteps-det.simps[of skipℓ m1 α p m2]
  have aux: p = None ∧ m2 = m1 ∧ α = []
    by auto
  with dequal skipstep MWLSteps-det.skip
  show ∃ p' m2'.
    ⟨skipℓ, m1'⟩ →Δα ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' {(V, V'). V = V' ∧
      (V = [] ∨ V = [skipℓ])} ∧
    (α = [] ∨ α = [skipℓ]) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP ℓ m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
      fastforce)
  qed

  with inR show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([skipℓ], [skipℓ]) ∈ R
    by auto
qed

```

— auxiliary lemma for assign side condition (lemma 9 in original paper)

lemma semAssignSC-aux:

```

assumes dhind: e ≡DA x, (htchLoc ℓ) e
shows NDC d (x :=ℓ e) ∨ IDC d (x :=ℓ e) (htchLoc (pp (x :=ℓ e)))
proof (simp add: IDC-def, auto, simp add: NDC-def)
  fix m1 m1'
  assume dhequal: m1 ∼d, htchLoc ℓ m1'
  hence dequal: m1 =d m1'

```

by (simp add: dH-equal-def)

obtain v **where** $veq: E\ e\ m1 = v$ **by** *auto*
hence $m2eq: \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) = m1(x := v)$
 by (simp add: NextMem-def,
 insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of $x :=_{\iota} e\ m1$],
 force)

obtain v' **where** $v'eq: E\ e\ m1' = v'$ **by** *auto*
hence $m2'eq: \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1') = m1'(x := v')$
 by (simp add: NextMem-def,
 insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of $x :=_{\iota} e\ m1'$],
 force)

from *dhequal* **have** *shiftdomain*:
 $DA\ x \leq d \implies m1 \sim_{DA\ x, (htchLoc\ \iota)} m1'$
 by (simp add: dH-equal-def d-equal-def htchLoc-def)

with $veq\ v'eq\ dhind$
have $(DA\ x) \leq d \implies v = v'$
 by (simp add: dH-indistinguishable-def)

with *dequal* $m2eq\ m2'eq$
show $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1')$
 by (simp add: d-equal-def)

qed

theorem *WHATWHERE-Secure-Assign*:
assumes *dhind*: $e \equiv_{DA\ x, (htchLoc\ \iota)} e$
assumes *dheq-imp*: $\forall m\ m'\ d\ \iota'. (m \sim_{d, (htchLoc\ \iota')} m' \wedge$
 $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m'))$
 $\longrightarrow \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d, (htchLoc\ \iota')} \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m'))$
shows *WHATWHERE-Secure* $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket$
proof (simp add: *WHATWHERE-Secure-def*, *auto*)
fix $d\ PP$
def $R \equiv \{(V::('exp, 'id)\ MWLsCom\ list, V'::('exp, 'id)\ MWLsCom\ list).$
 $V = V' \wedge (V = [] \vee V = [x :=_{\iota} e])\}$

have *inR*: $([x :=_{\iota} e], [x :=_{\iota} e]) \in R$
 by (simp add: *R-def*)

have *SdlHPPB* $d\ PP\ R$
proof (simp add: *Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def* *R-def*
 sym-def trans-def, *auto*)
assume *notIDC*: $\neg IDC\ d\ (x :=_{\iota} e)\ (htchLoc\ \iota)$
with *dhind* *semAssignSC-aux*
show *NDC* $d\ (x :=_{\iota} e)$

```

    by force
next
fix m1 m1' m2 p α
assume assignstep:  $\langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dhequal:  $m1 \sim_{d, htchLocSet PP} m1'$ 

from assignstep have nextm1:
  p = None  $\wedge$   $\alpha = [] \wedge \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) = m2$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def,
      insert MWLSteps-det.simps[of  $x :=_{\iota} e m1$ ], force)

obtain m2' where nextm1':
   $\langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft [] \triangleright \langle None, m2' \rangle \wedge \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1') = m2'$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def,
      insert MWLSteps-det.simps[of  $x :=_{\iota} e m1'$ ], force)

from dhequal have dhequal-ι:  $\bigwedge \iota. htchLoc \iota \subseteq htchLocSet PP$ 
 $\implies m1 \sim_{d, (htchLoc \iota)} m1'$ 
  by (simp add: dH-equal-def, auto)

with dhind semAssignSC-aux
have htchLoc  $\iota \subseteq htchLocSet PP \implies$ 
 $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1')$ 
  by (simp add: NDC-def IDC-def dH-equal-def, fastforce)

with dhind dheq-imp dhequal-ι
have htchLoc  $\iota \subseteq htchLocSet PP \implies$ 
 $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) \sim_{d, (htchLocSet PP)} \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1')$ 
  by (simp add: htchLocSet-def dH-equal-def, blast)

with nextm1 nextm1' assignstep dhequal
show  $\exists p' m2'$ .
   $\langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $stepResultsinR p p' \{(V, V'). V = V' \wedge (V = [] \vee V = [x :=_{\iota} e])\} \wedge$ 
   $(\alpha = [] \vee \alpha = [x :=_{\iota} e]) \wedge dhequality-alternative d PP \iota m2 m2'$ 
  by (auto simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def)
qed

with inR show  $\exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge ([x :=_{\iota} e], [x :=_{\iota} e]) \in R$ 
  by auto
qed

end

end

```

3.3 Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results

We prove compositionality results for each non-atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is composed out of other commands): If the components are strongly secure and the expressions involved indistinguishable for an observer on security level d , then the composed command is also strongly secure.

theory *Language-Composition*

imports *WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip-Assign*

begin

context *WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs*

begin

theorem *Compositionality-Seq:*

assumes *WWs-part1: WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]*

assumes *WWs-part2: WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]*

assumes *uniPPc1c2: unique-PPc (c1;c2)*

shows *WHATWHERE-Secure [c1;c2]*

proof (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto*)

fix *d PP*

from *uniPPc1c2* **have** *nocommonPP: set (PPc c1) ∩ set (PPc c2) = {}*

by (*simp add: unique-PPV-def unique-PPc-def*)

from *WWs-part1* **obtain** *R1'* **where** *R1'assump:*

SdlHPPB d PP R1' ∧ ([c1],[c1]) ∈ R1'

by (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto*)

def *R1* $\equiv \{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R1' \wedge \text{set } (PPV V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c1) \wedge \text{set } (PPV V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c1)\}$

from *R1'assump* *R1-def* *SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB*

have *SdlHPPR1: SdlHPPB d PP R1*

by *force*

from *WWs-part2* **obtain** *R2'* **where** *R2'assump:*

SdlHPPB d PP R2' ∧ ([c2],[c2]) ∈ R2'

by (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto*)

def *R2* $\equiv \{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R2' \wedge \text{set } (PPV V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c2) \wedge \text{set } (PPV V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c2)\}$

from *R2'assump* *R2-def* *SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB*

have *SdlHPPR2: SdlHPPB d PP R2*

by *force*

from *nocommonPP* **have** *nocommonDomain: Domain R1 ∩ Domain R2 ⊆ {}*

```

by (simp add: R1-def R2-def, auto,
      metis inf-greatest inf-idem le-bot unique-V-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have Areflassump1: Arefl R1  $\cap$  Arefl R2  $\subseteq$   $\{\emptyset\}$ 
by force

def R0  $\equiv$   $\{(s1, s2). \exists c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'. s1 = [c1; c2] \wedge s2 = [c1'; c2'] \wedge$ 
   $([c1], [c1']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R2\}$ 

with R1-def R1'-assump R2-def R2'-assump
have inR0:  $([c1; c2], [c1'; c2']) \in R0$ 
by auto

have Domain R0  $\cap$  Domain (R1  $\cup$  R2) =  $\{\}$ 
by (simp add: R0-def R1-def R2-def, auto, metis Int-absorb1 Int-assoc Int-empty-left

      nocommonPP unique-c-uneq, metis Int-absorb Int-absorb1
      Int-assoc Int-empty-left nocommonPP unique-c-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have Areflassump2: Arefl R0  $\cap$  Arefl (R1  $\cup$  R2)  $\subseteq$   $\{\emptyset\}$ 
by force

have disjuptoR0:
  disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP (R1  $\cup$  R2) R0
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
  from Areflassump1 SdlHPPR1 SdlHPPR2 Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim
  show SdlHPPB d PP (R1  $\cup$  R2)
  by metis
next
  from SdlHPPR1 have symR1: sym R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  from SdlHPPR2 have symR2: sym R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  with symR1 R0-def show sym R0
  by (simp add: sym-def, auto)
next
  from SdlHPPR1 have transR1: trans R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  from SdlHPPR2 have transR2: trans R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  show trans R0
  proof –
  {
    fix V V' V''
    assume p1:  $(V, V') \in R0$ 
    assume p2:  $(V', V'') \in R0$ 
    have  $(V, V'') \in R0$ 
  }

```

```

proof –
  from  $p1$   $R0$ -def obtain  $c1\ c2\ c1'\ c2'$  where  $p1assump$ :
     $V = [c1;c2] \wedge V' = [c1';c2'] \wedge$ 
     $([c1],[c1']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R2$ 
    by auto
  with  $p2$   $R0$ -def obtain  $c1''\ c2''$  where  $p2assump$ :
     $V'' = [c1'';c2''] \wedge$ 
     $([c1''],[c1'']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2''],[c2'']) \in R2$ 
    by auto
  with  $p1assump$   $transR1$   $transR2$  have
     $trans-assump$ :  $([c1],[c1'']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2],[c2'']) \in R2$ 
    by (simp add: trans-def, blast)
  with  $p1assump\ p2assump\ R0$ -def show  $?thesis$ 
    by auto
  qed
}
thus  $?thesis$  unfolding  $trans-def$  by blast
qed
next
  fix  $V\ V'$ 
  assume  $(V, V') \in R0$ 
  with  $R0$ -def show  $length\ V = length\ V'$ 
    by auto
next
  fix  $V\ V'\ i$ 
  assume  $inR0$ :  $(V, V') \in R0$ 
  assume  $irange$ :  $i < length\ V$ 
  assume  $notIDC$ :  $\neg IDC\ d\ (V!i)\ (htchLoc\ (pp\ (V!i)))$ 
  from  $inR0\ R0$ -def obtain  $c1\ c2\ c1'\ c2'$  where  $VV'assump$ :
     $V = [c1;c2] \wedge V' = [c1';c2'] \wedge$ 
     $([c1],[c1']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R2$ 
    by auto
  have  $eqnextmem$ :  $\bigwedge m. \llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 
    proof –
      fix  $m$ 
      from  $nextmem$ -exists-and-unique obtain  $m'$  where  $c1nextmem$ :
         $\exists p\ \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
         $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p\ \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
        by force

      hence  $eqdir1$ :  $\llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
        by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

      from  $c1nextmem$  obtain  $p\ \alpha$  where  $\langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
        by auto

      with  $c1nextmem$  have  $\exists p\ \alpha. \langle c1;c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
         $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p\ \alpha. \langle c1;c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
        by (auto, metis MWLsSteps-det.seq1 MWLsSteps-det.seq2)
    qed

```

```

    option.exhaust, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(3))

  hence eqdir2:  $\llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
    by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

  with eqdir1 show  $\llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 
    by auto
qed

have eqpp:  $pp(c1;c2) = pp\ c1$ 
  by simp
from  $VV'assump\ SdlHPPR1$  have  $IDC\ d\ c1\ (htchLoc\ (pp\ c1))$ 
   $\vee\ NDC\ d\ c1$ 
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
with eqnextmem eqpp have  $IDC\ d\ (c1;c2)$ 
   $(htchLoc\ (pp\ (c1;c2))) \vee NDC\ d\ (c1;c2)$ 
  by (simp add: IDC-def NDC-def)
with  $inR0\ irange\ notIDC\ VV'assump$ 
show  $NDC\ d\ (V!i)$ 
  by (simp add: IDC-def, auto)
next
fix  $V\ V'\ m1\ m1'\ m2\ \alpha\ p\ i$ 
assume  $inR0: (V, V') \in R0$ 
assume  $irange: i < length\ V$ 
assume  $step: \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume  $dhequal: m1 \sim_{d, htchLocSet\ PP} m1'$ 

from  $inR0\ R0-def$  obtain  $c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'$  where  $R0pair$ :
   $V = [c1;c2] \wedge V' = [c1';c2'] \wedge ([c1], [c1']) \in R1$ 
   $\wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R2$ 
  by auto

from  $R0pair\ irange$  have  $i0: i = 0$  by simp

have eqpp:  $pp(c1;c2) = pp\ c1$ 
  by simp

— get the two different cases:
from  $R0pair\ step\ i0$  obtain  $c3$  where case-distinction:
   $(p = Some\ c2 \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle None, m2 \rangle)$ 
   $\vee (p = Some\ (c3;c2) \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle Some\ c3, m2 \rangle)$ 
  by (simp, insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of  $c1;c2\ m1$ ],
    auto)
moreover
— Case 1: first command terminates
{
  assume passump:  $p = Some\ c2$ 
  assume StepAssump:  $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle None, m2 \rangle$ 
  hence Vstep-case1:

```

$\langle c1;c2,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2,m2 \rangle$
by (*simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1*)

from *SdlHPPR1 StepAssump R0pair dhequal*
strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP
R1 0 [c1] [c1'] m1 α None m2 m1']
obtain $p' \alpha' m2'$ **where** $c1c1'$ *reason*:
 $p' = \text{None} \wedge \langle c1',m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p',m2' \rangle \wedge (\alpha,\alpha') \in R1 \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce*)

with *eqpp c1c1' reason have conclpart*:
 $\langle c1';c2',m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2',m2' \rangle \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (c1;c2)) m2 m2'
by (*auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1*)

with *passump R0pair c1c1' reason i0*
have *case1-concl*:
 $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$
 $\langle V!i,m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p',m2' \rangle \wedge$
stepResultsinR p p' (R0 $\cup$ (R1 $\cup$ R2)) $\wedge$
 $((\alpha,\alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha,\alpha') \in R1 \vee (\alpha,\alpha') \in R2) \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto*)

}
moreover
 — Case 2: first command does not terminate
{
assume *passump: p = Some (c3;c2)*
assume *StepAssump: $\langle c1,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c3,m2 \rangle$*

hence *Vstep-case2: $\langle c1;c2,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c3;c2),m2 \rangle$*
by (*simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq2*)

from *SdlHPPR1 StepAssump R0pair dhequal*
strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP
R1 0 [c1] [c1'] m1 α Some c3 m2 m1']
obtain $p' c3' \alpha' m2'$ **where** $c1c1'$ *reason*:
 $p' = \text{Some } c3' \wedge \langle c1',m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p',m2' \rangle \wedge$
 $([c3],[c3']) \in R1 \wedge (\alpha,\alpha') \in R1 \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce*)

with *eqpp c1c1' reason have conclpart*:
 $\langle c1';c2',m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c3';c2'),m2' \rangle \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (c1;c2)) m2 m2'
by (*auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq2*)

from $c1c1'$ *reason R0pair R0-def have*

$([c3;c2],[c3';c2']) \in R0$
by *auto*

with *R0pair conclpart passump c1c1'reason i0*
have *case1-concl:*
 $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $stepResultsinR \ p \ p' (R0 \cup (R1 \cup R2)) \wedge$
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R1 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R2) \wedge$
 $dhequality-alternative \ d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto*)

}

ultimately

show $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $stepResultsinR \ p \ p' (R0 \cup (R1 \cup R2)) \wedge$
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R1 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R2) \wedge$
 $dhequality-alternative \ d \ PP \ (pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$
by *blast*

qed

with *inR0 Areflassump2 Up-To-Technique*
have *SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ (R1 ∪ R2))*
by *auto*

with *inR0* **show** $\exists R. \ SdlHPPB \ d \ PP \ R \wedge ([c1;c2],[c1';c2']) \in R$
by *auto*

qed

theorem *Compositionality-Spawn:*

assumes *WWs-threads: WHATWHERE-Secure V*

assumes *uniPPspawn: unique-PPc (spawn_l V)*

shows *WHATWHERE-Secure [spawn_l V]*

proof (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto*)

fix *d PP*

from *uniPPspawn* **have** *pp-difference: $\iota \notin set \ (PPV \ V)$*
by (*simp add: unique-PPc-def*)

— Step 1

from *WWs-threads* **obtain** *R' where R'assump:*

SdlHPPB d PP R' ∧ (V, V) ∈ R'

by (*simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto*)

def $R \equiv \{(V', V''). (V', V'') \in R' \wedge set \ (PPV \ V') \subseteq set \ (PPV \ V) \wedge set \ (PPV \ V'') \subseteq set \ (PPV \ V)\}$

from *R'assump* *R-def* *SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB*
have *SdlHPPR: SdlHPPB d PP R*

by force

— Step 2

def $R0 \equiv \{(sp1, sp2). \exists \iota' \iota'' V' V''.$
 $sp1 = [spawn_{\iota'} V] \wedge sp2 = [spawn_{\iota''} V'']$
 $\wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPV V) \wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set } (PPV V) \wedge (V', V'') \in R\}$

with $R\text{-def } R'\text{assump pp-difference}$ **have** $inR0$:
 $([spawn_{\iota} V], [spawn_{\iota} V]) \in R0$
by *auto*

— Step 3

from $R0\text{-def } R\text{-def } R'\text{assump}$ **have** $\text{Domain } R0 \cap \text{Domain } R = \{\}$
by *auto*

with $\text{commonArefl-subset-commonDomain}$
have $\text{Areflassump: Arefl } R0 \cap \text{Arefl } R \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$
by *force*

— Step 4

have $\text{disjupto}R0$:
 $\text{disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-}R' \text{ d } PP \text{ R } R0$
proof (*simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-}R'\text{-def, auto}*)
from $SdlHPPR$ **show** $SdlHPPB \text{ d } PP \text{ R}$
by *auto*
next
from $SdlHPPR$ **have** $\text{sym}R$: $\text{sym } R$
by (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)
with $R0\text{-def}$ **show** $\text{sym } R0$
by (*simp add: sym-def, auto*)
next
from $SdlHPPR$ **have** $\text{trans}R$: $\text{trans } R$
by (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)
with $R0\text{-def}$ **show** $\text{trans } R0$
proof —
 $\{$
fix $V1 V2 V3$
assume $inR1$: $(V1, V2) \in R0$
assume $inR2$: $(V2, V3) \in R0$
from $inR1 \text{ } R0\text{-def}$ **obtain** $W W' \iota \iota'$ **where** $p1$: $V1 = [spawn_{\iota} W]$
 $\wedge V2 = [spawn_{\iota'} W'] \wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPV V) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPV V)$
 $\wedge (W, W') \in R$
by *auto*
with $inR2 \text{ } R0\text{-def}$ **obtain** $W'' \iota''$ **where** $p2$: $V3 = [spawn_{\iota''} W'']$
 $\wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set } (PPV V) \wedge (W', W'') \in R$
by *auto*
from $p1 \text{ } p2 \text{ } \text{trans}R$ **have** $(W, W'') \in R$
by (*simp add: trans-def, auto*)
with $p1 \text{ } p2 \text{ } R0\text{-def}$ **have** $(V1, V3) \in R0$

```

      by auto
    }
    thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
  qed
next
fix V' V''
from SdlHPPR have eqlenR:  $(V', V'') \in R \implies \text{length } V' = \text{length } V''$ 
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
with R0-def show  $(V', V'') \in R0 \implies \text{length } V' = \text{length } V''$ 
  by auto
next
fix V' V'' i
assume inR0:  $(V', V'') \in R0$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V'$ 
from inR0 R0-def obtain  $\iota' \iota'' W' W''$ 
  where R0pair:  $V' = [\text{spawn}_{\iota'}, W'] \wedge V'' = [\text{spawn}_{\iota''}, W'']$ 
  by auto
{
  fix m
  from spawnnextmem-exists-and-unique obtain  $m'$  where spawnnextmem:
     $\exists p \alpha. \langle \text{spawn}_{\iota'}, W', m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
     $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle \text{spawn}_{\iota''}, W'', m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
  by force

  hence  $m = m'$ 
    by (metis MWLsSteps-det.spawn)

  with spawnnextmem have eqnextmem:
     $\llbracket \text{spawn}_{\iota'}, W' \rrbracket(m) = m$ 
    by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)
}

with R0pair irange show NDC d  $(V'!i)$ 
  by (simp add: NDC-def)
next
fix V' V'' i m1 m1' m2  $\alpha p$ 
assume inR0:  $(V', V'') \in R0$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V'$ 
assume step:  $\langle V'!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dhequal:  $m1 \sim_{d, \text{htchLocSet } PP} m1'$ 

from inR0 R0-def obtain  $\iota' \iota'' W' W''$ 
  where R0pair:  $V' = [\text{spawn}_{\iota'}, W']$ 
     $\wedge V'' = [\text{spawn}_{\iota''}, W''] \wedge (W', W'') \in R$ 
  by auto

with step irange
have conc-step1:  $\alpha = W' \wedge p = \text{None} \wedge m2 = m1$ 
  by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(6))

```

```

from  $R0$ pair irange
obtain  $p' \alpha' m2'$  where conc-step2:  $\langle V'!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle$ 
 $\wedge p' = \text{None} \wedge \alpha' = W'' \wedge m2' = m1'$ 
by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det.spawn)

with  $R0$ pair conc-step1 dhequal irange
show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
stepResultsinR  $p p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge$ 
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
dhequality-alternative  $d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$ 
by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def
dhequality-alternative-def, auto)
qed
— Step 5
with Areflassump Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB  $d PP (R0 \cup R)$ 
by auto

with inR0 show  $\exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge$ 
 $([spawn_{\iota} V], [spawn_{\iota} V]) \in R$ 
by auto
qed

```

```

theorem Compositionality-If:
assumes dind:  $\forall d. b \equiv_d b$ 
assumes Wws-branch1: WHATWHERE-Secure  $[c1]$ 
assumes Wws-branch2: WHATWHERE-Secure  $[c2]$ 
assumes uniPPif: unique-PPc (if  $_{\iota} b$  then  $c1$  else  $c2$  fi)
shows WHATWHERE-Secure [if  $_{\iota} b$  then  $c1$  else  $c2$  fi]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
fix  $d PP$ 
from uniPPif have nocommonPP:  $\text{set } (PPc c1) \cap \text{set } (PPc c2) = \{\}$ 
by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

from uniPPif have pp-difference:  $\iota \notin \text{set } (PPc c1) \cup \text{set } (PPc c2)$ 
by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

from Wws-branch1 obtain  $R1'$  where  $R1'$ assump:
SdlHPPB  $d PP R1' \wedge ([c1], [c1]) \in R1'$ 
by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def  $R1 \equiv \{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R1' \wedge \text{set } (PPV V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c1)$ 
 $\wedge \text{set } (PPV V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc c1)\}$ 

from  $R1'$ assump  $R1$ -def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR1: SdlHPPB  $d PP R1$ 
by force

```

```

from WWs-branch2 obtain  $R2'$  where  $R2'$ assump:
   $SdlHPPB \ d \ PP \ R2' \wedge ([c2],[c2]) \in R2'$ 
by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def  $R2 \equiv \{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R2' \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c2) \\ \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c2)\}$ 

from  $R2'$ assump  $R2$ -def  $SdlHPPB$ -restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have  $SdlHPPR2$ :  $SdlHPPB \ d \ PP \ R2$ 
by force

from nocommonPP have  $\text{Domain } R1 \cap \text{Domain } R2 \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$ 

by (simp add: R1-def R2-def, auto,
  metis empty-subsetI inf-idem inf-mono set-eq-subset unique-V-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have  $\text{Arefl} \ R1 \cap \text{Arefl } R2 \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$ 
by force

with  $SdlHPPR1 \ SdlHPPR2$  Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim have  $SdlHPPR1R2$ :
   $SdlHPPB \ d \ PP \ (R1 \cup R2)$ 
by force

def  $R \equiv (R1 \cup R2) \cup \{(\emptyset, \emptyset)\}$ 

def  $R0 \equiv \{(i1, i2). \exists \iota' \iota'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2''. \\ i1 = [\text{if}_{\iota'} b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}] \\ \wedge i2 = [\text{if}_{\iota''} b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}] \\ \wedge \iota' \notin (\text{set } (PPc \ c1) \cup \text{set } (PPc \ c2)) \\ \wedge \iota'' \notin (\text{set } (PPc \ c1) \cup \text{set } (PPc \ c2)) \wedge ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R1 \\ \wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R2 \wedge b' \equiv_d b''\}$ 

with  $R$ -def  $R1$ -def  $R1'$ assump  $R2$ -def  $R2'$ assump pp-difference dind
have  $\text{in}R0$ :  $([\text{if}_{\iota} b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}], [\text{if}_{\iota} b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}]) \in R0$ 
by auto

from  $R0$ -def  $R$ -def  $R1$ -def  $R2$ -def
have  $\text{Domain } R0 \cap \text{Domain } R = \{\}$ 
by auto

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have  $\text{Arefl} \ R0 \cap \text{Arefl } R \subseteq \{\emptyset\}$ 
by force

have disjuptoR0:
  disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R R0
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)

```

```

from SdlHPPR1R2 adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB
show SdlHPPB d PP R
  by (simp add: R-def)
next
from SdlHPPR1 have symR1: sym R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from SdlHPPR2 have symR2: sym R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from symR1 symR2 d-indistinguishable-sym R0-def show sym R0
  by (simp add: sym-def, fastforce)
next
from SdlHPPR1 have transR1: trans R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from SdlHPPR2 have transR2: trans R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
show trans R0
proof -
  {
    fix V' V'' V'''
    assume p1: (V', V'') ∈ R0
    assume p2: (V'', V''') ∈ R0

    from p1 R0-def obtain ι' ι'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2'' where
      passump1: V' = [ifι' b' then c1' else c2' fi]
      ∧ V'' = [ifι'' b'' then c1'' else c2'' fi]
      ∧ ι' ∉ (set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2))
      ∧ ι'' ∉ (set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2))
      ∧ ([c1']], [c1'']]) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2']], [c2'']]) ∈ R2
      ∧ b' ≡d b''
      by force

    with p2 R0-def obtain ι''' b''' c1''' c2''' where
      passump2: V''' = [ifι''' b''' then c1''' else c2''' fi]
      ∧ ι''' ∉ (set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2))
      ∧ ([c1''']], [c1''']]) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2''']], [c2''']]) ∈ R2
      ∧ b'' ≡d b'''
      by force

    with passump1 transR1 transR2 d-indistinguishable-trans
    have ([c1']], [c1''']]) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2']], [c2''']]) ∈ R2
      ∧ b' ≡d b'''
      by (metis transD)

    with passump1 passump2 R0-def have (V', V''') ∈ R0
      by auto
  }
  thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed
next

```

```

fix  $V\ V'$ 
assume  $inR0: (V, V') \in R0$ 
with  $R0\text{-def}$  show  $length\ V = length\ V'$  by auto
next
fix  $V'\ V''\ i$ 
assume  $inR0: (V', V'') \in R0$ 
assume  $irange: i < length\ V'$ 
assume  $notIDC: \neg IDC\ d\ (V'!i)\ (htchLoc\ (pp\ (V'!i)))$ 

from  $inR0\ R0\text{-def}$  obtain  $\iota'\ \iota''\ b'\ b''\ c1'\ c1''\ c2'\ c2''$ 
  where  $R0pair: V' = [if_{\iota'}\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi]$ 
   $\wedge\ V'' = [if_{\iota''}\ b''\ then\ c1''\ else\ c2''\ fi]$ 
   $\wedge\ \iota' \notin set\ (PPc\ c1) \cup set\ (PPc\ c2)$ 
   $\wedge\ \iota'' \notin set\ (PPc\ c1) \cup set\ (PPc\ c2)$ 
   $\wedge\ ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R2$ 
   $\wedge\ b' \equiv_d b''$ 
  by force

have  $NDC\ d\ (if_{\iota'}\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi)$ 
proof –
  {
    fix  $m$ 
    from  $nextmem\text{-exists-and-unique}$  obtain  $m'\ p\ \alpha$  where  $ifnextmem:$ 
       $\langle if_{\iota'}\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
       $\wedge\ (\forall m''. (\exists p\ \alpha. \langle if_{\iota'}\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle)$ 
         $\longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
      by blast

    hence  $m = m'$ 
    by  $(metis\ MWLsSteps\text{-det.iffalse}\ MWLsSteps\text{-det.iftrue})$ 

    with  $ifnextmem$  have  $eqnextmem:$ 
       $\llbracket if_{\iota'}\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi \rrbracket(m) = m$ 
      by  $(simp\ add: NextMem\text{-def},\ auto)$ 
  }
  thus  $?thesis$ 
  by  $(simp\ add: NDC\text{-def})$ 
qed

with  $R0pair\ irange$  show  $NDC\ d\ (V'!i)$ 
by simp
next
fix  $V'\ V''\ i\ m1\ m1'\ m2\ \alpha\ p$ 
assume  $inR0: (V', V'') \in R0$ 
assume  $irange: i < length\ V'$ 
assume  $step: \langle V'!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume  $dhequal: m1 \sim_{d, htchLocSet\ PP}\ m1'$ 

from  $inR0\ R0\text{-def}$  obtain  $\iota'\ \iota''\ b'\ b''\ c1'\ c1''\ c2'\ c2''$ 

```

where $R0pair$: $V' = [if_{\iota'} b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}]$
 $\wedge V'' = [if_{\iota''} b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}]$
 $\wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c1) \cup \text{set } (PPc \ c2)$
 $\wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c1) \cup \text{set } (PPc \ c2)$
 $\wedge ([c1']^{\iota'}, [c1'']^{\iota''}) \in R1 \wedge ([c2']^{\iota'}, [c2'']^{\iota''}) \in R2$
 $\wedge b' \equiv_d b''$
by *force*

with $R0pair$ *irange step* **have** *case-distinction*:

$(p = \text{Some } c1' \wedge BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1) = \text{True})$
 $\vee (p = \text{Some } c2' \wedge BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1) = \text{False})$
by (*simp*, *metis* $MWLSSteps\text{-}det\text{-}cases(4)$)

moreover

— Case 1: b evaluates to True

$\{$
assume *passump*: $p = \text{Some } c1'$
assume *eval*: $BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1) = \text{True}$

from $R0pair$ *step irange* **have** *stepconcl*: $\alpha = [] \wedge m2 = m1$
by (*simp*, *metis* $MWLS\text{-}semantics.MWLSSteps\text{-}det\text{-}cases(4)$)

from *eval* $R0pair$ *dhequal* **have** *eval'*: $BMap \ (E \ b'' \ m1') = \text{True}$
by (*simp* *add*: *d-indistinguishable-def* *dH-equal-def*, *auto*)

hence *step'*: $\langle if_{\iota''} b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft [] \triangleright$
 $\langle \text{Some } c1'', m1' \rangle$
by (*simp* *add*: $MWLSSteps\text{-}det.iftrue$)

with *passump* $R0pair$ *R-def dhequal stepconcl irange*

have $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'^{\iota'} i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$

stepResultsinR $p \ p' \ (R0 \cup R) \wedge$

$((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$

dhequality-alternative $d \ PP \ (pp \ (V'^{\iota'} i)) \ m2 \ m2'$

by (*simp* *add*: *stepResultsinR-def* *dhequality-alternative-def*, *auto*)

$\}$

moreover

— Case 2: b evaluates to False

$\{$
assume *passump*: $p = \text{Some } c2'$
assume *eval*: $BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1) = \text{False}$

from $R0pair$ *step irange* **have** *stepconcl*: $\alpha = [] \wedge m2 = m1$
by (*simp*, *metis* $MWLS\text{-}semantics.MWLSSteps\text{-}det\text{-}cases(4)$)

from *eval* $R0pair$ *dhequal* **have** *eval'*: $BMap \ (E \ b'' \ m1') = \text{False}$
by (*simp* *add*: *d-indistinguishable-def* *dH-equal-def*, *auto*)

hence *step'*: $\langle if_{\iota''} b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft [] \triangleright$

```

    ⟨Some c2'',m1'⟩
  by (simp add: MWLSteps-det.iffalse)

  with passump R0pair R-def dhequal stepconcl irange
  have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V''!i,m1'⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧
    ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V''!i)) m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
        auto)
  }
  ultimately
  show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V''!i,m1'⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧
    ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V''!i)) m2 m2'
    by auto
  qed

  with Areflassump2 Up-To-Technique
  have SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ R)
    by auto

  with inR0 show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R
    ∧ ([ifι b then c1 else c2 fi],[ifι b then c1 else c2 fi]) ∈ R
    by auto

  qed

  theorem Compositionality-While:
    assumes dind: ∀ d. b ≡d b
    assumes Wws-body: WHATWHERE-Secure [c]
    assumes uniPPwhile: unique-PPc (whileι b do c od)
    shows WHATWHERE-Secure [whileι b do c od]
  proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
    fix d PP

    from uniPPwhile have pp-difference: ι ∉ set (PPc c)
      by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

    from Wws-body obtain R' where R'assump:
      SdlHPPB d PP R' ∧ ([c],[c]) ∈ R'
      by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

    — add the empty pair because it is needed later in the proof
    def R ≡ {(V,V'). (V,V') ∈ R' ∧ set (PPV V) ⊆ set (PPc c) ∧
      set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPc c)} ∪ {([],[])}

    with R'assump SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB

```

adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB
have *SdlHPPR*: *SdlHPPB* *d* *PP* *R*
proof —
from *R'**assump* *SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB* **have**
SdlHPPB *d* *PP*
 $\{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R' \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge$
 $\text{set } (PPV \ V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c)\}$
by *force*

with *adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB* **have**
SdlHPPB *d* *PP*
 $\{(V, V'). (V, V') \in R' \wedge \text{set } (PPV \ V) \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge$
 $\text{set } (PPV \ V') \subseteq \text{set } (PPc \ c)\} \cup \{([], [])\}$
by *auto*

with *R-def* **show** *?thesis*
by *auto*
qed

def *R1* $\equiv \{(w1, w2). \exists \iota \ \iota' \ b \ b' \ c1 \ c1' \ c2 \ c2'. \\$
 $w1 = [c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do} \ c2 \ \text{od})]$
 $\wedge w2 = [c1'; (\text{while}_{\iota'} \ b' \ \text{do} \ c2' \ \text{od})]$
 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c)$
 $\wedge ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R$
 $\wedge b \equiv_d b'\}$

def *R2* $\equiv \{(w1, w2). \exists \iota \ \iota' \ b \ b' \ c1 \ c1'. \\$
 $w1 = [\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do} \ c1 \ \text{od}]$
 $\wedge w2 = [\text{while}_{\iota'} \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}]$
 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge$
 $([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b'\}$

def *R0* $\equiv R1 \cup R2$

from *R2-def* *R-def* *R'assump* *pp-difference* *dind*
have *inR2*: $([\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do} \ c \ \text{od}], [\text{while}_{\iota'} \ b' \ \text{do} \ c \ \text{od}]) \in R2$
by *auto*

from *R0-def* *R1-def* *R2-def* *R-def* *R'assump* **have**
 $\text{Domain } R0 \cap \text{Domain } R = \{\}$
by *auto*

with *commonArefl-subset-commonDomain*
have *Areflassump*: $\text{Arefl } R0 \cap \text{Arefl } R \subseteq \{[], []\}$
by *force*

— show some facts about *R1* and *R2* needed later in the proof at several positions

from *SdlHPPR* **have** *symR*: *sym* *R*

```

  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from symR R1-def d-indistinguishable-sym have symR1: sym R1
  by (simp add: sym-def, fastforce)
from symR R2-def d-indistinguishable-sym have symR2: sym R2
  by (simp add: sym-def, fastforce)

have disjuptoR1R2:
  disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R R0
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
  from SdlHPPR show SdlHPPB d PP R
  by auto
next
  from symR1 symR2 R0-def show sym R0
  by (simp add: sym-def)
next
  from SdlHPPR have transR: trans R
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  have transR1: trans R1
  proof -
    {
      fix V V' V''
      assume p1: (V, V') ∈ R1
      assume p2: (V', V'') ∈ R1

      from p1 R1-def obtain  $\iota$   $\iota'$   $b$   $b'$   $c1$   $c1'$   $c2$   $c2'$  where passump1:
         $V = [c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})]$ 
         $\wedge V' = [c1'; (\text{while}_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})]$ 
         $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c)$ 
         $\wedge ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R$ 
         $\wedge b \equiv_d b'$ 
      by force

      with p2 R1-def obtain  $\iota''$   $b''$   $c1''$   $c2''$  where passump2:
         $V'' = [c1''; (\text{while}_{\iota''} b'' \text{ do } c2'' \text{ od})] \wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c)$ 
         $\wedge ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R \wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R$ 
         $\wedge b' \equiv_d b''$ 
      by force

      with passump1 transR d-indistinguishable-trans
      have  $([c1], [c1'']) \in R \wedge ([c2], [c2'']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b''$ 
      by (metis trans-def)

      with passump1 passump2 R1-def have (V, V'') ∈ R1
      by auto
    }
  thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed

have transR2: trans R2

```

```

proof –
{
  fix  $V\ V'\ V''$ 
  assume  $p1: (V, V') \in R2$ 
  assume  $p2: (V', V'') \in R2$ 

  from  $p1$   $R2$ -def obtain  $\iota\ \iota'\ b\ b'\ c1\ c1'$  where  $passump1$ :
     $V = [while_{\iota}\ b\ do\ c1\ od]$ 
     $\wedge\ V' = [while_{\iota'}\ b'\ do\ c1'\ od]$ 
     $\wedge\ \iota \notin set\ (PPc\ c) \wedge \iota' \notin set\ (PPc\ c)$ 
     $\wedge\ ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b'$ 
    by force

  with  $p2$   $R2$ -def obtain  $\iota''\ b''\ c1''$  where  $passump2$ :
     $V'' = [while_{\iota''}\ b''\ do\ c1''\ od] \wedge \iota'' \notin set\ (PPc\ c)$ 
     $\wedge\ ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R \wedge b' \equiv_d b''$ 
    by force

  with  $passump1$   $transR$   $d$ -indistinguishable-trans
  have  $([c1], [c1'']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b''$ 
  by (metis trans-def)

  with  $passump1$   $passump2$   $R2$ -def have  $(V, V'') \in R2$ 
  by auto
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed

from  $SdlHPPR$  have  $eqlenR: \forall (V, V') \in R. length\ V = length\ V'$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from  $R1$ -def  $eqlenR$  have  $eqlenR1: \forall (V, V') \in R1. length\ V = length\ V'$ 
by auto
from  $R2$ -def  $eqlenR$  have  $eqlenR2: \forall (V, V') \in R2. length\ V = length\ V'$ 
by auto

from  $R1$ -def  $R2$ -def have  $Domain\ R1 \cap Domain\ R2 = \{\}$ 
by auto

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain have  $Arefl\ a$ :
   $Arefl\ R1 \cap Arefl\ R2 = \{\}$ 
by force

with  $symR1\ symR2\ transR1\ transR2\ eqlenR1\ eqlenR2\ trans\ RuR'$ 
have  $trans\ (R1 \cup R2)$ 
by force
with  $R0$ -def show  $trans\ R0$  by auto
next
fix  $V\ V'$ 
assume  $inR0: (V, V') \in R0$ 

```

with $R0\text{-def } R1\text{-def } R2\text{-def}$ **show** $\text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ **by** *auto*
next
fix $V \ V' \ i$
assume $\text{in}R0: (V, V') \in R0$
assume $\text{irange}: i < \text{length } V$
assume $\text{not}IDC: \neg IDC \ d \ (V!i)$
 $(\text{htchLoc } (pp \ (V!i)))$

from $\text{in}R0 \ R0\text{-def } R1\text{-def } R2\text{-def}$ **obtain** $\iota \ \iota' \ b \ b' \ c1 \ c1' \ c2 \ c2'$
where $R0\text{pair}: ((V = [c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od})])$
 $\wedge \ V' = [c1'; (\text{while}_{\iota'} \ b' \ \text{do } c2' \ \text{od})])$
 $\vee \ (V = [\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c1 \ \text{od}] \wedge \ V' = [\text{while}_{\iota'} \ b' \ \text{do } c1' \ \text{od}]))$
 $\wedge \ \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \ \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c)$
 $\wedge \ ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge \ ([c2], [c2']) \in R$
 $\wedge \ b \equiv_d b'$
by *force*

with $\text{irange } SdlHPPR \ \text{strongdlHPPB-NDCIDCaux}$
 $[of \ d \ PP \ R \ [c1] \ [c1'] \ i]$
have $c1NDCIDC:$
 $NDC \ d \ c1 \ \vee \ IDC \ d \ c1 \ (\text{htchLoc } (pp \ c1))$
by *auto*

— first alternative for V and V'
have $\text{case1}: NDC \ d \ (c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od})) \vee$
 $IDC \ d \ (c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od}))$
 $(\text{htchLoc } (pp \ (c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od}))))$
proof —
have $\text{eqnextmem}: \bigwedge m. \llbracket c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od}) \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$
proof —
fix m
from $\text{nextmem-exists-and-unique}$ **obtain** m' **where** $c1\text{nextmem}:$
 $\exists p \ \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
 $\wedge \ (\forall m''. \ (\exists p \ \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$
by *force*

hence $\text{eqdir1}: \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m) = m'$
by $(\text{simp add: NextMem-def}, \text{ auto})$

from $c1\text{nextmem}$ **obtain** $p \ \alpha$ **where** $\langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
by *auto*

with $c1\text{nextmem}$ **have**
 $\exists p \ \alpha. \langle c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od}), m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
 $\wedge \ (\forall m''. \ (\exists p \ \alpha. \langle c1; (\text{while}_{\iota} \ b \ \text{do } c2 \ \text{od}), m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$
by $(\text{auto}, \text{metis MWLsSteps-det.seq1 MWLsSteps-det.seq2}$
 $\text{option.exhaust}, \text{metis MWLsSteps-det-cases}(3))$

hence $eqdir2: \llbracket c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}) \rrbracket(m) = m'$
by (*simp add: NextMem-def, auto*)

with $eqdir1$ **show** $\llbracket c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}) \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$
by *auto*
qed

have $eqpp: pp (c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})) = pp c1$
by *simp*

with $c1NDCIDC eqnextmem$ **show**
 $NDC d (c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})) \vee$
 $IDC d (c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}))$
 $(htchLoc (pp (c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}))))$
by (*simp add: IDC-def NDC-def*)
qed

— second alternative for $V V'$

have $case2: NDC d (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od})$

proof —

{
fix m
from *nextmem-exists-and-unique* **obtain** $m' p \alpha$
where *whilenextmem*: $\langle while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$
 $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle))$
 $\longrightarrow m'' = m')$
by *blast*

hence $m = m'$
by (*metis MWLsSteps-det.whilefalse MWLsSteps-det.whiletrue*)

with *whilenextmem* **have** *eqnextmem*:
 $\llbracket while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od} \rrbracket(m) = m$
by (*simp add: NextMem-def, auto*)

}

thus $NDC d (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od})$

by (*simp add: NDC-def*)

qed

from $R0pair$ $case1$ $case2$ *irange* *notIDC*

show $NDC d (V!i)$

by *force*

next

fix $V V' i m1 m1' m2 \alpha p$
assume $inR0: (V, V') \in R0$
assume $irange: i < \text{length } V$
assume $step: \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$
assume $dhequal: m1 \sim_{d, htchLocSet PP} m1'$

from *inR0 R0-def R1-def R2-def* **obtain** $\iota \iota' b b' c1 c1' c2 c2'$
where *R0pair*: $((V = [c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})])$
 $\wedge V' = [c1'; (while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})])$
 $\vee (V = [while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}] \wedge V' = [while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c1' \text{ od}])$
 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc \ c)$
 $\wedge ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R$
 $\wedge b \equiv_d b'$
by *force*

— Case 1: V and V' are sequential commands

have *case1*: $\llbracket V = [c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})];$
 $V' = [c1'; (while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})] \rrbracket$
 $\implies \exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$
stepResultsinR $p \ p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge ((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP $(pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$

proof —

assume *Vassump*: $V = [c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})]$
assume *V'assump*: $V' = [c1'; (while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})]$

have *eqpp*: $pp \ (c1; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})) = pp \ c1$
by *simp*

from *Vassump irange step irange* **obtain** $c3$

where *case-distinction*:

$(p = \text{Some } (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}) \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m2 \rangle)$
 $\vee (p = \text{Some } (c3; (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})))$
 $\wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c3, m2 \rangle)$
by *(simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(3))*

moreover

— Case 1a: first command terminates

$\{$
assume *passump*: $p = \text{Some } (while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})$
assume *stepassump*: $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m2 \rangle$

with *R0pair SdlHPPR dhequal*

strongdlHPPB-aux $[of \ d \ PP \ R$

$- [c1] \ [c1'] \ m1 \ \alpha \ \text{None} \ m2 \ m1']$

obtain $p' \alpha' m2'$ **where** $c1c1'$ *reason*:

$p' = \text{None} \wedge \langle c1', m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP $(pp \ c1) \ m2 \ m2'$
by *(simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)*

hence *conclpart*:

$\langle c1'; (while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}), m1' \rangle$
 $\rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}), m2' \rangle$
by *(auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1)*

from *R0pair R0-def R2-def* **have**

$([while_{\iota} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}], [while_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}]) \in R0$

by *simp*

```

with passump V'assump Vassump eqpp conclpart
  c1c1'reason irange
have  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0  $\cup$  R)  $\wedge ((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee$ 
   $(\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto)
}
moreover
— Case 1b: first command does not terminate
{
  assume passump: p = Some (c3;(whilel b do c2 od))
  assume stepassump:  $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c3, m2 \rangle$ 

  with R0pair SdlHPPR dhequal
    strongdllHPPB-aux[of d PP R
    - [c1] [c1'] m1  $\alpha$  Some c3 m2 m1']
  obtain p' c3'  $\alpha'$  m2' where c1c1'reason:
    p' = Some c3'  $\wedge \langle c1', m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
     $([c3], [c3']) \in R \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge$ 
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

  hence conclpart:
     $\langle c1'; (\text{while}_{l'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}), m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright$ 
     $\langle \text{Some } (c3'; \text{while}_{l'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}), m2' \rangle$ 
    by (auto, simp add: MWLSSteps-det.seq2)

  from c1c1'reason R0pair R0-def R1-def have
     $([c3'; \text{while}_{l'} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}], [c3'; \text{while}_{l'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od}]) \in R0$ 
    by simp

  with passump V'assump Vassump eqpp conclpart c1c1'reason irange
  have  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0  $\cup$  R)  $\wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto)
}
ultimately show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
stepResultsinR p p' (R0  $\cup$  R)  $\wedge$ 
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by auto
qed

```

— Case 2: *V* and *V'* are while commands

have *case2*: $\llbracket V = [\text{while}_\iota \ b \ \text{do} \ c1 \ \text{od}]; V' = [\text{while}_\iota \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}] \rrbracket$
 $\implies \exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$
stepResultsinR $p \ p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge ((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP $(pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$
proof –
assume *Vassump*: $V = [\text{while}_\iota \ b \ \text{do} \ c1 \ \text{od}]$
assume *V'assump*: $V' = [\text{while}_\iota \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}]$

from *Vassump irange step* **have** *case-distinction*:
 $(p = \text{None} \wedge BMap \ (E \ b \ m1) = \text{False})$
 $\vee p = (\text{Some} \ (c1; \text{while}_\iota \ b \ \text{do} \ c1 \ \text{od})) \wedge BMap \ (E \ b \ m1) = \text{True}$
by (*simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(5) option.simps(2)*)
moreover
— Case 2a: *b* evaluates to *False*
{
assume *passump*: $p = \text{None}$
assume *eval*: $BMap \ (E \ b \ m1) = \text{False}$

with *Vassump step irange* **have** *stepconcl*: $\alpha = \llbracket \wedge m2 = m1$
by (*simp, metis (no-types) MWLsSteps-det-cases(5)*)

from *eval R0pair dhequal* **have** *eval'*: $BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1') = \text{False}$
by (*simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto*)

hence $\langle \text{while}_\iota \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \llbracket \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m1' \rangle$
by (*simp add: MWLsSteps-det.whilefalse*)

with *passump R-def Vassump V'assump stepconcl dhequal irange*
have $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$
stepResultsinR $p \ p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge ((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$
dhequality-alternative d PP $(pp \ (V!i)) \ m2 \ m2'$
by (*simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def, auto*)
}
moreover
— Case 2b: *b* evaluates to *True*
{
assume *passump*: $p = (\text{Some} \ (c1; \text{while}_\iota \ b \ \text{do} \ c1 \ \text{od}))$
assume *eval*: $BMap \ (E \ b \ m1) = \text{True}$

with *Vassump step irange* **have** *stepconcl*: $\alpha = \llbracket \wedge m2 = m1$
by (*simp, metis (no-types) MWLsSteps-det-cases(5)*)

from *eval R0pair dhequal* **have** *eval'*:
 $BMap \ (E \ b' \ m1') = \text{True}$
by (*simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto*)

hence *step'*: $\langle \text{while}_\iota \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \llbracket \triangleright$
 $\langle \text{Some} \ (c1'; \text{while}_\iota \ b' \ \text{do} \ c1' \ \text{od}), m1' \rangle$

```

    by (simp add: MWLSteps-det.whiletrue)

  from R1-def R0pair have inR1:
    ([c1;whileℓ b do c1 od],[c1';whileℓ b' do c1' od]) ∈ R1
  by auto

  with step' R0-def passump R-def Vassump V'assump
    stepconcl dhequal irange
  have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
    auto)
}
ultimately
show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by auto
qed

with case1 R0pair show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1⟩ →<α'> ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by auto
qed

with Areflassump Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ R)
by auto

with inR2 R0-def show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧
  ([whileℓ b do c od], [whileℓ b do c od]) ∈ R
by auto
qed

end

end

```

4 Security type system

4.1 Abstract security type system with soundness proof

We formalize an abstract version of the type system in [2] using locales [1]. Our formalization of the type system is abstract in the sense that the rules specify abstract semantic side conditions on the expressions within a command that satisfy for proving the soundness of the rules. That is, it can

be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these semantic side conditions in order to achieve a type system for a concrete language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions. Obtaining a soundness proof for such a concrete type system then boils down to proving that the concrete type system interprets the abstract type system.

We prove the soundness of the abstract type system by simply applying the compositionality results proven before.

```

theory Type-System
imports Language-Composition
begin

locale Type-System =
  WWP?: WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs E BMap DA lH
  for E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
  and BMap :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment
  and lH :: ('d, 'exp) lHatches
+
fixes
  AssignSideCondition :: 'id  $\Rightarrow$  'exp  $\Rightarrow$  nat  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and WhileSideCondition :: 'exp  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and IfSideCondition ::
    'exp  $\Rightarrow$  ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom  $\Rightarrow$  ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  assumes semAssignSC: AssignSideCondition x e  $\iota \Longrightarrow$ 
    e  $\equiv_{DA} x, (htchLoc \iota)$  e  $\wedge (\forall m m' d \iota'. (m \sim_{d, (htchLoc \iota')} m' \wedge$ 
       $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m')$ 
       $\longrightarrow \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d, (htchLoc \iota')} \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m')$ )
  and semWhileSC: WhileSideCondition e  $\Longrightarrow \forall d. e \equiv_d e$ 
  and semIfSC: IfSideCondition e c1 c2  $\Longrightarrow \forall d. e \equiv_d e$ 
begin

```

— Security typing rules for the language commands

```

inductive
  ComSecTyping :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  ( $\vdash_C$  -)
  and ComSecTypingL :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom list  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  ( $\vdash_V$  -)
where
  Skip:  $\vdash_C skip_{\iota}$  |
  Assign:  $\llbracket AssignSideCondition x e \iota \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_C x :=_{\iota} e$  |
  Spawn:  $\llbracket \vdash_V V \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_C spawn_{\iota} V$  |
  Seq:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c1; \vdash_C c2 \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_C c1; c2$  |
  While:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c; WhileSideCondition b \rrbracket$ 
     $\Longrightarrow \vdash_C while_{\iota} b do c od$  |
  If:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c1; \vdash_C c2; IfSideCondition b c1 c2 \rrbracket$ 
     $\Longrightarrow \vdash_C if_{\iota} b then c1 else c2 fi$  |
  Parallel:  $\llbracket \forall i < length V. \vdash_C V!i \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_V V$ 

```

inductive-cases *parallel-cases*:

$\vdash_{\mathcal{V}} V$

definition *auxiliary-predicate*

where

auxiliary-predicate $V \equiv \text{unique-PPV } V \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$

— soundness proof of abstract type system

theorem *ComSecTyping-single-is-sound*:

$\llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{C}} c; \text{unique-PPc } c \rrbracket$

$\implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c]$

proof (*induct rule: ComSecTyping-ComSecTypingL.inducts(1)*)

[*of - - auxiliary-predicate*], *simp-all add: auxiliary-predicate-def*)

fix ι

show *WHATWHERE-Secure* [*skip* _{ι}]

by (*metis WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip*)

next

fix $x \in \iota$

assume *AssignSideCondition* $x \in \iota$

thus *WHATWHERE-Secure* [$x :=_{\iota} e$]

by (*metis WHATWHERE-Secure-Assign semAssignSC*)

next

fix $V \in \iota$

assume *IH*: *unique-PPV* $V \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$

assume *uniPPspawn*: *unique-PPc* (*spawn* _{ι} V)

hence *unique-PPV* V

by (*simp add: unique-PPV-def unique-PPc-def*)

with *IH* **have** *WHATWHERE-Secure* V

..

with *uniPPspawn* **show** *WHATWHERE-Secure* [*spawn* _{ι} V]

by (*metis Compositionality-Spawn*)

next

fix $c1 \ c2$

assume *IH1*: *unique-PPc* $c1 \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c1]$

assume *IH2*: *unique-PPc* $c2 \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c2]$

assume *uniPPc1c2*: *unique-PPc* ($c1; c2$)

from *uniPPc1c2* **have** *uniPPc1*: *unique-PPc* $c1$

by (*simp add: unique-PPc-def*)

with *IH1* **have** *IS1*: *WHATWHERE-Secure* [$c1$]

.

from *uniPPc1c2* **have** *uniPPc2*: *unique-PPc* $c2$

by (*simp add: unique-PPc-def*)

with *IH2* **have** *IS2*: *WHATWHERE-Secure* [$c2$]

.

from *IS1 IS2 uniPPc1c2* **show** *WHATWHERE-Secure* [$c1; c2$]

by (*metis Compositionality-Seq*)

next

```

fix  $c\ b\ \iota$ 
assume  $SC: \text{WhileSideCondition } b$ 
assume  $IH: \text{unique-PPc } c \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c]$ 
assume  $\text{uniPPwhile}: \text{unique-PPc } (\text{while}_\iota\ b\ \text{do } c\ \text{od})$ 
hence  $\text{unique-PPc } c$ 
  by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with  $IH$  have  $\text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c]$ 
  .
with  $\text{uniPPwhile } SC$  show  $\text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [\text{while}_\iota\ b\ \text{do } c\ \text{od}]$ 
  by (metis Compositionality-While semWhileSC)
next
  fix  $c1\ c2\ b\ \iota$ 
  assume  $SC: \text{IfSideCondition } b\ c1\ c2$ 
  assume  $IH1: \text{unique-PPc } c1 \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c1]$ 
  assume  $IH2: \text{unique-PPc } c2 \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c2]$ 
  assume  $\text{uniPPif}: \text{unique-PPc } (\text{if}_\iota\ b\ \text{then } c1\ \text{else } c2\ \text{fi})$ 
  from  $\text{uniPPif}$  have  $\text{unique-PPc } c1$ 
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
  with  $IH1$  have  $IS1: \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c1]$ 
    .
  from  $\text{uniPPif}$  have  $\text{unique-PPc } c2$ 
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
  with  $IH2$  have  $IS2: \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c2]$ 
    .
  from  $IS1\ IS2\ SC\ \text{uniPPif}$  show
     $\text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [\text{if}_\iota\ b\ \text{then } c1\ \text{else } c2\ \text{fi}]$ 
    by (metis Compositionality-If semIfSC)
  next
  fix  $V$ 
  assume  $IH: \forall i < \text{length } V. \vdash_{\mathcal{C}} V\ !\ i \wedge$ 
    ( $\text{unique-PPc } (V!i) \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [V!i]$ )
  have  $\text{unique-PPV } V \longrightarrow (\forall i < \text{length } V. \text{unique-PPc } (V!i))$ 
    by (metis uniPPV-uniPPc)
  with  $IH$  have  $\text{unique-PPV } V \longrightarrow (\forall i < \text{length } V. \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [V!i])$ 
    .
  by auto
  thus  $\text{uniPPV}: \text{unique-PPV } V \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$ 
    by (metis parallel-composition)
qed

theorem ComSecTyping-list-is-sound:
 $\llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{V}} V; \text{unique-PPV } V \rrbracket \implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$ 
by (metis ComSecTyping-single-is-sound parallel-cases
  parallel-composition uniPPV-uniPPc)

end

end

```

4.2 Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions

As an example, we provide a simple example language for instantiating the parameter *'exp* for the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions (from the entry Strong-Security).

```

theory Expr
imports Types
begin

— type parameters:
— 'val: numbers, boolean constants...
— 'id: identifier names

type-synonym ('val) operation = 'val list  $\Rightarrow$  'val

datatype (dead 'id, dead 'val) Expr =
  Const 'val |
  Var 'id |
  Op 'val operation (('id, 'val) Expr) list

— defining a simple recursive evaluation function on this datatype
primrec ExprEval :: (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
and ExprEvalL :: (('id, 'val) Expr) list  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  'val list
where
  ExprEval (Const v) m = v |
  ExprEval (Var x) m = (m x) |
  ExprEval (Op f arglist) m = (f (ExprEvalL arglist m)) |

  ExprEvalL [] m = [] |
  ExprEvalL (e#V) m = (ExprEval e m)#(ExprEvalL V m)

end

```

4.3 Example interpretation of abstract security type system

Using the example instantiation of the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions, we give an example instantiation of our abstract security type system, instantiating the parameter for domains *'d* with a two-level security lattice (from the entry Strong-Security).

```

theory Domain-example
imports Expr
begin

```

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example,

we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

```
datatype Dom = low | high
```

```
instantiation Dom :: order
begin
```

```
definition
```

```
less-eq-Dom-def: d1 ≤ d2 = (if d1 = d2 then True
  else (if d1 = low then True else False))
```

```
definition
```

```
less-Dom-def: d1 < d2 = (if d1 = d2 then False
  else (if d1 = low then True else False))
```

```
instance proof
```

```
fix x y z :: Dom
```

```
  show (x < y) = (x ≤ y ∧ ¬ y ≤ x)
```

```
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def less-Dom-def by auto
```

```
  show x ≤ x unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by auto
```

```
  show [x ≤ y; y ≤ z] ⇒ x ≤ z
```

```
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by ((split if-split-asm)+, auto)
```

```
  show [x ≤ y; y ≤ x] ⇒ x = y
```

```
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by ((split if-split-asm)+,
      auto, (split if-split-asm)+, auto)
```

```
qed
```

```
end
```

```
end
```

```
theory Type-System-example
```

```
imports Type-System ../Strong-Security/Expr ../Strong-Security/Domain-example
```

```
begin
```

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

```
consts DA :: ('id, Dom) DomainAssignment
```

```
consts BMap :: 'val ⇒ bool
```

```
consts lH :: (Dom, ('id, 'val) Expr) lHatches
```

— redefine all the abbreviations necessary for auxiliary lemmas with the correct parameter instantiation

```
abbreviation MWLsStepsdet' ::
```

```
((('id, 'val) Expr, 'id, 'val, (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom) TLSteps-curry
  ((1 ⟨-,/-⟩) →◁▷/ (1 ⟨-,/-⟩) [0,0,0,0,0] 81)
```

```
where
```

$\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle \langle c2, m2 \rangle \equiv$
 $((c1, m1), \alpha, (c2, m2)) \in \text{MWLs- semantics.MWLsSteps-det ExprEval BMap}$

abbreviation $d\text{-equal}' :: ('id, 'val) \text{State} \Rightarrow \text{Dom} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{State} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
 $((- =_- -))$

where
 $m =_d m' \equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.d\text{-equal DA } d \ m \ m'$

abbreviation $dH\text{-equal}' :: ('id, 'val) \text{State} \Rightarrow \text{Dom} \Rightarrow (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{Expr}) \text{Hatches} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{State} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
 $((- \sim_{-,-} -))$

where
 $m \sim_{d,H} m' \equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.dH\text{-equal ExprEval DA } d \ H \ m \ m'$

abbreviation $\text{NextMem}' :: (('id, 'val) \text{Expr}, 'id) \text{MWLsCom} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{State} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{State}$
 $([\![\cdot]\!])'(-')$

where
 $[\![c]\!](m) \equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.NextMem (\text{MWLs- semantics.MWLsSteps-det ExprEval BMap})$
 $c \ m$

abbreviation $dH\text{-indistinguishable}' :: ('id, 'val) \text{Expr} \Rightarrow \text{Dom} \Rightarrow (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{Expr}) \text{Hatches} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{Expr} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
 $((- \equiv_{-,-} -))$

where
 $e1 \equiv_{d,H} e2$
 $\equiv \text{WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs}.dH\text{-indistinguishable ExprEval DA } d \ H \ e1 \ e2$

abbreviation $htchLoc :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{Expr}) \text{Hatches}$
where
 $htchLoc \ \iota \equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.htchLoc \ lH \ \iota$

— Security typing rules for expressions

inductive
 $\text{ExprSecTyping} :: (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{Expr}) \text{Hatches} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{Expr} \Rightarrow \text{Dom} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
 $(- \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} - : -)$

for $H :: (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{Expr}) \text{Hatches}$
where

$\text{Consts: } H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Const } v) : d \mid$
 $\text{Vars: } DA \ x = d \implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Var } x) : d \mid$
 $\text{Hatch: } (d, e) \in H \implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d \mid$
 $\text{Ops: } [\![\forall i < \text{length arglist. } H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{arglist}!i) : (d!i) \wedge (d!i) \leq d]\!] \implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Op } f \text{ arglist}) : d$

— function substituting a certain expression with another expression in expressions

primrec $Subst :: ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr$
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr$
 $(-<->)$
and $SubstL :: ('id, 'val) Expr list \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr$
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr list$
where
 $(Const v) < e1 \setminus e2 > = (if\ e1 = (Const\ v)\ then\ e2\ else\ (Const\ v)) \mid$
 $(Var\ x) < e1 \setminus e2 > = (if\ e1 = (Var\ x)\ then\ e2\ else\ (Var\ x)) \mid$
 $(Op\ f\ arglist) < e1 \setminus e2 > = (if\ e1 = (Op\ f\ arglist)\ then\ e2\ else$
 $(Op\ f\ (SubstL\ arglist\ e1\ e2))) \mid$
 $SubstL\ []\ e1\ e2 = [] \mid$
 $SubstL\ (e \# V)\ e1\ e2 = (e < e1 \setminus e2 >) \# (SubstL\ V\ e1\ e2)$

definition $SubstClosure :: 'id \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $SubstClosure\ x\ e \equiv \forall (d', e', \iota') \in lH. (d', e' < (Var\ x) \setminus e >, \iota') \in lH$

definition $synAssignSC :: 'id \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $synAssignSC\ x\ e\ \iota \equiv \exists d. ((htchLoc\ \iota) \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d \wedge d \leq DA\ x)$
 $\wedge (SubstClosure\ x\ e)$

definition $synWhileSC :: ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $synWhileSC\ e \equiv (\exists d. (\{\} \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d) \wedge (\forall d'. d \leq d'))$

definition $synIfSC :: ('id, 'val) Expr$
 $\Rightarrow (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom$
 $\Rightarrow (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom \Rightarrow bool$
where
 $synIfSC\ e\ c1\ c2 \equiv \exists d. (\{\} \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d \wedge (\forall d'. d \leq d'))$

— auxiliary lemma for locale interpretation (theorem 7 in original paper)

lemma $ExprTypable-with-smaller-d\ implies-dH-indistinguishable$:

$\llbracket H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d'; d' \leq d \rrbracket \implies e \equiv_{d,H} e$

proof (induct rule: $ExprSecTyping.induct$,

$simp-all\ add: WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.dH-indistinguishable-def$

$WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def\ WHATWHERE.d-equal-def, auto$)

fix $dl\ arglist\ f\ m1\ m2\ d'\ d$

assume $main: \forall i < length\ arglist.$

$(H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (arglist!i) : (dl!i)) \wedge (dl!i \leq d \longrightarrow$

$(\forall m1\ m2. (\forall x. DA\ x \leq d \longrightarrow m1\ x = m2\ x) \wedge$

$(\forall (d', e) \in H. d' \leq d \longrightarrow ExprEval\ e\ m1 = ExprEval\ e\ m2) \longrightarrow$

$ExprEval\ (arglist!i)\ m1 = ExprEval\ (arglist!i)\ m2)) \wedge dl!i \leq d'$

assume *smaller*: $d' \leq d$
assume *egeval*: $\forall (d', e) \in H. d' \leq d \longrightarrow \text{ExprEval } e \ m1 = \text{ExprEval } e \ m2$
assume *eqstate*: $\forall x. DA \ x \leq d \longrightarrow m1 \ x = m2 \ x$

from *main smaller* **have** *irangesubst*:
 $\forall i < \text{length } \text{arglist}. dl!i \leq d$
by (*metis order-trans*)

with *eqstate egeval main* **have**
 $\forall i < \text{length } \text{arglist}. \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) \ m1$
 $= \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) \ m2$
by *force*

hence *substmap*: $(\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist } m1) = (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist } m2)$
by (*induct arglist, auto, force*)

show $f (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist } m1) = f (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist } m2)$
by (*subst substmap, auto*)

qed

— auxiliary lemma about substitutions in expressions and in memories

lemma *substexp-substmem*:

$\text{ExprEval } e' < \text{Var } x \setminus e > \ m = \text{ExprEval } e' (m(x := \text{ExprEval } e \ m))$
 $\wedge \text{ExprEvalL } (\text{SubstL } \text{elist } (\text{Var } x) \ e) \ m$
 $= \text{ExprEvalL } \text{elist } (m(x := \text{ExprEval } e \ m))$
by (*induct-tac e' and elist rule: ExprEval.induct ExprEvalL.induct, simp-all*)

— another auxiliary lemma for locale interpretation (lemma 8 in original paper)

lemma *SubstClosure-implications*:

$\llbracket \text{SubstClosure } x \ e; \ m \sim_{d, (\text{htchLoc } \iota')} \ m' \rrbracket$
 $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m')$
 $\implies \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d, (\text{htchLoc } \iota')} \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m')$

proof —

fix $m1 \ m1'$
assume *substclosure*: $\text{SubstClosure } x \ e$
assume *dequalm2*: $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) =_d \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1')$
assume *dhequalm1*: $m1 \sim_{d, (\text{htchLoc } \iota')} m1'$

from *MWLs-semantic.nextmem-exists-and-unique* **obtain** $m2$ **where** *m1step*:

$(\exists p \ \alpha. \langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle)$
 $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \ \alpha. \langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m2)$
by *force*

hence *m2-is-next*: $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) = m2$

by (*simp add: WHATWHERE.NextMem-def, auto*)

from *m1step MWLs-semantic.MWLsSteps-det.assign*

[*of ExprEval e m1 - x ι BMap*]

have *m2eq*: $m2 = m1(x := (\text{ExprEval } e \ m1))$

by *auto*

from *MWLS-antics.nextmem-exists-and-unique* obtain $m2'$ where $m1'$ step:
 $(\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2' \rangle)$
 $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_{\iota} e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m2')$
 by *force*
 hence $m2'$ -is-next: $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1') = m2'$
 by (*simp add: WHATWHERE.NextMem-def, auto*)
 from $m1'$ step *MWLS-antics.MWLSSteps-det.assign*
 [of *ExprEval e m1' - x \iota BMap*]
 have $m2'$ eq: $m2' = m1'(x := (ExprEval e m1'))$
 by *auto*

from $m2'$ eq *substexp-substmem*
 have *substeval1*: $\forall e'. ExprEval (e' < Var x \backslash e >) m1 = ExprEval e' m2$
 by *force*

from $m2'$ eq *substexp-substmem*
 have *substeval2*: $\forall e'. ExprEval e' < Var x \backslash e > m1' = ExprEval e' m2'$
 by *force*

from *substclosure* have
 $\forall (d', e') \in htchLoc \iota'. (d', e' < Var x \backslash e >) \in (htchLoc \iota')$
 by (*simp add: SubstClosure-def WHATWHERE.htchLoc-def, auto*)

with *dhequalm1* have
 $\forall (d', e') \in htchLoc \iota'.$
 $d' \leq d \longrightarrow ExprEval e' < Var x \backslash e > m1 = ExprEval e' < Var x \backslash e > m1'$
 by (*simp add: WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def, auto*)

with *substeval1 substeval2* have
 $\forall (d', e') \in htchLoc \iota'.$
 $d' \leq d \longrightarrow ExprEval e' m2 = ExprEval e' m2'$
 by *auto*

with *dequalm2 m2-is-next m2'-is-next*
 show $\llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1) \sim_{d, htchLoc \iota'} \llbracket x :=_{\iota} e \rrbracket(m1')$
 by (*simp add: WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def*)

qed

— interpretation of the abstract type system using the above definitions for the side conditions

interpretation *Type-System-example: Type-System ExprEval BMap DA lH*
synAssignSC synWhileSC synIfSC

by (*unfold-locales, auto,*
metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
synAssignSC-def,
metis SubstClosure-implications synAssignSC-def,
simp add: synWhileSC-def,

```

metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable,

simp add: synIfSC-def,
metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable)

end

```

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