

An Isabelle/HOL formalization of Strong Security

Sylvia Grewe, Alexander Lux, Heiko Mantel, Jens Sauer

March 17, 2025

Abstract

Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information leaks within programs from private sources to public sinks. Noninterference captures this intuition. Strong security from [2] formalizes noninterference for concurrent systems.

We present an Isabelle/HOL formalization of strong security for arbitrary security lattices ([2] uses a two-element security lattice). The formalization includes compositionality proofs for strong security and a soundness proof for a security type system that checks strong security for programs in a simple while language with dynamic thread creation.

Our formalization of the security type system is abstract in the language for expressions and in the semantic side conditions for expressions. It can easily be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these side conditions. The soundness proof of such an instantiation boils down to showing that these syntactic approximations imply the semantic side conditions.

Contents

1	Preliminary definitions	2
1.1	Type synonyms	2
2	Strong security	4
2.1	Definition of strong security	4
2.2	Proof technique for compositionality results	8
2.3	Proof of parallel compositionality	10
3	Example language and compositionality proofs	13
3.1	Example language with dynamic thread creation	13
3.2	Proofs of atomic compositionality results	15
3.3	Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results	18

4 Security type system	32
4.1 Abstract security type system with soundness proof	32
4.2 Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions . . .	34
4.3 Example interpretation of abstract security type system . . .	34

1 Preliminary definitions

1.1 Type synonyms

The formalization is parametric in different aspects. Notably, it is parametric in the security lattice it supports.

For better readability, we use the following type synonyms in our formalization:

```
theory Types
imports Main
begin
```

- type parameters:
- 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
- 'val: values
- 'id: identifier names
- 'com: commands
- 'd: domains

This is a collection of type synonyms. Note that not all of these type synonyms are used within Strong-Security - some are used in WHATandWHERE-Security.

```
type-synonym ('id, 'val) State = 'id  $\Rightarrow$  'val
```

- type for evaluation functions mapping expressions to a values depending on a state

```
type-synonym ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction =
  'exp  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  'val
```

- define configurations with threads as pair of commands and states

```
type-synonym ('id, 'val, 'com) TConfig = 'com  $\times$  ('id, 'val) State
```

- define configurations with thread pools as pair of command lists (thread pool) and states

```
type-synonym ('id, 'val, 'com) TPConfig =
  ('com list)  $\times$  ('id, 'val) State
```

- type for program states (including the set of commands and a symbol for terminating - None)

```
type-synonym 'com ProgramState = 'com option
```

— type for configurations with program states

type-synonym (*'id, 'val, 'com*) *PConfig* =
'com ProgramState × (*'id, 'val*) *State*

— type for labels with a list of spawned threads

type-synonym *'com Label* = *'com list*

— type for step relations from single commands to a program state, with a label

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TLSteps* =
((*'id, 'val, 'com*) *TConfig* × *'com Label*
× (*'id, 'val, 'com*) *PConfig*) *set*

— curried version of previously defined type

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TLSteps-curry* =
'com ⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com Label* ⇒ *'com ProgramState*
⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— type for step relations from thread pools to thread pools

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TPSteps* =
((*'id, 'val, 'com*) *TPConfig* × (*'id, 'val, 'com*) *TPConfig*) *set*

— curried version of previously defined type

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TPSteps-curry* =
'com list ⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com list* ⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— define type of step relations for single threads to thread pools

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TSteps* =
((*'id, 'val, 'com*) *TConfig* × (*'id, 'val, 'com*) *TPConfig*) *set*

— define the same type as TSteps, but in a curried version (allowing syntax abbreviations)

type-synonym (*'exp, 'id, 'val, 'com*) *TSteps-curry* =
'com ⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com list* ⇒ (*'id, 'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— type for simple domain assignments; 'd has to be an instance of order (partial order)

type-synonym (*'id, 'd*) *DomainAssignment* = *'id* ⇒ *'d::order*

type-synonym *'com Bisimulation-type* = ((*'com list*) × (*'com list*)) *set*

— type for escape hatches

type-synonym (*'d, 'exp*) *Hatch* = *'d* × *'exp*

— type for sets of escape hatches

type-synonym (*'d, 'exp*) *Hatches* = ((*'d, 'exp*) *Hatch*) *set*

— type for local escape hatches

type-synonym (*'d, 'exp*) *lHatch* = *'d* × *'exp* × *nat*

— type for sets of local escape hatches
type-synonym (*'d*, *'exp*) *lHatches* = ((*'d*, *'exp*) *lHatch*) *set*

end

2 Strong security

2.1 Definition of strong security

We define strong security such that it is parametric in a security lattice (*'d*). The definition of strong security by itself is language-independent, therefore the definition is parametric in a programming language (*'com*) in addition.

theory *Strong-Security*

imports *Types*

begin

locale *Strong-Security* =

fixes *SR* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TSteps*

and *DA* :: (*'id*, *'d::order*) *DomainAssignment*

begin

— define when two states are indistinguishable for an observer on domain *d*

definition *d-equal* :: (*'d::order*) \Rightarrow (*'id*, *'val*) *State*

\Rightarrow (*'id*, *'val*) *State* \Rightarrow *bool*

where

d-equal d m m' $\equiv \forall x. ((DA\ x) \leq d \longrightarrow (m\ x) = (m'\ x))$

abbreviation *d-equal'* :: (*'id*, *'val*) *State*

\Rightarrow (*'d::order*) \Rightarrow (*'id*, *'val*) *State* \Rightarrow *bool*

($\langle (- =_ -) \rangle$)

where

m =_d m' $\equiv d\text{-equal } d\ m\ m'$

— transitivity of d-equality

lemma *d-equal-trans*:

$\llbracket m =_d m'; m' =_d m'' \rrbracket \Longrightarrow m =_d m''$

by (*simp add: d-equal-def*)

abbreviation *SRabbr* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TSteps-curry*

($\langle (1\langle -,/- \rangle) \rightarrow / (1\langle -,/- \rangle) \rangle [0,0,0,0] 81$)

where

$\langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle c', m' \rangle \equiv ((c, m), (c', m')) \in SR$

— predicate for strong d-bisimulation

definition *Strong-d-Bisimulation* $:: 'd \Rightarrow 'com \text{ Bisimulation-type} \Rightarrow bool$
where

Strong-d-Bisimulation $d \ R \equiv$
 $(sym \ R) \wedge$
 $(\forall (V, V') \in R. length \ V = length \ V') \wedge$
 $(\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < length \ V. \forall m1 \ m1' \ m2 \ W.$
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 =_d m1'$
 $\rightarrow (\exists W' \ m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle \wedge (W, W') \in R \wedge m2 =_d m2'))$

— union of all strong d-bisimulations

definition *USdB* $:: 'd \Rightarrow 'com \text{ Bisimulation-type}$
 $\langle \approx_{-} \rangle \ [65]$

where

$\approx_d \equiv \bigcup \{r. (Strong-d-Bisimulation \ d \ r)\}$

abbreviation *relatedbyUSdB* $:: 'com \ list \Rightarrow 'd \Rightarrow 'com \ list \Rightarrow bool$

$\langle (- \approx_{-} -) \rangle \ [66, 66] \ [65]$

where $V \approx_d V' \equiv (V, V') \in USdB \ d$

— predicate to define when a program is strongly secure

definition *Strongly-Secure* $:: 'com \ list \Rightarrow bool$

where

Strongly-Secure $V \equiv (\forall d. V \approx_d V)$

— auxiliary lemma to obtain central strong d-Bisimulation property as Lemma in meta logic (allows instantiating all the variables manually if necessary)

lemma *strongdB-aux*: $\bigwedge V \ V' \ m1 \ m1' \ m2 \ W \ i. \llbracket Strong-d-Bisimulation \ d \ R;$

$i < length \ V ; (V, V') \in R; \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle; m1 =_d m1' \rrbracket$

$\implies (\exists W' \ m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle \wedge (W, W') \in R \wedge m2 =_d m2')$

by (*simp add: Strong-d-Bisimulation-def, fastforce*)

lemma *trivialpair-in-USdB*:

$\llbracket \rrbracket \approx_d \llbracket \rrbracket$

by (*simp add: USdB-def Strong-d-Bisimulation-def,*

rule-tac x=\{\llbracket, \llbracket\}\} in exI, simp add: sym-def)

lemma *USdBsym*: $sym \ (\approx_d)$

by (*simp add: USdB-def Strong-d-Bisimulation-def sym-def, auto*)

lemma *USdBqlen*:

$V \approx_d V' \implies length \ V = length \ V'$

by (*simp add: USdB-def Strong-d-Bisimulation-def, auto*)

lemma *USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation*:

Strong-d-Bisimulation $d \ (\approx_d)$

proof (*simp add: Strong-d-Bisimulation-def, auto*)

show $sym \ (\approx_d)$ **by** (*rule USdBsym*)

next

```

fix V V'
show  $V \approx_d V' \implies \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$  by (rule USdBeqlen, auto)
next
fix V V' m1 m1' m2 W i
assume inUSdB:  $V \approx_d V'$ 
assume stepV:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V$ 
assume dequal:  $m1 =_d m1'$ 

from inUSdB obtain R where someR:
  Strong-d-Bisimulation  $d R \wedge (V, V') \in R$ 
by (simp add: USdB-def, auto)

with strongdB-aux stepV irange dequal show
   $\exists W' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2' \rangle \wedge W \approx_d W' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
by (simp add: USdB-def, fastforce)

```

qed

```

lemma USdBtrans: trans ( $\approx_d$ )
proof (simp add: trans-def, auto)
fix V V' V''
assume p1:  $V \approx_d V'$ 
assume p2:  $V' \approx_d V''$ 

let ?R =  $\{(V, V''). \exists V'. V \approx_d V' \wedge V' \approx_d V''\}$ 

from p1 p2 have inRest:  $(V, V'') \in ?R$  by auto

have SdB-rest: Strong-d-Bisimulation  $d ?R$ 
proof (simp add: Strong-d-Bisimulation-def sym-def, auto)
fix V V' V''
assume p1:  $V \approx_d V'$ 
moreover
assume p2:  $V' \approx_d V''$ 
moreover
from p1 USdBsym have  $V' \approx_d V$ 
by (simp add: sym-def)
moreover
from p2 USdBsym have  $V'' \approx_d V'$ 
by (simp add: sym-def)
ultimately show
 $\exists V'. V'' \approx_d V' \wedge V' \approx_d V$ 
by (rule-tac x=V' in exI, auto)
next
fix V V' V''
assume p1:  $V \approx_d V'$ 
moreover

```

```

assume p2:  $V' \approx_d V''$ 
moreover
from p1 USdBeqlen[of V V'] have length V = length V'
  by auto
moreover
from p2 USdBeqlen[of V' V''] have length V' = length V''
  by auto
ultimately show eqLen: length V = length V'' by auto
next
fix V V' V'' i m1 m1' W m2
assume step:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dequal:  $m1 =_d m1'$ 
assume p1:  $V \approx_d V'$ 
assume p2:  $V' \approx_d V''$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V$ 
from p1 USdBeqlen[of V V']
have leq: length V = length V'
  by force

have deq-same:  $m1' =_d m1'$  by (simp add: d-equal-def)

from irange step dequal p1 USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
  strongdB-aux[of d  $\approx_d$  i V V' m1 W m2 m1']
obtain W' m2' where p1concl:
   $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2' \rangle \wedge W \approx_d W' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
  by auto

with deq-same leq USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
  strongdB-aux[of d  $\approx_d$  i V' V'' m1' W' m2' m1']
  irange p2 dequal obtain W'' m2'' where p2concl:
   $W' \approx_d W'' \wedge \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W'', m2'' \rangle \wedge m2' =_d m2''$ 
  by auto

from p1concl p2concl d-equal-trans have tt'':  $m2 =_d m2''$ 
  by blast

from p1concl p2concl have (W, W'')  $\in ?R$ 
  by auto

with p2concl tt'' show  $\exists W'' m2''. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W'', m2'' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $(\exists V'. W \approx_d V' \wedge V' \approx_d W'') \wedge m2 =_d m2''$ 
  by auto
qed

hence liftup:  $?R \subseteq (\approx_d)$ 
  by (simp add: USdB-def, auto)

with inRest show  $V \approx_d V''$ 
  by auto

```

qed

end

end

2.2 Proof technique for compositionality results

For proving compositionality results for strong security, we formalize the following “up-to technique” and prove it sound:

theory *Up-To-Technique*
imports *Strong-Security*
begin

context *Strong-Security*
begin

— define d-bisimulation ‘up to’ union of strong d-Bisimulations

definition *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB* ::

'd ⇒ 'com Bisimulation-type ⇒ bool

where

d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R ≡

$(\text{sym } R) \wedge (\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V') \wedge$
 $(\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1\ m1'\ W\ m2.$
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle \wedge (m1 =_d m1')$
 $\rightarrow (\exists W'\ m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle$
 $\wedge (W, W') \in (R \cup (\approx_d)) \wedge (m2 =_d m2'))))$

lemma *UpTo-aux*: $\bigwedge V\ V'\ m1\ m1'\ m2\ W\ i. \llbracket d\text{-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB } d\ R;$

$i < \text{length } V; (V, V') \in R; \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle; m1 =_d m1' \rrbracket$

$\implies (\exists W'\ m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle$

$\wedge (W, W') \in (R \cup (\approx_d)) \wedge (m2 =_d m2'))$

by (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, fastforce*)

lemma *RuUSdBeglen*:

$\llbracket d\text{-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB } d\ R;$

$(V, V') \in (R \cup (\approx_d)) \rrbracket$

$\implies \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$

by (*auto, simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto,*
rule USdBeglen, auto)

lemma *Up-To-Technique*:

assumes *upToR*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R*

shows $R \subseteq \approx_d$

proof –

define *S* **where** $S = R \cup (\approx_d)$


```

from S-def have  $R \subseteq S$ 
  by auto
moreover
have  $S \subseteq (\approx_d)$ 
proof (simp add: USdB-def, auto, rule-tac x=S in exI, auto,
  simp add: Strong-d-Bisimulation-def, auto)
  — show symmetry
show symS: sym S
proof —
  from upToR
  have Rsym: sym R
    by (simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def)
  with USdBsym have Usym:
    sym (R  $\cup$  ( $\approx_d$ ))
    by (metis sym-Un)
  with S-def show ?thesis
    by simp
qed
next
fix  $V V'$ 
assume inS:  $(V, V') \in S$ 
  — show equal length (by definition)
from inS S-def upToR RuUSdBeqlen
show eqlen:  $\text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
  by simp
next
  — show general bisimulation property
fix  $V V' W m1 m1' m2 i$ 
assume inS:  $(V, V') \in S$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V$ 
assume stepV:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dequal:  $m1 =_d m1'$ 

from inS show  $\exists W' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $(W, W') \in S \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
proof (simp add: S-def, auto)
  assume firstcase:  $(V, V') \in R$ 

  with upToR dequal irange stepV
    UpTo-aux[of d R i V V' m1 W m2 m1']
  show  $\exists W' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
     $((W, W') \in R \vee W \approx_d W') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by (auto simp add: S-def)
next
assume secondcase:  $V \approx_d V'$ 

from USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation upToR
  secondcase dequal irange stepV
  strongdB-aux[of d  $\approx_d$  i V V' m1 W m2 m1']

```

```

    show  $\exists W' m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle \wedge$ 
       $((W, W') \in R \vee W \approx_d W') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by auto
  qed
end
ultimately show ?thesis by auto
qed
end
end

```

2.3 Proof of parallel compositionality

We prove that strong security is preserved under composition of strongly secure threads.

```

theory Parallel-Composition
imports Up-To-Technique
begin

context Strong-Security
begin

theorem parallel-composition:
  assumes eqlen:  $length\ V = length\ V'$ 
  assumes partsrelated:  $\forall i < length\ V. [V!i] \approx_d [V!i]$ 
  shows  $V \approx_d V'$ 
proof -
  define R where  $R = \{(V, V'). length\ V = length\ V'$ 
     $\wedge (\forall i < length\ V. [V!i] \approx_d [V!i])\}$ 
  from eqlen partsrelated have inR:  $(V, V') \in R$ 
  by (simp add: R-def)

  have d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB  $d\ R$ 
  proof (simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto)
    from USdBsym show sym R
    by (simp add: R-def sym-def)
  next
  fix V V'
  assume  $(V, V') \in R$ 
  with USdBqlen show  $length\ V = length\ V'$ 
  by (simp add: R-def)
  next
  fix V V' i m1 m1' RS m2
  assume inR:  $(V, V') \in R$ 
  assume irange:  $i < length\ V$ 
  assume step:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS, m2 \rangle$ 

```

assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$

from *inR* **have** *Vassump*:

$length\ V = length\ V' \wedge (\forall i < length\ V. [V!i] \approx_d [V'!i])$

by (*simp add: R-def*)

with *step dequal USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation irange*

strongdB-aux[*of* $d \approx_d 0 [V!i] [V'!i] m1\ RS\ m2\ m1'$]

show $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$

$((RS, RS') \in R \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$

by (*simp, fastforce*)

qed

hence $R \subseteq (\approx_d)$

by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR* **show** *?thesis* **by** *auto*

qed

lemma *parallel-decomposition*:

assumes *related*: $V \approx_d V'$

shows $\forall i < length\ V. [V!i] \approx_d [V'!i]$

proof –

define *R* **where** $R = \{(C, C'). \exists i\ W\ W'. W \approx_d W' \wedge i < length\ W$
 $\wedge C = [W!i] \wedge C' = [W'!i]\}$

with *related* **have** *inR*: $\forall i < length\ V. ([V!i], [V'!i]) \in R$

by *auto*

have *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB* $d\ R$

proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)

from *USdBsym USDBeqlen* **show** *sym* *R*

by (*simp add: sym-def R-def, metis*)

next

fix *C C'*

assume $(C, C') \in R$

with *USDBeqlen* **show** $length\ C = length\ C'$

by (*simp add: R-def, auto*)

next

fix *C C' i m1 m1' RS m2*

assume *inR*: $(C, C') \in R$

assume *irange*: $i < length\ C$

assume *step*: $\langle C!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS, m2 \rangle$

assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$

from *inR* **obtain** *j W W'* **where** *Rassump*:

$W \approx_d W' \wedge j < length\ W \wedge C = [W!j] \wedge C' = [W'!j]$

by (*simp add: R-def, auto*)

with *irange* **have** $i0: i = 0$ **by** *auto*

from *Rassump i0 strongdB-aux*[of $d \approx_d j W W'$
 $m1 RS m2 m1$]

USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation step dequal

show $\exists RS' m2'. \langle C!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle$
 $\wedge ((RS, RS') \in R \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

qed

hence $R \subseteq (\approx_d)$
by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR* **show** *?thesis*
by *auto*

qed

lemma *USdB-comp-head-tail*:

assumes *relatedhead*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$

assumes *relatedtail*: $V \approx_d V'$

shows $(c\#V) \approx_d (c'\#V')$

proof –

from *relatedtail USdBqlen* **have** *eqlen*: $\text{length } (c\#V) = \text{length } (c'\#V')$
by *force*

from *relatedtail parallel-decomposition* **have** *singleV*:

$\forall i < \text{length } V. [V!i] \approx_d [V'!i]$

by *force*

with *relatedhead* **have** *intermediate*:

$\forall i < \text{length } (c\#V). [(c\#V)!i] \approx_d [(c'\#V')!i]$

by (*auto, case-tac i, auto*)

with *eqlen parallel-composition*

show *?thesis*

by *blast*

qed

lemma *USdB-decomp-head-tail*:

assumes *relatedlist*: $(c\#V) \approx_d (c'\#V')$

shows $[c] \approx_d [c'] \wedge V \approx_d V'$

proof *auto*

from *relatedlist USdBqlen*[of $c\#V c'\#V'$]

have *eqlen*: $\text{length } V = \text{length } V'$

by *auto*

from *relatedlist parallel-decomposition*[of $c\#V c'\#V' d$]

```

have intermediate:
   $\forall i < \text{length } (c\#V). [(c\#V)!i] \approx_d [(c'\#V')!i]$ 
  by auto
thus  $[c] \approx_d [c']$ 
  by force

from intermediate eqLen show  $V \approx_d V'$ 
proof (case-tac V)
  assume Vcase1:  $V = []$ 
  with eqLen have  $V' = []$  by auto
  with Vcase1 trivialpair-in-USdB show  $V \approx_d V'$ 
  by auto
next
  fix c1 W
  assume Vcase2:  $V = c1\#W$ 
  hence Vlen:  $\text{length } V > 0$  by auto

from intermediate have intermediate-aux:
   $\bigwedge i. i < \text{length } V$ 
   $\implies [V!i] \approx_d [V'!i]$ 
  by force

with parallel-composition[of V V'] eqLen
show  $V \approx_d V'$ 
  by blast

```

```

qed
qed

```

```

end

```

```

end

```

3 Example language and compositionality proofs

3.1 Example language with dynamic thread creation

As in [2], we instantiate the language with a simple while language that supports dynamic thread creation via a fork command (Multi-threaded While Language with fork, MWLf). Note that the language is still parametric in the language used for Boolean and arithmetic expressions (*'exp*).

```

theory MWLf
imports Types
begin

```

— SYNTAX

— Commands for the multi-threaded while language with fork (to instantiate 'com)

```

datatype ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom
  = Skip (⟨skip⟩)
  | Assign 'id 'exp
    (⟨:-:=-> [70,70] 70)

  | Seq ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom
    (⟨;-;-> [61,60] 60)

  | If-Else 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom
    (⟨if - then - else - fi [80,79,79] 70)

  | While-Do 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom
    (⟨while - do - od [80,79] 70)

  | Fork ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom (('exp, 'id) MWLfCom) list
    (⟨fork - -> [70,70] 70)

```

— SEMANTICS

```

locale MWLf-semantics =
fixes E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
and BMap :: 'val ⇒ bool
begin

```

— steps semantics, set of deterministic steps from single threads to either single threads or thread pools

inductive-set

```

MWLfSteps-det :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom) TSteps
and MWLfSteps-det' :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom) TSteps-curry
  (⟨(1⟨-,/-⟩) →/ (1⟨-,/-⟩) [0,0,0,0] 81)

```

where

```

⟨c1,m1⟩ → ⟨c2,m2⟩ ≡ ((c1,m1),(c2,m2)) ∈ MWLfSteps-det |
skip: ⟨skip,m⟩ → ⟨[],m⟩ |
assign: (E e m) = v ⇒ ⟨x := e,m⟩ → ⟨[],m(x := v)⟩ |
seq1: ⟨c1,m⟩ → ⟨[],m^⟩ ⇒ ⟨c1;c2,m⟩ → ⟨[c2],m^⟩ |
seq2: ⟨c1,m⟩ → ⟨c1'#V,m^⟩ ⇒ ⟨c1;c2,m⟩ → ⟨(c1';c2)#V,m^⟩ |
iftrue: BMap (E b m) = True ⇒
  ⟨if b then c1 else c2 fi,m⟩ → ⟨[c1],m⟩ |
iffalse: BMap (E b m) = False ⇒
  ⟨if b then c1 else c2 fi,m⟩ → ⟨[c2],m⟩ |
whiletrue: BMap (E b m) = True ⇒
  ⟨while b do c od,m⟩ → ⟨[c;(while b do c od)],m⟩ |
whilefalse: BMap (E b m) = False ⇒
  ⟨while b do c od,m⟩ → ⟨[],m⟩ |
fork: ⟨fork c V,m⟩ → ⟨c#V,m⟩

```

inductive-cases *MWLFSteps-det-cases*:

$\langle \text{skip}, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$
 $\langle x := e, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{if } b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{while } b \text{ do } c \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$
 $\langle \text{fork } c \text{ V}, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m \wedge \rangle$

— non-deterministic, possibilistic system step (added for intuition, not used in the proofs)

inductive-set

MWLFSteps-ndet :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) *MWLFCom*) *TPSteps*
and *MWLFSteps-ndet'* :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) *MWLFCom*) *TPSteps-curry*
 $(\langle 1 \langle -, - \rangle \Rightarrow / (1 \langle -, - \rangle) \rangle [0, 0, 0, 0] \ 81)$

where

$\langle V1, m1 \rangle \Rightarrow \langle V2, m2 \rangle \equiv ((V1, m1), (V2, m2)) \in \text{MWLFSteps-ndet} \mid$
 $\langle ci, m \rangle \rightarrow \langle c, m \wedge \rangle \implies \langle Vf \ @ \ [ci] \ @ \ Va, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle Vf \ @ \ c \ @ \ Va, m \wedge \rangle$

end

end

3.2 Proofs of atomic compositionality results

We prove for each atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is not composed out of other commands) that it is strongly secure if the expressions involved are indistinguishable for an observer on security level d .

theory *Strongly-Secure-Skip-Assign*
imports *MWLF Parallel-Composition*
begin

locale *Strongly-Secure-Programs* =
 $L? : \text{MWLF-semantics } E \text{ BMap}$
 $+ \text{SS?} : \text{Strong-Security } \text{MWLFSteps-det } DA$
for $E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) \text{ Evalfunction}$
and $BMap :: 'val \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
and $DA :: ('id, 'd::\text{order}) \text{ DomainAssignment}$
begin

abbreviation $USdBname :: 'd \Rightarrow ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLFCom } \text{Bisimulation-type}$
 $(\langle \approx_{-} \rangle)$

where $\approx_d \equiv USdB \ d$

abbreviation $\text{relatedbyUSdB} :: ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLFCom } \text{list} \Rightarrow 'd$
 $\Rightarrow ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLFCom } \text{list} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ (**infixr** $\langle \approx_{-} \rangle$ 65)

where $V \approx_d V' \equiv (V, V') \in USdB\ d$

— define when two expressions are indistinguishable with respect to a domain d

definition $d\text{-indistinguishable} :: 'd::order \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$

where

$d\text{-indistinguishable}\ d\ e1\ e2 \equiv$
 $\forall m\ m'. ((m =_d m') \longrightarrow ((E\ e1\ m) = (E\ e2\ m')))$

abbreviation $d\text{-indistinguishable}' :: 'exp \Rightarrow 'd::order \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$

($\langle(- \equiv_d -)\rangle$)

where

$e1 \equiv_d e2 \equiv d\text{-indistinguishable}\ d\ e1\ e2$

— symmetry of d -indistinguishable

lemma $d\text{-indistinguishable-sym}$:

$e \equiv_d e' \Longrightarrow e' \equiv_d e$

by (*simp add: d-indistinguishable-def d-equal-def, metis*)

— transitivity of d -indistinguishable

lemma $d\text{-indistinguishable-trans}$:

$\llbracket e \equiv_d e'; e' \equiv_d e'' \rrbracket \Longrightarrow e \equiv_d e''$

by (*simp add: d-indistinguishable-def d-equal-def, metis*)

theorem $Strongly-Secure-Skip$:

$[skip] \approx_d [skip]$

proof —

define $R0$ where $R0 = \{(V::('exp, 'id)\ MWLfCom\ list, V'::('exp, 'id)\ MWLfCom\ list)\}$.

$V = [skip] \wedge V' = [skip]$

have $uptoR0$: $d\text{-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB}\ d\ R0$

proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)

show $sym\ R0$ by (*simp add: R0-def sym-def*)

next

fix $V\ V'$

assume $(V, V') \in R0$

thus $length\ V = length\ V'$

by (*simp add: R0-def*)

next

fix $V\ V'\ i\ m1\ m1'\ W\ m2$

assume $inR0$: $(V, V') \in R0$

assume $irange$: $i < length\ V$

assume $step$: $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle$

assume $dequal$: $m1 =_d m1'$

from $inR0$ **have** $Vassump$:

$V = [skip] \wedge V' = [skip]$

by (*simp add: R0-def*)

with *step irange* **have** *step1*:
 $W = [] \wedge m2 = m1$
by (*simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(1)*)

from *Vassump irange* **obtain** $m2'$ **where** *step2*:
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [], m2 \rangle \wedge m2' = m1'$
by (*simp, metis MWLFSteps-det.skip*)

with *step1 dequal trivialpair-in-USdB* **show** $\exists W' m2'$.
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((W, W') \in R0 \vee W \approx_d W') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

qed

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add: R0-def*)

qed

theorem *Strongly-Secure-Assign*:

assumes *d-indistinguishable-exp*: $e \equiv_{DA} x e'$
shows $[x := e] \approx_d [x := e']$

proof –

define *R0* **where** $R0 = \{(V, V'). \exists x e e'. V = [x := e] \wedge V' = [x := e'] \wedge e \equiv_{DA} x e'\}$

from *d-indistinguishable-exp* **have** *inR0*: $([x:=e], [x:=e']) \in R0$
by (*simp add: R0-def*)

have *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R0*

proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)

from *d-indistinguishable-sym* **show** *sym R0*

by (*simp add: R0-def sym-def, fastforce*)

next

fix $V V'$

assume $(V, V') \in R0$

thus $\text{length } V = \text{length } V'$

by (*simp add: R0-def, auto*)

next

fix $V V' i m1 m1' W m2$

assume *inR0*: $(V, V') \in R0$

assume *irange*: $i < \text{length } V$

assume *step*: $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, m2 \rangle$

assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$

from *inR0* **obtain** $x e e'$ **where** *Vassump*:

$V = [x := e] \wedge V' = [x := e'] \wedge$
 $e \equiv_{DA} x e'$
by (*simp add: R0-def, auto*)

with *step irange obtain v where step1:*
 $E e m1 = v \wedge W = [] \wedge m2 = m1(x := v)$
by (*auto, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(2)*)

from *Vassump irange obtain m2' v' where step2:*
 $E e' m1' = v' \wedge \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle [], m2' \rangle \wedge m2' = m1'(x := v')$
by (*auto, metis MWLFSteps-det.assign*)

with *Vassump dequal step step1*
have *dequalnext:* $m1(x := v) =_d m1'(x := v')$
by (*simp add: d-equal-def d-indistinguishable-def, auto*)

with *step1 step2 trivialpair-in-USdB show* $\exists W' m2'$.
 $\langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2' \rangle \wedge ((W, W') \in R0 \vee W \approx_d W')$
 $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

qed

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR0 show ?thesis*
by *auto*

qed

end

end

3.3 Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results

We prove compositionality results for each non-atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is composed out of other commands): If the components are strongly secure and the expressions involved indistinguishable for an observer on security level d , then the composed command is also strongly secure.

theory *Language-Composition*
imports *Strongly-Secure-Skip-Assign*
begin

context *Strongly-Secure-Programs*
begin

theorem *Compositionality-Seq*:

assumes *relatedpart1*: $[c1] \approx_d [c1']$
assumes *relatedpart2*: $[c2] \approx_d [c2']$
shows $[c1;c2] \approx_d [c1';c2']$

proof –

define *R0* **where** $R0 = \{(S1, S2). \exists c1 c1' c2 c2' W W'. \\ S1 = (c1;c2)\#W \wedge S2 = (c1';c2')\#W' \wedge \\ [c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2'] \wedge W \approx_d W'\}$

from *relatedpart1 relatedpart2 trivialpair-in-USdB*
have *inR0*: $([c1;c2], [c1';c2']) \in R0$
by (*simp add: R0-def*)

have *uptoR0*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R0*
proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)
from *USdBsym*
show *sym R0*
by (*simp add: sym-def R0-def, fastforce*)

next
fix *S1 S2*
assume *inR0*: $(S1, S2) \in R0$
with *USDBeqlen* **show** *length S1 = length S2*
by (*auto simp add: R0-def*)

next
fix *S1 S2 RS m1 m2 m1' i*
assume *inR0*: $(S1, S2) \in R0$
assume *irange*: $i < \text{length } S1$
assume *S1step*: $\langle S1!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS, m2 \rangle$
assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$
from *inR0* **obtain** $c1 c1' c2 c2' V V'$
where *R0def'*: $S1 = (c1;c2)\#V \wedge S2 = (c1';c2')\#V' \wedge \\ [c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2'] \wedge V \approx_d V'$
by (*simp add: R0-def, force*)

with *irange* **have** *case-distinction1*:
 $i = 0 \vee (V \neq [] \wedge i \neq 0)$
by *auto*

moreover
have *case1*: $i = 0 \implies \\ \exists RS' m2'. \langle S2!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2' \rangle \wedge \\ ((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$

proof –
assume *i0*: $i = 0$

— get the two different sub-cases:
with *R0def' S1step* **obtain** $c3 W$ **where** *case-distinction*:
 $RS = [c2] \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [], m2 \rangle$
 $\vee RS = (c3;c2)\#W \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c3\#W, m2 \rangle$

by (*simp*, *metis MWLfSteps-det-cases(3)*)
moreover
 — Case 1: first command terminates
 {
assume *RSassump*: $RS = [c2]$
assume *StepAssump*: $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [], m2 \rangle$

from *USdBeqlen*[of $[]$] *StepAssump R0def'*
USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation dequal
strongdB-aux[of $d \approx_d i$]
 $[c1] [c1 \uparrow] m1 [] m2 m1 \uparrow i0$
obtain $W' m2'$ **where** *c1c1'reason*:
 $\langle c1', m1 \uparrow \rangle \rightarrow \langle W', m2 \uparrow \rangle \wedge W' = []$
 $\wedge [] \approx_d W' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *fastforce*

with *c1c1'reason* **have** *conclpart*:
 $\langle c1'; c2', m1 \uparrow \rangle \rightarrow \langle [c2 \uparrow], m2 \uparrow \rangle \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by (*simp add: MWLfSteps-det.seq1*)

with *RSassump R0def' i0* **have** *case1-concl*:
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \uparrow \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \uparrow \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by (*simp, rule-tac x=[c2 \uparrow] in exI, auto*)
 }
moreover
 — Case 2: first command does not terminate
 {
assume *RSassump*: $RS = (c3; c2) \# W$
assume *StepAssump*: $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c3 \# W, m2 \rangle$

from *StepAssump R0def' USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation dequal*
strongdB-aux[of $d \approx_d i [c1] [c1 \uparrow] m1$]
 $c3 \# W m2 m1 \uparrow i0$
obtain $V'' m2'$ **where** *c1c1'reason*:
 $\langle c1', m1 \uparrow \rangle \rightarrow \langle V'', m2 \uparrow \rangle$
 $\wedge (c3 \# W) \approx_d V'' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *fastforce*

with *USdBeqlen*[of $c3 \# W V''$] **obtain** $c3' W'$
where *V''reason*:
 $V'' = c3' \# W' \wedge \text{length } W = \text{length } W'$
by (*cases V'', force, force*)

with *c1c1'reason* **have** *conclpart1*:
 $\langle c1'; c2', m1 \uparrow \rangle \rightarrow \langle (c3'; c2') \# W', m2 \uparrow \rangle \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by (*simp add: MWLfSteps-det.seq2*)

from *V''reason c1c1'reason*

USdB-decomp-head-tail[of $c3\ W$]
USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
have $c3aWinUSDB$:
 $[c3] \approx_d [c3'] \wedge W \approx_d W'$
by *blast*

with $R0def'$ **have** *conclpart2*:
 $((c3;c2)\#W, (c3';c2')\#W') \in R0$
by (*auto simp add: R0-def*)

with $i0\ RSassump\ R0def'\ V''reason\ conclpart1$
have *case2-concl*:
 $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by (*rule-tac x=(c3';c2')\#W' in exI, auto*)

}
ultimately
show $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *blast*

qed
moreover
have *case2*: $\llbracket V \neq []; i \neq 0 \rrbracket$
 $\implies \exists RS'\ m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
proof –
assume $Vnonempt$: $V \neq []$
assume $inot0$: $i \neq 0$

with $Vnonempt\ irange\ R0def'$ **have** $i1range$:
 $(i - Suc\ 0) < length\ V$
by *simp*

from $inot0\ R0def'$ **have** $S1ieq$: $S1!i = V!(i - Suc\ 0)$
by *auto*

from $inot0\ R0def'$ **have** $S2!i = V!(i - Suc\ 0)$
by *auto*

with $S1ieq\ R0def'\ S1step\ i1range\ dequal$
USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
strongdB-aux[of $d\ USdB\ d$
 $i - Suc\ 0\ V\ V'\ m1\ RS\ m2\ m1'$]
show $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *force*

qed
ultimately show $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle S2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$

by *auto*
qed

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
by (rule *Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR0* show *?thesis*
by *auto*

qed

theorem *Compositionality-Fork*:

fixes $V::('exp,'id) MWLfCom\ list$
assumes *relatedmain*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$
assumes *relatedthreads*: $V \approx_d V'$
shows $[fork\ c\ V] \approx_d [fork\ c'\ V']$

proof –

define *R0* where $R0 = \{(F1,F2). \exists c1\ c1'\ W\ W'\}$.

$F1 = [fork\ c1\ W] \wedge F2 = [fork\ c1'\ W']$
 $\wedge [c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge W \approx_d W'$

from *relatedmain* *relatedthreads*

have *inR0*: $([fork\ c\ V],[fork\ c'\ V']) \in R0$
by (*simp add: R0-def*)

have *uptoR0*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R0*

proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)

from *USdBsym* **show** *sym R0*

by (*simp add: R0-def sym-def, auto*)

next

fix *F1 F2*

assume *inR0*: $(F1,F2) \in R0$

with *R0-def* *USdBeqlen* **show** $length\ F1 = length\ F2$

by *auto*

next

fix *F1 F2 c1V m1 m2 m1' i*

assume *inR0*: $(F1,F2) \in R0$

assume *irange*: $i < length\ F1$

assume *F1step*: $\langle F1!i,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c1V,m2 \rangle$

assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$

from *inR0* **obtain** $c1\ c1'\ V\ V'$

where *R0def'*: $F1 = [fork\ c1\ V] \wedge F2 = [fork\ c1'\ V'] \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge V \approx_d V'$

by (*simp add: R0-def, force*)

from *irange* *R0def'* *F1step*

have *rew*: $c1V = c1\#V \wedge m2 = m1$

by (*simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(6)*)

from *irange R0def' MWLfSteps-det.fork* **have** *F2step*:
 $\langle F2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c1' \# V', m1 \rangle$
by *force*

from *R0def' USdB-comp-head-tail* **have** *conclpart*:
 $((c1 \# V, c1' \# V') \in R0 \vee (c1 \# V) \approx_d (c1' \# V'))$
by *auto*

with *irange rew inR0 F1step dequal R0def' F2step*
show $\exists c1V' m2'. \langle F2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c1V', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((c1V, c1V') \in R0 \vee c1V \approx_d c1V') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *fastforce*
qed

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR0* **show** *?thesis*
by *auto*

qed

theorem *Compositionality-If*:

assumes *dind-or-branchesrelated*:

$b \equiv_d b' \vee [c1] \approx_d [c2] \vee [c1 \uparrow] \approx_d [c2 \uparrow]$

assumes *branch1related*: $[c1] \approx_d [c1 \uparrow]$

assumes *branch2related*: $[c2] \approx_d [c2 \uparrow]$

shows $[if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi] \approx_d [if\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi]$

proof –

define *R1* **where** $R1 = \{(I1, I2). \exists c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'\ b\ b'. \}$

$I1 = [if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi] \wedge I2 = [if\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi] \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1 \uparrow] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2 \uparrow] \wedge b \equiv_d b'$

define *R2* **where** $R2 = \{(I1, I2). \exists c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'\ b\ b'. \}$

$I1 = [if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi] \wedge I2 = [if\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi] \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1 \uparrow] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2 \uparrow] \wedge$
 $([c1] \approx_d [c2] \vee [c1 \uparrow] \approx_d [c2 \uparrow])$

define *R0* **where** $R0 = R1 \cup R2$

from *dind-or-branchesrelated branch1related branch2related*

have *inR0*: $([if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi], [if\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi]) \in R0$
by (*simp add: R0-def R1-def R2-def*)

have *uptoR0*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R0*

proof (*simp add: d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def, auto*)

from *USdBsym d-indistinguishable-sym*

have *symR1*: *sym R1*

by (*simp add: sym-def R1-def, fastforce*)

```

from USdBsym
have symR2: sym R2
  by (simp add: sym-def R2-def, fastforce)

from symR1 symR2 show sym R0
  by (simp add: sym-def R0-def)
next
fix I1 I2
assume inR0: (I1, I2) ∈ R0
thus length I1 = length I2
  by (simp add: R0-def R1-def R2-def, auto)
next
fix I1 I2 RS m1 m1' m2 i
assume inR0: (I1, I2) ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length I1
assume I1step: ⟨I1!i, m1⟩ → ⟨RS, m2⟩
assume dequal: m1 =d m1'

have inR1case: (I1, I2) ∈ R1
  ⇒ ∃ RS' m2'. ⟨I2!i, m1'⟩ → ⟨RS', m2'⟩ ∧
    ((RS, RS') ∈ R0 ∨ RS ≈d RS') ∧ m2 =d m2'
  proof –
    assume inR1: (I1, I2) ∈ R1

    then obtain c1 c1' c2 c2' b b' where R1def':
      I1 = [if b then c1 else c2 fi]
      ∧ I2 = [if b' then c1' else c2' fi] ∧
      [c1] ≈d [c1'] ∧ [c2] ≈d [c2'] ∧ b ≡d b'
      by (simp add: R1-def, force)
    moreover
    – get the two different cases True and False from semantics:
    from irange R1def' I1step have case-distinction:
      RS = [c1] ∧ BMap (E b m1) = True ∨
      RS = [c2] ∧ BMap (E b m1) = False
      by (simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(4))
    moreover
    – Case 1: b evaluates to True
    {
      assume bevalT: BMap (E b m1) = True
      assume RSassump: RS = [c1]
      from irange bevalT I1step R1def' RSassump have memeq:
        m2 = m1
      by (simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(4))

      from bevalT R1def' dequal have b'evalT:
        BMap (E b' m1') = True
      by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def)

      hence I2step-case1:

```


$\langle \text{if } b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [c1], m1 \rangle$
by (*simp add: MWLfSteps-det.iftrue*)

with *irange dequal RSassump memeq R1def'*
have *case1-concl:*
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

}
moreover
— Case 2: b evaluates to False

{
assume *bevalF: BMap (E b m1) = False*
assume *RSassump: RS = [c2]*
from *irange bevalF I1step R1def' RSassump* **have** *memeq:*
 $m1 = m2$
by (*simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLfSteps-det-cases(4)*)

from *bevalF R1def' dequal* **have** *b'evalF:*
 $BMap (E b' m1') = False$
by (*simp add: d-indistinguishable-def*)

hence *I2step-case1:*
 $\langle \text{if } b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [c2], m1 \rangle$
by (*simp add: MWLfSteps-det.iffalse*)

with *irange dequal RSassump memeq R1def'*
have *case1-concl:*
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

}
ultimately show
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*

qed

have *inR2case: (I1, I2) ∈ R2*
 $\implies \exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
proof —
assume *inR2: (I1, I2) ∈ R2*
then obtain *c1 c1' c2 c2' b b' where R2def':*
 $I1 = [\text{if } b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}]$
 $\wedge I2 = [\text{if } b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}] \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2'] \wedge$
 $([c1] \approx_d [c2] \vee [c1'] \approx_d [c2'])$

by (*simp add: R2-def, force*)
moreover
 — get the two different cases for the result from semantics:
from *irange R2def' I1step have case-distinction-left:*
 $(RS = [c1] \vee RS = [c2]) \wedge m2 = m1$
 by (*simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(4)*)
moreover
from *irange R2def' dequal obtain RS' where I2step:*
 $\langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m1 \rangle$
 $\wedge (RS' = [c1] \vee RS' = [c2]) \wedge m1 =_d m1'$
 by (*simp, metis MWLFSteps-det.iffalse MWLFSteps-det.iftrue*)
moreover
from *USdBtrans have* $\llbracket [c1] \approx_d [c2]; [c2] \approx_d [c2] \rrbracket$
 $\implies [c1] \approx_d [c2]$
 by (*unfold trans-def, blast*)
moreover
from *USdBtrans have* $\llbracket [c1] \approx_d [c1]; [c1] \approx_d [c2] \rrbracket$
 $\implies [c1] \approx_d [c2]$
 by (*unfold trans-def, blast*)
moreover
from *USdBsym have* $[c1] \approx_d [c2] \implies [c2] \approx_d [c1]$
 by (*simp add: sym-def*)
moreover
from *USdBtrans have* $\llbracket [c2] \approx_d [c1]; [c1] \approx_d [c1] \rrbracket$
 $\implies [c2] \approx_d [c1]$
 by (*unfold trans-def, blast*)
moreover
from *USdBsym have* $[c1] \approx_d [c2] \implies [c2] \approx_d [c1]$
 by (*simp add: sym-def*)
moreover
from *USdBtrans have* $\llbracket [c2] \approx_d [c2]; [c2] \approx_d [c1] \rrbracket$
 $\implies [c2] \approx_d [c1]$
 by (*unfold trans-def, blast*)
ultimately show
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
 by *auto*
qed

from *inR0 inR1case inR2case show*
 $\exists RS' m2'. \langle I2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
 by (*auto simp add: R0-def*)
qed

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
 by (*rule Up-To-Technique*)

with *inR0 show ?thesis*

by *auto*

qed

theorem *Compositionality-While:*

assumes *dind*: $b \equiv_d b'$

assumes *bodyrelated*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$

shows $[while\ b\ do\ c\ od] \approx_d [while\ b'\ do\ c'\ od]$

proof –

define *R1* **where** $R1 = \{(S1, S2). \exists c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'\ b\ b'\ W\ W'\}.$

$S1 = (c1; (while\ b\ do\ c2\ od)) \# W \wedge$

$S2 = (c1'; (while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od)) \# W' \wedge$

$[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2'] \wedge W \approx_d W' \wedge b \equiv_d b'\}$

define *R2* **where** $R2 = \{(W1, W2). \exists c1\ c1'\ b\ b'\}.$

$W1 = [while\ b\ do\ c1\ od] \wedge W2 = [while\ b'\ do\ c1'\ od] \wedge$

$[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge b \equiv_d b'\}$

define *R0* **where** $R0 = R1 \cup R2$

from *dind* *bodyrelated*

have *inR0*: $([while\ b\ do\ c\ od], [while\ b'\ do\ c'\ od]) \in R0$

by (*simp* *add*: *R0-def* *R1-def* *R2-def*)

have *uptoR0*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB* *d* *R0*

proof (*simp* *add*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB-def*, *auto*)

from *USdBsym* *d-indistinguishable-sym* **have** *symR1*: *sym* *R1*

by (*simp* *add*: *sym-def* *R1-def*, *fastforce*)

from *USdBsym* *d-indistinguishable-sym* **have** *symR2*: *sym* *R2*

by (*simp* *add*: *sym-def* *R2-def*, *fastforce*)

from *symR1* *symR2* **show** *sym* *R0*

by (*simp* *add*: *sym-def* *R0-def*)

next

fix *W1* *W2*

assume *inR0*: $(W1, W2) \in R0$

with *USDBeglen* **show** $length\ W1 = length\ W2$

by (*simp* *add*: *R0-def* *R1-def* *R2-def*, *force*)

next

fix *W1* *W2* *i* *m1* *m1'* *RS* *m2*

assume *inR0*: $(W1, W2) \in R0$

assume *irange*: $i < length\ W1$

assume *W1step*: $\langle W1!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS, m2 \rangle$

assume *dequal*: $m1 =_d m1'$

from *inR0* **show** $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle W2!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2' \rangle \wedge$

$((RS, RS') \in R0 \vee RS \approx_d RS') \wedge m2 =_d m2'$

proof (*simp* *add*: *R0-def*, *auto*)

assume *inR1*: $(W1, W2) \in R1$

then obtain $c1\ c1'\ c2\ c2'\ b\ b'\ V\ V'$
where $R1def'$: $W1 = (c1;(while\ b\ do\ c2\ od))\#V$
 $\wedge\ W2 = (c1';(while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od))\#V' \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge [c2] \approx_d [c2'] \wedge V \approx_d V' \wedge b \equiv_d b'$
by (*simp add: R1-def, force*)

with *irange have case-distinction1*: $i = 0 \vee$
 $(V \neq [] \wedge i \neq 0)$
by *auto*
moreover
have *case1*: $i = 0 \implies$
 $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle W2!i,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS',m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS,RS') \in R1 \vee (RS,RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$
 $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
proof –
assume *i0*: $i = 0$
– get the two different sub-cases:
with $R1def'$ *W1step obtain* $c3\ W$ **where** *case-distinction*:
 $RS = [while\ b\ do\ c2\ od] \wedge \langle c1,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [],m2 \rangle$
 $\vee RS = (c3;(while\ b\ do\ c2\ od))\#W \wedge \langle c1,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c3\#W,m2 \rangle$
by (*simp, metis MWLSteps-det-cases(3)*)
moreover
– Case 1: first command terminates
{
assume *RSassump*: $RS = [while\ b\ do\ c2\ od]$
assume *StepAssump*: $\langle c1,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle [],m2 \rangle$

from *USdBeqlen[of []] StepAssump R1def'*
USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation dequal
strongdB-aux[of d ≈_d i
 $[c1] [c1'] m1 [] m2 m1']\ i0$
obtain $W'\ m2'$ **where** *c1c1'reason*:
 $\langle c1',m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle W',m2 \rangle \wedge W' = []$
 $\wedge [] \approx_d W' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *fastforce*

with *c1c1'reason have conclpart1*:
 $\langle c1';(while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od),m1 \rangle$
 $\rightarrow \langle [while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od],m2 \rangle \wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by (*simp add: MWLSteps-det.seq1*)

from $R1def'$ **have** *conclpart2*:
 $([while\ b\ do\ c2\ od],[while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od]) \in R2$
by (*simp add: R2-def*)

with *conclpart1 RSassump i0 R1def'*
have *case1-concl*:
 $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle W2!i,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS',m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS,RS') \in R1 \vee (RS,RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$

```

     $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by auto
  }
moreover
  — Case 2: first command does not terminate
  {
    assume RSassump:  $RS = (c3;(while\ b\ do\ c2\ od))\#W$ 
    assume StepAssump:  $\langle c1,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle c3\#W,m2 \rangle$ 

    from StepAssump R1def' USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation dequal
      strongdB-ax[of  $d \approx_d i$ 
        [c1] [c1  $\wedge$ ] m1  $c3\#W$  m2 m1  $\wedge$ ] i0
    obtain  $V''\ m2'$  where c1c1'reason:
       $\langle c1',m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle V'',m2' \rangle$ 
       $\wedge (c3\#W) \approx_d V'' \wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by fastforce

    with USDBeqlen[of  $c3\#W\ V''$ ] obtain  $c3'\ W'$ 
      where V''reason:  $V'' = c3'\#W'$ 
      by (cases  $V''$ , force, force)

    with c1c1'reason have conclpart1:
       $\langle c1';(while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od),m1' \rangle \rightarrow$ 
       $\langle (c3';(while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od))\#W',m2' \rangle$ 
       $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by (simp add: MWLfSteps-det.seq2)

    from V''reason
      c1c1'reason USdB-decomp-head-tail[of  $c3\ W$ ]
      USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
    have c3aWinUSDB:
       $[c3] \approx_d [c3'] \wedge W \approx_d W'$ 
    by blast

    with R1def' have conclpart2:
       $((c3;(while\ b\ do\ c2\ od))\#W,$ 
       $(c3';(while\ b'\ do\ c2'\ od))\#W') \in R1$ 
    by (simp add: R1-def)

    with i0 RSassump R1def' V''reason conclpart1
    have case2-concl:
       $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle W2!i,m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS',m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
       $((RS,RS') \in R1 \vee (RS,RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$ 
       $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$ 
    by auto
  }
ultimately
show  $\exists RS'\ m2'. \langle W2!i,m1' \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS',m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $((RS,RS') \in R1 \vee (RS,RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$ 

```

$\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *blast*
qed
moreover
have *case2*: $\llbracket V \neq []; i \neq 0 \rrbracket$
 $\implies \exists RS' m2'. \langle W2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R1 \vee (RS, RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$
 $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
proof –
assume *Vnonempt*: $V \neq []$
assume *inot0*: $i \neq 0$

with *Vnonempt irange R1def' have irange*:
 $(i - \text{Suc } 0) < \text{length } V$
by *simp*

from *inot0 R1def' have W1ieq*: $W1!i = V!(i - \text{Suc } 0)$
by *auto*

from *inot0 R1def' have W2!i*: $W2!i = V!(i - \text{Suc } 0)$
by *auto*

with *W1ieq R1def' W1step irange dequal*
USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation
strongdB-aux[of d USdB d
 $i - \text{Suc } 0 V V' m1 RS m2 m1 \rangle$
show $\exists RS' m2'. \langle W2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R1 \vee (RS, RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$
 $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *force*
qed
ultimately show $\exists RS' m2'. \langle W2!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle RS', m2 \rangle \wedge$
 $((RS, RS') \in R1 \vee (RS, RS') \in R2 \vee RS \approx_d RS')$
 $\wedge m2 =_d m2'$
by *auto*
next
assume *inR2*: $(W1, W2) \in R2$

then obtain *c1 c1' b b' where R2def'*:
 $W1 = [\text{while } b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}] \wedge W2 = [\text{while } b' \text{ do } c1' \text{ od}] \wedge$
 $[c1] \approx_d [c1'] \wedge b \equiv_d b'$
by (*auto simp add: R2-def*)
— get the two different cases:
moreover
from *irange R2def' W1step have case-distinction*:
 $RS = [c1; (\text{while } b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od})] \wedge BMap (E b m1) = \text{True} \vee$
 $RS = [] \wedge BMap (E b m1) = \text{False}$
by (*simp, metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(5)*)
moreover

— Case 1: b evaluates to True

```

{
  assume bevalT: BMap (E b m1)
  assume RSassump: RS = [c1;(while b do c1 od)]
  from irange bevalT W1step R2def' RSassump have memeq:
    m2 = m1
    by (simp,metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(5))

  from bevalT R2def' dequal have b'evalT: BMap (E b' m1')
    by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def)

  hence W2step-case1:
    ⟨while b' do c1' od,m1'⟩
    → ⟨[c1';(while b' do c1' od)],m1'⟩
    by (simp add: MWLFSteps-det.whiletrue)

  from trivialpair-in-USdB R2def' have inWR2:
    ([c1';(while b do c1 od)],
     [c1';(while b' do c1' od)]) ∈ R1
    by (auto simp add: R1-def)

  with irange dequal RSassump memeq W2step-case1 R2def'
  have case1-concl:
    ∃ RS' m2'. ⟨W2!i,m1'⟩ → ⟨RS',m2'⟩ ∧
    ((RS,RS') ∈ R1 ∨ (RS,RS') ∈ R2 ∨ RS ≈d RS')
    ∧ m2 =d m2'
    by auto
}
moreover
— Case 2: b evaluates to False
{
  assume bevalF: BMap (E b m1) = False
  assume RSassump: RS = []
  from irange bevalF W1step R2def' RSassump have memeq:
    m2 = m1
    by (simp,metis MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det-cases(5))

  from bevalF R2def' dequal have b'equalF:
    BMap (E b' m1') = False
    by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def)

  hence W2step-case2:
    ⟨while b' do c1' od,m1'⟩ → ⟨[],m1'⟩
    by (simp add: MWLFSteps-det.whilefalse)

  with trivialpair-in-USdB irange dequal RSassump
  memeq R2def'
  have case1-concl:
    ∃ RS' m2'. ⟨W2!i,m1'⟩ → ⟨RS',m2'⟩ ∧

```

```

      ((RS,RS') ∈ R1 ∨ (RS,RS') ∈ R2 ∨ RS ≈d RS')
      ∧ m2 =d m2'
      by force
    }
  ultimately
  show ∃ RS' m2'. ⟨W2!i,m1'⟩ → ⟨RS',m2'⟩ ∧
    ((RS,RS') ∈ R1 ∨ (RS,RS') ∈ R2 ∨ RS ≈d RS')
    ∧ m2 =d m2'
    by auto
  qed
qed

```

hence $R0 \subseteq \approx_d$
 by (rule Up-To-Technique)

with *inR0* show *?thesis*
 by auto

qed

end

end

4 Security type system

4.1 Abstract security type system with soundness proof

We formalize an abstract version of the type system in [2] using locales [1]. Our formalization of the type system is abstract in the sense that the rules specify abstract semantic side conditions on the expressions within a command that satisfy for proving the soundness of the rules. That is, it can be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these semantic side conditions in order to achieve a type system for a concrete language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions. Obtaining a soundness proof for such a concrete type system then boils down to proving that the concrete type system interprets the abstract type system.

We prove the soundness of the abstract type system by simply applying the compositionality results proven before.

```

theory Type-System
imports Language-Composition
begin

locale Type-System =
  SSP? : Strongly-Secure-Programs E BMap DA
  for E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction

```


and $BMap :: 'val \Rightarrow bool$
and $DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment$
 +
fixes
 $AssignSideCondition :: 'id \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$
and $WhileSideCondition :: 'exp \Rightarrow bool$
and $IfSideCondition ::$
 $'exp \Rightarrow ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom \Rightarrow ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom \Rightarrow bool$
assumes $semAssignSC: AssignSideCondition\ x\ e \Longrightarrow e \equiv_{DA} x\ e$
and $semWhileSC: WhileSideCondition\ e \Longrightarrow \forall d. e \equiv_d e$
and $semIfSC: IfSideCondition\ e\ c1\ c2 \Longrightarrow \forall d. e \equiv_d e \vee [c1] \approx_d [c2]$
begin

— Security typing rules for the language commands

inductive

$ComSecTyping :: ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom \Rightarrow bool$
 ($\vdash_{\mathcal{C}} \rightarrow$)
and $ComSecTypingL :: ('exp, 'id) MWLfCom\ list \Rightarrow bool$
 ($\vdash_{\mathcal{V}} \rightarrow$)

where

$skip: \vdash_{\mathcal{C}} skip \mid$
 $Assign: \llbracket AssignSideCondition\ x\ e \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}} x := e \mid$
 $Fork: \llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c; \vdash_{\mathcal{V}}\ V \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ fork\ c\ V \mid$
 $Seq: \llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c1; \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c2 \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c1; c2 \mid$
 $While: \llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c; WhileSideCondition\ b \rrbracket$
 $\Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ while\ b\ do\ c\ od \mid$
 $If: \llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c1; \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c2; IfSideCondition\ b\ c1\ c2 \rrbracket$
 $\Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi \mid$
 $Parallel: \llbracket \forall i < length\ V. \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ V!i \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{V}}\ V$

inductive-cases *parallel-cases*:

$\vdash_{\mathcal{V}}\ V$

— soundness proof of abstract type system

theorem *ComSecTyping-single-is-sound*:

$\vdash_{\mathcal{C}}\ c \Longrightarrow Strongly-Secure\ [c]$

by (*induct rule*: $ComSecTyping-ComSecTypingL.inducts(1)$)

[*of - - Strongly-Secure*],

auto simp add: Strongly-Secure-def,

metis Strongly-Secure-Skip,

metis Strongly-Secure-Assign semAssignSC,

metis Compositionality-Fork,

metis Compositionality-Seq,

metis Compositionality-While semWhileSC,

metis Compositionality-If semIfSC,

metis parallel-composition)

theorem *ComSecTyping-list-is-sound*:

$\vdash_{\mathcal{V}}\ V \Longrightarrow Strongly-Secure\ V$

by (*metis ComSecTyping-single-is-sound Strongly-Secure-def
parallel-composition parallel-cases*)

end

end

4.2 Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions

As an example, we provide a simple example language for instantiating the parameter *'exp* for the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions.

theory *Expr*

imports *Types*

begin

— type parameters:

— *'val*: numbers, boolean constants....

— *'id*: identifier names

type-synonym (*'val*) *operation* = *'val list* \Rightarrow *'val*

datatype (*dead 'id*, *dead 'val*) *Expr* =

Const 'val |

Var 'id |

Op 'val operation (*('id, 'val) Expr*) *list*

— defining a simple recursive evaluation function on this datatype

primrec *ExprEval* :: (*('id, 'val) Expr*, *'id, 'val*) *Evalfunction*

and *ExprEvalL* :: (*('id, 'val) Expr*) *list* \Rightarrow (*'id, 'val*) *State* \Rightarrow *'val list*

where

ExprEval (*Const v*) *m* = *v* |

ExprEval (*Var x*) *m* = (*m x*) |

ExprEval (*Op f arglist*) *m* = (*f (ExprEvalL arglist m)*) |

ExprEvalL [] *m* = [] |

ExprEvalL (*e#V*) *m* = (*ExprEval e m*)#(*ExprEvalL V m*)

end

4.3 Example interpretation of abstract security type system

Using the example instantiation of the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions, we give an example instantiation of our abstract security type system, instantiating the parameter for domains *'d* with a two-level security lattice.

```

theory Domain-example
imports Expr
begin

```

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

```

datatype Dom = low | high

```

```

instantiation Dom :: order
begin

```

```

definition
less-eq-Dom-def:  $d1 \leq d2 = (if\ d1 = d2\ then\ True$ 
   $\ else\ (if\ d1 = low\ then\ True\ else\ False))$ 

```

```

definition
less-Dom-def:  $d1 < d2 = (if\ d1 = d2\ then\ False$ 
   $\ else\ (if\ d1 = low\ then\ True\ else\ False))$ 

```

```

instance proof

```

```

fix x y z :: Dom
  show  $(x < y) = (x \leq y \wedge \neg y \leq x)$ 
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def less-Dom-def by auto
  show  $x \leq x$  unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by auto
  show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq z \rrbracket \implies x \leq z$ 
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by  $((split\ if-split-asm)+, auto)$ 
  show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq x \rrbracket \implies x = y$ 
    unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by  $((split\ if-split-asm)+,$ 
       $auto, (split\ if-split-asm)+, auto)$ 

```

```

qed

```

```

end

```

```

end

```

```

theory Type-System-example
imports Type-System Expr Domain-example
begin

```

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains.
 — As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

```

consts DA :: ('id,Dom) DomainAssignment
consts BMap :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool'

```

```

abbreviation d-indistinguishable' :: ('id, 'val') Expr  $\Rightarrow$  Dom

```

$\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow bool$
 $(\langle (- \equiv -) \rangle)$
where
 $e1 \equiv_d e2$
 $\equiv \text{Strongly-Secure-Programs.d-indistinguishable ExprEval DA d e1 e2}$

abbreviation $\text{relatedbyUSdB}' :: (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLfCom list$
 $\Rightarrow Dom \Rightarrow (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLfCom list \Rightarrow bool$ (**infixr** $\langle \approx_{-} \rangle$ 65)
where $V \approx_d V' \equiv (V, V') \in \text{Strong-Security.USdB}$
 $(MWLf-semantics.MWLFSteps-det ExprEval BMap) DA d$

— Security typing rules for expressions - will be part of a side condition

inductive
 $\text{ExprSecTyping} :: ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow Dom set \Rightarrow bool$
 $(\langle \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} - : - \rangle)$
where

$\text{Consts} : \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Const } v) : \{d\} \mid$
 $\text{Vars} : \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Var } x) : \{DA\ x\} \mid$
 $\text{Ops} : \forall i < \text{length arglist}. \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{arglist}!i) : (d!!i)$
 $\implies \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Op } f \text{ arglist}) : (\bigcup \{d. (\exists i < \text{length arglist}. d = (d!!i))\})$

definition $\text{synAssignSC} :: 'id \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow bool$

where
 $\text{synAssignSC } x e \equiv \exists D. (\vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : D \wedge (\forall d \in D. (d \leq DA\ x)))$

definition $\text{synWhileSC} :: ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow bool$

where
 $\text{synWhileSC } e \equiv \exists D. (\vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : D \wedge (\forall d \in D. \forall d'. d \leq d'))$

definition $\text{synIfSC} :: ('id, 'val) Expr \Rightarrow (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLfCom$
 $\Rightarrow (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLfCom \Rightarrow bool$

where
 $\text{synIfSC } e c1 c2 \equiv$
 $\forall d. (\neg (e \equiv_d e) \longrightarrow [c1] \approx_d [c2])$

lemma $\text{ExprTypable-with-smallerD-implies-d-indistinguishable}$:

$\llbracket \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : D'; \forall d' \in D'. d' \leq d \rrbracket \implies e \equiv_d e$

proof (*induct rule: ExprSecTyping.induct,*
simp-all add: Strongly-Secure-Programs.d-indistinguishable-def
Strong-Security.d-equal-def, auto)

fix $d!$ **and** $\text{arglist} :: (('id, 'val) Expr) list$ **and** $f :: 'val list \Rightarrow 'val$

and $m1 :: ('id, 'val) State$ **and** $m2 :: ('id, 'val) State$

assume $\text{main} : \forall i < \text{length arglist}. \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} \text{arglist}!i : d!!i \wedge$

$((\forall d' \in (d!!i). d' \leq d) \longrightarrow$

$(\forall m m'. (\forall x. DA\ x \leq d \longrightarrow m\ x = m'\ x)$

$\longrightarrow \text{ExprEval} (\text{arglist}!i) m = \text{ExprEval} (\text{arglist}!i) m')$)

assume $\text{smaller} : \forall D. (\exists i < \text{length arglist}. D = (d!!i))$

$\longrightarrow (\forall d' \in D. d' \leq d)$

assume $\text{eqstate} : \forall x. DA\ x \leq d \longrightarrow m1\ x = m2\ x$

from *smaller* **have** *irangesubst*:
 $\forall i < \text{length } \text{arglist}. \forall d' \in (d!!i). d' \leq d$
by *auto*

with *eqstate main* **have**
 $\forall i < \text{length } \text{arglist}. \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) \ m1$
 $= \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) \ m2$
by *force*

hence *substmap*: $(\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist} \ m1) = (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist} \ m2)$
by (*induct arglist, auto, force*)

show $f (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist} \ m1) = f (\text{ExprEvalL } \text{arglist} \ m2)$
by (*subst substmap, auto*)

qed

interpretation *Type-System-example: Type-System ExprEval BMap DA*
synAssignSC synWhileSC synIfSC
by (*unfold-locales, simp add: synAssignSC-def,*
metis ExprTypable-with-smallerD-implies-d-indistinguishable,
simp add: synWhileSC-def,
metis ExprTypable-with-smallerD-implies-d-indistinguishable,
simp add: synIfSC-def, metis)

end

References

- [1] C. Ballarin. Locales and Locale Expressions in Isabelle/Isar. In S. Berardi, M. Coppo, and F. Damiani, editors, *TYPES*, volume 3085 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 34–50. Springer, 2003.
- [2] A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In *Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2000. CSFW-13. Proceedings. 13th IEEE*, pages 200–214. IEEE, 2000.