Σ-protocols and Commitment Schemes

David Butler, Andreas Lochbihler

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Abstract

We use CryptHOL [2] to formalise commitment schemes and Σ-protocols. Both are widely used fundamental two party cryptographic primitives. Security for commitment schemes is considered using game-based definitions whereas the security of Σ-protocols is considered using both the game-based and simulation-based security paradigms. In this work we first define security for both primitives and then prove secure multiple examples namely; the Schnorr, Chaum-Pedersen and Okamoto Σ-protocols as well as a construction that allows for compound (AND and OR) Σ-protocols and the Pedersen and Rivest commitment schemes. We also prove that commitment schemes can be constructed from Σ-protocols. We formalise this proof at an abstract level, only assuming the existence of a Σ-protocol, consequently the instantiations of this result for the concrete Σ-protocols we consider come for free.

Contents

1 Commitment Schemes

A commitment scheme is a two party Cryptographic protocol run between a committer and a verifier. They allow the committer to commit to a chosen value while at a later time reveal the value. A commitment scheme is composed of three algorithms, the key generation, the commitment and the verification algorithms.
The two main properties of commitment schemes are hiding and binding.

Hiding is the property that the commitment leaks no information about the committed value, and binding is the property that the committer cannot reveal their a different message to the one they committed to; that is they are bound to their commitment. We follow the game based approach [12] to define security. A game is played between an adversary and a challenger.

theory *Commitment-Schemes* **imports**
CryptHOL.CryptHOL
begin

1.1 Defining security

Here we define the hiding, binding and correctness properties of commitment schemes.

We provide the types of the adversaries that take part in the hiding and binding games. We consider two variants of the hiding property, one stronger than the other — thus we provide two hiding adversaries. The first hiding property we consider is analogous to the IND-CPA property for encryption schemes, the second, weaker notion, does not allow the adversary to choose the messages used in the game, instead they are sampled from a set distribution.

type-synonym $('vk, 'plain, 'commit, 'state)$ *hid-adv* =
$('vk \Rightarrow (('plain \times 'plain) \times 'state)\ spmf)$
$\times ('commit \Rightarrow 'state \Rightarrow bool\ spmf)$

type-synonym $'commit$ *hid* = $'commit \Rightarrow bool\ spmf$

type-synonym $('ck, 'plain, 'commit, 'opening)$ *bind-adversary* =
$'ck \Rightarrow ('commit \times 'plain \times 'opening \times 'plain \times 'opening)\ spmf$

We fix the algorithms that make up a commitment scheme in the locale.

locale *abstract-commitment* =
fixes *key-gen* :: $('ck \times 'vk)\ spmf$ — outputs the keys received by the two parties
and *commit* :: $'ck \Rightarrow 'plain \Rightarrow ('commit \times 'opening)\ spmf$ — outputs the commitment as well as the opening values sent by the committer in the reveal phase
and *verify* :: $'vk \Rightarrow 'plain \Rightarrow 'commit \Rightarrow 'opening \Rightarrow bool$

and *valid-msg* :: *'plain* ⇒ *bool* — checks whether a message is valid, used in the hiding game
begin

definition *valid-msg-set* = {*m*. *valid-msg m*}

definition *lossless* :: (*'pub-key*, *'plain*, *'commit*, *'state*) *hid-adv* ⇒ *bool*
where *lossless* $\mathcal{A}$ ⟷
((∀ *pk*. *lossless-spmf* (*fst* $\mathcal{A}$ *pk*)) ∧
(∀ *commit* σ. *lossless-spmf* (*snd* $\mathcal{A}$ *commit* σ)))

The correct game runs the three algorithms that make up commitment schemes and outputs the output of the verification algorithm.

definition *correct-game* :: *'plain* ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *correct-game m* = *do* {
(*ck*, *vk*) ← *key-gen*;
(*c*,*d*) ← *commit ck m*;
return-spmf (*verify vk m c d*)}

lemma ⟦ *lossless-spmf key-gen*; *lossless-spmf TI*;
⋀*pk m*. *valid-msg m* ⟹ *lossless-spmf* (*commit pk m*) ⟧
⟹ *valid-msg m* ⟹ *lossless-spmf* (*correct-game m*)
by(*simp add*: *lossless-def correct-game-def split-def Let-def*)

definition *correct* **where** *correct* ≡ (∀ *m*. *valid-msg m* ⟶ *spmf* (*correct-game m*) *True* = *1*)

The hiding property is defined using the hiding game. Here the adversary is asked to output two messages, the challenger flips a coin to decide which message to commit and hand to the adversary. The adversary's challenge is to guess which commitment it was handed. Note we must check the two messages outputted by the adversary are valid.

primrec *hiding-game-ind-cpa* :: (*'vk*, *'plain*, *'commit*, *'state*) *hid-adv* ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *hiding-game-ind-cpa* ($\mathcal{A}$*1*, $\mathcal{A}$*2*) = *TRY do* {
(*ck*, *vk*) ← *key-gen*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}$*1 vk*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
(*c*,*d*) ← *commit ck* (*if b then m0 else m1*);
b' :: *bool* ← $\mathcal{A}$*2 c* σ;
return-spmf (*b'* = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*

The adversary wins the game if $b = b'$.

lemma *lossless-hiding-game*:
⟦ *lossless* $\mathcal{A}$; *lossless-spmf key-gen*;
⋀*pk plain*. *valid-msg plain* ⟹ *lossless-spmf* (*commit pk plain*) ⟧
⟹ *lossless-spmf* (*hiding-game-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$)
by(*auto simp add*: *lossless-def hiding-game-ind-cpa-def split-def Let-def*)

To define security we consider the advantage an adversary has of winning the game over a tossing a coin to determine their output.

definition *hiding-advantage-ind-cpa* :: (*'vk*, *'plain*, *'commit*, *'state*) *hid-adv* ⇒ *real*
  where *hiding-advantage-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$ ≡ |*spmf* (*hiding-game-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$) *True* − *1/2*|

definition *perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* :: (*'vk*, *'plain*, *'commit*, *'state*) *hid-adv* ⇒ *bool*
  where *perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$ ≡ (*hiding-advantage-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$ = *0*)

The binding game challenges an adversary to bind two messages to the same committed value. Both opening values and messages are verified with respect to the same committed value, the adversary wins if the game outputs true. We must check some conditions of the adversaries output are met; we will always require that $m \neq m'$, other conditions will be dependent on the protocol for example we may require group or field membership.

definition *bind-game* :: (*'ck*, *'plain*, *'commit*, *'opening*) *bind-adversary* ⇒ *bool spmf*
  where *bind-game* $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
  (*ck*, *vk*) ← *key-gen*;
  (*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ *ck*;
  - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*m* ≠ *m'* ∧ *valid-msg m* ∧ *valid-msg m'*);
  let b = *verify vk m c d*;
  let b' = *verify vk m' c d'*;
  return-spmf (*b* ∧ *b'*)} *ELSE return-spmf False*

We proof the binding game is equivalent to the following game which is easier to work with. In particular we assert b and b' in the game and return True.

lemma *bind-game-alt-def*:
  bind-game $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
  (*ck*, *vk*) ← *key-gen*;
  (*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ *ck*;
  - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*m* ≠ *m'* ∧ *valid-msg m* ∧ *valid-msg m'*);
  let b = *verify vk m c d*;
  let b' = *verify vk m' c d'*;
  - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*b* ∧ *b'*);
  return-spmf True} *ELSE return-spmf False*
  (**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof −
  have *?lhs* = *TRY do* {
    (*ck*, *vk*) ← *key-gen*;
    TRY do {
      (*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ *ck*;
      TRY do {
        - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*m* ≠ *m'* ∧ *valid-msg m* ∧ *valid-msg m'*);
        TRY return-spmf (*verify vk m c d* ∧ *verify vk m' c d'*) *ELSE return-spmf False*
      } *ELSE return-spmf False*

```
    } ELSE return-spmf False
  } ELSE return-spmf False
  unfolding split-def bind-game-def
  by(fold try-bind-spmf-lossless2[OF lossless-return-spmf]) simp
 also have ... = TRY do {
    (ck, vk) ← key-gen;
    TRY do {
      (c, m, d, m', d') ← 𝒜 ck;
      TRY do {
        - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
        TRY do {
          - :: unit ← assert-spmf (verify vk m c d ∧ verify vk m' c d');
          return-spmf True
        } ELSE return-spmf False
      } ELSE return-spmf False
    } ELSE return-spmf False
  } ELSE return-spmf False
  by(auto simp add: try-bind-assert-spmf try-spmf-return-spmf1 intro!: try-spmf-cong
bind-spmf-cong)
 also have ... = ?rhs
  unfolding split-def Let-def
  by(fold try-bind-spmf-lossless2[OF lossless-return-spmf]) simp
 finally show ?thesis .
qed

lemma lossless-binding-game: lossless-spmf (bind-game 𝒜)
 by (simp add: bind-game-def)

definition bind-advantage :: ('ck, 'plain, 'commit, 'opening) bind-adversary ⇒ real
 where bind-advantage 𝒜 ≡ spmf (bind-game 𝒜) True

end

end
theory Cyclic-Group-Ext imports
 CryptHOL.CryptHOL
 HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
begin

context cyclic-group begin

lemma generator-pow-order: g [^] order G = 1
proof(cases order G > 0)
 case True
 hence fin: finite (carrier G) by(simp add: order-gt-0-iff-finite)
 then have [symmetric]: (λx. x ⊗ g) ` carrier G = carrier G
  by(rule endo-inj-surj)(auto simp add: inj-on-multc)
 then have carrier G = (λ n. g [^] Suc n) ` {..<order G} using fin
  by(simp add: carrier-conv-generator image-image)
```

then obtain n **where** n: $\mathbf{1} = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ Suc\ n\ n < order\ G$ **by** *auto*
have $n = order\ G - 1$ **using** n *inj-onD*[*OF inj-on-generator*, *of 0 Suc n*] **by** *fastforce*
with *True n* **show** *?thesis* **by** *auto*
qed *simp*

lemma *generator-pow-mult-order*: $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (order\ G * order\ G) = \mathbf{1}$
using *generator-pow-order*
by (*metis generator-closed nat-pow-one nat-pow-pow*)

lemma *pow-generator-mod*: $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (k\ mod\ order\ G) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k$
proof(*cases order G > 0*)
case *True*
obtain n **where** n: $k = n * order\ G + k\ mod\ order\ G$ **by** (*metis div-mult-mod-eq*)
have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k = (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ order\ G)\ [\widehat{}]\ n \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (k\ mod\ order\ G)$
by(*subst n*)(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow mult-ac*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *generator-pow-order*)
qed *simp*

lemma *pow-carrier-mod*:
assumes $g \in carrier\ G$
shows $g\ [\widehat{}]\ (k\ mod\ order\ G) = g\ [\widehat{}]\ k$
using *assms pow-generator-mod*
by (*metis generatorE generator-closed mod-mult-right-eq nat-pow-pow*)

lemma *pow-generator-mod-int*: $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((k::int)\ mod\ order\ G) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k$
proof(*cases order G > 0*)
case *True*
obtain $n :: int$ **where** n: $k = n * order\ G + k\ mod\ order\ G$
by (*metis div-mult-mod-eq*)
have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k = (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ order\ G)\ [\widehat{}]\ n \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (k\ mod\ order\ G)$
apply(*subst n*)**apply**(*simp add*: *int-pow-mult int-pow-pow mult-ac*)
by (*metis generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mult.commute*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *generator-pow-order*)
qed *simp*

lemma *pow-generator-eq-iff-cong*:
$finite\ (carrier\ G) \Longrightarrow \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ x = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ y \longleftrightarrow [x = y]\ (mod\ order\ G)$
apply(*subst* (*1 2*) *pow-generator-mod*[*symmetric*])
by(*auto simp add*: *cong-def order-gt-0-iff-finite intro*: *inj-onD*[*OF inj-on-generator*])

lemma *power-distrib*:
assumes $h \in carrier\ G$
shows $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (e :: nat) \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e = (\mathbf{g} \otimes h\ )\ [\widehat{}]\ e$
(**is** *?lhs = ?rhs*)
proof−
obtain $x :: nat$ **where** x: $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ x$
using *assms generatorE* **by** *blast*
hence *?lhs* $= \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (e * (1 + x))$

```
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult mult.commute nat-pow-pow)
  also have ... = (g [^] (1 + x)) [^] e
    by (metis generator-closed mult.commute nat-pow-pow)
  ultimately show ?thesis
   by (metis x One-nat-def generator-closed l-one monoid.nat-pow-Suc monoid-axioms
nat-pow-0 nat-pow-mult)
qed

lemma neg-power-inverse:
  assumes g ∈ carrier G
    and x < order G
  shows g [^] (order G − (x :: nat)) = inv (g [^] x)
proof−
  have inv (g [^] x) = g [^] (− int x)
    by (simp add: int-pow-int int-pow-neg assms)
  moreover have g [^] (order G − (x :: nat)) = g [^] (− int x)
  proof−
    have g [^] ((order G − (x :: nat)) mod (order G)) = g [^] ((− int x) mod
(order G))
    proof−
      have (order G − (x :: nat)) mod (order G) = (− int x) mod (order G)
        using assms(2) zmod-zminus1-eq-if by auto
      thus ?thesis
        by (metis int-pow-int)
    qed
    thus ?thesis
    proof −
      have f1: ∀ a. a [^] int 0 = 1
        by simp
      have f2: ∀ n na. ((na::nat) + n) mod na = n mod na
        by simp
        have f3: ∀ a aa. aa ⊗ a [^] int 0 = aa ∨ aa ∉ carrier G
          by force
       have f4: ∀ i a aa. a [^] int 0 ⊗ aa [^] i = aa [^] (int 0 + i) ∨ aa ∉ carrier
G
          by force
        have ∀ n a. a [^] int (n ∗ 0) = a [^] (int 0 + int 0) ∨ a ∉ carrier G
          by simp
        then have f5: ∀ a aa. aa [^] int (order G) = a [^] int 0 ∨ aa ∉ carrier G
            using f4 f3 f2 f1 by (metis int-pow-closed int-pow-int mod-mult-self2
pow-carrier-mod)
        have ∀ n na. int (n − na) = − int na + int n ∨ ¬ na ≤ n
          by auto
        then show ?thesis
            using f5 f3 by (metis assms(1) assms(2) int-pow-closed int-pow-int
int-pow-mult less-imp-le-nat)
      qed
    qed
  ultimately show ?thesis by simp
```

qed

lemma *int-nat-pow*: **assumes** $a \geq 0$ **shows** (**g** [^] (*int* (*a* ::*nat*))) [^] (*b*::*int*) = **g** [^] (*a*∗*b*)
using *assms*
proof(*cases a >0*)
case *True*
show *?thesis*
using *int-pow-pow* **by** *blast*
next case *False*
have (**g** [^] (*int* (*a* ::*nat*))) [^] (*b*::*int*) = **1 using** *False* **by** *simp*
also have g [^] (*a*∗*b*) = **1 using** *False* **by** *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *pow-gen-mod-mult*:
shows(**g** [^] (*a*::*nat*) ⊗ **g** [^] (*b*::*nat*)) [^] ((*c*::*int*)∗*int* (*d*::*nat*)) = (**g** [^] *a* ⊗ **g** [^] *b*) [^] ((*c*∗*int d*) *mod* (*order G*))
proof−
have (**g** [^] (*a*::*nat*) ⊗ **g** [^] (*b*::*nat*)) ∈ *carrier G* **by** *simp*
then obtain *n* :: *nat* **where** *n*: **g** [^] *n* = (**g** [^] (*a*::*nat*) ⊗ **g** [^] (*b*::*nat*))
by (*simp add*: *monoid.nat-pow-mult*)
also obtain *r* **where** *r*: *r* = *c*∗*int d* **by** *simp*
have *1*: (**g** [^] (*a*::*nat*) ⊗ **g** [^] (*b*::*nat*)) [^] ((*c*::*int*)∗*int* (*d*::*nat*)) = (**g** [^] *n*) [^] *r* **using** *n r* **by** *simp*
also have *2*:... = (**g** [^] *n*) [^] (*r mod* (*order G*)) **using** *pow-generator-mod-int pow-generator-mod*
by (*metis int-nat-pow int-pow-int mod-mult-right-eq zero-le*)
also have *3*:... = (**g** [^] *a* ⊗ **g** [^] *b*) [^] ((*c*∗*int d*) *mod* (*order G*)) **using** *r n* **by** *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *1 2 3* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *cyclic-group-commute*: **assumes** *a* ∈ *carrier G b* ∈ *carrier G* **shows** *a* ⊗ *b* = *b* ⊗ *a*
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
obtain *n* :: *nat* **where** *n*: *a* = **g** [^] *n* **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
also obtain *k* :: *nat* **where** *k*: *b* = **g** [^] *k* **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
ultimately have *?lhs* = **g** [^] *n* ⊗ **g** [^] *k* **by** *simp*
then have ... = **g** [^] (*n* + *k*) **by**(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
then have ... = **g** [^] (*k* + *n*) **by**(*simp add*: *add.commute*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult n k*)
qed

lemma *cyclic-group-assoc*:
assumes *a* ∈ *carrier G b* ∈ *carrier G c* ∈ *carrier G*
shows (*a* ⊗ *b*) ⊗ *c* = *a* ⊗ (*b* ⊗ *c*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)

proof−
obtain n :: *nat* **where** n: $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ n$ **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
obtain k :: *nat* **where** k: $b = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k$ **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
obtain j :: *nat* **where** j: $c = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ j$ **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
have *?lhs* = $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ n \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ k) \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ j$ **using** $n\ k\ j$ **by** *simp*
then have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (n + (k + j))$ **by**(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult add.assoc*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult n k j*)
qed

lemma *l-cancel-inv*:
assumes $h \in$ *carrier G*
shows $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (a$ :: *nat*$) \otimes$ *inv* $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ a)) \otimes h = h$
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *?lhs* = $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]$ *int a* $\otimes$ *inv* $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]$ *int a*$)) \otimes h$ **by** *simp*
then have ... = $(\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]$ *int a* $\otimes (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (-\ a))) \otimes h$ **using** *int-pow-neg*[*symmetric*]
by *simp*
then have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (int\ a - a) \otimes h$ **by**(*simp add*: *int-pow-mult*)
then have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((0$:: *int*$)) \otimes h$ **by** *simp*
then show *?thesis* **by** (*simp add*: *assms*)
qed

lemma *inverse-split*:
assumes $a \in$ *carrier G* **and** $b \in$ *carrier G*
shows *inv* $(a \otimes b) =$ *inv a* $\otimes$ *inv b*
by (*simp add*: *assms comm-group.inv-mult cyclic-group-commute group-comm-groupI*)

lemma *inverse-pow-pow*:
assumes $a \in$ *carrier G*
shows *inv* $(a\ [\widehat{}]\ (r$::*nat*$)) = (inv\ a)\ [\widehat{}]\ r$
proof −
have $a\ [\widehat{}]\ r \in$ *carrier G*
using *assms* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *assms nat-pow-inv*)
qed

lemma *l-neq-1-exp-neq-0*:
assumes $l \in$ *carrier G*
and $l \neq \mathbf{1}$
and $l = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (t$::*nat*$)$
shows $t \neq 0$
proof(*rule ccontr*)
assume $\neg\ (t \neq 0)$
hence $t = 0$ **by** *simp*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t = \mathbf{1}$ **by** *simp*
then show *False* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *order-gt-1-gen-not-1*:
assumes *order G* > *1*
shows **g** ≠ **1**
proof(*rule ccontr*)
assume ¬ **g** ≠ **1**
hence **g** = **1** **by** *simp*
hence *g-pow-eq-1*: **g** [^] *n* = **1** **for** *n* :: *nat* **by** *simp*
hence *range* (λ*n* :: *nat*. **g** [^] *n*) = {**1**} **by** *auto*
hence *carrier G* ⊆ {**1**} **using** *generator* **by** *auto*
hence *order G* < *1*
by (*metis inj-onD inj-on-generator lessThan-iff g-pow-eq-1 assms less-one neq0-conv*)
with *assms* **show** *False* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *power-swap*: ((**g** [^] (*α0*::*nat*)) [^] (*r*::*nat*)) = ((**g** [^] *r*) [^] *α0*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *?lhs* = **g** [^] (*α0* ∗ *r*) **using** *nat-pow-pow mult.commute* **by** *auto*
hence ... = **g** [^] (*r* ∗ *α0*) **by**(*metis mult.commute*)
thus *?thesis* **using** *nat-pow-pow* **by** *auto*
qed

lemma *gen-power-0*:
fixes *r* :: *nat*
assumes **g** [^] *r* = **1**
and *r* < *order G*
shows *r* = *0*
using *assms inj-onD inj-on-generator* **by** *fastforce*

lemma *group-eq-pow-eq-mod*:
fixes *a b* :: *nat*
assumes **g** [^] *a* = **g** [^] *b*
and *order G* > *0*
shows [*a* = *b*] (*mod order G*)
proof(*cases a* > *b*)
case *True*
have **g** [^] *a* ⊗ *inv* (**g** [^] *b*) = **1**
using *assms* **by** *simp*
hence **g** [^] (*a* − *b*) = **1**
by (*smt True add-Suc-right assms diff-add-inverse generator-closed group.l-cancel-one′ group-l-invI l-inv-ex less-imp-Suc-add nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult*)
hence **g** [^] ((*a* − *b*) *mod* (*order G*)) = **1** **using** *pow-generator-mod* **by** *auto*
thus *?thesis* **using** *gen-power-0*
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
next
case *False*
have **g** [^] *a* ⊗ *inv* (**g** [^] *b*) = **1**
using *assms* **by** *simp*

hence g [^] (*b* − *a*) = **1**
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *False Group.group.axioms*(*1*) *Units-eq add-diff-inverse-nat assms*(*1*) *generator-closed group-l-invI l-inv-ex l-neq-1-exp-neq-0 monoid.Units-l-cancel nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult r-one*)
hence g [^] ((*b* − *a*) *mod* (*order G*)) = **1 using** *pow-generator-mod* **by** *simp*
thus *?thesis* **using** *gen-power-0*
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
qed

end

end
theory *Discrete-Log* **imports**
CryptHOL.CryptHOL
Cyclic-Group-Ext
begin

locale *dis-log* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *'grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
assumes *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: *order* $\mathcal{G}$ > *0*
begin

type-synonym *'grp' dislog-adv* = *'grp'* ⇒ *nat spmf*

type-synonym *'grp' dislog-adv'* = *'grp'* ⇒ (*nat* × *nat*) *spmf*

type-synonym *'grp' dislog-adv2* = *'grp'* × *'grp'* ⇒ *nat spmf*

definition *dis-log* :: *'grp dislog-adv* ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *dis-log* $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
x ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let h = **g** [^] *x*;
x'← $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;
return-spmf ([*x* = *x'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$))} *ELSE return-spmf False*

definition *advantage* :: *'grp dislog-adv* ⇒ *real*
where *advantage* $\mathcal{A}$ ≡ *spmf* (*dis-log* $\mathcal{A}$) *True*

lemma *lossless-dis-log*: ⟦*0* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$; ∀ *h*. *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$ *h*)⟧ ⟹ *lossless-spmf* (*dis-log* $\mathcal{A}$)
by(*auto simp add*: *dis-log-def*)

end

locale *dis-log-alt* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *'grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
and *x* :: *nat*
assumes *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: *order* $\mathcal{G}$ > *0*

begin

sublocale *dis-log*: *dis-log* $\mathcal{G}$
unfolding *dis-log-def* **by** *simp*

definition $g' = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ x$

definition *dis-log2* :: *'grp dis-log.dislog-adv'* ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *dis-log2* $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
$w \leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ w$;
(*w1'*,*w2'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ h;
return-spmf ([$w = (w1' + x * w2')$] (*mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))} *ELSE return-spmf False*

definition *advantage2* :: *'grp dis-log.dislog-adv'* ⇒ *real*
where *advantage2* $\mathcal{A} \equiv$ *spmf* (*dis-log2* $\mathcal{A}$) *True*

definition *adversary2* :: (*'grp* ⇒ (*nat* × *nat*) *spmf*) ⇒ *'grp* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *adversary2* $\mathcal{A}$ h = *do* {
(*w1*,*w2*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ h;
return-spmf (*w1* + x * *w2*)}

definition *dis-log3* :: *'grp dis-log.dislog-adv2* ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *dis-log3* $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
$w \leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let (h,w) = ((**g** [$\widehat{}$] w, g' [$\widehat{}$] w), w);
$w' \leftarrow$ $\mathcal{A}$ h;
return-spmf ([$w = w'$] (*mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))} *ELSE return-spmf False*

definition *advantage3* :: *'grp dis-log.dislog-adv2* ⇒ *real*
where *advantage3* $\mathcal{A} \equiv$ *spmf* (*dis-log3* $\mathcal{A}$) *True*

definition *adversary3*:: *'grp dis-log.dislog-adv2* ⇒ *'grp* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *adversary3* $\mathcal{A}$ g = *do* {
$\mathcal{A}$ (g, g [$\widehat{}$] x)}

end

locale *dis-log-alt-reductions* = *dis-log-alt* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *dis-log-adv3*:
shows *advantage3* $\mathcal{A}$ = *dis-log.advantage* (*adversary3* $\mathcal{A}$)
unfolding *dis-log-alt.advantage3-def*
by(*simp add*: *advantage3-def dis-log.advantage-def adversary3-def dis-log.dis-log-def dis-log3-def Let-def g'-def power-swap*)

lemma *dis-log-adv2*:

shows *advantage2* $\mathcal{A}$ = *dis-log.advantage* (*adversary2* $\mathcal{A}$)
unfolding *dis-log-alt.advantage2-def*
by(*simp add*: *advantage2-def dis-log2-def dis-log.advantage-def dis-log.dis-log-def adversary2-def split-def*)

end

end
theory *Number-Theory-Aux* **imports**
HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
HOL−Number-Theory.Residues
begin

abbreviation *inverse* **where** *inverse x q* ≡ (*fst* (*bezw x q*))

lemma *inverse*: **assumes** *gcd x q* = *1*
shows [*x* ∗ *inverse x q* = *1*] (*mod q*)
proof−
have *2*: *fst* (*bezw x q*) ∗ *x* + *snd* (*bezw x q*) ∗ *int q* = *1*
using *bezw-aux assms int-minus*
by (*metis Num.of-nat-simps*(*2*))
hence *3*: (*fst* (*bezw x q*) ∗ *x* + *snd* (*bezw x q*) ∗ *int q*) *mod q* = *1 mod q*
by (*metis assms bezw-aux of-nat-mod*)
hence *4*: (*fst* (*bezw x q*) ∗ *x*) *mod q* = *1 mod q*
by *simp*
hence *5*: [(*fst* (*bezw x q*)) ∗ *x* = *1*] (*mod q*)
using *2 3 cong-def* **by** *force*
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *mult.commute*)
qed

lemma *prod-not-prime*:
assumes *prime* (*x*::*nat*)
and *prime y*
and *x* > *2*
and *y* > *2*
shows ¬ *prime* ((*x*−*1*)∗(*y*−*1*))
by (*metis assms One-nat-def Suc-diff-1 nat-neq-iff numeral-2-eq-2 prime-gt-0-nat prime-product*)

lemma *ex-inverse*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime* (*e* :: *nat*) ((*P*−*1*)∗(*Q*−*1*))
and *prime P*
and *prime Q*
and *P* ≠ *Q*
shows ∃ *d*. [*e*∗*d* = *1*] (*mod* (*P*−*1*)) ∧ *d* ≠ *0*
proof−
have *coprime e* (*P*−*1*)
using *assms*(*1*) **by** *simp*
then obtain *d* **where** *d*: [*e*∗*d* = *1*] (*mod* (*P*−*1*))

```
    using cong-solve-coprime-nat by auto
  then show ?thesis by (metis cong-0-1-nat cong-1 mult-0-right zero-neq-one)
qed

lemma ex-k1-k2:
  assumes coprime: coprime (e :: nat) ((P−1)∗(Q−1))
    and [e∗d = 1] (mod (P−1))
  shows ∃ k1 k2. e∗d + k1∗(P−1) = 1 + k2∗(P−1)
  by (metis assms(2) cong-iff-lin-nat)
lemma a > b ⟹ int a − int b = int (a − b)
  by simp

lemma ex-k-mod:
  assumes coprime: coprime (e :: nat) ((P−1)∗(Q−1))
    and P ≠ Q
    and prime P
    and prime Q
    and d ≠ 0
    and [e∗d = 1] (mod (P−1))
  shows ∃ k. e∗d = 1 + k∗(P−1)
proof−
  have e > 0
    using assms(1) assms(2) prime-gt-0-nat by fastforce
  then have e∗d ≥ 1 using assms by simp
  then obtain k where k: e∗d = 1 + k∗(P−1)
    using assms(6) cong-to-1′-nat by auto
  then show ?thesis
    by simp
qed

lemma fermat-little-theorem:
  assumes prime (P :: nat)
  shows [x^P = x] (mod P)
proof(cases P dvd x)
  case True
  hence x mod P = 0 by simp
  moreover have x ^ P mod P = 0
    by (simp add: True assms prime-dvd-power-nat-iff prime-gt-0-nat)
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by (simp add: cong-def)
next
  case False
  hence [x ^ (P − 1) = 1] (mod P) using fermat-theorem assms by blast
  then show ?thesis
   by (metis Suc-diff-1 assms cong-scalar-left nat-mult-1-right not-gr-zero not-prime-0
power-Suc)
qed

lemma prime-field:
```

assumes *prime* (*q*::*nat*)
and *a* < *q*
and *a* ≠ *0*
shows *coprime a q*
by (*meson assms coprime-commute dvd-imp-le linorder-not-le neq0-conv prime-imp-coprime*)

end
theory *Uniform-Sampling* **imports**
CryptHOL.CryptHOL
HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
begin

definition *sample-uniform-units* :: *nat* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *sample-uniform-units q* = *spmf-of-set* ({..< *q*} − {*0*})

lemma *set-spmf-sample-uniform-units* [*simp*]:
set-spmf (*sample-uniform-units q*) = {..< *q*} − {*0*}
by(*simp add*: *sample-uniform-units-def*)

lemma *lossless-sample-uniform-units*:
assumes (*p*::*nat*) > *1*
shows *lossless-spmf* (*sample-uniform-units p*)
unfolding *sample-uniform-units-def*
using *assms* **by** *auto*

lemma *weight-sample-uniform-units*:
assumes (*p*::*nat*) > *1*
shows *weight-spmf* (*sample-uniform-units p*) = *1*
using *assms lossless-sample-uniform-units*
by (*simp add*: *lossless-weight-spmfD*)

lemma *one-time-pad′*:
assumes *inj-on*: *inj-on f* ({..<*q*} − {*0*})
and *sur*: *f* ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) = ({..<*q*} − {*0*})
shows *map-spmf f* (*sample-uniform-units q*) = (*sample-uniform-units q*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *rhs*: *?rhs* = *spmf-of-set* (({..<*q*} − {*0*}))
by(*auto simp add*: *sample-uniform-units-def*)
also have *map-spmf*(λ*s*. *f s*) (*spmf-of-set* ({..<*q*} − {*0*})) = *spmf-of-set* ((λ*s*. *f*
s) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}))
by(*simp add*: *inj-on*)
also have *f* ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) = ({..<*q*} − {*0*})
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **by**(*simp*, *simp add*: *sur*, *simp add*: *inj-on*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *rhs* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *one-time-pad*:
assumes *inj-on*: *inj-on f* {..<*q*}
and *sur*: *f* ‘ {..<*q*} = {..<*q*}
shows *map-spmf f* (*sample-uniform q*) = (*sample-uniform q*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *rhs*: *?rhs* = *spmf-of-set* ({..< *q*})
by(*auto simp add*: *sample-uniform-def*)
also have *map-spmf*(λ*s*. *f s*) (*spmf-of-set* {..<*q*}) = *spmf-of-set* ((λ*s*. *f s*) ‘ {..<*q*})
by(*simp add*: *inj-on*)
also have *f* ‘ {..<*q*} = {..<*q*}
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **by**(*simp*, *simp add*: *sur*, *simp add*: *inj-on*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *rhs* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *plus-inj-eq*:
assumes *x*: *x* < *q*
and *x′*: *x′* < *q*
and *map*: ((*y* :: *nat*) + *x*) *mod q* = (*y* + *x′*) *mod q*
shows *x* = *x′*
proof−
have ((*y* :: *nat*) + *x*) *mod q* = (*y* + *x′*) *mod q* ⟹ *x mod q* = *x′ mod q*
proof−
have ((*y*:: *nat*) + *x*) *mod q* = (*y* + *x′*) *mod q* ⟹ [((*y*:: *nat*) + *x*) = (*y* + *x′*)] (*mod q*)
by(*simp add*: *cong-def*)
moreover have [((*y*:: *nat*) + *x*) = (*y* + *x′*)] (*mod q*) ⟹ [*x* = *x′*] (*mod q*)
by (*simp add*: *cong-add-lcancel-nat*)
moreover have [*x* = *x′*] (*mod q*) ⟹ *x mod q* = *x′ mod q*
by(*simp add*: *cong-def*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *map*)
qed
moreover have *x mod q* = *x′ mod q* ⟹ *x* = *x′*
by(*simp add*: *x x′*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *map*)
qed

lemma *inj-uni-samp-plus*: *inj-on* (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + *b*) *mod q*) {..<*q*}
by(*simp add*: *inj-on-def*)(*auto simp only*: *plus-inj-eq*)

lemma *surj-uni-samp-plus*:
assumes *inj*: *inj-on* (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + *b*) *mod q*) {..<*q*}
shows (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + *b*) *mod q*) ‘ {..< *q*} = {..< *q*}
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **using** *inj* **by** *auto*

lemma *samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad*:

shows *map-spmf* ($\lambda b.\ (y + b)\ mod\ q$) (*sample-uniform q*) = *sample-uniform q*
using *inj-uni-samp-plus surj-uni-samp-plus one-time-pad* **by** *simp*

lemma *mult-inj-eq*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x* (*q*::*nat*)
and *y*: $y < q$
and *y'*: $y' < q$
and *map*: $x * y\ mod\ q = x * y'\ mod\ q$
shows $y = y'$
proof−
have $x*y\ mod\ q = x*y'\ mod\ q \Longrightarrow y\ mod\ q = y'\ mod\ q$
proof−
have $x*y\ mod\ q = x*y'\ mod\ q \Longrightarrow [x*y = x*y']\ (mod\ q)$
by(*simp add*: *cong-def*)
moreover have $[x*y = x*y']\ (mod\ q) = [y = y']\ (mod\ q)$
by(*simp add*: *cong-mult-lcancel-nat coprime*)
moreover have $[y = y']\ (mod\ q) \Longrightarrow y\ mod\ q = y'\ mod\ q$
by(*simp add*: *cong-def*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *map*)
qed
moreover have $y\ mod\ q = y'\ mod\ q \Longrightarrow y = y'$
by(*simp add*: *y y'*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *map*)
qed

lemma *inj-on-mult*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x* (*q*::*nat*)
shows *inj-on* ($\lambda\ b.\ x*b\ mod\ q$) $\{..<q\}$
apply(*auto simp add*: *inj-on-def*)
using *coprime* **by**(*simp only*: *mult-inj-eq*)

lemma *surj-on-mult*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x* (*q*::*nat*)
and *inj*: *inj-on* ($\lambda\ b.\ x*b\ mod\ q$) $\{..<q\}$
shows ($\lambda\ b.\ x*b\ mod\ q$) ' $\{..< q\} = \{..< q\}$
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **using** *coprime inj* **by** *auto*

lemma *mult-one-time-pad*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x q*
shows *map-spmf* ($\lambda\ b.\ x*b\ mod\ q$) (*sample-uniform q*) = *sample-uniform q*
using *inj-on-mult surj-on-mult one-time-pad coprime* **by** *simp*

lemma *inj-on-mult'*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x* (*q*::*nat*)
shows *inj-on* ($\lambda\ b.\ x*b\ mod\ q$) ($\{..<q\} - \{0\}$)
apply(*auto simp add*: *inj-on-def*)

using *coprime* **by**(*simp only*: *mult-inj-eq*)

lemma *surj-on-mult'*:
assumes *coprime*: *coprime x* (*q*::*nat*)
and *inj*: *inj-on* (λ *b*. *x*∗*b mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*})
shows (λ *b*. *x*∗*b mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) = ({..<*q*} − {*0*})
proof(*rule endo-inj-surj*)
show *finite* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) **by** *auto*
show (λ*b*. *x* ∗ *b mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ⊆ {..<*q*} − {*0*}
proof−
obtain *nn* :: *nat set* ⇒ (*nat* ⇒ *nat*) ⇒ *nat set* ⇒ *nat* **where**
∀ *x0 x1 x2*. (∃ *v3*. *v3* ∈ *x2* ∧ *x1 v3* ∉ *x0*) = (*nn x0 x1 x2* ∈ *x2* ∧ *x1* (*nn x0 x1 x2*) ∉ *x0*)
by *moura*
hence *1*: ∀ *N f Na*. *nn Na f N* ∈ *N* ∧ *f* (*nn Na f N*) ∉ *Na* ∨ *f* ‘ *N* ⊆ *Na*
by (*meson image-subsetI*)
have *2*: *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∉ {..<*q*} ∨ *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ *insert 0* {..<*q*}
by *force*
have *3*: (*x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ *insert 0* {..<*q*} − {*0*}) = (*x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ {..<*q*} − {*0*})
by *simp*
{ assume *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* = *x* ∗ *0 mod q*
hence (*0* ≤ *q*) = (*0* = *q*) ∨ (*nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ∉ {..<*q*} ∨ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ∈ {*0*}) ∨ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ∉ {..<*q*} − {*0*} ∨ *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ {..<*q*} − {*0*}
by (*metis antisym-conv1 insertCI lessThan-iff local.coprime mult-inj-eq*) **}**
moreover
{ assume *0* ≠ *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q*
moreover
{ assume *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ *insert 0* {..<*q*} ∧ *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∉ {*0*}
hence (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ⊆ {..<*q*} − {*0*}
using *3 1* **by** (*meson Diff-iff*) **}**
ultimately have (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ⊆ {..<*q*} − {*0*} ∨ (*0* ≤ *q*) = (*0* = *q*)
using *2* **by** (*metis antisym-conv1 lessThan-iff mod-less-divisor singletonD*) **}**
ultimately have (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ⊆ {..<*q*} − {*0*} ∨ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ∉ {..<*q*} − {*0*} ∨ *x* ∗ *nn* ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) *mod q* ∈ {..<*q*} − {*0*}
by *force*
thus (λ*n*. *x* ∗ *n mod q*) ‘ ({..<*q*} − {*0*}) ⊆ {..<*q*} − {*0*}

```
    using 1 by meson
  qed
  show inj-on (λb. x * b mod q) ({..<q} - {0})
    using inj by blast
qed

lemma mult-one-time-pad':
  assumes coprime: coprime x q
 shows map-spmf (λ b. x*b mod q) (sample-uniform-units q) = sample-uniform-units
q
  using inj-on-mult' surj-on-mult' one-time-pad' coprime by simp



lemma samp-uni-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
    and x': x' < q
    and y': y' < q
    and map: (y + x * x') mod q = (y + x * y') mod q
  shows x' = y'
proof−
  have (y + x * x') mod q = (y + x * y') mod q ⟹ x' mod q = y' mod q
  proof−
  have (y + x * x') mod q = (y + x * y') mod q ⟹ [y + x*x' = y + x *y'] (mod
q)
    using cong-def by blast
  moreover have [y + x*x' = y + x *y'] (mod q) ⟹ [x' = y'] (mod q)
    by(simp add: cong-add-lcancel-nat)(simp add: coprime cong-mult-lcancel-nat)
  ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: cong-def map)
  qed
  moreover have x' mod q = y' mod q ⟹ x' = y'
    by(simp add: x' y')
  ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: map)
qed

lemma inj-on-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
  shows inj-on (λ b. (y + x*b) mod q) {..<q}
  apply(auto simp add: inj-on-def)
  using coprime by(simp only: samp-uni-add-mult)

lemma surj-on-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
    and inj: inj-on (λ b. (y + x*b) mod q) {..<q}
  shows (λ b. (y + x*b) mod q) ‘ {..< q} = {..< q}
  apply(rule endo-inj-surj) using coprime inj by auto

lemma add-mult-one-time-pad:
  assumes coprime: coprime x q
```

shows *map-spmf* (λ *b*. (*y* + *x*∗*b*) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*) = (*sample-uniform q*)
using *inj-on-add-mult surj-on-add-mult one-time-pad coprime* **by** *simp*

lemma *inj-on-minus*: *inj-on* (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + (*q* − *b*)) *mod q*) {..<*q*}
proof(*unfold inj-on-def*; *auto*)
fix *x* :: *nat* **and** *y′* :: *nat*
assume *x*: *x* < *q*
assume *y′*: *y′* < *q*
assume *map*: (*y* + *q* − *x*) *mod q* = (*y* + *q* − *y′*) *mod q*
have ∀ *n na p*. ∃ *nb*. ∀ *nc nd pa*. (¬ (*nc*::*nat*) < *nd* ∨ ¬ *pa* (*nc* − *nd*) ∨ *pa 0*) ∧ (¬ *p* (*0*::*nat*) ∨ *p* (*n* − *na*) ∨ *na* + *nb* = *n*)
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *nat-diff-split*)
hence ¬ *y* < *y′* − *q* ∧ ¬ *y* < *x* − *q*
using *y′ x* **by** (*metis add.commute less-diff-conv not-add-less2*)
hence ∃ *n*. (*y′* + *n*) *mod q* = (*n* + *x*) *mod q*
using *map* **by** (*metis add.commute add-diff-inverse-nat less-diff-conv mod-add-left-eq*)
thus *x* = *y′*
by (*metis plus-inj-eq x y′ add.commute*)
qed

lemma *surj-on-minus*:
assumes *inj*: *inj-on* (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + (*q* − *b*)) *mod q*) {..<*q*}
shows (λ(*b* :: *nat*). (*y* + (*q* − *b*)) *mod q*) ‘ {..< *q*} = {..< *q*}
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **using** *inj* **by** *auto*

lemma *samp-uni-minus-one-time-pad*:
shows *map-spmf*(λ *b*. (*y* + (*q* − *b*)) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*) = *sample-uniform q*
using *inj-on-minus surj-on-minus one-time-pad* **by** *simp*

lemma *not-coin-spmf*: *map-spmf* (λ *a*. ¬ *a*) *coin-spmf* = *coin-spmf*
proof−
have *inj-on Not* {*True*, *False*}
by *simp*
moreover have *Not* ‘ {*True*, *False*} = {*True*, *False*}
by *auto*
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *one-time-pad*
by (*simp add*: *UNIV-bool*)
qed

lemma *xor-uni-samp*: *map-spmf*(λ *b*. *y* ⊕ *b*) (*coin-spmf*) = *map-spmf*(λ *b*. *b*) (*coin-spmf*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *rhs*: *?rhs* = *spmf-of-set* {*True*, *False*}
by (*simp add*: *UNIV-bool insert-commute*)

also have *map-spmf*(λ *b*. *y* ⊕ *b*) (*spmf-of-set* {*True*, *False*}) = *spmf-of-set*((λ *b*. *y* ⊕ *b*) ‘ {*True*, *False*})
by (*simp add*: *xor-def*)
also have (λ *b*. *xor y b*) ‘ {*True*, *False*} = {*True*, *False*}
using *xor-def* **by** *auto*
finally show *?thesis* **using** *rhs* **by**(*simp*)
qed

lemma *ped-inv-mapping*:
assumes (*a*::*nat*) < *q*
and [*m* ≠ *0*] (*mod q*)
shows *map-spmf* (λ *d*. (*d* + *a* ∗ (*m*::*nat*)) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*) = *map-spmf* (λ *d*. (*d* + *q* ∗ *m* − *a* ∗ *m*) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *ineq*: *q* ∗ *m* − *a* ∗ *m* > *0*
using *assms gr0I* **by** *force*
have *?lhs* = *map-spmf* (λ *d*. (*a* ∗ *m* + *d*) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*)
using *add.commute* **by** *metis*
also have ... = *sample-uniform q*
using *samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad* **by** *simp*
also have ... = *map-spmf* (λ *d*. ((*q* ∗ *m* − *a* ∗ *m*) + *d*) *mod q*) (*sample-uniform q*)
using *ineq samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad* **by** *metis*
ultimately show *?thesis*
using *add.commute ineq*
by (*simp add*: *Groups.add-ac*(*2*))
qed

end

1.2 Pedersen Commitment Scheme

The Pedersen commitment scheme [8] is a commitment scheme based on a cyclic group. We use the construction of cyclic groups from CryptHOL to formalise the commitment scheme. We prove perfect hiding and computational binding, with a reduction to the discrete log problem. We a proof of the Pedersen commitment scheme is realised in the instantiation of the Schnorr Σ-protocol with the general construction of commitment schemes from Σ-protocols. The commitment scheme that is realised there however take the inverse of the message in the commitment phase due to the construction of the simulator in the Σ-protocol proof. The two schemes are in some way equal however as we do not have a well defined notion of equality for commitment schemes we keep this section of the formalisation. This also serves as reference to the formal proof of the Pedersen commitment scheme we provide in [5].

theory *Pedersen* **imports**

Commitment-Schemes
HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale *pedersen-base* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *'grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
assumes *prime-order*: *prime* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)
begin

lemma *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: *order* $\mathcal{G} > 0$
by (*simp add*: *prime-gt-0-nat prime-order*)

type-synonym *'grp' ck* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *'grp' vk* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *plain* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' commit* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *opening* = *nat*

definition *key-gen* :: (*'grp ck* × *'grp vk*) *spmf*
where
key-gen = *do* {
x :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let h = **g** [^] *x*;
return-spmf (*h*, *h*)
}

definition *commit* :: *'grp ck* ⇒ *plain* ⇒ (*'grp commit* × *opening*) *spmf*
where
commit ck m = *do* {
d :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let c = (**g** [^] *d*) ⊗ (*ck* [^] *m*);
return-spmf (*c*,*d*)
}

definition *commit-inv* :: *'grp ck* ⇒ *plain* ⇒ (*'grp commit* × *opening*) *spmf*
where
commit-inv ck m = *do* {
d :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let c = (**g** [^] *d*) ⊗ (*inv ck* [^] *m*);
return-spmf (*c*,*d*)
}

definition *verify* :: *'grp vk* ⇒ *plain* ⇒ *'grp commit* ⇒ *opening* ⇒ *bool*
where
verify v-key m c d = (*c* = (**g** [^] *d* ⊗ *v-key* [^] *m*))

definition *valid-msg* :: *plain* ⇒ *bool*
  where *valid-msg msg* ≡ (*msg* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

definition *dis-log-*$\mathcal{A}$ :: (*'grp ck*, *plain*, *'grp commit*, *opening*) *bind-adversary* ⇒ *'grp ck* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *dis-log-*$\mathcal{A}$ $\mathcal{A}$ *h* = *do* {
  (*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;
  - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*m* ≠ *m'* ∧ *valid-msg m* ∧ *valid-msg m'*);
  - :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*c* = **g** [^] *d* ⊗ *h* [^] *m* ∧ *c* = **g** [^] *d'* ⊗ *h* [^] *m'*);
  return-spmf (*if* (*m* > *m'*) *then* (*nat* ((*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ *inverse* (*m* − *m'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *else*
    (*nat* ((*int d* − *int d'*) ∗ *inverse* (*m'* − *m*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)))}

sublocale *ped-commit*: *abstract-commitment key-gen commit verify valid-msg* .

sublocale *discrete-log*: *dis-log* -
  unfolding *dis-log-def* **by**(*simp*)

end

locale *pedersen* = *pedersen-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *mod-one-cancel*: **assumes** [*int y* ∗ *z* ∗ *x* = *y'* ∗ *x*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **and** [*z* ∗ *x* = *1*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
  shows [*int y* = *y'* ∗ *x*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
 by (*metis assms Groups.mult-ac*(*2*) *cong-scalar-right cong-sym-eq cong-trans more-arith-simps*(*11*) *more-arith-simps*(*5*))

lemma *dis-log-break*:
  fixes *d d' m m'* :: *nat*
  assumes *c*: **g** [^] *d'* ⊗ (**g** [^] *y*) [^] *m'* = **g** [^] *d* ⊗ (**g** [^] *y*) [^] *m*
    and *y-less-order*: *y* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
    and *m-ge-m'*: *m* > *m'*
    and *m*: *m* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
  shows *y* = *nat* ((*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
proof −
  have *mm'*: ¬ [*m* = *m'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
    using *m m-ge-m' basic-trans-rules*(*19*) *cong-less-modulus-unique-nat* **by** *blast*
  hence *gcd*: *int* (*gcd* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *1*
    using *assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) *prime-field prime-order* **by** *auto*
  have **g** [^] (*d* + *y* ∗ *m*) = **g** [^] (*d'* + *y* ∗ *m'*)
    using *c* **by** (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
  hence [*d* + *y* ∗ *m* = *d'* + *y* ∗ *m'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
    by(*simp add*: *pow-generator-eq-iff-cong finite-carrier*)
  hence [*int d* + *int y* ∗ *int m* = *int d'* + *int y* ∗ *int m'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
    using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*

from *cong-diff*[*OF this cong-refl*, *of int d* + *int y* ∗ *int m'*]
have [*int y* ∗ *int* (*m* − *m'*) = *int d'* − *int d*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **using** *m-ge-m'*
by(*simp add*: *int-distrib of-nat-diff*)
hence ∗: [*int y* ∗ *int* (*m* − *m'*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) = (*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *cong-scalar-right*)
hence [*int y* ∗ (*int* (*m* − *m'*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))) = (*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *more-arith-simps*(*11*))
hence [*int y* ∗ *1* = (*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *inverse gcd*
by (*smt Groups.mult-ac*(*2*) *Number-Theory-Aux.inverse Totient.of-nat-eq-1-iff* ∗ *cong-def int-ops*(*9*) *mod-mult-right-eq mod-one-cancel*)
hence [*int y* = (*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **by** *simp*
hence *y mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ = (*int d'* − *int d*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* − *m'*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$
using *cong-def zmod-int* **by** *auto*
thus *?thesis* **using** *y-less-order* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *dis-log-break'*:
assumes *y* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and ¬ *m'* < *m*
and *m* ≠ *m'*
and *m*: *m'* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and **g** [^] *d* ⊗ (**g** [^] *y*) [^] *m* = **g** [^] *d'* ⊗ (**g** [^] *y*) [^] *m'*
shows *y* = *nat* ((*int d* − *int d'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*m'* − *m*)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof−
have *m'* > *m* **using** *assms*
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod nat-neq-iff order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis*
using *dis-log-break*[*of d y m d' m'*]*assms cong-sym-eq assms* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *set-spmf-samp-uni* [*simp*]: *set-spmf* (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = {*x*. *x* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$}
by(*auto simp add*: *sample-uniform-def*)

lemma *correct*:
shows *spmf* (*ped-commit.correct-game m*) *True* = *1*
using *finite-carrier order-gt-0-iff-finite*
apply(*simp add*: *abstract-commitment.correct-game-def Let-def commit-def verify-def*)
by(*simp add*: *key-gen-def Let-def bind-spmf-const cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)

theorem *abstract-correct*:

shows *ped-commit.correct*
unfolding *abstract-commitment.correct-def* **using** *correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *perfect-hiding*:
shows *spmf* (*ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$) *True* − *1/2* = *0*
including *monad-normalisation*
proof −
obtain $\mathcal{A}1$ $\mathcal{A}2$ **where** [*simp*]: $\mathcal{A}$ = ($\mathcal{A}1$, $\mathcal{A}2$) **by**(*cases* $\mathcal{A}$)
note [*simp*] = *Let-def split-def*
have *ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa* ($\mathcal{A}1$, $\mathcal{A}2$) = *TRY do* {
(*ck*,*vk*) ← *key-gen*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ *vk*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
(*c*,*d*) ← *commit ck* (*if b then m0 else m1*);
b′ ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *c* σ;
return-spmf (*b*′ = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
by(*simp add*: *abstract-commitment.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
x :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let h = **g** [^] *x*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ *h*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
d :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let c = ((**g** [^] *d*) ⊗ (*h* [^] (*if b then m0 else m1*)));
b′ ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *c* σ;
return-spmf (*b*′ = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
by(*simp add*: *commit-def key-gen-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
x :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let h = (**g** [^] *x*);
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ *h*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
z ← *map-spmf* (λ*z*. **g** [^] *z* ⊗ (*h* [^] (*if b then m0 else m1*))) (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
guess :: *bool* ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *z* σ;
return-spmf(*guess* = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
by(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf o-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
x :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let h = (**g** [^] *x*);
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ *h*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
z ← *map-spmf* (λ*z*. **g** [^] *z*) (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
guess :: *bool* ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *z* σ;
return-spmf(*guess* = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*

```
    by(simp add: sample-uniform-one-time-pad)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    let h = (g [^] x);
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← 𝒜1 h;
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    z ← map-spmf (λz. g [^] z) (sample-uniform (order 𝒢));
    guess :: bool ← 𝒜2 z σ;
    map-spmf((=) guess) coin-spmf} ELSE coin-spmf
      by(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
  also have ... = coin-spmf
    by(auto simp add: bind-spmf-const map-eq-const-coin-spmf try-bind-spmf-lossless2'
scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf)
  ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: spmf-of-set)
qed

theorem abstract-perfect-hiding:
  shows ped-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa 𝒜
proof−
  have spmf (ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa 𝒜) True − 1/2 = 0
    using perfect-hiding by fastforce
  thus ?thesis
   by(simp add: abstract-commitment.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-commitment.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa
qed

lemma bind-output-cong:
  assumes x < order 𝒢
  shows (x = nat ((int b − int ab) ∗ fst (bezw (aa − ac) (order 𝒢)) mod int (order
𝒢)))
          ⟷ [x = nat ((int b − int ab) ∗ fst (bezw (aa − ac) (order 𝒢)) mod int
(order 𝒢))] (mod order 𝒢)
  using assms cong-less-modulus-unique-nat nat-less-iff by auto

lemma bind-game-eq-dis-log:
  shows ped-commit.bind-game 𝒜 = discrete-log.dis-log (dis-log-𝒜 𝒜)
proof−
  note [simp] = Let-def split-def
  have ped-commit.bind-game 𝒜 = TRY do {
    (ck,vk) ← key-gen;
    (c, m, d, m', d') ← 𝒜 ck;
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf(m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    let b = verify vk m c d;
    let b' = verify vk m' c d';
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (b ∧ b');
    return-spmf True} ELSE return-spmf False
    by(simp add: abstract-commitment.bind-game-alt-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat ← sample-uniform (Coset.order 𝒢);
    (c, m, d, m', d') ← 𝒜 (g [^] x);
```

```
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = g [^] d ⊗ (g [^] x) [^] m ∧ c = g [^] d' ⊗ (g [^]
x) [^] m');
    return-spmf True} ELSE return-spmf False
    by(simp add: verify-def key-gen-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat ← sample-uniform (order G);
    (c, m, d, m', d') ← A (g [^] x);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = g [^] d ⊗ (g [^] x) [^] m ∧ c = g [^] d' ⊗ (g [^]
x) [^] m');
    return-spmf (x = (if (m > m') then (nat ((int d' − int d) * (fst (bezw ((m −
m')) (order G))) mod order G)) else
                (nat ((int d − int d') * (fst (bezw ((m' − m)) (order G))) mod order
G)))))} ELSE return-spmf False
    apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)
     apply(auto simp add: valid-msg-def)
     apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
     apply(simp add: dis-log-break)
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
    by(simp add: dis-log-break')
  ultimately show ?thesis
   apply(simp add: discrete-log.dis-log-def dis-log-A-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
    apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
    using bind-output-cong by auto
qed

theorem pedersen-bind: ped-commit.bind-advantage A = discrete-log.advantage
(dis-log-A A)
  unfolding abstract-commitment.bind-advantage-def discrete-log.advantage-def
  using bind-game-eq-dis-log by simp

end

locale pedersen-asymp =
  fixes G :: nat ⇒ 'grp cyclic-group
  assumes pedersen: ⋀η. pedersen (G η)
begin

sublocale pedersen G η for η by(simp add: pedersen)

theorem pedersen-correct-asym:
 shows ped-commit.correct n
  using abstract-correct by simp

theorem pedersen-perfect-hiding-asym:
  shows ped-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n (A n)
    by (simp add: abstract-perfect-hiding)
```

theorem *pedersen-bind-asym*:
shows *negligible* (λ *n*. *ped-commit.bind-advantage n* (*A n*))
$\longleftrightarrow$ *negligible* (λ *n*. *discrete-log.advantage n* (*dis-log-A n* (*A n*)))
by(*simp add*: *pedersen-bind*)

end

end

1.3 Rivest Commitment Scheme

The Rivest commitment scheme was first introduced in [10]. We note however the original scheme did not allow for perfect hiding. This was pointed out by Blundo and Masucci in [3] who alightly ammended the commitment scheme so that is provided perfect hiding.

The Rivest commitment scheme uses a trusted initialiser to provide correlated randomness to the two parties before an execution of the protocol. In our framework we set these as keys that held by the respective parties.

theory *Rivest* **imports**
Commitment-Schemes
HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
CryptHOL.CryptHOL
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale *rivest* =
fixes *q* :: *nat*
assumes *prime-q*: *prime q*
begin

lemma *q-gt-0* [*simp*]: *q* > *0*
by (*simp add*: *prime-q prime-gt-0-nat*)

type-synonym *ck* = *nat* × *nat*
type-synonym *vk* = *nat* × *nat*
type-synonym *plain* = *nat*
type-synonym *commit* = *nat*
type-synonym *opening* = *nat* × *nat*

definition *key-gen* :: (*ck* × *vk*) *spmf*
where
key-gen = *do* {
a :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform q*;
b :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform q*;
x1 :: *nat* ← *sample-uniform q*;

```
    let y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q;
    return-spmf ((a,b), (x1,y1))}

definition commit :: ck ⇒ plain ⇒ (commit × opening) spmf
  where
    commit ck m = do {
  let (a,b) = ck;
  return-spmf ((m + a) mod q, (a,b))}

fun verify :: vk ⇒ plain ⇒ commit ⇒ opening ⇒ bool
  where
    verify (x1,y1) m c (a,b) = (((c = (m + a) mod q)) ∧ (y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod
q))

definition valid-msg :: plain ⇒ bool
  where valid-msg msg ≡ msg ∈ {..< q}

sublocale rivest-commit: abstract-commitment key-gen commit verify valid-msg .

lemma abstract-correct: rivest-commit.correct
 unfolding abstract-commitment.correct-def abstract-commitment.correct-game-def
  by(simp add: key-gen-def commit-def bind-spmf-const lossless-weight-spmfD)

lemma rivest-hiding: (spmf (rivest-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa 𝒜) True − 1/2
= 0)
  including monad-normalisation
proof−
  note [simp] = Let-def split-def
  obtain 𝒜1 𝒜2 where [simp]: 𝒜 = (𝒜1, 𝒜2) by(cases 𝒜)
  have rivest-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa (𝒜1, 𝒜2) = TRY do {
    a :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    y1 ← map-spmf (λ b. (a * x1 + b) mod q) (sample-uniform q);
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← 𝒜1 (x1,y1);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    d ← coin-spmf;
    let c = ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q;
    b' ← 𝒜2 c σ;
    return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
    unfolding abstract-commitment.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def
    by(simp add: commit-def key-gen-def o-def bind-map-spmf)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    a :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    y1 ← sample-uniform q;
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← 𝒜1 (x1,y1);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    d ← coin-spmf;
    let c = ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q;
```

```
    b' ← A2 c σ;
    return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    y1 ← sample-uniform q;
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← A1 (x1,y1);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    d ← coin-spmf;
    c ← map-spmf (λ a. ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q) (sample-uniform q);
    b' ← A2 c σ;
    return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: o-def bind-map-spmf)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    y1 ← sample-uniform q;
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← A1 (x1,y1);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    d ← coin-spmf;
    c ← sample-uniform q;
    b' :: bool ← A2 c σ;
    return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    y1 ← sample-uniform q;
    ((m0, m1), σ) ← A1 (x1,y1);
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0 ∧ valid-msg m1);
    c :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    guess :: bool ← A2 c σ;
    map-spmf((=) guess) coin-spmf} ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
  also have ... = coin-spmf
    by(simp add: map-eq-const-coin-spmf bind-spmf-const try-bind-spmf-lossless2'
        scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf)
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by(simp add: spmf-of-set)
qed

lemma rivest-perfect-hiding: rivest-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa A
 unfolding abstract-commitment.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-commitment.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa-de
 by(simp add: rivest-hiding)

lemma samp-uni-break':
  assumes fst-cond: m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m'
    and c: c = (m + a) mod q ∧ y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q
    and  c': c = (m' + a') mod q ∧ y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q
    and x1: x1 < q
  shows x1 = (if (a mod q > a' mod q) then nat ((int b'− int b) * (inverse (nat
```

```
((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q)) q) mod q)  else
        nat ((int b− int b′) ∗ (inverse (nat ((int a′ mod q − int a mod q) mod q))
q) mod q))
proof−
  have m: m < q ∧ m′ < q using fst-cond valid-msg-def by simp
  have a-a′: ¬ [a = a′] (mod q)
  proof−
    have [m + a = m′ + a′] (mod q)
      using assms cong-def by blast
    thus ?thesis
     by (metis m fst-cond c c′ add.commute cong-less-modulus-unique-nat cong-add-rcancel-nat
cong-mod-right)
  qed
  have cong-y1: [int a ∗ int x1 + int b = int a′ ∗ int x1 + int b′] (mod q)
   by (metis c c′ cong-def Num.of-nat-simps(4) Num.of-nat-simps(5) cong-int-iff)
  show ?thesis
  proof (cases a mod q > a′ mod q)
    case True
    moreover have ‹((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q) ≠ 0›
      by (metis True comm-monoid-add-class.add-0 diff-add-cancel mod-add-left-eq
mod-diff-eq nat-mod-as-int order-less-irrefl)
    moreover have ((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q) < q by simp
    ultimately have ‹coprime (nat ((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q)) q›
     using prime-field [of q ‹nat ((int a mod int q − int a′ mod int q) mod int q)›]
prime-q
      by (simp flip: of-nat-mod of-nat-diff)
    then have gcd: gcd (nat ((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q)) q = 1
      by simp
    hence [int a ∗ int x1 − int a′ ∗ int x1 = int b′− int b] (mod q)
      by (smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-y1 cong-diff cong-diff)
    hence [int a mod q ∗ int x1 − int a′ mod q ∗ int x1 = int b′− int b] (mod q)
    proof −
      have [int x1 ∗ (int a mod int q − int a′ mod int q) = int x1 ∗ (int a − int
a′)] (mod int q)
        by (meson cong-def cong-mult cong-refl mod-diff-eq)
      then show ?thesis
       by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) Groups.mult-ac(2) ‹[int a ∗ int x1 − int
a′ ∗ int x1 = int b′ − int b] (mod int q)› cong-def mod-diff-left-eq mod-diff-right-eq
mod-mult-right-eq)
    qed
    hence [int x1 ∗ (int a mod q − int a′ mod q) = int b′− int b] (mod q)
      by(metis int-distrib(3) mult.commute)
    hence [int x1 ∗ (int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q = int b′− int b] (mod q)
      using cong-def by simp
   hence [int x1 ∗ nat ((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q) = int b′− int b] (mod
q)
      by (simp add: True cong-def mod-mult-right-eq)
    hence [int x1 ∗ nat ((int a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q) ∗ inverse (nat ((int
a mod q − int a′ mod q) mod q)) q
```

$= (int\ b' - int\ b) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q]\ (mod\ q)$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[int\ x1 * (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q)$
$= (int\ b' - int\ b) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q]\ (mod\ q)$
by (*simp add*: *more-arith-simps*(*11*))
hence $[int\ x1 * 1 = (int\ b' - int\ b) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q]\ (mod\ q)$
using *inverse gcd*
by (*meson cong-scalar-left cong-sym-eq cong-trans*)
hence $[int\ x1 = (int\ b' - int\ b) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q]\ (mod\ q)$
by *simp*
hence $int\ x1\ mod\ q = ((int\ b' - int\ b) * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a\ mod\ q - int\ a'\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q)\ mod\ q$
using *cong-def* **by** *fast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *x1 True* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence *aa'*: $a\ mod\ q < a'\ mod\ q$
using *a-a' cong-refl nat-neq-iff*
by (*simp add*: *cong-def*)
moreover have $((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q) \neq 0$
by (*metis aa' comm-monoid-add-class.add-0 diff-add-cancel mod-add-left-eq mod-diff-eq nat-mod-as-int order-less-irrefl*)
moreover have $((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q) < q$ **by** *simp*
ultimately have ‹*coprime* $(nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q$›
using *prime-field* [*of q* ‹$nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ int\ q - int\ a\ mod\ int\ q)\ mod\ int\ q)$›] *prime-q*
by (*simp flip*: *of-nat-mod of-nat-diff*)
then have *gcd*: $gcd\ (nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q = 1$
by *simp*
have $[int\ b - int\ b' = int\ a' * int\ x1 - int\ a * int\ x1]\ (mod\ q)$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-y1 cong-diff cong-diff*)
hence $[int\ b - int\ b' = int\ x1 * (int\ a' - int\ a)]\ (mod\ q)$
using *int-distrib mult.commute* **by** *metis*
hence $[int\ b - int\ b' = int\ x1 * (int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)]\ (mod\ q)$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence $[int\ b - int\ b' = int\ x1 * (int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q]\ (mod\ q)$
using *cong-def* **by** *simp*
hence $[(int\ b - int\ b') * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q = int\ x1 * (int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q\ ]\ (mod\ q)$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(int\ b - int\ b') * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q = int\ x1 * ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q * inverse\ (nat\ ((int\ a'\ mod\ q - int\ a\ mod\ q)\ mod\ q))\ q)]\ (mod\ q)$

by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *cong-def mod-mult-left-eq mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*))
hence ∗: [*int x1* ∗ ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q* ∗ *inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q*)) *q*)
= (*int b* − *int b′*) ∗ *inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q*)) *q*] (*mod q*)
using *cong-sym-eq* **by** *auto*
hence [*int x1* ∗ *1* = (*int b* − *int b′*) ∗ *inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q*)) *q*] (*mod q*)
proof −
have [(*int a′ mod int q* − *int a mod int q*) *mod int q* ∗ *Number-Theory-Aux.inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod int q* − *int a mod int q*) *mod int q*)) *q* = *1*] (*mod int q*)
using *inverse* [*of* ‹*nat* ((*int a′ mod int q* − *int a mod int q*) *mod int q*)› *q*, *OF gcd*]
by *simp*
then show *?thesis*
by (*meson* ∗ *cong-scalar-left cong-sym-eq cong-trans*)
qed
hence [*int x1* = (*int b* − *int b′*) ∗ *inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q*)) *q*] (*mod q*)
by *simp*
hence *int x1 mod q* = (*int b* − *int b′*) ∗ (*inverse* (*nat* ((*int a′ mod q* − *int a mod q*) *mod q*)) *q*) *mod q*
using *cong-def* **by** *auto*
thus *?thesis* **using** *x1 aa′* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *samp-uni-spmf-mod-q*:
shows *spmf* (*sample-uniform q*) (*x mod q*) = *1*/*q*
proof−
have *indicator* {..< *q*} (*x mod q*) = *1*
using *q-gt-0* **by** *auto*
moreover have *real* (*card* {..< *q*}) = *q* **by** *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by(*auto simp add*: *spmf-of-set sample-uniform-def*)
qed

lemma *spmf-samp-uni-eq-return-bool-mod*:
shows *spmf* (*do* {
x1 ← *sample-uniform q*;
return-spmf (*int x1* = *y mod q*)}) *True* = *1*/*q*
proof−
have *spmf* (*do* {
x1 ← *sample-uniform q*;
return-spmf (*x1* = *y mod q*)}) *True* = *spmf* (*sample-uniform q* ⤜ (λ *x1*. *return-spmf x1*)) (*y mod q*)
apply(*simp only*: *spmf-bind*)

```
    apply(rule Bochner-Integration.integral-cong[OF refl])+
  proof −
    fix x :: nat
    have y mod q = x ⟶ indicator {True} (x = (y mod q)) = (indicator {(y mod
q)} x::real)
      by simp
    then have indicator {True} (x = y mod q) = (indicator {y mod q} x::real)
      by fastforce
    then show spmf (return-spmf (x = y mod q)) True = spmf (return-spmf x)
(y mod q)
      by (metis pmf-return spmf-of-pmf-return-pmf spmf-spmf-of-pmf)
  qed
  thus ?thesis using samp-uni-spmf-mod-q by simp
qed

lemma bind-game-le-inv-q:
  shows spmf (rivest-commit.bind-game 𝒜) True ≤ 1 / q
proof −
  let ?eq = λa a' b b'. (=)
    (if (a mod q > a' mod q) then nat ((int b'− int b) * (inverse (nat ((int a mod
q − int a' mod q) mod q)) q) mod q)
     else nat ((int b − int b') * (inverse (nat ((int a' mod q − int a mod q) mod q))
q) mod q))
  have spmf (rivest-commit.bind-game 𝒜) True = spmf (do {
    (ck,(x1,y1)) ← key-gen;
    (c, m, (a,b), m', (a',b')) ← 𝒜 ck;
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf(m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    let b = verify (x1,y1) m c (a,b);
    let b' = verify (x1,y1) m' c (a',b');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (b ∧ b');
    return-spmf True}) True
   by(simp add: abstract-commitment.bind-game-alt-def split-def spmf-try-spmf del:
verify.simps)
  also have ... = spmf (do {
    a' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    b' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    let y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q;
    (c, m, (a,b), m', (a',b')) ← 𝒜 (a',b');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = (m + a) mod q ∧ y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q ∧ c
= (m' + a') mod q ∧ y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q);
    return-spmf True}) True
    by(simp add: key-gen-def Let-def)
  also have ... = spmf (do {
    a'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    b'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    let y1 = (a'' * x1 + b'') mod q;
```

```
    (c, m, (a,b), m', (a',b')) ← 𝒜 (a'',b'');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
    - :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = (m + a) mod q ∧ y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q ∧ c
= (m' + a') mod q ∧ y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q);
    return-spmf (?eq a a' b b' x1)}) True
    unfolding split-def Let-def
    by(rule arg-cong2[where f=spmf, OF - refl] bind-spmf-cong[OF refl])+
      (auto simp add: eq-commute samp-uni-break' Let-def split-def valid-msg-def
cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... ≤ spmf (do {
    a'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    b'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
    (c, m, (a,(b::nat)), m', (a',b')) ← 𝒜 (a'',b'');
    map-spmf (?eq a a' b b') (sample-uniform q)}) True
    including monad-normalisation
    unfolding split-def Let-def assert-spmf-def
    apply(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
    apply(rule ord-spmf-eq-leD ord-spmf-bind-reflI)+
    apply auto
    done
  also have ... ≤ 1/q
  proof((rule spmf-bind-leI)+, clarify)
    fix a a' b b'
    define A where A = Collect (?eq a a' b b')
    define x1 where x1 = The (?eq a a' b b')
    note q-gt-0[simp del]
    have A ⊆ {x1} by(auto simp add: A-def x1-def)
    hence card (A ∩ {..<q}) ≤ card {x1} by(intro card-mono) auto
    also have ... = 1 by simp
    finally have spmf (map-spmf (λx. x ∈ A) (sample-uniform q)) True ≤ 1 / q
      using q-gt-0 unfolding sample-uniform-def
      by(subst map-mem-spmf-of-set)(auto simp add: field-simps)
    then show spmf (map-spmf (?eq a a' b b') (sample-uniform q)) True ≤ 1 / q
      unfolding A-def mem-Collect-eq .
  qed auto
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

lemma rivest-bind:
  shows rivest-commit.bind-advantage 𝒜 ≤ 1 / q
  using bind-game-le-inv-q rivest-commit.bind-advantage-def by simp

end

locale rivest-asymp =
  fixes q :: nat ⇒ nat
  assumes rivest: ⋀η. rivest (q η)
begin
```

sublocale *rivest q η* **for** *η* **by**(*simp add*: *rivest*)

theorem *rivest-correct*:
shows *rivest-commit.correct n*
using *abstract-correct* **by** *simp*

theorem *rivest-perfect-hiding-asym*:
assumes *lossless-𝒜*: *rivest-commit.lossless* (*𝒜 n*)
shows *rivest-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n* (*𝒜 n*)
by (*simp add*: *lossless-𝒜 rivest-perfect-hiding*)

theorem *rivest-binding-asym*:
assumes *negligible* (*λn. 1 / (q n)*)
shows *negligible* (*λn. rivest-commit.bind-advantage n* (*𝒜 n*))
using *negligible-le rivest-bind assms rivest-commit.bind-advantage-def* **by** *auto*

end

end

2 Σ-Protocols

Σ-protocols were first introduced as an abstract notion by Cramer [9]. We point the reader to [7] for a good introduction to the primitive as well as informal proofs of many of the constructions we formalise in this work. In particular the construction of commitment schemes from Σ-protocols and the construction of compound AND and OR statements.

In this section we define Σ-protocols then provide a general proof that they can be used to construct commitment schemes. Defining security for Σ-protocols uses a mixture of the game-based and simulation-based paradigms. The honest verifier zero knowledge property is considered using simulation-based proof, thus we follow the follow the simulation-based formalisation of [1] and [4].

2.1 Defining Σ-protocols

theory *Sigma-Protocols* **imports**
CryptHOL.CryptHOL
Commitment-Schemes
begin

type-synonym (*'msg'*, *'challenge'*, *'response'*) *conv-tuple* = (*'msg'* × *'challenge'* × *'response'*)

type-synonym (*'msg'*,*'response'*) *sim-out* = (*'msg'* × *'response'*)

type-synonym (*'pub-input'*, *'msg'*, *'challenge'*, *'response'*, *'witness'*) *prover-adversary*

$= $ *'pub-input'* $\Rightarrow$ (*'msg'*, *'challenge'*, *'response'*) *conv-tuple*
$\Rightarrow$ (*'msg'*, *'challenge'*, *'response'*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$ *'witness' spmf*

locale Σ-*protocols-base* =
fixes *init* :: *'pub-input* $\Rightarrow$ *'witness* $\Rightarrow$ (*'rand* $\times$ *'msg*) *spmf* — initial message in Σ-protocol
and *response* :: *'rand* $\Rightarrow$ *'witness* $\Rightarrow$ *'challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *'response spmf*
and *check* :: *'pub-input* $\Rightarrow$ *'msg* $\Rightarrow$ *'challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *'response* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
and *Rel* :: (*'pub-input* $\times$ *'witness*) *set* — The relation the Σ protocol is considered over
and *S-raw* :: *'pub-input* $\Rightarrow$ *'challenge* $\Rightarrow$ (*'msg*, *'response*) *sim-out spmf* — Simulator for the HVZK property
and $\mathcal{A}ss$ :: (*'pub-input*, *'msg*, *'challenge*, *'response*, *'witness*) *prover-adversary* — Special soundness adversary
and *challenge-space* :: *'challenge set* — The set of valid challenges
and *valid-pub* :: *'pub-input set*
assumes *domain-subset-valid-pub*: *Domain Rel* $\subseteq$ *valid-pub*
begin

lemma assumes $x \in$ *Domain Rel* **shows** $\exists\ w.\ (x,w) \in$ *Rel*
using *assms* **by** *auto*

The language defined by the relation is the set of all public inputs such that there exists a witness that satisfies the relation.

definition $L \equiv \{x.\ \exists\ w.\ (x,\ w) \in Rel\}$

The first property of Σ-protocols we consider is completeness, we define a probabilistic programme that runs the components of the protocol and outputs the boolean defined by the check algorithm.

definition *completeness-game* :: *'pub-input* $\Rightarrow$ *'witness* $\Rightarrow$ *'challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *bool spmf*
where *completeness-game h w e* = *do* {
$(r,\ a) \leftarrow$ *init h w*;
$z \leftarrow$ *response r w e*;
return-spmf (*check h a e z*)}

We define completeness as the probability that the completeness-game returns true for all challenges assuming the relation holds on h and w.

definition *completeness* $\equiv$ ($\forall\ h\ w\ e\ .\ (h,w) \in$ *Rel* $\longrightarrow$ $e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow$ *spmf* (*completeness-game h w e*) *True* = *1*)

Second we consider the honest verifier zero knowledge property (HVZK). To reason about this we construct the real view of the Σ-protocol given a challenge e as input.

definition *R* :: *'pub-input* $\Rightarrow$ *'witness* $\Rightarrow$ *'challenge* $\Rightarrow$ (*'msg*, *'challenge*, *'response*) *conv-tuple spmf*
where *R h w e* = *do* {

$(r,a) \leftarrow$ *init h w*;
$z \leftarrow$ *response r w e*;
return-spmf $(a,e,z)\}$

definition S **where** $S\ h\ e$ = *map-spmf* $(\lambda\ (a,\ e,\ z).\ (a,\ e,\ z))$ $(S\text{-}raw\ h\ e)$

lemma *lossless-S-raw-imp-lossless-S*: *lossless-spmf* $(S\text{-}raw\ h\ e) \longrightarrow$ *lossless-spmf* $(S\ h\ e)$
by(*simp add*: *S-def*)

The HVZK property requires that the simulator's output distribution is equal to the real views output distribution.

definition *HVZK* $\equiv (\forall\ e \in$ *challenge-space*.
$(\forall\ (h,\ w) \in Rel.\ R\ h\ w\ e = S\ h\ e)$
$\wedge\ (\forall\ h \in$ *valid-pub*. $\forall\ (a,\ z) \in$ *set-spmf* $(S\text{-}raw\ h\ e).$ *check h a e z*$))$

The final property to consider is that of special soundness. This says that given two valid transcripts such that the challenges are not equal there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}ss$ that can output the witness.

definition *special-soundness* $\equiv (\forall\ h\ e\ e'\ a\ z\ z'.\ h \in$ *valid-pub* $\longrightarrow\ e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow\ e' \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow\ e \neq e'$
$\longrightarrow$ *check h a e z* $\longrightarrow$ *check h a e' z'* $\longrightarrow$ (*lossless-spmf* $(\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z)\ (a,\ e',\ z')) \wedge$
$(\forall\ w' \in$ *set-spmf* $(\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z)\ (a,e',z')).\ (h,w') \in Rel)))$

lemma *special-soundness-alt*:
special-soundness $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\forall\ h\ a\ e\ z\ e'\ z'.\ e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow\ e' \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow\ h \in$ *valid-pub*
$\longrightarrow\ e \neq e' \longrightarrow$ *check h a e z* $\wedge$ *check h a e' z'*
$\longrightarrow$ *bind-spmf* $(\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z)\ (a,e',z'))\ (\lambda\ w'.$ *return-spmf* $((h,w') \in Rel)) =$ *return-spmf True*)
apply(*auto simp add*: *special-soundness-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf*[*symmetric*] *map-pmf-eq-return-pmf-iff in-set-spmf lossless-iff-set-pmf-None*)
apply(*metis Domain.DomainI in-set-spmf not-Some-eq*)
using *Domain.intros* **by** *blast* +

definition Σ-*protocol* $\equiv$ *completeness* $\wedge$ *special-soundness* $\wedge$ *HVZK*

General lemmas

lemma *lossless-complete-game*:
assumes *lossless-init*: $\forall\ h\ w.$ *lossless-spmf* $(init\ h\ w)$
and *lossless-response*: $\forall\ r\ w\ e.$ *lossless-spmf* $(response\ r\ w\ e)$
shows *lossless-spmf* $(completeness\text{-}game\ h\ w\ e)$
by(*simp add*: *completeness-game-def lossless-init lossless-response split-def*)

lemma *complete-game-return-true*:

assumes $(h,w) \in Rel$
and *completeness*
and *lossless-init*: $\forall\ h\ w.$ *lossless-spmf* $(init\ h\ w)$
and *lossless-response*: $\forall\ r\ w\ e.$ *lossless-spmf* $(response\ r\ w\ e)$
and $e \in$ *challenge-space*
shows *completeness-game h w e* = *return-spmf True*
proof −
have *spmf* (*completeness-game h w e*) *True* = *spmf* (*return-spmf True*) *True*
using *assms* Σ*-protocol-def completeness-def* **by** *fastforce*
then have *completeness-game h w e* = *return-spmf True*
by (*metis* (*full-types*) *lossless-complete-game lossless-init lossless-response lossless-return-spmf spmf-False-conv-True spmf-eqI*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *completeness-game-def*)
qed

lemma *HVZK-unfold1*:
assumes Σ*-protocol*
shows $\forall\ h\ w\ e.\ (h,w) \in Rel \longrightarrow e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow R\ h\ w\ e = S\ h\ e$
using *assms* **by**(*auto simp add*: Σ*-protocol-def HVZK-def*)

lemma *HVZK-unfold2*:
assumes Σ*-protocol*
shows $\forall\ h\ e\ out.\ e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow h \in$ *valid-pub* $\longrightarrow out \in$ *set-spmf* (*S-raw h e*) $\longrightarrow$ *check h* (*fst out*) *e* (*snd out*)
using *assms* **by**(*auto simp add*: Σ*-protocol-def HVZK-def split-def*)

lemma *HVZK-unfold2-alt*:
assumes Σ*-protocol*
shows $\forall\ h\ a\ e\ z.\ e \in$ *challenge-space* $\longrightarrow h \in$ *valid-pub* $\longrightarrow (a,z) \in$ *set-spmf* (*S-raw h e*) $\longrightarrow$ *check h a e z*
using *assms* **by**(*fastforce simp add*: Σ*-protocol-def HVZK-def*)

end

2.2 Commitments from Σ-protocols

In this section we provide a general proof that Σ-protocols can be used to construct commitment schemes. We follow the construction given by Damgard in [7].

locale Σ*-protocols-to-commitments* = Σ*-protocols-base init response check Rel S-raw* $\mathcal{A}ss$ *challenge-space valid-pub*
for *init* :: *'pub-input* ⇒ *'witness* ⇒ (*'rand* × *'msg*) *spmf*
and *response* :: *'rand* ⇒ *'witness* ⇒ *'challenge* ⇒ *'response spmf*
and *check* :: *'pub-input* ⇒ *'msg* ⇒ *'challenge* ⇒ *'response* ⇒ *bool*
and *Rel* :: (*'pub-input* × *'witness*) *set*
and *S-raw* :: *'pub-input* ⇒ *'challenge* ⇒ (*'msg*, *'response*) *sim-out spmf*
and $\mathcal{A}ss$ :: (*'pub-input*, *'msg*, *'challenge*, *'response*, *'witness*) *prover-adversary*
and *challenge-space* :: *'challenge set*

and *valid-pub* :: *'pub-input set*
and *G* :: (*'pub-input* × *'witness*) *spmf* — generates pairs that satisfy the relation
+
assumes Σ-*prot*: Σ-*protocol* — assume we have a Σ-protocol
and *set-spmf-G-rel* [*simp*]: (*h*,*w*) ∈ *set-spmf G* ⟹ (*h*,*w*) ∈ *Rel* — the generator has the desired property
and *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
and *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init h w*)
and *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response r w e*)
begin

lemma *set-spmf-G-domain-rel* [*simp*]: (*h*,*w*) ∈ *set-spmf G* ⟹ *h* ∈ *Domain Rel*
using *set-spmf-G-rel* **by** *fast*

lemma *set-spmf-G-L* [*simp*]: (*h*,*w*) ∈ *set-spmf G* ⟹ *h* ∈ *L*
by (*metis mem-Collect-eq set-spmf-G-rel L-def*)

We define the advantage associated with the hard relation, this is used in the proof of the binding property where we reduce the binding advantage to the relation advantage.

definition *rel-game* :: (*'pub-input* ⇒ *'witness spmf*) ⇒ *bool spmf*
where *rel-game* 𝒜 = *TRY do* {
(*h*,*w*) ← *G*;
w' ← 𝒜 *h*;
return-spmf ((*h*,*w'*) ∈ *Rel*)} *ELSE return-spmf False*

definition *rel-advantage* :: (*'pub-input* ⇒ *'witness spmf*) ⇒ *real*
where *rel-advantage* 𝒜 ≡ *spmf* (*rel-game* 𝒜) *True*

We now define the algorithms that define the commitment scheme constructed from a Σ-protocol.

definition *key-gen* :: (*'pub-input* × (*'pub-input* × *'witness*)) *spmf*
where
key-gen = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
return-spmf (*x*, (*x*,*w*))}

definition *commit* :: *'pub-input* ⇒ *'challenge* ⇒ (*'msg* × *'response*) *spmf*
where
commit x e = *do* {
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *S x e*;
return-spmf (*a*, *z*)}

definition *verify* :: (*'pub-input* × *'witness*) ⇒ *'challenge* ⇒ *'msg* ⇒ *'response* ⇒ *bool*
where *verify x e a z* = (*check* (*fst x*) *a e z*)

We allow the adversary to output any message, so this means the type constraint is enough

definition *valid-msg m* = (*m* ∈ *challenge-space*)

Showing the construction of a commitment scheme from a Σ-protocol is a valid commitment scheme is trivial.

sublocale *abstract-com*: *abstract-commitment key-gen commit verify valid-msg* **.**

Correctness **lemma** *commit-correct*:
shows *abstract-com.correct*
including *monad-normalisation*
proof−
have ∀ *m* ∈ *challenge-space*. *abstract-com.correct-game m* = *return-spmf True*
proof
fix *m*
assume *m*: *m* ∈ *challenge-space*
show *abstract-com.correct-game m* = *return-spmf True*
proof−
have *abstract-com.correct-game m* = *do* {
(*ck*, (*vk1*,*vk2*)) ← *key-gen*;
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *S ck m*;
return-spmf (*check vk1 a m z*)}
unfolding *abstract-com.correct-game-def*
by(*simp add*: *commit-def verify-def split-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
let (*ck*, (*vk1*,*vk2*)) = (*x*,(*x*,*w*));
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *S ck m*;
return-spmf (*check vk1 a m z*)}
by(*simp add*: *key-gen-def split-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *S x m*;
return-spmf (*check x a m z*)}
by(*simp add*: *Let-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
(*a*, *e*,*z*) ← *R x w m*;
return-spmf (*check x a m z*)}
using Σ-*prot HVZK-unfold1 m*
by(*intro bind-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *clarsimp?*)
also have ... = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
(*r*, *a*) ← *init x w*;
z ← *response r w m*;
return-spmf (*check x a m z*)}
by(*simp add*: *R-def split-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
return-spmf True}
apply(*intro bind-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *clarsimp?*)

using *complete-game-return-true lossless-init lossless-response* Σ*-prot* Σ*-protocol-def*
by(*simp add*: *split-def completeness-game-def* Σ*-protocols-base.*Σ*-protocol-def m cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
ultimately show *abstract-com.correct-game m* = *return-spmf True*
by(*simp add*: *bind-spmf-const lossless-G lossless-weight-spmfD split-def*)
qed
qed
thus *?thesis*
using *abstract-com.correct-def abstract-com.valid-msg-set-def valid-msg-def* **by** *simp*
qed

The hiding property We first show we have perfect hiding with respect to the hiding game that allows the adversary to choose the messages that are committed to, this is akin to the ind-cpa game for encryption schemes.

lemma *perfect-hiding*:
shows *abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$
including *monad-normalisation*
proof−
obtain $\mathcal{A}1$ $\mathcal{A}2$ **where** [*simp*]: $\mathcal{A}$ = ($\mathcal{A}1$, $\mathcal{A}2$) **by**(*cases* $\mathcal{A}$)
have *abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa* ($\mathcal{A}1$, $\mathcal{A}2$) = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ (*x*,*w*);
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *S x* (*if b then m0 else m1*);
b′ ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *a* σ;
return-spmf (*b*′ = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
by(*simp add*: *abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def commit-def*; *simp add*: *key-gen-def split-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ (*x*,*w*);
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b :: *bool* ← *coin-spmf*;
(*a*,*e*,*z*) ← *R x w* (*if b then m0 else m1*);
b′ :: *bool* ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *a* σ;
return-spmf (*b*′ = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
apply(*intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *clarsimp?*)+
by(*simp add*: Σ*-prot HVZK-unfold1 valid-msg-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← $\mathcal{A}1$ (*x*,*w*);
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
(*r*,*a*) ← *init x w*;
z :: *'response* ← *response r w* (*if b then m0 else m1*);
guess :: *bool* ← $\mathcal{A}2$ *a* σ;

return-spmf(*guess* = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
using Σ-*protocols-base.R-def*
by(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf o-def R-def split-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← *A1* (*x*,*w*);
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
b ← *coin-spmf*;
(*r*,*a*) ← *init x w*;
guess :: *bool* ← *A2 a* σ;
return-spmf(*guess* = *b*)} *ELSE coin-spmf*
by(*simp add*: *bind-spmf-const lossless-response lossless-weight-spmfD*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
((*m0*, *m1*), σ) ← *A1* (*x*,*w*);
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*valid-msg m0* ∧ *valid-msg m1*);
(*r*,*a*) ← *init x w*;
guess :: *bool* ← *A2 a* σ;
map-spmf((=) *guess*) *coin-spmf*} *ELSE coin-spmf*
apply(*simp add*: *map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf*)
by(*simp add*: *split-def*)
also have ... = *coin-spmf*
by(*auto simp add*: *map-eq-const-coin-spmf try-bind-spmf-lossless2' Let-def split-def bind-spmf-const scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf*)
ultimately have *spmf* (*abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa* A) *True* = *1*/*2*
by(*simp add*: *spmf-of-set*)
thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-com.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa-def*)
qed

We reduce the security of the binding property to the relation advantage. To do this we first construct an adversary that interacts with the relation game. This adversary succeeds if the binding adversary succeeds.

definition *adversary* :: ('*pub-input* ⇒ ('*msg* × '*challenge* × '*response* × '*challenge* × '*response*) *spmf*) ⇒ '*pub-input* ⇒ '*witness spmf*
where *adversary* A *x* = *do* {
(*c*, *e*, *ez*, *e'*, *ez'*) ← A *x*;
A*ss x* (*c*,*e*,*ez*) (*c*,*e'*,*ez'*)}

lemma *bind-advantage*:
shows *abstract-com.bind-advantage* A ≤ *rel-advantage* (*adversary* A)
proof−
have *abstract-com.bind-game* A = *TRY do* {
(*x*,*w*) ← *G*;
(*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) ← A *x*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*m* ≠ *m'* ∧ *m* ∈ *challenge-space* ∧ *m'* ∈ *challenge-space*);
let b = *check x c m d*;
let b' = *check x c m' d'*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* (*b* ∧ *b'*);

```
  w' ← 𝒜ss x (c,m, d) (c,m', d');
  return-spmf ((x,w') ∈ Rel)} ELSE return-spmf False
    unfolding abstract-com.bind-game-alt-def
    apply(simp add:  key-gen-def verify-def Let-def split-def valid-msg-def)
    apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
     using special-soundness-def Σ-prot Σ-protocol-def special-soundness-alt spe-
cial-soundness-def set-spmf-G-rel set-spmf-G-domain-rel
    by (smt basic-trans-rules(31) bind-spmf-cong domain-subset-valid-pub)
  hence abstract-com.bind-advantage 𝒜 ≤ spmf (TRY do {
  (x,w) ← G;
  (c, m, d, m', d') ← 𝒜 x;
  w' ← 𝒜ss x (c,m, d) (c,m', d');
  return-spmf ((x,w') ∈ Rel)} ELSE return-spmf False) True
    unfolding abstract-com.bind-advantage-def
    apply(simp add: spmf-try-spmf)
    apply(rule ord-spmf-eq-leD)
    apply(rule ord-spmf-bind-reflI;clarsimp)+
    by(simp add: assert-spmf-def)
  thus ?thesis
    by(simp add: rel-game-def adversary-def split-def rel-advantage-def)
qed

end

end
```

2.3 Schnorr Σ-protocol

In this section we show the Schnoor protocol [11] is a Σ-protocol and then use it to construct a commitment scheme. The security statements for the resulting commitment scheme come for free from our general proof of the construction.

```
theory Schnorr-Sigma-Commit imports
  Commitment-Schemes
  Sigma-Protocols
  Cyclic-Group-Ext
  Discrete-Log
  Number-Theory-Aux
  Uniform-Sampling
  HOL−Number-Theory.Cong
begin

locale schnorr-base =
  fixes 𝒢 :: 'grp cyclic-group (structure)
  assumes prime-order: prime (order 𝒢)
begin

lemma order-gt-0 [simp]: order 𝒢 > 0
```

using *prime-order prime-gt-0-nat* **by** *blast*

The types for the Σ-protocol.

type-synonym *witness* = *nat*
type-synonym *rand* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' msg* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *response* = *nat*
type-synonym *challenge* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' pub-in* = *'grp'*

definition *R-DL* :: (*'grp pub-in* × *witness*) *set*
where *R-DL* = {(*h*, *w*). *h* = **g** [^] *w*}

definition *init* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *witness* ⇒ (*rand* × *'grp msg*) *spmf*
where *init h w* = *do* {
r ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf (*r*, **g** [^] *r*)}

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init h w*)
by(*simp add*: *init-def*)

definition *response r w c* = *return-spmf* ((*w*∗*c* + *r*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response r w c*)
by(*simp add*: *response-def*)

definition *G* :: (*'grp pub-in* × *witness*) *spmf*
where *G* = *do* {
w ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf (**g** [^] *w*, *w*)}

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
by(*simp add*: *G-def*)

definition *challenge-space* = {..< *order* $\mathcal{G}$}

definition *check* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *'grp msg* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ *response* ⇒ *bool*
where *check h a e z* = (*a* ⊗ (*h* [^] *e*) = **g** [^] *z* ∧ *a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$)

definition *S2* :: *'grp* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out spmf*
where *S2 h e* = *do* {
c ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let a = **g** [^] *c* ⊗ (*inv* (*h* [^] *e*));
return-spmf (*a*, *c*)}

definition *ss-adversary* :: *'grp* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* ⇒
(*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *ss-adversary x c1 c2* = *do* {
let (*a*, *e*, *z*) = *c1*;

let $(a', e', z') = c2$;
return-spmf (*if* $(e > e')$ *then*
(*nat* $((int\ z - int\ z') * inverse\ ((e - e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
else
(*nat* $((int\ z' - int\ z) * inverse\ ((e' - e))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}))$)}

definition *valid-pub* = *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$

We now use the Schnorr Σ-protocol use Schnorr to construct a commitment scheme.

type-synonym *'grp' ck* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *'grp' vk* = *'grp'* × *nat*
type-synonym *plain* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' commit* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *opening* = *nat*

The adversary we use in the discrete log game to reduce the binding property to the discrete log assumption.

definition *dis-log-*$\mathcal{A}$ :: (*'grp ck*, *plain*, *'grp commit*, *opening*) *bind-adversary* ⇒ *'grp ck* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *dis-log-*$\mathcal{A}$ $\mathcal{A}$ *h* = *do* {
(*c*, *e*, *z*, *e'*, *z'*) ← $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* $(e > e' \wedge \neg [e = e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}) \wedge (gcd\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = 1) \wedge c \in carrier\ \mathcal{G})$;
- :: *unit* ← *assert-spmf* $(((c \otimes h\ [\hat{}]\ e) = \mathbf{g}\ [\hat{}]\ z) \wedge (c \otimes h\ [\hat{}]\ e') = \mathbf{g}\ [\hat{}]\ z')$;
return-spmf (*nat* $((int\ z - int\ z') * inverse\ ((e - e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}))$}

sublocale *discrete-log*: *dis-log* $\mathcal{G}$
unfolding *dis-log-def* **by** *simp*

end

locale *schnorr-sigma-protocol* = *schnorr-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

sublocale *Schnorr-*Σ: Σ*-protocols-base init response check R-DL S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub*
apply *unfold-locales*
by(*simp add*: *R-DL-def valid-pub-def*; *blast*)

The Schnorr Σ-protocol is complete.

lemma *completeness*: *Schnorr-*Σ*.completeness*
proof−
have $\mathbf{g}\ [\hat{}]\ y \otimes (\mathbf{g}\ [\hat{}]\ w')\ [\hat{}]\ e = \mathbf{g}\ [\hat{}]\ (y + w' * e)$ **for** *y e w'* :: *nat*
using *nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult* **by** *simp*
then show *?thesis*
unfolding *Schnorr-*Σ*.completeness-game-def Schnorr-*Σ*.completeness-def*

by(*auto simp add*: *init-def response-def check-def pow-generator-mod R-DL-def add.commute bind-spmf-const*)
qed

The next two lemmas help us rewrite terms in the proof of honest verfier zero knowledge.

lemma *zr-rewrite*:
assumes *z*: $z = (x*c + r)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G})$
and *r*: $r < order\ \mathcal{G}$
shows $(z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*x*c - x*c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = r$
proof(*cases* $x = 0$)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*
next
case *x-neq-0*: *False*
then show *?thesis*
proof(*cases* $c = 0$)
case *True*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *assms*)
next
case *False*
have *cong*: $[z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*x*c = x*c + r]\ (mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*simp add*: *cong-def mult.assoc z*)
hence $[z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*x*c - x*c = r]\ (mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
proof−
have $z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*x*c > x*c$
by (*metis One-nat-def mult-less-cancel2 n-less-m-mult-n neq0-conv prime-gt-1-nat prime-order trans-less-add2 x-neq-0 False*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis cong add-diff-inverse-nat cong-add-lcancel-nat less-imp-le linorder-not-le*)

qed
then show *?thesis*
by(*simp add*: *cong-def r*)
qed
qed

lemma *h-sub-rewrite*:
assumes $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ x$
and *z*: $z < order\ \mathcal{G}$
shows $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*x*c - x*c)) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof(*cases* $x = 0$)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*
next
case *x-neq-0*: *False*
then show *?thesis*

```
  proof−
    have (z + order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c) = (z + (order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c))
      using z by (simp add: less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono)
    then have lhs: ?lhs = g [^] z ⊗ g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c − x∗c)
      by(simp add: nat-pow-mult)
    have  g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c − x∗c) =  inv (h [^] c)
    proof(cases c = 0)
      case True
      then show ?thesis by simp
    next
      case False
      hence bound: ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c − x∗c) > 0
        using assms x-neq-0 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order by auto
      then have g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c− x∗c) = g [^] int ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c − x∗c)
        by (metis int-pow-int)
      also have ... = g [^] int ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c) ⊗ inv (g [^] (x∗c))
          by (metis bound generator-closed int-ops(6) int-pow-int of-nat-eq-0-iff
of-nat-less-0-iff of-nat-less-iff int-pow-diff)
      also have ... = g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c) ⊗ inv (g [^] (x∗c))
        by (metis int-pow-int)
      also have ... = g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c) ⊗ inv ((g [^] x) [^] c)
        by(simp add: nat-pow-pow)
      also have ... = g [^] ((order 𝒢)∗x∗c) ⊗ inv (h [^] c)
        using assms by simp
      also have ... = 1 ⊗ inv (h [^] c)
        using generator-pow-order
        by (metis generator-closed mult-is-0 nat-pow-0 nat-pow-pow)
      ultimately show ?thesis
        by (simp add: assms(1))
    qed
    then show ?thesis using lhs by simp
  qed
qed

lemma hvzk-R-rewrite-grp:
  fixes x c r :: nat
  assumes r < order 𝒢
  shows g [^] (((x ∗ c + order 𝒢 − r) mod order 𝒢 + order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c)
mod order 𝒢) = inv g [^] r
    (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof−
  have [(x ∗ c + order 𝒢 − r) mod order 𝒢 + order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c = order 𝒢
− r] (mod order 𝒢)
  proof−
    have [(x ∗ c + order 𝒢 − r) mod order 𝒢 + order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c
          = x ∗ c + order 𝒢 − r + order 𝒢 ∗ x ∗ c − x ∗ c] (mod order 𝒢)
     by (smt cong-def One-nat-def add-diff-inverse-nat cong-diff-nat less-imp-le-nat
linorder-not-less mod-add-left-eq mult.assoc n-less-m-mult-n prime-gt-1-nat prime-order
trans-less-add2 zero-less-diff)
```

```
    hence [(x * c + order 𝒢 − r) mod order 𝒢 + order 𝒢 * x * c − x * c
          =  order 𝒢 − r + order 𝒢 * x * c] (mod order 𝒢)
      using assms by auto
    thus ?thesis
      by (simp add: cong-def mult.assoc)
  qed
  hence g [^] ((x * c + order 𝒢 − r) mod order 𝒢 + order 𝒢 * x * c − x * c) =
g [^] (order 𝒢 − r)
    using finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by blast
  thus ?thesis using neg-power-inverse
    by (simp add: assms inverse-pow-pow pow-generator-mod)
qed

lemma hv-zk:
  assumes (h,x) ∈ R-DL
  shows Schnorr-Σ.R h x c = Schnorr-Σ.S h c
  including monad-normalisation
proof−
  have Schnorr-Σ.R h x c = do {
      r ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
      let z = (x*c + r) mod (order 𝒢);
      let a = g [^] ((z + (order 𝒢)*x*c − x*c) mod (order 𝒢));
      return-spmf (a,c,z)}
    apply(simp add: Let-def Schnorr-Σ.R-def init-def response-def)
    using assms zr-rewrite R-DL-def
    by(simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... = do {
      z ← map-spmf (λ r. (x*c + r) mod (order 𝒢)) (sample-uniform (order 𝒢));
      let a = g [^] ((z + (order 𝒢)*x*c − x*c) mod (order 𝒢));
      return-spmf (a,c,z)}
    by(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def)
  also have ... = do {
      z ← (sample-uniform (order 𝒢));
      let a = g [^] ((z + (order 𝒢)*x*c − x*c));
      return-spmf (a,c,z)}
    by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad pow-generator-mod)
  also have ... = do {
      z ← (sample-uniform (order 𝒢));
      let a = g [^] z ⊗ inv (h [^] c);
      return-spmf (a,c,z)}
    using h-sub-rewrite assms R-DL-def
    by(simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by(simp add: Schnorr-Σ.S-def S2-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
qed
```

We can now prove that honest verifier zero knowledge holds for the Schnorr Σ-protocol.

```
lemma honest-verifier-ZK:
```

shows *Schnorr-Σ.HVZK*
unfolding *Schnorr-Σ.HVZK-def*
by(*auto simp add*: *hv-zk R-DL-def S2-def check-def valid-pub-def challenge-space-def cyclic-group-assoc*)

It is left to prove the special soundness property. First we prove a lemma we use to rewrite a term in the special soundness proof and then prove the property itself.

lemma *ss-rewrite*:
assumes $e' < e$
and $e <$ *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a-mem*:$a \in$ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *h-mem*: $h \in$ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a*: $a \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z$
and *a'*: $a \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e' = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z'$
shows $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ z - int\ z') * inverse\ ((e - e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
proof−
have *gcd*: *gcd* (*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *1*
using *prime-field*
by (*metis Primes.prime-nat-def assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *coprime-imp-gcd-eq-1 diff-is-0-eq less-imp-diff-less*
mod-less nat-minus-as-int not-less schnorr-base.prime-order schnorr-base-axioms)
have $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e)$
using *a a-mem*
by (*simp add*: *h-mem group.inv-solve-right*)
moreover have $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z' \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e')$
using *a' a-mem*
by (*simp add*: *h-mem group.inv-solve-right*)
ultimately have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e' = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z' \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e$
using *h-mem*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *a a' h-mem a-mem cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain *t* :: *nat* **where** *t*: $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *h-mem generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (z + t * e') = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (z' + t * e)$
by (*simp add*: *monoid.nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
hence $[z + t * e' = z' + t * e]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[int\ z + int\ t * int\ e' = int\ z' + int\ t * int\ e]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence $[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-iff-lin*)
hence $[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add*: ‹$[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$› *right-diff-distrib*)
hence $[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*meson cong-diff cong-mod-left cong-mult cong-refl cong-trans*)
hence ∗: $[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$

using *assms*
by (*simp add*: *int-ops*(*9*) *of-nat-diff*)
hence [*int z* − *int z'* = *int t* ∗ *nat* (*int e* − *int e'*)] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *assms*
by *auto*
hence ∗∗: [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
= *int t* ∗ (*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*)
∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*smt* ‹[*int z* − *int z'* = *int t* ∗ (*int e* − *int e'*)] (*mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))› *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *cong-scalar-right int-nat-eq less-imp-of-nat-less mod-less more-arith-simps*(*11*) *nat-less-iff of-nat-0-le-iff*)
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* ∗ *1*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *gcd inverse assms*(*2*) *cong-scalar-left cong-trans less-imp-diff-less mod-less mult.comm-neutral nat-minus-as-int*)
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
= *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **by** *simp*
hence [((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$
= *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *cong-mod-left* **by** *blast*
hence ∗∗: [*nat* (((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
= *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis cong-def mod-mod-trivial nat-int of-nat-mod*)
hence g [^] (*nat* (((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*nat* (*int e* − *int e'*))) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = **g** [^] *t*
using *cyclic-group.pow-generator-eq-iff-cong cyclic-group-axioms order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *t*
by (*simp add*: *nat-minus-as-int*)
qed

The special soundness property for the Schnorr Σ-protocol.

lemma *special-soundness*:
shows *Schnorr-Σ.special-soundness*
unfolding *Schnorr-Σ.special-soundness-def*
by(*auto simp add*: *valid-pub-def ss-rewrite challenge-space-def split-def ss-adversary-def check-def R-DL-def Let-def*)

We are now able to prove that the Schnorr Σ-protocol is a Σ-protocol, the proof comes from the properties of completeness, HVZK and special soundness we have previously proven.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows *Schnorr-Σ.Σ-protocol*
by(*simp add*: *Schnorr-Σ.Σ-protocol-def completeness honest-verifier-ZK special-soundness*)

Having proven the Σ-protocol property is satisfied we can show the com-

mitment scheme we construct from the Schnorr Σ-protocol has the desired properties. This result comes with very little proof effort as we can instantiate our general proof.

sublocale *Schnorr-Σ-commit*: *Σ-protocols-to-commitments init response check R-DL S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G*
unfolding *Σ-protocols-to-commitments-def Σ-protocols-to-commitments-axioms-def*
apply(*auto simp add*: *Σ-protocols-base-def*)
apply(*simp add*: *R-DL-def valid-pub-def*)
apply(*auto simp add*: *sigma-protocol lossless-G lossless-init lossless-response*)
by(*simp add*: *R-DL-def G-def*)

lemma *Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct*
by(*fact Schnorr-Σ-commit.commit-correct*)

lemma *Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$
by(*fact Schnorr-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding*)

lemma *rel-adv-eq-dis-log-adv*:
Schnorr-Σ-commit.rel-advantage $\mathcal{A}$ = *discrete-log.advantage* $\mathcal{A}$
proof−
have *Schnorr-Σ-commit.rel-game* $\mathcal{A}$ = *discrete-log.dis-log* $\mathcal{A}$
unfolding *Schnorr-Σ-commit.rel-game-def discrete-log.dis-log-def*
by(*auto intro*: *try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]
simp add: *G-def R-DL-def cong-less-modulus-unique-nat group-eq-pow-eq-mod finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong*)
thus *?thesis*
using *Schnorr-Σ-commit.rel-advantage-def discrete-log.advantage-def* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *bind-advantage-bound-dis-log*:
Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage $\mathcal{A}$ ≤ *discrete-log.advantage* (*Schnorr-Σ-commit.adversary* $\mathcal{A}$)
using *Schnorr-Σ-commit.bind-advantage rel-adv-eq-dis-log-adv* **by** *simp*

end

locale *schnorr-asymp* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *nat* ⇒ *'grp cyclic-group*
assumes *schnorr*: ⋀η. *schnorr-sigma-protocol* ($\mathcal{G}$ η)
begin

sublocale *schnorr-sigma-protocol* $\mathcal{G}$ η **for** η
by(*simp add*: *schnorr*)

The Σ-protocol statement comes easily in the asymptotic setting.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows *Schnorr-Σ.Σ-protocol n*
by(*simp add*: *sigma-protocol*)

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asymp-correct*: *Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct n*
using *Schnorr-Σ-commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asymp-perfect-hiding*: *Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n* (*𝒜 n*)
using *Schnorr-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asymp-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* (*λ n. discrete-log.advantage n* (*Schnorr-Σ-commit.adversary n* (*𝒜 n*)))
shows *negligible* (*λ n. Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage n* (*𝒜 n*))
using *Schnorr-Σ-commit.bind-advantage assms Schnorr-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def negligible-le bind-advantage-bound-dis-log* **by** *auto*

end

end

2.4 Chaum-Pedersen Σ-protocol

The Chaum-Pedersen Σ-protocol [6] considers a relation of equality of discrete logs.

theory *Chaum-Pedersen-Sigma-Commit* **imports**
Commitment-Schemes
Sigma-Protocols
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale *chaum-ped-Σ-base* =
fixes *𝒢* :: *'grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
and *x* :: *nat*
assumes *prime-order*: *prime* (*order 𝒢*)
begin

definition *g'* = **g** [^] *x*

lemma *or-gt-1*: *order 𝒢* > *1*
using *prime-order*
using *prime-gt-1-nat* **by** *blast*

lemma *or-gt-0* [*simp*]:*order 𝒢* > *0*
using *or-gt-1* **by** *simp*

type-synonym *witness* = *nat*
type-synonym *rand* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' msg* = *'grp'* × *'grp'*
type-synonym *response* = *nat*
type-synonym *challenge* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' pub-in* = *'grp'* × *'grp'*

definition *G* = *do* {
w ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf ((**g** [^] *w*, *g'* [^] *w*), *w*)}

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
by(*simp add*: *G-def*)

definition *challenge-space* = {..< *order* $\mathcal{G}$}

definition *init* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *witness* ⇒ (*rand* × *'grp msg*) *spmf*
where *init h w* = *do* {
let (*h*, *h'*) = *h*;
r ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf (*r*, **g** [^] *r*, *g'* [^] *r*)}

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init h w*)
by(*simp add*: *init-def*)

definition *response r w e* = *return-spmf* ((*w*∗*e* + *r*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response r w e*)
by(*simp add*: *response-def*)

definition *check* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *'grp msg* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ *response* ⇒ *bool*
where *check h a e z* = (*fst a* ⊗ (*fst h* [^] *e*) = **g** [^] *z* ∧ *snd a* ⊗ (*snd h* [^] *e*)
= *g'* [^] *z* ∧ *fst a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$ ∧ *snd a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$)

definition *R* :: (*'grp pub-in* × *witness*) *set*
where *R* = {(*h*, *w*). (*fst h* = **g** [^] *w* ∧ *snd h* = *g'* [^] *w*)}

definition *S2* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out spmf*
where *S2 H c* = *do* {
let (*h*, *h'*) = *H*;
z ← (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
let a = **g** [^] *z* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *c*);
let a' = *g'* [^] *z* ⊗ *inv* (*h'* [^] *c*);
return-spmf ((*a*,*a'*), *z*)}

definition *ss-adversary* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple*
⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* ⇒ *nat spmf*
where *ss-adversary x' c1 c2* = *do* {

let ((*a*,*a'*), *e*, *z*) = *c1*;
let ((*b*,*b'*), *e'*, *z'*) = *c2*;
return-spmf (*if* (*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ > *e' mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *then* (*nat* ((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *e' mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *else*
(*nat* ((*int z'* − *int z*) ∗ (*fst* (*bezw* ((*e' mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)))}

definition *valid-pub* = *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$ × *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$

end

locale *chaum-ped-*Σ = *chaum-ped-*Σ*-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *g'-in-carrier* [*simp*]: *g'* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
by(*simp add*: *g'-def*)

sublocale *chaum-ped-sigma*: Σ*-protocols-base init response check R S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub*
by *unfold-locales* (*auto simp add*: *R-def valid-pub-def*)

lemma *completeness*:
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.completeness*
proof−
have *g'* [^] *y* ⊗ (*g'* [^] *w'*) [^] *e* = *g'* [^] ((*w'* ∗ *e* + *y*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **for** *y e w'*
by (*simp add*: *Groups.add-ac*(*2*) *pow-carrier-mod nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult*)
moreover have g [^] *y* ⊗ (**g** [^] *w'*) [^] *e* = **g** [^] ((*w'* ∗ *e* + *y*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) **for** *y e w'*
by (*metis add.commute nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult pow-generator-mod generator-closed mod-mult-right-eq*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
unfolding *chaum-ped-sigma.completeness-def chaum-ped-sigma.completeness-game-def*
by(*auto simp add*: *R-def challenge-space-def init-def check-def response-def split-def bind-spmf-const*)
qed

lemma *hvzk-xr'-rewrite*:
assumes *r*: *r* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
shows ((*w*∗*c* + *r*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) + (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) ∗ *w*∗*c* − *w*∗*c*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *r*
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *?lhs* = (*w*∗*c* + *r* + (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) ∗ *w*∗*c*− *w*∗*c*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis Nat.add-diff-assoc Num.of-nat-simps*(*1*) *One-nat-def add-less-same-cancel2 less-imp-le-nat*
mod-add-left-eq mult.assoc mult-0-right n-less-m-mult-n nat-neq-iff not-add-less2 of-nat-0-le-iff prime-gt-1-nat prime-order)
thus *?thesis* **using** *r*

by (*metis ab-semigroup-add-class.add-ac(1) ab-semigroup-mult-class.mult-ac(1) diff-add-inverse mod-if mod-mult-self2*)
qed

lemma *hvzk-h-sub-rewrite*:
assumes $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ w$
and z: $z < order\ \mathcal{G}$
shows $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w*c)) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
(**is** *?lhs = ?rhs*)
proof(*cases* $w = 0$)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*
next
case *w-gt-0*: *False*
then show *?thesis*
proof−
have $(z + order\ \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c) = (z + (order\ \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c))$
using z **by** (*simp add*: *less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono*)
then have *lhs*: *?lhs* = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w*c)$
by(*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w*c) = inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
proof(*cases* $c = 0$)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **using** *lhs* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence ∗: $((order\ \mathcal{G})*w * c - w*c) > 0$ **using** *assms w-gt-0*
using *gr0I mult-less-cancel2 n-less-m-mult-n numeral-nat*(7) *prime-gt-1-nat prime-order zero-less-diff* **by** *presburger*
then have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ int\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c)$
by (*metis int-pow-int*)
also have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ int\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (w*c))$
using *int-pow-diff*[*of* **g** *order* $\mathcal{G} * w * c\ w * c$] ∗ *generator-closed int-ops*(6) *int-pow-neg int-pow-neg-int* **by** *presburger*
also have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (w*c))$
by (*metis int-pow-int*)
also have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ ((\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ w)\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
by(*simp add*: *nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
using *assms* **by** *simp*
also have ... = $\mathbf{1} \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$
using *generator-pow-order*
by (*metis generator-closed mult-is-0 nat-pow-0 nat-pow-pow*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *assms*(1))
qed
then show *?thesis* **using** *lhs* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *hvzk-h-sub2-rewrite*:
assumes $h' = g' [\hat{}] w$
and z: $z < order\ \mathcal{G}$
shows $g' [\hat{}] ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c)) = g' [\hat{}] z \otimes inv\ (h' [\hat{}] c)$
(**is** *?lhs = ?rhs*)
proof(*cases w = 0*)
case *True*
then show *?thesis*
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *g'-def*)
next
case *w-gt-0*: *False*
then show *?thesis*
proof−
have $g' = \mathbf{g} [\hat{}] x$ **using** *g'-def* **by** *simp*
have *g'-carrier*: $g' \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$ **using** *g'-def* **by** *simp*
have *1*: $g' [\hat{}] ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c- w*c) = inv\ (h' [\hat{}] c)$
proof(*cases c = 0*)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence ∗: $((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c) > 0$
using *assms mult-strict-mono w-gt-0 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order* **by** *auto*
then have $g' [\hat{}] ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c) = g' [\hat{}] (int\ (order\ \mathcal{G} * w * c) - int\ (w * c))$
by (*metis int-ops*(*6*) *int-pow-int of-nat-0-less-iff order.irrefl*)
also have ... $= g' [\hat{}] ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ (g' [\hat{}] (w*c))$
by (*metis g'-carrier int-pow-diff int-pow-int*)
also have ... $= g' [\hat{}] ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c) \otimes inv\ (h' [\hat{}] c)$
by(*simp add*: *nat-pow-pow assms*)
also have ... $= \mathbf{1} \otimes inv\ (h' [\hat{}] c)$
by (*metis g'-carrier nat-pow-one nat-pow-pow pow-order-eq-1*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *assms*(*1*))
qed
have $(z + order\ \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c) = (z + (order\ \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c))$
using *z* **by** (*simp add*: *less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono*)
then have *lhs*: *?lhs* $= g' [\hat{}] z \otimes g' [\hat{}] ((order\ \mathcal{G})*w*c - w*c)$
by(*auto simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
then show *?thesis* **using** *1* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *hv-zk2*:
assumes $(H, w) \in R$
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.R H w c = chaum-ped-sigma.S H c*
including *monad-normalisation*
proof−

have H: $H = (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (w::nat),\ g'\ [\widehat{}]\ w)$
using *assms R-def* **by**(*simp add*: *prod.expand*)
have *g'-carrier*: $g' \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$ **using** *g'-def* **by** *simp*
have *chaum-ped-sigma.R H w c* $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$r \leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* $(order\ \mathcal{G})$;
let $z = (w{*}c + r)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G})$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a' = g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
return-spmf $((a,a'),c,\ z)$}
apply(*simp add*: *chaum-ped-sigma.R-def Let-def response-def split-def init-def*)
using *assms hvzk-xr'-rewrite*
by(*simp cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$z \leftarrow$ *map-spmf* $(\lambda\ r.\ (w{*}c + r)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ (sample\text{-}uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a' = g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
return-spmf $((a,a'),c,\ z)$}
by(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf Let-def o-def*)
also have ... $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$z \leftarrow (sample\text{-}uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a' = g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
return-spmf $((a,a'),c,\ z)$}
by(*simp add*: *samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad*)
also have ... $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$z \leftarrow (sample\text{-}uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$;
let $a' = g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) * w{*}c - w{*}c)\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
return-spmf $((a,a'),c,\ z)$}
using *hvzk-h-sub-rewrite assms*
apply(*simp add*: *Let-def H*)
apply(*intro bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *clarsimp?*)
by (*simp add*: *pow-generator-mod*)
also have ... $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$z \leftarrow (sample\text{-}uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$;
let $a' = g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((z + (order\ \mathcal{G}) {*} w{*}c - w{*}c))$;
return-spmf $((a,a'),c,\ z)$}
using *g'-carrier pow-carrier-mod*[*of g'*] **by** *simp*
also have ... $=$ *do* {
let $(h,\ h') = H$;
$z \leftarrow (sample\text{-}uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$;
let $a = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$;
let $a' = \ g'\ [\widehat{}]\ z \otimes inv\ (h'\ [\widehat{}]\ c)$;

return-spmf ((*a*,*a'*),*c*, *z*)}
using *hvzk-h-sub2-rewrite assms H*
by(*simp cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
unfolding *chaum-ped-sigma.S-def chaum-ped-sigma.R-def*
by(*simp add*: *init-def S2-def split-def Let-def Σ-protocols-base.S-def bind-map-spmf map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf*)
qed

lemma *HVZK*:
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.HVZK*
unfolding *chaum-ped-sigma.HVZK-def*
by(*auto simp add*: *hv-zk2 R-def valid-pub-def S2-def check-def cyclic-group-assoc*)

lemma *ss-rewrite1*:
assumes *fst h* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *e*: *e* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e* = **g** [^] *z*
and *e'*: *e'* < *e*
and *a* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e'* = **g** [^] *z'*
shows *fst h* = **g** [^] ((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *inverse* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof−
have *gcd*: *gcd* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *1*
using *e e' prime-field prime-order* **by** *simp*
have *a* = **g** [^] *z* ⊗ *inv* (*fst h* [^] *e*)
using *assms*
by (*simp add*: *assms inv-solve-right*)
moreover have *a* = **g** [^] *z'* ⊗ *inv* (*fst h* [^] *e'*)
using *assms*
by (*simp add*: *assms inv-solve-right*)
ultimately have g [^] *z* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e'* = **g** [^] *z'* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *assms cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain *t* :: *nat* **where** *t*: *fst h* = **g** [^] *t*
using *assms generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have g [^] (*z* + *t* ∗ *e'*) = **g** [^] (*z'* + *t* ∗ *e*)
using *nat-pow-pow*
by (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
hence [*z* + *t* ∗ *e'* = *z'* + *t* ∗ *e*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod or-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence [*int z* + *int t* ∗ *int e'* = *int z'* + *int t* ∗ *int e*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence [*int z* − *int z'* = *int t* ∗ *int e* − *int t* ∗ *int e'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0*)
hence [*int z* − *int z'* = *int t* ∗ (*int e* − *int e'*)] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *right-diff-distrib*)
hence [*int z* − *int z'* = *int t* ∗ (*e* − *e'*)] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)

using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *of-nat-diff*)
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* ∗ (*e* − *e'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* ∗ ((*e* − *e'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *more-arith-simps*(*11*))
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* ∗ *1*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *cong-scalar-left cong-trans inverse gcd*)
hence [(*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ = *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by *simp*
hence [*nat* ((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis cong-def int-ops*(*9*) *mod-mod-trivial nat-int*)
hence **g** [^] (*nat* ((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = **g** [^] *t*
using *order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *t* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *ss-rewrite2*:
assumes *fst h* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *snd h* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *b* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *e* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e* = **g** [^] *z*
and *b* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e* = *g'* [^] *z*
and *e'* < *e*
and *a* ⊗ *fst h* [^] *e'* = **g** [^] *z'*
and *b* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e'* = *g'* [^] *z'*
shows *snd h* = *g'* [^] ((*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *inverse* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof−
have *gcd*: *gcd* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *1*
using *prime-field assms prime-order* **by** *simp*
have *b* = *g'* [^] *z* ⊗ *inv* (*snd h* [^] *e*)
by (*simp add*: *assms inv-solve-right*)
moreover have *b* = *g'* [^] *z'* ⊗ *inv* (*snd h* [^] *e'*)
by (*metis assms*(*2*) *assms*(*4*) *assms*(*10*) *g'-def generator-closed group.inv-solve-right' group-l-invI l-inv-ex nat-pow-closed*)
ultimately have *g'* [^] *z* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e'* = *g'* [^] *z'* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *assms cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain *t* :: *nat* **where** *t*: *snd h* = **g** [^] *t*
using *assms*(*2*) *generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have **g** [^] (*x* ∗ *z* + *t* ∗ *e'*) = **g** [^] (*x* ∗ *z'* + *t* ∗ *e*)

using *g'-def nat-pow-pow*
by (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
hence [$x * z + t * e' = x * z' + t * e$] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence [*int x* $*$ *int z* + *int t* $*$ *int e'* = *int x* $*$ *int z'* + *int t* $*$ *int e*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis Groups.add-ac*(2) *Groups.mult-ac*(2) *cong-int-iff int-ops*(7) *int-plus*)
hence [*int x* $*$ *int z* − *int x* $*$ *int z'* = *int t* $*$ *int e* − *int t* $*$ *int e'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0*)
hence [*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*) = *int t* $*$ (*int e* − *int e'*)] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *int-distrib*(4))
hence [*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*) = *int t* $*$ (*e* − *e'*)] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *of-nat-diff*)
hence [(*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*)) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* $*$ (*e* − *e'*) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence [(*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*)) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* $*$ ((*e* − *e'*) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)))] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*simp add*: *more-arith-simps*(11))
hence $*$: [(*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*)) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int t* $*$ *1*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *cong-scalar-left cong-trans gcd inverse*)
hence [*nat* ((*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*)) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *t*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
by (*metis cong-def cong-mod-right more-arith-simps*(6) *nat-int zmod-int*)
hence **g** [^] (*nat* ((*int x* $*$ (*int z* − *int z'*)) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = **g** [^] *t*
using *order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *t*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *opaque-lifting*) $*$ *cong-def g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(11) *more-arith-simps*(6) *pow-generator-mod-int*)
qed

lemma *ss-rewrite-snd-h*:
assumes *e-e'-mod*: *e'* *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ < *e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$
and *h-mem*: *snd h* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a-mem*: *snd a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a1*: *snd a* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e* = *g'* [^] *z*
and *a2*: *snd a* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e'* = *g'* [^] *z'*
shows *snd h* = *g'* [^] ((*int z* − *int z'*) $*$ *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *e'* *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof−
have *gcd*: *gcd* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *e'* *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *1*
using *prime-field*
by (*simp add*: *assms less-imp-diff-less linorder-not-le prime-order*)
have *snd a* = *g'* [^] *z* ⊗ *inv* (*snd h* [^] *e*)
using *a1*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *Group.group.axioms*(1) *h-mem a-mem group.inv-closed*

group-l-invI l-inv-ex monoid.m-assoc nat-pow-closed r-inv r-one)
moreover have *snd a* = *g'* [^] *z'* ⊗ *inv* (*snd h* [^] *e'*)
by (*metis a2 h-mem a-mem g'-def generator-closed group.inv-solve-right' group-l-invI l-inv-ex nat-pow-closed*)
ultimately have *g'* [^] *z* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e'* = *g'* [^] *z'* ⊗ *snd h* [^] *e*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *a2 h-mem a-mem a1 cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain *t* :: *nat* **where** *t*: *snd h* = **g** [^] *t*
using *assms*(*2*) *generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have g [^] (*x* ∗ *z* + *t* ∗ *e'*) = **g** [^] (*x* ∗ *z'* + *t* ∗ *e*)
using *g'-def nat-pow-pow*
by (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
hence [*x* ∗ *z* + *t* ∗ *e'* = *x* ∗ *z'* + *t* ∗ *e*] (*mod order* G)
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence [*int x* ∗ *int z* + *int t* ∗ *int e'* = *int x* ∗ *int z'* + *int t* ∗ *int e*] (*mod order* G)
by (*metis Groups.add-ac*(*2*) *Groups.mult-ac*(*2*) *cong-int-iff int-ops*(*7*) *int-plus*)
hence [*int x* ∗ *int z* − *int x* ∗ *int z'* = *int t* ∗ *int e* − *int t* ∗ *int e'*] (*mod order* G)
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0*)
hence [*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) = *int t* ∗ (*int e* − *int e'*)] (*mod order* G)
by (*simp add*: *int-distrib*(*4*))
hence [*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) = *int t* ∗ (*int e mod order* G − *int e' mod order* G) *mod order* G] (*mod order* G)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mod-trivial mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence ∗: [*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) = *int t* ∗ (*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G] (*mod order* G)
by (*simp add*: *assms*(*1*) *int-ops*(*9*) *less-imp-le-nat*)
hence [*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G) (*order* G))
= *int t* ∗ ((*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G
∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G) (*order* G)))] (*mod order* G)
by (*smt* (*verit*, *best*) *int-ops*(*9*) *mod-mult-left-eq mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*) *unique-euclidean-semiring-class.cong-def*)
hence [*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G) (*order* G))
= *int t* ∗ *1*] (*mod order* G)
by (*meson Number-Theory-Aux.inverse* ∗ *gcd cong-scalar-left cong-trans*)
hence g [^] (*int x* ∗ (*int z* − *int z'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* G − *e' mod order* G) *mod order* G) (*order* G))) = **g** [^] *t*
by (*metis cong-def int-pow-int more-arith-simps*(*6*) *pow-generator-mod-int*)
thus *?thesis* **using** *t*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *opaque-lifting*) *g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*) *pow-generator-mod-int*)
qed

lemma *special-soundness*:
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.special-soundness*

unfolding *chaum-ped-sigma.special-soundness-def*
apply(*auto simp add*: *challenge-space-def check-def ss-adversary-def R-def valid-pub-def*)
using *ss-rewrite2 ss-rewrite1* **by** *auto*

theorem Σ*-protocol*: *chaum-ped-sigma.*Σ*-protocol*
by(*simp add*: *chaum-ped-sigma.*Σ*-protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness*)

sublocale *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit*: Σ*-protocols-to-commitments init response check R S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G*
apply *unfold-locales*
apply(*auto simp add*: Σ*-protocol lossless-init lossless-response lossless-G*)
by(*simp add*: *R-def G-def*)

sublocale *dis-log*: *dis-log* $\mathcal{G}$
unfolding *dis-log-def* **by** *simp*

sublocale *dis-log-alt*: *dis-log-alt* $\mathcal{G}$ *x*
unfolding *dis-log-alt-def* **by** *simp*

lemma *reduction-to-dis-log*:
shows *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit.rel-advantage* $\mathcal{A}$ = *dis-log.advantage* (*dis-log-alt.adversary3* $\mathcal{A}$)
proof−
have *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit.rel-game* $\mathcal{A}$ = *TRY do* {
w ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let (*h*,*w*) = ((**g** [^] *w*, *g'* [^] *w*), *w*);
w' ← $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;
return-spmf ((*fst h* = **g** [^] *w'* ∧ *snd h* = *g'* [^] *w'*))} *ELSE return-spmf False*
unfolding *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit.rel-game-def*
by(*simp add*: *G-def R-def*)
also have ... = *TRY do* {
w ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let (*h*,*w*) = ((**g** [^] *w*, *g'* [^] *w*), *w*);
w' ← $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;
return-spmf ([*w* = *w'*] (*mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ∧ [*x*∗*w* = *x*∗*w'*] (*mod order* $\mathcal{G}$))} *ELSE return-spmf False*
apply(*intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *simp add*: *dis-log-alt.dis-log3-def dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def*)
by (*simp add*: *finite-carrier nat-pow-pow pow-generator-eq-iff-cong*)
also have ... = *dis-log-alt.dis-log3* $\mathcal{A}$
apply(*auto simp add*: *dis-log-alt.dis-log3-def dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def*)
by(*intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong*[*OF refl*]; *clarsimp?*; *auto simp add*: *cong-scalar-left*)
ultimately have *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit.rel-advantage* $\mathcal{A}$ = *dis-log-alt.advantage3* $\mathcal{A}$
by(*simp add*: *chaum-ped-*Σ*-commit.rel-advantage-def dis-log-alt.advantage3-def*)
thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *dis-log-alt-reductions.dis-log-adv3 cyclic-group-axioms dis-log-alt.dis-log-alt-axioms dis-log-alt-reductions.intro*)

qed

lemma *commitment-correct*: *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct*
by(*simp add*: *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.commit-correct*)

lemma *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$
using *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *binding*: *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage* $\mathcal{A} \leq$ *dis-log.advantage* (*dis-log-alt.adversary3* ((*chaum-ped-Σ-commit.adversary* $\mathcal{A}$)))
using *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.bind-advantage reduction-to-dis-log* **by** *simp*

end

locale *chaum-ped-asymp* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *nat* ⇒ *'grp cyclic-group*
and x :: *nat*
assumes *cp-Σ*: $\bigwedge\eta$. *chaum-ped-Σ* ($\mathcal{G}$ η)
begin

sublocale *chaum-ped-Σ* $\mathcal{G}$ η **for** η
by(*simp add*: *cp-Σ*)

The Σ-protocol statement comes easily in the asympotic setting.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.Σ-protocol n*
by(*simp add*: *Σ-protocol*)

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asymp-correct*: *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct n*
using *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asymp-perfect-hiding*: *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*)
using *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asymp-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* (λ *n*. *dis-log.advantage n* (*dis-log-alt.adversary3 n* ((*chaum-ped-Σ-commit.adversary n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*)))))
shows *negligible* (λ *n*. *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*))
using *chaum-ped-Σ-commit.bind-advantage assms chaum-ped-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def negligible-le binding* **by** *auto*

end

end

2.5 Okamoto Σ-protocol

theory *Okamoto-Sigma-Commit* **imports**
Commitment-Schemes
Sigma-Protocols
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
HOL.GCD
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale *okamoto-base* =
fixes $\mathcal{G}$ :: *'grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
and *x* :: *nat*
assumes *prime-order*: *prime* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)
begin

definition $g' = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ x$

lemma *order-gt-1*: *order* $\mathcal{G} > 1$
using *prime-order*
using *prime-gt-1-nat* **by** *blast*

lemma *order-gt-0* [*simp*]:*order* $\mathcal{G} > 0$
using *order-gt-1* **by** *simp*

definition *response r w e* = *do* {
let (*r1*,*r2*) = *r*;
let (*x1*,*x2*) = *w*;
let z1 = (*e* ∗ *x1* + *r1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let z2 = (*e* ∗ *x2* + *r2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf ((*z1*,*z2*))}

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response r w e*)
by(*simp add*: *response-def split-def*)

type-synonym *witness* = *nat* × *nat*
type-synonym *rand* = *nat* × *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' msg* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *response* = (*nat* × *nat*)
type-synonym *challenge* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' pub-in* = *'grp'*

definition *init* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *witness* ⇒ (*rand* × *'grp msg*) *spmf*
where *init y w* = *do* {
let (*x1*,*x2*) = *w*;
r1 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
r2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf ((*r1*,*r2*), $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ r1 \otimes g'\ [\widehat{}]\ r2$)}

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init h w*)
by(*simp add*: *init-def*)

definition *check* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *'grp msg* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ *response* ⇒ *bool*
where *check h a e z* = (**g** [^] (*fst z*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*snd z*) = *a* ⊗ (*h* [^] *e*) ∧ *a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$)

definition *R* :: (*'grp pub-in* × *witness*) *set*
where *R* ≡ {(*h*, *w*). (*h* = **g** [^] (*fst w*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*snd w*))}

definition *G* :: (*'grp pub-in* × *witness*) *spmf*
where *G* = *do* {
w1 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
w2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf (**g** [^] *w1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *w2* , (*w1*,*w2*))}

definition *challenge-space* = {..< *order* $\mathcal{G}$}

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
by(*simp add*: *G-def*)

definition *S2* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out spmf*
where *S2 h c* = *do* {
z1 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
z2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let a = (**g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2*) ⊗ (*inv h* [^] *c*);
return-spmf (*a*, (*z1*,*z2*))}

definition *R2* :: *'grp pub-in* ⇒ *witness* ⇒ *challenge* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple spmf*
where *R2 h w c* = *do* {
let (*x1*,*x2*) = *w*;
r1 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
r2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let z1 = (*c* ∗ *x1* + *r1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
let z2 = (*c* ∗ *x2* + *r2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$);
return-spmf (**g** [^] *r1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *r2* ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}

definition *ss-adversary* :: *'grp* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* ⇒ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* ⇒ (*nat* × *nat*) *spmf*
where *ss-adversary y c1 c2* = *do* {
let (*a*, *e*, (*z1*,*z2*)) = *c1*;
let (*a'*, *e'*, (*z1'*,*z2'*)) = *c2*;
return-spmf (*if* (*e* > *e'*) *then* (*nat* ((*int z1* − *int z1'*) ∗ *inverse* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *else*
(*nat* ((*int z1'* − *int z1*) ∗ *inverse* (*e'* − *e*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)),
if (*e* > *e'*) *then* (*nat* ((*int z2* − *int z2'*) ∗ *inverse* (*e* − *e'*) (*order*

$\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *else*
(*nat* ((*int z2'* − *int z2*) ∗ *inverse* (*e'* − *e*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)))}

definition *valid-pub* = *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
end

locale *okamoto* = *okamoto-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *g'-in-carrier* [*simp*]: *g'* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
using *g'-def* **by** *auto*

sublocale Σ-*protocols-base*: Σ-*protocols-base init response check R S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub*
by *unfold-locales* (*auto simp add*: *R-def valid-pub-def*)

lemma Σ-*protocols-base.R h w c* = *R2 h w c*
by(*simp add*: Σ-*protocols-base.R-def R2-def*; *simp add*: *init-def split-def response-def*)

lemma *completeness*:
shows Σ-*protocols-base.completeness*
proof−
have (**g** [^] ((*e* ∗ *fst w'* + *y*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*e* ∗ *snd w'* + *ya*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) = **g** [^] *y* ⊗ *g'* [^] *ya* ⊗ (**g** [^] *fst w'* ⊗ *g'* [^] *snd w'*) [^] *e*)
for *e y ya* :: *nat* **and** *w'* :: *nat* × *nat*
proof−
have **g** [^] ((*e* ∗ *fst w'* + *y*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*e* ∗ *snd w'* + *ya*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) = **g** [^] ((*y* + *e* ∗ *fst w'*)) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*ya* + *e* ∗ *snd w'*))
by (*simp add*: *cyclic-group.pow-carrier-mod cyclic-group-axioms g'-def add.commute pow-generator-mod*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *y* ⊗ **g** [^] (*e* ∗ *fst w'*) ⊗ *g'* [^] *ya* ⊗ *g'* [^] (*e* ∗ *snd w'*)
by (*simp add*: *g'-def m-assoc nat-pow-mult*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *y* ⊗ *g'* [^] *ya* ⊗ **g** [^] (*e* ∗ *fst w'*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*e* ∗ *snd w'*)
by (*smt add.commute g'-def generator-closed m-assoc nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *y* ⊗ *g'* [^] *ya* ⊗ ((**g** [^] *fst w'*) [^] *e* ⊗ (*g'* [^] *snd w'*) [^] *e*)
by (*simp add*: *m-assoc mult.commute nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *y* ⊗ *g'* [^] *ya* ⊗ ((**g** [^] *fst w'* ⊗ *g'* [^] *snd w'*) [^] *e*)
by (*smt power-distrib g'-def generator-closed mult.commute nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed
thus *?thesis*
unfolding Σ-*protocols-base.completeness-def* Σ-*protocols-base.completeness-game-def*
by(*simp add*: *R-def challenge-space-def init-def check-def response-def split-def bind-spmf-const*)
qed

lemma *hvzk-z-r*:
assumes *r1*: *r1* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
shows *r1* = ((*r1* + *c* * (*x1* :: *nat*)) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* − *c* * *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)
proof(*cases x1* = *0*)
case *True*
then show *?thesis* **using** *r1* **by** *simp*
next
case *x1-neq-0*: *False*
have *z1-eq*: [(*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* = *r1* + *c* * *x1*] (*mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
using *gr-implies-not-zero order-gt-1*
by (*simp add*: *Groups.mult-ac*(*1*) *cong-def*)
hence [(*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* − *c* * *x1* = *r1*] (*mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof(*cases c* = *0*)
case *True*
then show *?thesis*
using *z1-eq* **by** *auto*
next
case *False*
have *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* − *c* * *x1* > *0* **using** *x1-neq-0 False*
using *prime-gt-1-nat prime-order* **by** *auto*
thus *?thesis*
by (*smt Groups.add-ac*(*2*) *add-diff-inverse-nat cong-add-lcancel-nat diff-is-0-eq le-simps*(*1*) *neq0-conv trans-less-add2 z1-eq zero-less-diff*)
qed
thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *r1 cong-def*)
qed

lemma *hvzk-z1-r1-tuple-rewrite*:
assumes *r1*: *r1* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
shows (**g** [^] *r1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *r2*, *c*, (*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$, (*r2* + *c* * *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) =
(**g** [^] (((*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* − *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
⊗ *g'* [^] *r2*, *c*, (*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$, (*r2* + *c* * *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
proof−
have **g** [^] *r1* = **g** [^] (((*r1* + *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ * *c* * *x1* − *c* * *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *assms hvzk-z-r* **by** *simp*
thus *?thesis* **by** *argo*
qed

lemma *hvzk-z2-r2-tuple-rewrite*:
assumes *xb* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$

shows (**g** [^] (((*x'* + *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *xa* ∗ *x1* − *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
⊗ *g'* [^] *xb*, *xa*, (*x'* + *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$, (*xb* + *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) =
(**g** [^] (((*x'* + *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *xa* ∗ *x1* − *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
⊗ *g'* [^] (((*xb* + *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *xa* ∗ *x2* − *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$), *xa*, (*x'* + *xa* ∗ *x1*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$, (*xb* + *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
proof−
have *g'* [^] *xb* = *g'* [^] (((*xb* + *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *xa* ∗ *x2* − *xa* ∗ *x2*) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
using *hvzk-z-r assms* **by** *simp*
thus *?thesis* **by** *argo*
qed

lemma *hvzk-sim-inverse-rewrite*:
assumes *h*: *h* = **g** [^] (*x1* :: *nat*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*x2* :: *nat*)
shows **g** [^] (((*z1*::*nat*) + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
⊗ *g'* [^] (((*z2*::*nat*) + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
= (**g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2*) ⊗ (*inv h* [^] *c*)
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *in-carrier1*: (*g'* [^] *x2*) [^] *c* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$ **by** *simp*
have *in-carrier2*: (**g** [^] *x1*) [^] *c* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$ **by** *simp*
have *pow-distrib1*: *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1* = (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*) ∗ *c* ∗ *x1*
and *pow-distrib2*: *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2* = (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*) ∗ *c* ∗ *x2*
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *diff-mult-distrib*)+
have *?lhs* = **g** [^] (*z1* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*z2* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*)
by (*simp add*: *pow-carrier-mod*)
also have ... = **g** [^] (*z1* + (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*)) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*z2* + (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*))
using *h*
by (*smt Nat.add-diff-assoc diff-zero le-simps*(*1*) *nat-0-less-mult-iff neq0-conv pow-distrib1 pow-distrib2 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order zero-less-diff*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ **g** [^] (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ *g'* [^] (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*)
using *nat-pow-mult*
by (*simp add*: *m-assoc*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ **g** [^] (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) ⊗ *g'* [^] (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*)
by (*smt add.commute g'-def generator-closed m-assoc nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ **g** [^] ((*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*) ∗ *c* ∗ *x1*) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*) ∗ *c* ∗ *x2*)
using *pow-distrib1 pow-distrib2* **by** *argo*
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ (**g** [^] (*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*)) [^] (*c* ∗ *x1*) ⊗ (*g'* [^] ((*order* $\mathcal{G}$ − *1*))) [^] (*c* ∗ *x2*)
by (*simp add*: *more-arith-simps*(*11*) *nat-pow-pow*)

also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ (*inv* (**g** [^] *c*)) [^] *x1* ⊗ (*inv* (*g'* [^] *c*)) [^] *x2*
using *assms neg-power-inverse inverse-pow-pow nat-pow-pow prime-gt-1-nat prime-order* **by** *auto*
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ (*inv* ((**g** [^] *c*) [^] *x1*)) ⊗ (*inv* ((*g'* [^] *c*) [^] *x2*))
by (*simp add*: *inverse-pow-pow*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ ((*inv* ((**g** [^] *x1*) [^] *c*)) ⊗ (*inv* ((*g'* [^] *x2*) [^] *c*)))
by (*simp add*: *mult.commute cyclic-group-assoc nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ *inv* ((**g** [^] *x1*) [^] *c* ⊗ (*g'* [^] *x2*) [^] *c*)
using *inverse-split in-carrier2 in-carrier1* **by** *simp*
also have ... = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *c*)
using *h cyclic-group-commute monoid-comm-monoidI*
by (*simp add*: *pow-mult-distrib*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *h inverse-pow-pow*)
qed

lemma *hv-zk*:
assumes *h* = **g** [^] *x1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *x2*
shows Σ-*protocols-base.R h* (*x1*,*x2*) *c* = Σ-*protocols-base.S h c*
including *monad-normalisation*
proof−
have Σ-*protocols-base.R h* (*x1*,*x2*) *c* = *do* {
r1 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢);
r2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢);
let z1 = (*r1* + *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢);
let z2 = (*r2* + *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢);
return-spmf (**g** [^] *r1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *r2* ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: Σ-*protocols-base.R-def R2-def*; *simp add*: *add.commute init-def split-def response-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
r2 ← *sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢);
z1 ← *map-spmf* (λ *r1*. (*r1* + *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) (*sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢));
let z2 = (*r2* + *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢);
return-spmf (**g** [^] ((*z1* + *order* 𝒢 ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) ⊗ *g'* [^] *r2* ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def hvzk-z1-r1-tuple-rewrite assms cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... = *do* {
z1 ← *map-spmf* (λ *r1*. (*r1* + *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) (*sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢));
z2 ← *map-spmf* (λ *r2*. (*r2* + *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) (*sample-uniform* (*order* 𝒢));
return-spmf (**g** [^] ((*z1* + *order* 𝒢 ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*z2* + *order* 𝒢 ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* 𝒢)) ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def hvzk-z2-r2-tuple-rewrite cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)

also have ... = *do* {
z1 ← *map-spmf* (λ *r1*. (*c* ∗ *x1* + *r1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
z2 ← *map-spmf* (λ *r2*. (*c* ∗ *x2* + *r2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
return-spmf (**g** [^] ((*z1* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*z2* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: *add.commute*)
also have ... = *do* {
z1 ← (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
z2 ← (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
return-spmf (**g** [^] ((*z1* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x1* − *c* ∗ *x1*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*z2* + *order* $\mathcal{G}$ ∗ *c* ∗ *x2* − *c* ∗ *x2*) *mod* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: *samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad*)
also have ... = *do* {
z1 ← (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
z2 ← (*sample-uniform* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$));
return-spmf ((**g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2*) ⊗ (*inv h* [^] *c*) ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}
by(*simp add*: *hvzk-sim-inverse-rewrite assms cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by(*simp add*: Σ*-protocols-base.S-def S2-def bind-map-spmf map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf*)
qed

lemma *HVZK*:
shows Σ*-protocols-base.HVZK*
unfolding Σ*-protocols-base.HVZK-def*
apply(*auto simp add*: *R-def challenge-space-def hv-zk S2-def check-def valid-pub-def*)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *cyclic-group-commute g'-in-carrier generator-closed inv-closed inv-solve-left inverse-pow-pow m-closed nat-pow-closed*)

lemma *ss-rewrite*:
assumes *h* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *a* ∈ *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
and *e* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$
and **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z1'* = *a* ⊗ *h* [^] *e*
and *e'* < *e*
and **g** [^] *z2* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2'* = *a* ⊗ *h* [^] *e'*
shows *h* = **g** [^] ((*int z1* − *int z2*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) ⊗ *g'* [^] ((*int z1'* − *int z2'*) ∗ *fst* (*bezw* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))
proof−
have *gcd*: *gcd* (*e* − *e'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) = *1*
using *prime-field assms prime-order* **by** *simp*
have **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z1'* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *e*) = *a*
by (*simp add*: *inv-solve-right' assms*)
moreover have **g** [^] *z2* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2'* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *e'*) = *a*
by (*simp add*: *assms inv-solve-right'*)
ultimately have **g** [^] *z2* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z2'* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *e'*) = **g** [^] *z1* ⊗ *g'* [^] *z1'* ⊗ *inv* (*h* [^] *e*)
using *g'-def* **by** (*simp add*: *nat-pow-pow*)

moreover obtain $t :: nat$ **where** t: $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *assms generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z2 \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * z2') \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (t * e) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ z1 \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * z1') \otimes (\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (t * e'))$
using *assms*(2) *assms*(4) *cyclic-group-commute m-assoc g'-def nat-pow-pow* **by** *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (z2 + x * z2' + t * e) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (z1 + x * z1' + t * e')$
by (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
hence $[z2 + x * z2' + t * e = z1 + x * z1' + t * e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[int\ z2 + int\ x * int\ z2' + int\ t * int\ e = int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' + int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence $[int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ z2 - int\ x * int\ z2' = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-sym*)
hence $[int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ z2 - int\ x * int\ z2' = int\ t * (e - e')]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *int-distrib*(4) *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *of-nat-diff*)
hence $[(int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ z2 - int\ x * int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * (e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ z2 - int\ x * int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * ((e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add*: *mult.assoc*)
hence $[(int\ z1 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ z2 - int\ x * int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * 1]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *cong-scalar-left cong-trans inverse gcd*)
hence $[(int\ z1 - int\ z2 + int\ x * int\ z1' - int\ x * int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by *smt*
hence $[(int\ z1 - int\ z2 + int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add*: *Rings.ring-distribs*(4) *add-diff-eq*)
hence $[nat\ ((int\ z1 - int\ z2 + int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (nat\ ((int\ z1 - int\ z2 + int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *cong-int-iff finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ z1 - int\ z2 + int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *pow-generator-mod-int* **by** *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ z1 - int\ z2) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) + int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
by (*metis Rings.ring-distribs*(2) *t*)
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ z1 - int\ z2) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (int\ x * (int\ z1' - int\ z2') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *int-pow-mult* **by** *auto*

thus *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *opaque-lifting*) *g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*) *pow-generator-mod-int t*)
qed

lemma
assumes *h-mem*: $h \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and *a-mem*: $a \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and *a*: $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z \otimes g'\ [\widehat{}]\ snd\ z = a \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e$
and *a'*: $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z' \otimes g'\ [\widehat{}]\ snd\ z' = a \otimes h\ [\widehat{}]\ e'$
and *e-e'-mod*: $e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} < e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}$
shows $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
$\otimes\ g'\ [\widehat{}]\ ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
proof−
have *gcd*: $gcd\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = 1$
using *prime-field*
by (*simp add*: *assms less-imp-diff-less linorder-not-le prime-order*)
have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z \otimes g'\ [\widehat{}]\ snd\ z \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e) = a$
using *a h-mem a-mem* **by** (*simp add*: *inv-solve-right'*)
moreover have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z' \otimes g'\ [\widehat{}]\ snd\ z' \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e') = a$
using *a h-mem a-mem* **by** (*simp add*: *assms*(*4*) *inv-solve-right'*)
ultimately have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * snd\ z) \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e) = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z' \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * snd\ z') \otimes inv\ (h\ [\widehat{}]\ e')$
using *g'-def* **by** (*simp add*: *nat-pow-pow*)
moreover obtain *t* :: *nat* **where** *t*: $h = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ t$
using *h-mem generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * snd\ z) \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (t * e') = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ fst\ z' \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (x * snd\ z') \otimes \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (t * e)$
using *a-mem assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) *cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute g'-def nat-pow-pow* **by** *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (fst\ z + x * snd\ z + t * e') = \mathbf{g}\ [\widehat{}]\ (fst\ z' + x * snd\ z' + t * e)$
by (*simp add*: *nat-pow-mult*)
hence $[fst\ z + x * snd\ z + t * e' = fst\ z' + x * snd\ z' + t * e]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[int\ (fst\ z) + int\ x * int\ (snd\ z) + int\ t * int\ e' = int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * int\ (snd\ z') + int\ t * int\ e]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence $[int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * int\ (snd\ z) - int\ x * int\ (snd\ z') = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0*)
hence $[int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
proof −
have $[int\ (fst\ z) + (int\ (x * snd\ z) - (int\ (fst\ z') + int\ (x * snd\ z'))) = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*simp add*: *Rings.ring-distribs*(*4*) ‹$[int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * int\ (snd\ z) - int\ x * int\ (snd\ z') = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e']\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$›

add-diff-add add-diff-eq)
then have $\exists i.\ [int\ (fst\ z) + (int\ x * int\ (snd\ z) - (int\ (fst\ z') + i * int\ (snd\ z'))) = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e') + int\ (snd\ z') * (int\ x - i)]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *add.commute arith-simps*(*49*) *cancel-comm-monoid-add-class.diff-cancel int-ops*(*7*) *mult-eq-0-iff*)
then have $\exists i.\ [int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + (int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) + i) = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e') + i]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *add-diff-add add-diff-eq mult-diff-mult mult-of-nat-commute*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *add.assoc cong-add-rcancel*)
qed
hence $[int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) = int\ t * (int\ e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - int\ e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mod-trivial mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence $[int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) = int\ t * (e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *e-e'-mod*
by (*simp add*: *int-ops*(*9*) *of-nat-diff*)
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z'))) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} = int\ t * (e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-cong-mod-int cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z'))) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} = int\ t * ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *cong-mod-right mod-mult-eq mod-mult-left-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*) *zmod-int*)
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z') + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z'))) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} = int\ t * 1]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *inverse gcd*
by (*smt Num.of-nat-simps*(*5*) *Number-Theory-Aux.inverse cong-def mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*6*) *of-nat-1*)
hence $[((int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) + (int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')))) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} = int\ t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by *auto*
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}) + (int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z'))) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$

$= int\ t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*) *cong-mod-left distrib-right mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} + (int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')))$
$* (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
$= t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
proof −
have $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = (int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *cong-def mod-mult-right-eq*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*meson* ‹$[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$› *cong-add-rcancel cong-mod-left cong-trans*)
qed
hence $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} + (int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')))$
$* fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}$
$= t]\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
proof −
have $int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *mod-mod-trivial mod-mult-right-eq*)
then have $[int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *cong-def*)
then have $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) + int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = (int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) + int\ x * (int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * (fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *Groups.mult-ac*(*1*) *cong-add cong-refl*)
then have $[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) + int\ x * ((int\ (snd\ z) - int\ (snd\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))\ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = int\ t]\ (mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
using ‹$[(int\ (fst\ z) - int\ (fst\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ ((e\ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} - e'\ mod\ order$

$\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) + *int* x * (*int* (*snd* z) − *int* (*snd* z')) * (*fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) = *int* t] (*mod int* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))› *cong-trans* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *Groups.mult-ac*(*1*))
qed
hence g [^] ((*int* (*fst* z) − *int* (*fst* z')) * *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ + (*int* x * (*int* (*snd* z) − *int* (*snd* z')))
* *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
= **g** [^] t
by (*metis cong-def int-pow-int pow-generator-mod-int*)
hence g [^] ((*int* (*fst* z) − *int* (*fst* z')) * *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) ⊗ **g** [^] ((*int* x * (*int* (*snd* z) − *int* (*snd* z')))
* *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$)
= **g** [^] t
using *int-pow-mult* **by** *auto*
hence g [^] ((*int* (*fst* z) − *int* (*fst* z')) * *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) ⊗ **g** [^] ((*int* x * ((*int* (*snd* z) − *int* (*snd* z')))
* *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$))
= **g** [^] t
by *blast*
hence g [^] ((*int* (*fst* z) − *int* (*fst* z')) * *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) ⊗ g' [^] ((((*int* (*snd* z) − *int* (*snd* z')))
* *fst* (*bezw* ((*e mod order* $\mathcal{G}$ − e' *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)) *mod order* $\mathcal{G}$))
= **g** [^] t
by (*smt g'-def cyclic-group.generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps*(*11*) *okamoto-axioms okamoto-def pow-generator-mod-int*)
thus *?thesis* **using** t **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *special-soundness*:
shows Σ-*protocols-base.special-soundness*
unfolding Σ-*protocols-base.special-soundness-def*
by(*auto simp add*: *valid-pub-def check-def R-def ss-adversary-def Let-def ss-rewrite challenge-space-def split-def*)

theorem Σ-*protocol*:
shows Σ-*protocols-base*.Σ-*protocol*
by(*simp add*: Σ-*protocols-base*.Σ-*protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness*)

sublocale *okamoto*-Σ-*commit*: Σ-*protocols-to-commitments init response check R*

```
S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G
  apply unfold-locales
  apply(auto simp add: Σ-protocol)
  by(auto simp add: G-def R-def lossless-init lossless-response)

sublocale dis-log: dis-log 𝒢
  unfolding dis-log-def by simp

sublocale dis-log-alt: dis-log-alt 𝒢 x
  unfolding dis-log-alt-def
  by(simp add:)

lemma reduction-to-dis-log:
 shows okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-advantage 𝒜 = dis-log.advantage (dis-log-alt.adversary2
𝒜)
proof−
  have exp-rewrite: g [^] w1 ⊗ g' [^] w2 =  g [^] (w1 + x * w2) for w1 w2 :: nat
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow g'-def)
  have okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-game 𝒜 = TRY do {
    w1 ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    w2 ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    let h = (g [^] w1 ⊗ g' [^] w2);
    (w1',w2') ← 𝒜 h;
    return-spmf (h = g [^] w1' ⊗ g' [^] w2')} ELSE return-spmf False
    unfolding okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-game-def
    by(simp add: Let-def split-def R-def G-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    w1 ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    w2 ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    let w = (w1 + x * w2) mod (order 𝒢);
    let h = g [^] w;
    (w1',w2') ← 𝒜 h;
    return-spmf (h = g [^] w1' ⊗ g' [^] w2')} ELSE return-spmf False
    using g'-def exp-rewrite pow-generator-mod by simp
  also have ... = TRY do {
    w2 ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    w ← map-spmf (λ w1. (x * w2 + w1) mod (order 𝒢)) (sample-uniform (order
𝒢));
    let h = g [^] w;
    (w1',w2') ← 𝒜 h;
    return-spmf (h = g [^] w1' ⊗ g' [^] w2')} ELSE return-spmf False
    including monad-normalisation
    by(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def add.commute)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    w2 :: nat ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    w ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    let h = g [^] w;
    (w1',w2') ← 𝒜 h;
    return-spmf (h = g [^] w1' ⊗ g' [^] w2')} ELSE return-spmf False
```

```
    using samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad add.commute by simp
  also have ... = TRY do {
    w ← sample-uniform (order 𝒢);
    let h = g [^] w;
    (w1',w2') ← 𝒜 h;
    return-spmf (h = g [^] w1' ⊗ g' [^] w2')} ELSE return-spmf False
    by(simp add: bind-spmf-const)
  also have ... = dis-log-alt.dis-log2 𝒜
    apply(simp add: dis-log-alt.dis-log2-def Let-def dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def)
    apply(intro try-spmf-cong)
     apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)
     apply auto
    using exp-rewrite pow-generator-mod g'-def
      apply (metis group-eq-pow-eq-mod okamoto-axioms okamoto-base.order-gt-0
okamoto-def)
    using exp-rewrite g'-def order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by auto
  ultimately have okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-game 𝒜 = dis-log-alt.dis-log2 𝒜
    by simp
  hence okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-advantage 𝒜 = dis-log-alt.advantage2 𝒜
    by(simp add: okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-advantage-def dis-log-alt.advantage2-def)
  thus ?thesis
   by (simp add: dis-log-alt-reductions.dis-log-adv2 cyclic-group-axioms dis-log-alt.dis-log-alt-axioms
dis-log-alt-reductions.intro)
qed

lemma commitment-correct: okamoto-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct
  by(simp add: okamoto-Σ-commit.commit-correct)

lemma okamoto-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa 𝒜
  using okamoto-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding by blast

lemma binding:
  shows okamoto-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage 𝒜
        ≤ dis-log.advantage (dis-log-alt.adversary2 (okamoto-Σ-commit.adversary
𝒜))
  using okamoto-Σ-commit.bind-advantage reduction-to-dis-log by auto

end

locale okamoto-asymp =
  fixes 𝒢 :: nat ⇒ 'grp cyclic-group
    and x :: nat
  assumes okamoto: ⋀η. okamoto (𝒢 η)
begin

sublocale okamoto 𝒢 η for η
  by(simp add: okamoto)
```

The Σ-protocol statement comes easily in the asympotic setting.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows Σ-*protocols-base.*Σ-*protocol n*
by(*simp add*: Σ-*protocol*)

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asymp-correct*: *okamoto-*Σ*-commit.abstract-com.correct n*
using *okamoto-*Σ*-commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asymp-perfect-hiding*: *okamoto-*Σ*-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*)
using *okamoto-*Σ*-commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asymp-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* (λ *n. dis-log.advantage n* (*dis-log-alt.adversary2* (*okamoto-*Σ*-commit.adversary n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*))))
shows *negligible* (λ *n. okamoto-*Σ*-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage n* ($\mathcal{A}$ *n*))
using *okamoto-*Σ*-commit.bind-advantage assms okamoto-*Σ*-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def negligible-le binding* **by** *auto*

end

end
theory *Xor* **imports**
HOL−Algebra.Complete-Lattice
CryptHOL.Misc-CryptHOL
begin

unbundle *no lattice-syntax*

context *bounded-lattice* **begin**

lemma *top-join* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow \top \sqcup x = \top$
using *eq-is-equal top-join* **by** *auto*

lemma *join-top* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow x \sqcup \top = \top$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *bot-join* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow \bot \sqcup x = x$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *join-bot* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow x \sqcup \bot = x$
by (*metis bot-join join-comm*)

lemma *bot-meet* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow \bot \sqcap x = \bot$
using *bottom-meet* **by** *auto*

lemma *meet-bot* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* $L \Longrightarrow x \sqcap \bot = \bot$

by (*metis bot-meet meet-comm*)

lemma *top-meet* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow \top \sqcap x = x$
by (*metis le-iff-join meet-comm top-closed top-higher*)

lemma *meet-top* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow x \sqcap \top = x$
by (*metis meet-comm top-meet*)

lemma *join-idem* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow x \sqcup x = x$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *meet-idem* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow x \sqcap x = x$
using *le-iff-join le-refl* **by** *presburger*

lemma *meet-leftcomm*: $x \sqcap (y \sqcap z) = y \sqcap (x \sqcap z)$ **if** $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $y \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $z \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$
by (*metis meet-assoc meet-comm that*)

lemma *join-leftcomm*: $x \sqcup (y \sqcup z) = y \sqcup (x \sqcup z)$ **if** $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $y \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $z \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$
by (*metis join-assoc join-comm that*)

lemmas *meet-ac* = *meet-assoc meet-comm meet-leftcomm*
lemmas *join-ac* = *join-assoc join-comm join-leftcomm*

end

record *'a boolean-algebra* = *'a gorder* +
compl :: *'a* ⇒ *'a* (‹−1› *1000*)

definition *xor* :: (*'a*, *'b*) *boolean-algebra-scheme* ⇒ *'a* ⇒ *'a* ⇒ *'a* (**infixr** ‹⊕1› *100*)
where
$x \oplus y = (x \sqcup y) \sqcap (- (x \sqcap y))$ **for** *L* (**structure**)

locale *boolean-algebra* = *bounded-lattice L*
for *L* (**structure**) +
assumes *compl-closed* [*intro*, *simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow - x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$
and *meet-compl-bot* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow - x \sqcap x = \bot$
and *join-compl-top* [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L \Longrightarrow - x \sqcup x = \top$
and *join-meet-distrib1*: $[\![x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L; y \in \mathit{carrier}\ L; z \in \mathit{carrier}\ L]\!] \Longrightarrow x \sqcup (y \sqcap z) = (x \sqcup y) \sqcap (x \sqcup z)$
begin

lemma *join-meet-distrib2*: $(y \sqcap z) \sqcup x = (y \sqcup x) \sqcap (z \sqcup x)$
if $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $y \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $z \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$
by (*simp add*: *join-comm join-meet-distrib1 that*)

lemma *meet-join-distrib1*: $x \sqcap (y \sqcup z) = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (x \sqcap z)$
if [*simp*]: $x \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $y \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$ $z \in \mathit{carrier}\ L$

proof −
have $x \sqcap (y \sqcup z) = (x \sqcap (x \sqcup z)) \sqcap (y \sqcup z)$
using *join-left le-iff-join* **by** *auto*
also have $\ldots = x \sqcap (z \sqcup (x \sqcap y))$
by (*simp add*: *join-comm join-meet-distrib1 meet-assoc*)
also have $\ldots = ((x \sqcap y) \sqcup x) \sqcap ((x \sqcap y) \sqcup z)$
by (*metis join-comm le-iff-meet meet-closed meet-left that*(*1*) *that*(*2*))
also have $\ldots = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (x \sqcap z)$
by (*simp add*: *join-meet-distrib1*)
finally show *?thesis* **.**
qed

lemma *meet-join-distrib2*: $(y \sqcup z) \sqcap x = (y \sqcap x) \sqcup (z \sqcap x)$
if [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L* $y \in$ *carrier L* $z \in$ *carrier L*
by (*simp add*: *meet-comm meet-join-distrib1*)

lemmas *join-meet-distrib* = *join-meet-distrib1 join-meet-distrib2*

lemmas *meet-join-distrib* = *meet-join-distrib1 meet-join-distrib2*

lemmas *distrib* = *join-meet-distrib meet-join-distrib*

lemma *meet-compl2-bot* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L* $\Longrightarrow x \sqcap - x = \bot$
by (*metis meet-comm meet-compl-bot*)

lemma *join-compl2-top* [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L* $\Longrightarrow x \sqcup - x = \top$
by (*metis join-comm join-compl-top*)

lemma *compl-unique*:
assumes $x \sqcap y = \bot$
and $x \sqcup y = \top$
and [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L* $y \in$ *carrier L*
shows $- x = y$
proof −
have $(x \sqcap - x) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y) = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y)$
using *inf-compl-bot assms*(*1*) **by** *simp*
then have $(- x \sqcap x) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y) = (y \sqcap x) \sqcup (y \sqcap - x)$
by (*simp add*: *meet-comm*)
then have $- x \sqcap (x \sqcup y) = y \sqcap (x \sqcup - x)$
using *assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) *compl-closed meet-join-distrib1* **by** *presburger*
then have $- x \sqcap \top = y \sqcap \top$
by (*simp add*: *assms*(*2*))
then show $- x = y$
using *le-iff-join top-higher* **by** *auto*
qed

lemma *double-compl* [*simp*]: $- (- x) = x$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L*
by(*rule compl-unique*)(*simp-all*)

lemma *compl-eq-compl-iff* [*simp*]: $- x = - y \longleftrightarrow x = y$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
by (*metis double-compl that that*)

lemma *compl-bot-eq* [*simp*]: $- \bot = \top$
using *le-iff-join le-iff-meet local.compl-unique top-higher* **by** *auto*

lemma *compl-top-eq* [*simp*]: $- \top = \bot$
by (*metis bottom-closed compl-bot-eq double-compl*)

lemma *compl-inf* [*simp*]: $- (x \sqcap y) = - x \sqcup - y$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
proof (*rule compl-unique*)
have $(x \sqcap y) \sqcap (- x \sqcup - y) = (y \sqcap (x \sqcap - x)) \sqcup (x \sqcap (y \sqcap - y))$
by (*smt compl-closed meet-assoc meet-closed meet-comm meet-join-distrib1 that*)
then show $(x \sqcap y) \sqcap (- x \sqcup - y) = \bot$
by (*metis bottom-closed bottom-lower le-iff-join le-iff-meet meet-comm meet-compl2-bot that*)
next
have $(x \sqcap y) \sqcup (- x \sqcup - y) = (- y \sqcup (x \sqcup - x)) \sqcap (- x \sqcup (y \sqcup - y))$
by (*smt compl-closed join-meet-distrib2 join-assoc join-comm local.boolean-algebra-axioms that join-closed*)
then show $(x \sqcap y) \sqcup (- x \sqcup - y) = \top$
by (*metis compl-closed join-compl2-top join-right le-iff-join le-iff-meet that top-closed*)
qed *simp-all*

lemma *compl-sup* [*simp*]: $- (x \sqcup y) = - x \sqcap - y$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
by (*metis compl-closed compl-inf double-compl meet-closed that*)

lemma *compl-mono*:
assumes $x \sqsubseteq y$
and $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
shows $- y \sqsubseteq - x$
by (*metis assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *assms*(*3*) *compl-closed join-comm le-iff-join le-iff-meet compl-inf*)

lemma *compl-le-compl-iff* [*simp*]: $- x \sqsubseteq - y \longleftrightarrow y \sqsubseteq x$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
using *that* **by** (*auto dest*: *compl-mono*)

lemma *compl-le-swap1*:
assumes $y \sqsubseteq - x$ $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
shows $x \sqsubseteq - y$
by (*metis assms compl-closed compl-le-compl-iff double-compl*)

lemma *compl-le-swap2*:
assumes $- y \sqsubseteq x$ $x \in$ *carrier* L $y \in$ *carrier* L
shows $- x \sqsubseteq y$

by (*metis assms compl-closed compl-le-compl-iff double-compl*)

lemma *join-compl-top-left1* [*simp*]: $- x \sqcup (x \sqcup y) = \top$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L y* $\in$ *carrier L*
by (*simp add*: *join-assoc*[*symmetric*])

lemma *join-compl-top-left2* [*simp*]: $x \sqcup (- x \sqcup y) = \top$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L y* $\in$ *carrier L*
using *join-compl-top-left1*[*of* $- x$ *y*] **by** *simp*

lemma *meet-compl-bot-left1* [*simp*]: $- x \sqcap (x \sqcap y) = \bot$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L y* $\in$ *carrier L*
by (*simp add*: *meet-assoc*[*symmetric*])

lemma *meet-compl-bot-left2* [*simp*]: $x \sqcap (- x \sqcap y) = \bot$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L y* $\in$ *carrier L*
using *meet-compl-bot-left1*[*of* $- x$ *y*] **by** *simp*

lemma *meet-compl-bot-right* [*simp*]: $x \sqcap (y \sqcap - x) = \bot$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L y* $\in$ *carrier L*
by (*metis meet-compl-bot-left2 meet-comm that*)

lemma *xor-closed* [*intro*, *simp*]: $[\![x \in$ *carrier L*; $y \in$ *carrier L* $]\!] \Longrightarrow x \oplus y \in$ *carrier L*
by(*simp add*: *xor-def*)

lemma *xor-comm*: $[\![x \in$ *carrier L*; $y \in$ *carrier L* $]\!] \Longrightarrow x \oplus y = y \oplus x$
by(*simp add*: *xor-def meet-join-distrib join-comm*)

lemma *xor-assoc*: $(x \oplus y) \oplus z = x \oplus (y \oplus z)$
if [*simp*]: $x \in$ *carrier L* $y \in$ *carrier L* $z \in$ *carrier L*
by(*simp add*: *xor-def*)(*simp add*: *meet-join-distrib meet-ac join-ac*)

lemma *xor-left-comm*: $x \oplus (y \oplus z) = y \oplus (x \oplus z)$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier L* $y \in$ *carrier L* $z \in$ *carrier L*
using *that xor-assoc xor-comm* **by** *auto*

lemma [*simp*]:
assumes $x \in$ *carrier L*
shows *xor-bot*: $x \oplus \bot = x$
and *bot-xor*: $\bot \oplus x = x$
and *xor-top*: $x \oplus \top = - x$
and *top-xor*: $\top \oplus x = - x$
by(*simp-all add*: *xor-def assms*)

lemma *xor-inverse* [*simp*]: $x \oplus x = \bot$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier L*
by(*simp add*: *xor-def that*)

lemma *xor-left-inverse* [*simp*]: $x \oplus x \oplus y = y$ **if** $x \in$ *carrier L* $y \in$ *carrier L*

using *that xor-assoc* **by** *fastforce*

lemmas *xor-ac* = *xor-assoc xor-comm xor-left-comm*

lemma *inj-on-xor*: *inj-on* ((⊕) *x*) (*carrier L*) **if** *x* ∈ *carrier L*
by(*rule inj-onI*)(*metis that xor-left-inverse*)

lemma *surj-xor*: (⊕) *x* ' *carrier L* = *carrier L* **if** [*simp*]: *x* ∈ *carrier L*
proof(*rule Set.set-eqI*, *rule iffI*)
fix *y*
assume [*simp*]: *y* ∈ *carrier L*
have *x* ⊕ *y* ∈ *carrier L* **by**(*simp*)
moreover have *y* = *x* ⊕ (*x* ⊕ *y*) **by** *simp*
ultimately show *y* ∈ (⊕) *x* ' *carrier L* **by**(*rule rev-image-eqI*)
qed *auto*

lemma *one-time-pad*: *map-spmf* ((⊕) *x*) (*spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*)) = *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*)
if *x* ∈ *carrier L*
apply(*subst map-spmf-of-set-inj-on*)
apply(*rule inj-on-xor*[*OF that*])
by(*simp add*: *surj-xor that*)

end

end

2.6 Σ-AND statements

theory *Sigma-AND* **imports**
Sigma-Protocols
Xor
begin

locale Σ*-AND-base* = Σ*0*: Σ*-protocols-base init0 response0 check0 Rel0 S0-raw* 𝒜*ss0 carrier L valid-pub0*
+ Σ*1*: Σ*-protocols-base init1 response1 check1 Rel1 S1-raw* 𝒜*ss1 carrier L valid-pub1*
for *init1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'witness1* ⇒ (*'rand1* × *'msg1*) *spmf*
and *response1* :: *'rand1* ⇒ *'witness1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response1 spmf*
and *check1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'msg1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response1* ⇒ *bool*
and *Rel1* :: (*'pub1* × *'witness1*) *set*
and *S1-raw* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'msg1* × *'response1*) *spmf*
and 𝒜*ss1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'msg1* × *'bool* × *'response1* ⇒ *'msg1* × *'bool* × *'response1* ⇒ *'witness1 spmf*
and *challenge-space1* :: *'bool set*
and *valid-pub1* :: *'pub1 set*
and *init0* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'witness0* ⇒ (*'rand0* × *'msg0*) *spmf*
and *response0* :: *'rand0* ⇒ *'witness0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response0 spmf*
and *check0* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'msg0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response0* ⇒ *bool*

and *Rel0* :: (*'pub0* × *'witness0*) *set*
and *S0-raw* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'msg0* × *'response0*) *spmf*
and $\mathcal{A}ss0$ :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'msg0* × *'bool* × *'response0* ⇒ *'msg0* × *'bool* × *'response0* ⇒ *'witness0 spmf*
and *challenge-space0* :: *'bool set*
and *valid-pub0* :: *'pub0 set*
and *G* :: ((*'pub0* × *'pub1*) × (*'witness0* × *'witness1*)) *spmf*
and *L* :: *'bool boolean-algebra* (**structure**)
+
assumes Σ-*prot1*: Σ*1*.Σ-*protocol*
and Σ-*prot0*: Σ*0*.Σ-*protocol*
and *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init0 h0 w0*) *lossless-spmf* (*init1 h1 w1*)
and *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response0 r0 w0 e0*) *lossless-spmf* (*response1 r1 w1 e1*)
and *lossless-S*: *lossless-spmf* (*S0 h0 e0*) *lossless-spmf* (*S1 h1 e1*)
and *lossless-*$\mathcal{A}ss$: *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}ss0$ *x0* (*a0*,*e*,*z0*) (*a0*,*e'*,*z0'*)) *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}ss1$ *x1* (*a1*,*e*,*z1*) (*a1*,*e'*,*z1'*))
and *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
and *set-spmf-G* [*simp*]: (*h*,*w*) ∈ *set-spmf G* ⟹ *Rel h w*
begin

definition *challenge-space* = *carrier L*

definition *Rel-AND* :: ((*'pub0* × *'pub1*) × *'witness0* × *'witness1*) *set*
where *Rel-AND* = {((*x0*,*x1*), (*w0*,*w1*)). ((*x0*,*w0*) ∈ *Rel0* ∧ (*x1*,*w1*) ∈ *Rel1*)}

definition *init-AND* :: (*'pub0* × *'pub1*) ⇒ (*'witness0* × *'witness1*) ⇒ ((*'rand0* × *'rand1*) × *'msg0* × *'msg1*) *spmf*
where *init-AND X W* = *do* {
let (*x0*, *x1*) = *X*;
let (*w0*,*w1*) = *W*;
(*r0*, *a0*) ← *init0 x0 w0*;
(*r1*, *a1*) ← *init1 x1 w1*;
return-spmf ((*r0*,*r1*), (*a0*,*a1*))}

lemma *lossless-init-AND*: *lossless-spmf* (*init-AND X W*)
by(*simp add*: *lossless-init init-AND-def split-def*)

definition *response-AND* :: (*'rand0* × *'rand1*) ⇒ (*'witness0* × *'witness1*) ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'response0* × *'response1*) *spmf*
where *response-AND R W s* = *do* {
let (*r0*,*r1*) = *R*;
let (*w0*,*w1*) = *W*;
z0 ← *response0 r0 w0 s*;
z1 :: *'response1* ← *response1 r1 w1 s*;
return-spmf (*z0*,*z1*)}

lemma *lossless-response-AND*: *lossless-spmf* (*response-AND R W s*)
by(*simp add*: *response-AND-def lossless-response split-def*)

fun *check-AND* :: (*'pub0* × *'pub1*) ⇒ (*'msg0* × *'msg1*) ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'response0* × *'response1*) ⇒ *bool*
  where *check-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) (*a0*,*a1*) *s* (*z0*,*z1*) = (*check0 x0 a0 s z0* ∧ *check1 x1 a1 s z1*)

definition *S-AND* :: *'pub0* × *'pub1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ ((*'msg0* × *'msg1*) × *'response0* × *'response1*) *spmf*
  where *S-AND X e* = *do* {
    let (*x0*,*x1*) = *X*;
    (*a0*, *z0*) ← *S0-raw x0 e*;
    (*a1*, *z1*) ← *S1-raw x1 e*;
    return-spmf ((*a0*,*a1*),(*z0*,*z1*))}

fun *Ass-AND* :: *'pub0* × *'pub1* ⇒ (*'msg0* × *'msg1*) × *'bool* × *'response0* × *'response1* ⇒ (*'msg0* × *'msg1*) × *'bool* × *'response0* × *'response1* ⇒ (*'witness0* × *'witness1*) *spmf*
  where *Ass-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) ((*a0*,*a1*), *e*, (*z0*,*z1*)) ((*a0'*,*a1'*), *e'*, (*z0'*,*z1'*)) = *do* {
    w0 :: *'witness0* ← *Ass0 x0* (*a0*,*e*,*z0*) (*a0'*,*e'*,*z0'*);
    w1 ← *Ass1 x1* (*a1*,*e*,*z1*) (*a1'*,*e'*,*z1'*);
    return-spmf (*w0*,*w1*)}

definition *valid-pub-AND* = {(*x0*,*x1*). *x0* ∈ *valid-pub0* ∧ *x1* ∈ *valid-pub1*}

sublocale Σ-*AND*: Σ-*protocols-base init-AND response-AND check-AND Rel-AND S-AND Ass-AND challenge-space valid-pub-AND*
  apply *unfold-locales* **apply**(*simp add*: *Rel-AND-def valid-pub-AND-def*)
  using Σ*1.domain-subset-valid-pub* Σ*0.domain-subset-valid-pub* **by** *blast*

end

locale Σ-*AND* = Σ-*AND-base* +
  assumes *set-spmf-G-L*: ((*x0*, *x1*), *w0*, *w1*) ∈ *set-spmf G* ⟹ ((*x0*, *x1*), (*w0*,*w1*)) ∈ *Rel-AND*
begin

lemma *hvzk*:
  assumes *Rel-AND*: ((*x0*,*x1*), (*w0*,*w1*)) ∈ *Rel-AND*
  and *e* ∈ *challenge-space*
  shows Σ-*AND.R* (*x0*,*x1*) (*w0*,*w1*) *e* = Σ-*AND.S* (*x0*,*x1*) *e*
  including *monad-normalisation*
proof−
  have *x-in-dom*: *x0* ∈ *Domain Rel0* **and** *x1* ∈ *Domain Rel1*
    using *Rel-AND Rel-AND-def* **by** *auto*
  have Σ-*AND.R* (*x0*,*x1*) (*w0*,*w1*) *e* = *do* {
    ((*r0*,*r1*),(*a0*,*a1*)) ← *init-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) (*w0*,*w1*);
    (*z0*,*z1*) ← *response-AND* (*r0*,*r1*) (*w0*,*w1*) *e*;
    return-spmf ((*a0*,*a1*),*e*,(*z0*,*z1*))}
    by(*simp add*: Σ-*AND.R-def split-def*)

```
  also have ... = do {
    (r0, a0) ← init0 x0 w0;
    z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e;
    (r1, a1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    z1 :: 'f ← response1 r1 w1 e;
    return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
    apply(simp add: init-AND-def response-AND-def split-def)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of response0 - w0 e])
    by simp
  also have ... = do {
    (a0, c0, z0) ← Σ0.R x0 w0 e;
    (a1, c1, z1) ← Σ1.R x1 w1 e;
    return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
    by(simp add: Σ0.R-def Σ1.R-def split-def)
  also have ... = do {
    (a0, c0, z0) ← Σ0.S x0 e;
    (a1, c1, z1) ← Σ1.S x1 e;
    return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
     using Rel-AND-def S-AND-def Σ-prot1 Σ-prot0 assms Σ0.HVZK-unfold1
Σ1.HVZK-unfold1
        valid-pub-AND-def split-def challenge-space-def x-in-dom
    by auto
  ultimately show ?thesis
   by(simp add: Σ0.S-def Σ1.S-def bind-map-spmf o-def split-def Let-def Σ-AND.S-def
map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf S-AND-def)
qed

lemma HVZK: Σ-AND.HVZK
  using Σ-AND.HVZK-def hvzk challenge-space-def
  apply(simp add: S-AND-def split-def)
  using Σ-prot1 Σ-prot0 Σ0.HVZK-unfold2 Σ1.HVZK-unfold2 valid-pub-AND-def
by auto

lemma correct:
  assumes Rel-AND: ((x0,x1), (w0,w1)) ∈ Rel-AND
  and e ∈ challenge-space
  shows Σ-AND.completeness-game (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = return-spmf True
  including monad-normalisation
proof−
  have Σ-AND.completeness-game (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = do {
    ((r0,r1),(a0,a1)) ← init-AND (x0,x1) (w0,w1);
    (z0,z1) ← response-AND (r0,r1) (w0,w1) e;
    return-spmf (check-AND (x0,x1) (a0,a1) e (z0,z1))}
    by(simp add: Σ-AND.completeness-game-def split-def del: check-AND.simps)
  also have ... = do {
    (r0, a0) ← init0 x0 w0;
    z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e;
    (r1, a1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    z1 ← response1 r1 w1 e;
```

return-spmf ((*check0 x0 a0 e z0* ∧ *check1 x1 a1 e z1*))}
apply(*simp add*: *init-AND-def response-AND-def split-def*)
apply(*rewrite bind-commute-spmf*[*of response0 - w0 e*])
by *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis*
using Σ*1.complete-game-return-true* Σ*-prot1* Σ*1.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*1.completeness-game-def assms*
Σ*0.complete-game-return-true* Σ*-prot0* Σ*0.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*0.completeness-game-def challenge-space-def*
apply(*auto simp add*: *Let-def split-def bind-eq-return-spmf lossless-init lossless-response Rel-AND-def*)
by(*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *assms*(*2*) *fst-conv snd-conv*)+
qed

lemma *completeness*: Σ*-AND.completeness*
using Σ*-AND.completeness-def correct challenge-space-def* **by** *force*

lemma *ss*:
assumes *e-neq-e′*: *s* ≠ *s′*
and *valid-pub*: (*x0*,*x1*) ∈ *valid-pub-AND*
and *challenge-space*: *s* ∈ *challenge-space s′* ∈ *challenge-space*
and *check-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) (*a0*,*a1*) *s* (*z0*,*z1*)
and *check-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) (*a0*,*a1*) *s′* (*z0′*,*z1′*)
shows *lossless-spmf* (*𝒜ss-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) ((*a0*,*a1*), *s*, (*z0*,*z1*)) ((*a0*,*a1*), *s′*, (*z0′*,*z1′*)))
∧ (∀ *w′*∈*set-spmf* (*𝒜ss-AND* (*x0*,*x1*) ((*a0*,*a1*), *s*, (*z0*,*z1*)) ((*a0*,*a1*), *s′*, (*z0′*,*z1′*))). ((*x0*,*x1*), *w′*) ∈ *Rel-AND*)
proof−
have *x0-in-dom*: *x0* ∈ *valid-pub0* **and** *x1-in-dom*: *x1* ∈ *valid-pub1*
using *valid-pub valid-pub-AND-def* **by** *auto*
moreover have *3*: *check0 x0 a0 s z0*
using *assms* **by** *simp*
moreover have *4*: *check1 x1 a1 s′ z1′*
using *assms* **by** *simp*
moreover have *w0* ∈ *set-spmf* (*𝒜ss0 x0* (*a0*, *s*, *z0*) (*a0*, *s′*, *z0′*)) ⟶ (*x0*,*w0*) ∈ *Rel0* **for** *w0*
using *3 4* Σ*0.special-soundness-def* Σ*-prot0* Σ*0.*Σ*-protocol-def x0-in-dom challenge-space-def assms valid-pub-AND-def valid-pub* **by** *fastforce*
moreover have *w1* ∈ *set-spmf* (*𝒜ss1 x1* (*a1*, *s*, *z1*) (*a1*, *s′*, *z1′*)) ⟶ (*x1*,*w1*) ∈ *Rel1* **for** *w1*
using *3 4* Σ*1.special-soundness-def* Σ*-prot1* Σ*1.*Σ*-protocol-def x1-in-dom challenge-space-def assms valid-pub-AND-def valid-pub* **by** *fastforce*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by(*auto simp add*: *lossless-𝒜ss Rel-AND-def*)
qed

lemma *special-soundness*:
shows Σ*-AND.special-soundness*
using Σ*-AND.special-soundness-def ss* **by** *fast*

theorem Σ-*protocol*:
shows Σ-*AND*.Σ-*protocol*
by(*auto simp add*: Σ-*AND*.Σ-*protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness*)

sublocale *AND*-Σ-*commit*: Σ-*protocols-to-commitments init-AND response-AND check-AND Rel-AND S-AND* $\mathcal{A}$*ss-AND challenge-space valid-pub-AND G*
apply *unfold-locales*
by(*auto simp add*: Σ-*protocol set-spmf-G-L lossless-G lossless-init-AND lossless-response-AND*)

lemma *AND*-Σ-*commit.abstract-com.correct*
using *AND*-Σ-*commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *AND*-Σ-*commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A}$
using *AND*-Σ-*commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *bind-advantage-bound-dis-log*:
shows *AND*-Σ-*commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage* $\mathcal{A} \leq$ *AND*-Σ-*commit.rel-advantage* (*AND*-Σ-*commit.adversary* $\mathcal{A}$)
using *AND*-Σ-*commit.bind-advantage* **by** *simp*

end

end

2.7 Σ-OR statements

theory *Sigma-OR* **imports**
Sigma-Protocols
Xor
begin

locale Σ-*OR-base* = $\Sigma 0$: Σ-*protocols-base init0 response0 check0 Rel0 S0-raw* $\mathcal{A}$*ss0 carrier L valid-pub0*
+ $\Sigma 1$: Σ-*protocols-base init1 response1 check1 Rel1 S1-raw* $\mathcal{A}$*ss1 carrier L valid-pub1*
for *init1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'witness1* ⇒ (*'rand1* × *'msg1*) *spmf*
and *response1* :: *'rand1* ⇒ *'witness1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response1 spmf*
and *check1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'msg1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response1* ⇒ *bool*
and *Rel1* :: (*'pub1* × *'witness1*) *set*
and *S1-raw* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'msg1* × *'response1*) *spmf*
and $\mathcal{A}$*ss1* :: *'pub1* ⇒ *'msg1* × *'bool* × *'response1* ⇒ *'msg1* × *'bool* × *'response1* ⇒ *'witness1 spmf*
and *challenge-space1* :: *'bool set*
and *valid-pub1* :: *'pub1 set*
and *init0* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'witness0* ⇒ (*'rand0* × *'msg0*) *spmf*
and *response0* :: *'rand0* ⇒ *'witness0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response0 spmf*
and *check0* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'msg0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ *'response0* ⇒ *bool*
and *Rel0* :: (*'pub0* × *'witness0*) *set*

and *S0-raw* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'bool* ⇒ (*'msg0* × *'response0*) *spmf*
and $\mathcal{A}$*ss0* :: *'pub0* ⇒ *'msg0* × *'bool* × *'response0* ⇒ *'msg0* × *'bool* × *'response0* ⇒ *'witness0 spmf*
and *challenge-space0* :: *'bool set*
and *valid-pub0* :: *'pub0 set*
and *G* :: ((*'pub0* × *'pub1*) × (*'witness0* + *'witness1*)) *spmf*
and *L* :: *'bool boolean-algebra* (**structure**)
+
assumes Σ-*prot1*: Σ*1*.Σ-*protocol*
and Σ-*prot0*: Σ*0*.Σ-*protocol*
and *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init0 h0 w0*) *lossless-spmf* (*init1 h1 w1*)
and *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response0 r0 w0 e0*) *lossless-spmf* (*response1 r1 w1 e1*)
and *lossless-S*: *lossless-spmf* (*S0 h0 e0*) *lossless-spmf* (*S1 h1 e1*)
and *finite-L*: *finite* (*carrier L*)
and *carrier-L-not-empty*: *carrier L* ≠ {}
and *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
begin

inductive-set *Rel-OR* :: ((*'pub0* × *'pub1*) × (*'witness0* + *'witness1*)) *set* **where**
Rel-OR-I0: ((*x0*, *x1*), *Inl w0*) ∈ *Rel-OR* **if** (*x0*, *w0*) ∈ *Rel0* ∧ *x1* ∈ *valid-pub1*
| *Rel-OR-I1*: ((*x0*, *x1*), *Inr w1*) ∈ *Rel-OR* **if** (*x1*, *w1*) ∈ *Rel1* ∧ *x0* ∈ *valid-pub0*

inductive-simps *Rel-OR-simps* [*simp*]:
((*x0*, *x1*), *Inl w0*) ∈ *Rel-OR*
((*x0*, *x1*), *Inr w1*) ∈ *Rel-OR*

lemma *Domain-Rel-cases*:
assumes (*x0*,*x1*) ∈ *Domain Rel-OR*
shows (∃ *w0*. (*x0*,*w0*) ∈ *Rel0* ∧ *x1* ∈ *valid-pub1*) ∨ (∃ *w1*. (*x1*,*w1*) ∈ *Rel1* ∧ *x0* ∈ *valid-pub0*)
using *assms*
by (*meson DomainE Rel-OR.cases*)

lemma *set-spmf-lists-sample* [*simp*]: *set-spmf* (*spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*)) = (*carrier L*)
using *finite-L* **by** *simp*

definition *challenge-space* = *carrier L*

fun *init-OR* :: (*'pub0* × *'pub1*) ⇒ (*'witness0* + *'witness1*) ⇒ ((((*'rand0* × *'bool* × *'response1* + *'rand1* × *'bool* × *'response0*)) × *'msg0* × *'msg1*)) *spmf*
where *init-OR* (*x0*,*x1*) (*Inl w0*) = *do* {
(*r0*,*a0*) ← *init0 x0 w0*;
e1 ← *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*);
(*a1*, *e'1*, *z1*) ← Σ*1.S x1 e1*;
return-spmf (*Inl* (*r0*, *e1*, *z1*), *a0*, *a1*)} |
init-OR (*x0*, *x1*) (*Inr w1*) = *do* {
(*r1*, *a1*) ← *init1 x1 w1*;

```
  e0 ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
  (a0, e'0, z0) ← Σ0.S x0 e0;
  return-spmf ((Inr (r1, e0, z0), a0, a1))}

lemma lossless-Σ-S: lossless-spmf (Σ1.S x1 e1) lossless-spmf (Σ0.S x0 e0)
  using lossless-S by fast +

lemma lossless-init-OR: lossless-spmf (init-OR (x0,x1) w)
  by(cases w;simp add: lossless-Σ-S split-def lossless-init lossless-S finite-L carrier-L-not-empty)

fun response-OR :: (('rand0 × 'bool × 'response1 + 'rand1 × 'bool × 'response0))
⇒ ('witness0 + 'witness1)
                    ⇒ 'bool ⇒ (('bool × 'response0) × ('bool × 'response1)) spmf
  where response-OR (Inl (r0 , e-1, z1)) (Inl w0) s = do {
    let e0 = s ⊕ e-1;
    z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e0;
    return-spmf ((e0,z0), (e-1,z1))} |
    response-OR (Inr (r1, e-0, z0)) (Inr w1) s = do {
    let e1 = s ⊕ e-0;
    z1 ← response1 r1 w1 e1;
    return-spmf ((e-0, z0), (e1, z1))}

definition check-OR :: ('pub0 × 'pub1) ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) ⇒ 'bool ⇒ (('bool ×
'response0) × ('bool × 'response1)) ⇒ bool
  where check-OR X A s Z
          = (s = (fst (fst Z)) ⊕ (fst (snd Z))
               ∧ (fst (fst Z)) ∈ challenge-space ∧ (fst (snd Z)) ∈ challenge-space
                 ∧ check0 (fst X) (fst A) (fst (fst Z)) (snd (fst Z)) ∧ check1 (snd
X) (snd A) (fst (snd Z)) (snd (snd Z)))

lemma  check-OR (x0,x1) (a0,a1) s ((e0,z0), (e1,z1))
          = (s = e0 ⊕ e1
               ∧ e0 ∈ challenge-space ∧ e1 ∈ challenge-space
                 ∧ check0 x0 a0 e0 z0 ∧ check1 x1 a1 e1 z1)
  by(simp add: check-OR-def)

fun S-OR where S-OR (x0,x1) c = do {
    e1 ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (a1, e1', z1) ← Σ1.S x1 e1;
    let e0 = c ⊕ e1;
    (a0, e0', z0) ← Σ0.S x0 e0;
    let z = ((e0',z0), (e1',z1));
    return-spmf ((a0, a1),z)}

definition Ass-OR' :: 'pub0 × 'pub1 ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × ('bool ×
'response0) × 'bool × 'response1
                    ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × ('bool × 'response0) × 'bool ×
'response1 ⇒ ('witness0 + 'witness1) spmf
```

where $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR'\ X\ C1\ C2 = TRY\ do\ \{$
$-$ :: $unit \leftarrow assert\text{-}spmf\ ((fst\ (fst\ \ (snd\ (snd\ C1)))) \neq (fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2)))))$;
$w0$ :: $'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0\ (fst\ X)\ (fst\ (fst\ C1),fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))),snd\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))))\ (fst\ (fst\ C2),fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))),snd\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))))$;
$return\text{-}spmf\ ((Inl\ w0))$ :: $('witness0 + 'witness1)\ spmf\}\ ELSE\ do\ \{$
$w1$ :: $'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1\ \ (snd\ X)\ (snd\ (fst\ C1),fst\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))),\ snd\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))))\ (snd\ (fst\ C2),\ fst\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))),\ snd\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))))$;
$(return\text{-}spmf\ ((Inr\ w1))$ :: $('witness0 + 'witness1)\ spmf)\}$

definition $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR$ :: $'pub0 \times 'pub1 \Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'msg1) \times 'bool \times ('bool \times 'response0) \times 'bool \times 'response1$
$\Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'msg1) \times 'bool \times ('bool \times 'response0) \times 'bool \times 'response1 \Rightarrow ('witness0 + 'witness1)\ spmf$
where $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR\ X\ C1\ C2 = do\ \{$
$if\ ((fst\ (fst\ \ (snd\ (snd\ C1)))) \neq (fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2)))))\ then\ do$
$\{w0$ :: $'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0\ (fst\ X)\ (fst\ (fst\ C1),fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))),snd\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))))\ (fst\ (fst\ C2),fst\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))),snd\ (fst\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))))$;
$return\text{-}spmf\ (Inl\ w0)\}$
$else$
$do\ \{w1$ :: $'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1\ \ (snd\ X)\ (snd\ (fst\ C1),fst\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))),\ snd\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C1))))\ (snd\ (fst\ C2),\ fst\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))),\ snd\ (snd\ (snd\ (snd\ C2))))$; $return\text{-}spmf\ (Inr\ w1)\}\}$

lemma $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR\text{-}alt\text{-}def$: $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR\ (x0,x1)\ ((a0,a1),s,(e0,z0),e1,z1)\ ((a0,a1),s',(e0',z0'),e1',z1') = do\ \{$
$if\ (e0 \neq e0')\ then\ do\ \{w0$ :: $'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0\ x0\ (a0,e0,z0)\ (a0,e0',z0')$; $return\text{-}spmf\ (Inl\ w0)\}$
$else\ do\ \{w1$ :: $'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1\ x1\ (a1,e1,z1)\ (a1,e1',z1')$; $return\text{-}spmf\ (Inr\ w1)\}\}$
by($simp\ add$: $\mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR\text{-}def$)

definition $valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR = \{(x0,x1).\ x0 \in valid\text{-}pub0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1\}$

sublocale $\Sigma\text{-}OR$: $\Sigma\text{-}protocols\text{-}base\ init\text{-}OR\ response\text{-}OR\ check\text{-}OR\ Rel\text{-}OR\ S\text{-}OR\ \mathcal{A}ss\text{-}OR\ challenge\text{-}space\ valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR$
unfolding $\Sigma\text{-}protocols\text{-}base\text{-}def$
proof($goal\text{-}cases$)
case 1
then show $?case$
proof
fix x
assume asm: $x \in Domain\ Rel\text{-}OR$
then obtain $x0\ x1$ **where** x: $(x0,x1) = x$
by ($metis\ surj\text{-}pair$)
show $x \in valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR$
proof($cases\ \exists\ w0.\ (x0,w0) \in Rel0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1$)
case $True$
then show $?thesis$

```
      using Σ0.domain-subset-valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def x by auto
    next
      case False
      hence ∃ w1. (x1,w1) ∈ Rel1 ∧ x0 ∈ valid-pub0
        using Domain-Rel-cases asm x by auto
      then show ?thesis
        using Σ1.domain-subset-valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def x by auto
    qed
  qed
qed

end

locale Σ-OR-proofs = Σ-OR-base + boolean-algebra L +
  assumes G-Rel-OR: ((x0, x1), w) ∈ set-spmf G ⟹ ((x0, x1), w) ∈ Rel-OR
    and lossless-response-OR: lossless-spmf (response-OR R W s)
begin

lemma HVZK1:
  assumes (x1,w1) ∈ Rel1
  shows ∀ c ∈ challenge-space. Σ-OR.R (x0,x1) (Inr w1) c = Σ-OR.S (x0,x1) c
  including monad-normalisation
proof
  fix c
  assume c: c ∈ challenge-space
  show Σ-OR.R (x0,x1) (Inr w1) c = Σ-OR.S (x0,x1) c
  proof−
    have ∗: x ∈ carrier L ⟶ c ⊕ c ⊕ x = x for x
      using c challenge-space-def by auto
    have Σ-OR.R (x0,x1) (Inr w1) c = do {
    (r1, ab1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    eb′ ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0′, eb0′′, zb0′) ← Σ0.S x0 eb′;
    let ((r, eb′, zb′),a) = ((r1, eb′, zb0′), ab0′, ab1);
    let eb = c ⊕ eb′;
    zb1 ← response1 r w1 eb;
    let z = ((eb′, zb′), (eb, zb1));
    return-spmf (a,c,z)}
      supply [[simproc del: monad-normalisation]]
      by(simp add: Σ-OR.R-def split-def Let-def)
    also have ... = do {
    eb′ ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0′, eb0′′, zb0′) ← Σ0.S x0 eb′;
    let eb = c ⊕ eb′;
    (ab1, c′, zb1) ← Σ1.R x1 w1 eb;
    let z = ((eb′, zb0′), (eb, zb1));
    return-spmf ((ab0′,ab1),c,z)}
      by(simp add: Σ1.R-def split-def Let-def)
    also have ... = do {
```

$eb' \leftarrow$ *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*);
($ab0'$, $eb0''$, $zb0'$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 0.S$ *x0* eb';
let $eb = c \oplus eb'$;
($ab1$, c', $zb1$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 1.S$ *x1* eb;
let z = ((eb', $zb0'$), (eb, $zb1$));
return-spmf (($ab0'$,$ab1$),c,z)}
using c
by(*simp add*: *split-def Let-def* Σ*-prot1* $\Sigma 1$*.HVZK-unfold1 assms challenge-space-def cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... = *do* {
$eb \leftarrow$ *map-spmf* (λ eb'. $c \oplus eb'$) (*spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*));
($ab1$, c', $zb1$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 1.S$ *x1* eb;
($ab0'$, $eb0''$, $zb0'$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 0.S$ *x0* ($c \oplus eb$);
let z = (($c \oplus eb$, $zb0'$), (eb, $zb1$));
return-spmf (($ab0'$,$ab1$),c,z)}
apply(*simp add*: *bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def*)
by(*simp add*: $*$ *split-def cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... = *do* {
$eb \leftarrow$ (*spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*));
($ab1$, c', $zb1$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 1.S$ *x1* eb;
($ab0'$, $eb0''$, $zb0'$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 0.S$ *x0* ($c \oplus eb$);
let z = (($c \oplus eb$, $zb0'$), (eb, $zb1$));
return-spmf (($ab0'$,$ab1$),c,z)}
using *assms assms one-time-pad c challenge-space-def* **by** *simp*
also have ... = *do* {
$eb \leftarrow$ (*spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*));
($ab1$, c', $zb1$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 1.S$ *x1* eb;
($ab0'$, $eb0''$, $zb0'$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 0.S$ *x0* ($c \oplus eb$);
let z = (($eb0''$, $zb0'$), (c', $zb1$));
return-spmf (($ab0'$,$ab1$),c,z)}
by(*simp add*: $\Sigma 0$*.S-def* $\Sigma 1$*.S-def bind-map-spmf o-def split-def*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add*: *Let-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf* Σ*-OR.S-def split-def*)
qed
qed

lemma *HVZK0*:
assumes (*x0*,*w0*) $\in$ *Rel0*
shows $\forall$ $c \in$ *challenge-space*. Σ*-OR.R* (*x0*,*x1*) (*Inl w0*) c = Σ*-OR.S* (*x0*,*x1*) c
proof
fix c
assume *c*: $c \in$ *challenge-space*
show Σ*-OR.R* (*x0*,*x1*) (*Inl w0*) c = Σ*-OR.S* (*x0*,*x1*) c
proof−
have Σ*-OR.R* (*x0*,*x1*) (*Inl w0*) c = *do* {
($r0$,$ab0$) $\leftarrow$ *init0 x0 w0*;
$eb' \leftarrow$ *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*);
($ab1'$, $eb1''$, $zb1'$) $\leftarrow$ $\Sigma 1.S$ *x1* eb';
let ((r, eb', zb'),a) = (($r0$, eb', $zb1'$), $ab0$, $ab1'$);

let eb = c ⊕ eb′;
zb0 ← response0 r w0 eb;
let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb′,zb′));
return-spmf (a,c,z)}
by(*simp add*: Σ-*OR.R-def split-def Let-def*)
also have ... = *do* {
eb′ ← (spmf-of-set (carrier L));
(ab1′, eb1′′, zb1′) ← Σ1.S x1 eb′;
let eb = c ⊕ eb′;
(ab0, c′, zb0) ← Σ0.R x0 w0 eb;
let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb′,zb1′));
return-spmf ((ab0, ab1′),c,z)}
apply(*simp add*: Σ*0.R-def split-def Let-def*)
apply(*rewrite bind-commute-spmf*)
apply(*rewrite bind-commute-spmf*[*of* - Σ*1.S* - -])
by *simp*
also have ... = *do* {
eb′ ← (spmf-of-set (carrier L));
(ab1′, eb1′′, zb1′) ← Σ1.S x1 eb′;
let eb = c ⊕ eb′;
(ab0, c′, zb0) ← Σ0.S x0 eb;
let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb′,zb1′));
return-spmf ((ab0, ab1′),c,z)}
using *c*
by(*simp add*: Σ-*prot0* Σ*0.HVZK-unfold1 assms challenge-space-def split-def Let-def cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by(*simp add*: Σ-*OR.S-def* Σ*1.S-def* Σ*0.S-def Let-def o-def bind-map-spmf split-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf*)
qed
qed

lemma *HVZK*:
shows Σ-*OR.HVZK*
unfolding Σ-*OR.HVZK-def*
apply *auto*
subgoal for *e a b w*
apply(*cases w*)
using *HVZK0 HVZK1* **by** *auto*
apply(*auto simp add*: *valid-pub-OR-def* Σ-*OR.S-def bind-map-spmf o-def check-OR-def image-def* Σ*0.S-def* Σ*1.S-def split-def challenge-space-def local.xor-ac*(*1*))
using Σ*0.HVZK-unfold2* Σ-*prot0 challenge-space-def* **apply** *force*
using Σ*1.HVZK-unfold2* Σ-*prot1 challenge-space-def* **by** *force*

lemma assumes (*x0*,*x1*) ∈ *Domain Rel-OR*
shows (∃ *w0*. (*x0*,*w0*) ∈ *Rel0*) ∨ (∃ *w1*. (*x1*,*w1*) ∈ *Rel1*)
using *assms Rel-OR.simps* **by** *blast*

lemma *ss*:

assumes *valid-pub-OR*: $(x0,x1) \in$ *valid-pub-OR*
and *check*: *check-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $(a0,a1)$ s $((e0,z0), (e1,z1))$
and *check'*: *check-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $(a0,a1)$ s' $((e0',z0'), (e1',z1'))$
and $s \neq s'$
and *challenge-space*: $s \in$ *challenge-space* $s' \in$ *challenge-space*
shows *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $((a0,a1),s,(e0,z0), e1,z1)$ $((a0,a1),s',(e0',z0'), e1',z1')) \wedge$
$(\forall w' \in$ *set-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $((a0,a1),s,(e0,z0), e1,z1)$ $((a0,a1),s',(e0',z0'), e1',z1')).$ $((x0,x1), w') \in$ *Rel-OR*)
proof−
have *e-or*: $e0 \neq e0' \vee e1 \neq e1'$ **using** *assms check-OR-def* **by** *auto*
show *?thesis*
proof(*cases* $e0 \neq e0'$)
case *True*
moreover have *2*: $x0 \in$ *valid-pub0*
using *valid-pub-OR valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover have *3*: *check0 x0 a0 e0 z0*
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover have *4*: *check0 x0 a0 e0' z0'*
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover have *e*: $e0 \in$ *carrier L* $e0' \in$ *carrier L*
using *challenge-space-def check check' check-OR-def* **by** *auto*
ultimately have ($\forall w' \in$ *set-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss0 x0* $(a0,e0,z0)$ $(a0,e0',z0')$). $(x0, w') \in$ *Rel0*)
using *True* Σ*0.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*0.special-soundness-def* Σ*-prot0 challenge-space assms* **by** *blast*
moreover have *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss0 x0* $(a0, e0, z0)$ $(a0, e0', z0')$)
using *2 3 4* $\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR-def True* Σ*-prot0* Σ*0.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*0.special-soundness-def challenge-space-def e* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\forall w' \in$ *set-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $((a0,a1),s,(e0,z0), e1,z1)$ $((a0,a1),s',(e0',z0'), e1',z1')).$ $((x0,x1), w') \in$ *Rel-OR*
apply(*auto simp only*: $\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR-alt-def True*)
apply(*auto simp add*: *o-def* $\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR-def*)
using *assms valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *blast*
moreover have *lossless-spmf* ($\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR* $(x0,x1)$ $((a0,a1),s,(e0,z0), e1,z1)$ $((a0,a1),s',(e0',z0'), e1',z1')$)
apply(*simp add*: $\mathcal{A}$*ss-OR-def*)
using *2 3 4 True* Σ*-prot0* Σ*0.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*0.special-soundness-def challenge-space e* **by** *blast*
ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence *e1-neq-e1'*: $e1 \neq e1'$ **using** *e-or* **by** *simp*
moreover have *2*: $x1 \in$ *valid-pub1*
using *valid-pub-OR valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover have *3*: *check1 x1 a1 e1 z1*
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover have *4*: *check1 x1 a1 e1' z1'*
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*

moreover have *e*: *e1* ∈ *carrier L e1′* ∈ *carrier L*
using *challenge-space-def check check′ check-OR-def* **by** *auto*
ultimately have (∀ *w′*∈*set-spmf* (*𝒜ss1 x1* (*a1*,*e1*,*z1*) (*a1*,*e1′*,*z1′*)). (*x1*,*w′*) ∈ *Rel1*)
using *False* Σ*1.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*1.special-soundness-def* Σ*-prot1 e1-neq-e1′ challenge-space* **by** *blast*
hence ∀ *w′* ∈ *set-spmf* (*𝒜ss-OR* (*x0*,*x1*) ((*a0*,*a1*),*s*,(*e0*,*z0*), *e1*,*z1*) ((*a0*,*a1*),*s′*,(*e0′*,*z0′*), *e1′*,*z1′*)). ((*x0*,*x1*), *w′*) ∈ *Rel-OR*
apply(*auto simp add*: *o-def 𝒜ss-OR-def*)
using *False assms* Σ*1.L-def assms valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *auto*
moreover have *lossless-spmf* (*𝒜ss-OR* (*x0*,*x1*) ((*a0*,*a1*),*s*,(*e0*,*z0*), *e1*,*z1*) ((*a0*,*a1*),*s′*,(*e0′*,*z0′*), *e1′*,*z1′*))
apply(*simp add*: *𝒜ss-OR-def*)
using *2 3 4* Σ*-prot1* Σ*1.*Σ*-protocol-def* Σ*1.special-soundness-def False e1-neq-e1′ challenge-space e* **by** *blast*
ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *special-soundness*:
shows Σ*-OR.special-soundness*
unfolding Σ*-OR.special-soundness-def*
using *ss prod.collapse* **by** *fastforce*

lemma *correct0*:
assumes *e-in-carrier*: *e* ∈ *carrier L*
and (*x0*,*w0*) ∈ *Rel0*
and *valid-pub*: *x1* ∈ *valid-pub1*
shows Σ*-OR.completeness-game* (*x0*,*x1*) (*Inl w0*) *e* = *return-spmf True*
(**is** *?lhs* = *?rhs*)
proof−
have *x* ∈ *carrier L* ⟶ *e* = (*e* ⊕ *x*) ⊕ *x* **for** *x*
using *e-in-carrier xor-assoc* **by** *simp*
hence *?lhs* = *do* {
(*r0*,*ab0*) ← *init0 x0 w0*;
eb′ ← *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*);
(*ab1′*, *eb1″*, *zb1′*) ← Σ*1.S x1 eb′*;
let eb = *e* ⊕ *eb′*;
zb0 ← *response0 r0 w0 eb*;
return-spmf ((*check0 x0 ab0 eb zb0* ∧ *check1 x1 ab1′ eb′ zb1′*))}
by(*simp add*: Σ*-OR.completeness-game-def split-def Let-def challenge-space-def assms check-OR-def cong*: *bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... = *do* {
eb′ ← *spmf-of-set* (*carrier L*);
(*ab1′*, *eb1″*, *zb1′*) ← Σ*1.S x1 eb′*;
let eb = *e* ⊕ *eb′*;
(*r0*,*ab0*) ← *init0 x0 w0*;
zb0 ← *response0 r0 w0 eb*;
return-spmf ((*check0 x0 ab0 eb zb0* ∧ *check1 x1 ab1′ eb′ zb1′*))}

```
    apply(simp add: Let-def split-def)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of - Σ1.S - -])
    by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb' :: 'e ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1') ← Σ1.S x1 eb';
    return-spmf (check1 x1 ab1' eb' zb1')}
    apply(simp add: Let-def)
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)+
    subgoal for e' a e z
      apply(cases check1 x1 a e' z)
     using Σ0.complete-game-return-true Σ-prot0 Σ0.completeness-game-def Σ0.Σ-protocol-def

       by(auto simp add: assms bind-spmf-const lossless-init lossless-response loss-
less-weight-spmfD split-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
    done
  also have ... = do {
    eb' :: 'e ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1') ← Σ1.S x1 eb';
    return-spmf (True)}
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)
    subgoal for x a aa b
      using  Σ-prot1
      apply(auto simp add: Σ1.S-def split-def image-def Σ1.HVZK-unfold2-alt)
       using Σ1.S-def split-def image-def Σ1.HVZK-unfold2-alt Σ-prot1 valid-pub
by blast
    done
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using Σ1.HVZK-unfold2-alt
   by(simp add: bind-spmf-const Let-def Σ1.HVZK-unfold2-alt split-def lossless-Σ-S
lossless-weight-spmfD carrier-L-not-empty finite-L)
qed

lemma correct1:
  assumes rel1: (x1,w1) ∈ Rel1
    and valid-pub: x0 ∈ valid-pub0
    and e-in-carrier: e ∈ carrier L
  shows Σ-OR.completeness-game (x0,x1) (Inr w1) e = return-spmf True
    (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof−
  have x1-inL: x1 ∈ Σ1.L
    using Σ1.L-def rel1 by auto
  have x ∈ carrier L ⟶ e = x ⊕ e ⊕ x for x
    by (simp add: e-in-carrier xor-assoc xor-commute  local.xor-ac(3))
  hence ?lhs = do {
    (r1, ab1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 eb';
```

```
    let eb = e ⊕ eb';
    zb1 ← response1 r1 w1 eb;
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0' ∧ check1 x1 ab1 eb zb1)}
   by(simp add: Σ-OR.completeness-game-def split-def Let-def assms challenge-space-def
check-OR-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... = do {
    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 eb';
    let eb = e ⊕ eb';
    (r1, ab1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    zb1 ← response1 r1 w1 eb;
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0' ∧ check1 x1 ab1 eb zb1)}
    apply(simp add: Let-def split-def)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of - Σ0.S - -])
    by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 eb';
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0')}
    apply(simp add: Let-def)
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)+
    subgoal for e' a e z
      apply(cases check0 x0 a e' z)
     using Σ1.complete-game-return-true Σ-prot1 Σ1.completeness-game-def Σ1.Σ-protocol-def
      by(auto simp add: x1-inL assms bind-spmf-const lossless-init lossless-response
lossless-weight-spmfD split-def)
    done
  also have ... = do {
    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 eb';
    return-spmf (True)}
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)
    subgoal for x a aa b
      using Σ-prot0
       by(auto simp add: valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def Σ0.S-def split-def image-def
Σ0.HVZK-unfold2-alt)
    done
  ultimately show ?thesis
    apply(simp add: Σ0.HVZK-unfold2 Let-def)
    using Σ0.complete-game-return-true Σ-OR.completeness-game-def
     by(simp add: bind-spmf-const split-def lossless-Σ-S(2) lossless-weight-spmfD
Let-def carrier-L-not-empty finite-L)
qed

lemma completeness':
  assumes Rel-OR-asm: ((x0,x1), w) ∈ Rel-OR
  shows ∀ e ∈ carrier L. spmf (Σ-OR.completeness-game (x0,x1) w e) True = 1
proof
```

```
  fix e
  assume asm: e ∈ carrier L
  hence (Σ-OR.completeness-game (x0,x1) w e) = return-spmf True
  proof(cases w)
    case inl: (Inl a)
    then show ?thesis
      using asm correct0 assms inl by auto
  next
    case inr: (Inr b)
    then show ?thesis
      using asm correct1 assms inr by auto
  qed
  thus spmf (Σ-OR.completeness-game (x0,x1) w e) True = 1
    by simp
qed

lemma completeness: shows Σ-OR.completeness
  unfolding Σ-OR.completeness-def
  using completeness' challenge-space-def by auto

lemma Σ-protocol: shows Σ-OR.Σ-protocol
 by(simp add: completeness HVZK special-soundness Σ-OR.Σ-protocol-def)

sublocale OR-Σ-commit: Σ-protocols-to-commitments init-OR response-OR check-OR
Rel-OR S-OR Ass-OR challenge-space valid-pub-OR G
  by unfold-locales (auto simp add: Σ-protocol lossless-G lossless-init-OR G-Rel-OR
lossless-response-OR)

lemma OR-Σ-commit.abstract-com.correct
  using OR-Σ-commit.commit-correct by simp

lemma OR-Σ-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa A
  using OR-Σ-commit.perfect-hiding by blast

lemma bind-advantage-bound-dis-log:
  shows OR-Σ-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage A ≤ OR-Σ-commit.rel-advantage
(OR-Σ-commit.adversary A)
  using OR-Σ-commit.bind-advantage by simp

end

end
```

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