

# RSAPSS

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## Abstract

Formal verification is getting more and more important in computer science. However the state of the art formal verification methods in cryptography are very rudimentary. These theories are one step to provide a tool box allowing the use of formal methods in every aspect of cryptography. Moreover we present a proof of concept for the feasibility of verification techniques to a standard signature algorithm.

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# 1 Extensions to the Word theory required for SHA1

```
theory WordOperations
imports Word
begin
```

```
type-synonym bv = bit list
```

```
datatype HEX = x0 | x1 | x2 | x3 | x4 | x5 | x6 | x7 | x8 | x9 | xA | xB | xC |
xD | xE | xF
```

```
definition
```

```
  bvxor: bvxor a b = bv-mapzip ( $\oplus_b$ ) a b
```

```
definition
```

```
  bvand: bvand a b = bv-mapzip ( $\wedge_b$ ) a b
```

```
definition
```

```
  bvor: bvor a b = bv-mapzip ( $\vee_b$ ) a b
```

```
primrec last where
```

```
  last [] = Zero
| last (x#r) = (if (r=[]) then x else (last r))
```

```
primrec dellast where
```

```
  dellast [] = []
| dellast (x#r) = (if (r = []) then [] else (x#dellast r))
```

```
fun bvrol where
```

```
  bvrol a 0 = a
| bvrol [] x = []
| bvrol (x#r) (Suc n) = bvrol (r@[x]) n
```

```
fun bvrer where
```

```
  bvrer a 0 = a
| bvrer [] x = []
| bvrer x (Suc n) = bvrer (last x # dellast x) n
```

```
fun selecthelp where
```

```
  selecthelp [] n = (if (n <= 0) then [Zero] else (Zero # selecthelp [] (n-(1::nat))))
| selecthelp (x#l) n = (if (n <= 0) then [x] else (x # selecthelp l (n-(1::nat))))
```

```
fun select where
```

```
  select [] i n = (if (i <= 0) then (selecthelp [] n) else select [] (i-(1::nat))
(n-(1::nat)))
| select (x#l) i n = (if (i <= 0) then (selecthelp (x#l) n) else select l (i-(1::nat))
(n-(1::nat)))
```

```
definition
```

*addmod32*:  $\text{addmod32 } a \ b =$   
 $\text{rev } (\text{select } (\text{rev } (\text{nat-to-bv } ((\text{bv-to-nat } a) + (\text{bv-to-nat } b)))) \ 0 \ 31)$

**definition**

*bv-prepend*:  $\text{bv-prepend } x \ b \ \text{bv} = \text{replicate } x \ b \ @ \ \text{bv}$

**primrec zerolist where**

$\text{zerolist } 0 = []$   
 $|\ \text{zerolist } (\text{Suc } n) = \text{zerolist } n \ @ \ [\text{Zero}]$

**primrec hextobv where**

$\text{hextobv } x0 = [\text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x1 = [\text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x2 = [\text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x3 = [\text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x4 = [\text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x5 = [\text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x6 = [\text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x7 = [\text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{One}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x8 = [\text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } x9 = [\text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xA = [\text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xB = [\text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xC = [\text{One}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xD = [\text{One}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}, \text{One}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xE = [\text{One}, \text{One}, \text{One}, \text{Zero}]$   
 $|\ \text{hextobv } xF = [\text{One}, \text{One}, \text{One}, \text{One}]$

**primrec hexvtobv where**

$\text{hexvtobv } [] = []$   
 $|\ \text{hexvtobv } (x\#r) = \text{hextobv } x \ @ \ \text{hexvtobv } r$

**lemma selectlenhelp**:  $\text{length } (\text{selecthelp } l \ i) = (i + 1)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma selectlenhelp2**:  $\bigwedge i. \forall l \ j. \exists k. \text{select } l \ i \ j = \text{select } k \ 0 \ (j - i)$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma selectlenhelp3**:  $\forall j. \text{select } l \ 0 \ j = \text{selecthelp } l \ j$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma selectlen**:  $\text{length } (\text{select } l \ i \ j) = j - i + 1$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**lemma addmod32len**:  $\bigwedge a \ b. \text{length } (\text{addmod32 } a \ b) = 32$   
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

**end**

## 2 Message Padding for SHA1

```
theory SHA1Padding
imports WordOperations
begin
```

```
definition zerocount :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  nat where
  zerocount: zerocount n = (((n + 64) div 512) + 1) * 512 - n - (65::nat)
```

```
definition helppadd :: bv  $\Rightarrow$  bv  $\Rightarrow$  nat  $\Rightarrow$  bv where
  helppadd x y n = x @ [One] @ zerolist (zerocount n) @ zerolist (64 - length y)
  @y
```

```
definition sha1padd :: bv  $\Rightarrow$  bv where
  sha1padd: sha1padd x = helppadd x (nat-to-bv (length x)) (length x)
```

```
end
```

## 3 Formal definition of the secure hash algorithm

```
theory SHA1
imports SHA1Padding
begin
```

We define the secure hash algorithm SHA-1 and give a proof for the length of the message digest

```
definition fif where
  fif: fif x y z = bvor (bvand x y) (bvand (bv-not x) z)
```

```
definition fxor where
  fxor: fxor x y z = bxor (bxor x y) z
```

```
definition fmaj where
  fmaj: fmaj x y z = bvor (bvor (bvand x y) (bvand x z)) (bvand y z)
```

```
definition fselect :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  bit list  $\Rightarrow$  bit list  $\Rightarrow$  bit list  $\Rightarrow$  bit list where
  fselect: fselect r x y z = (if (r < 20) then (fif x y z) else
    (if (r < 40) then (fxor x y z) else
      (if (r < 60) then (fmaj x y z) else
        (fxor x y z))))
```

```
definition K1 where
  K1: K1 = hexvtobv [x5,xA,x8,x2,x7,x9,x9,x9]
```

```
definition K2 where
  K2: K2 = hexvtobv [x6,xE,xD,x9,xE,xB,xA,x1]
```

```
definition K3 where
  K3: K3 = hexvtobv [x8,xF,x1,xB,xB,xC,xD,xC]
```

**definition**  $K_4$  **where**

$K_4: K_4 = \text{hexvtobv } [xC, xA, x6, x2, xC, x1, xD, x6]$

**definition**  $kselect :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{bit list}$  **where**

$kselect: kselect\ r = (\text{if } (r < 20) \text{ then } K_1 \text{ else}$   
 $(\text{if } (r < 40) \text{ then } K_2 \text{ else}$   
 $(\text{if } (r < 60) \text{ then } K_3 \text{ else}$   
 $K_4))$

**definition**  $getblock$  **where**

$getblock: getblock\ x = \text{select } x\ 0\ 511$

**fun**  $delblockhelp$  **where**

$delblockhelp\ []\ n = []$   
 $| delblockhelp\ (x\#\#r)\ n = (\text{if } n \leq 0 \text{ then } x\#\#r \text{ else } delblockhelp\ r\ (n - (1::\text{nat})))$

**definition**  $delblock$  **where**

$delblock: delblock\ x = delblockhelp\ x\ 512$

**primrec**  $sha1compress$  **where**

$sha1compress\ 0\ b\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E = (\text{let } j = (79::\text{nat}) \text{ in}$   
 $(\text{let } W = \text{select } b\ (32*j)\ ((32*j)+31) \text{ in}$   
 $(\text{let } AA = \text{addmod32 } (\text{addmod32 } (\text{addmod32 } W$   
 $(bvrol\ A\ 5))\ (fselect\ j\ B\ C\ D))\ (\text{addmod32 } E\ (kselect\ j));$   
 $BB = A;$   
 $CC = bvrol\ B\ 30;$   
 $DD = C;$   
 $EE = D \text{ in}$   
 $AA@BB@CC@DD@EE)))$   
 $| sha1compress\ (Suc\ n)\ b\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E = (\text{let } j = (79 - (Suc\ n)) \text{ in}$   
 $(\text{let } W = \text{select } b\ (32*j)\ ((32*j)+31) \text{ in}$   
 $(\text{let } AA = \text{addmod32 } (\text{addmod32 } (\text{addmod32 } W$   
 $(bvrol\ A\ 5))\ (fselect\ j\ B\ C\ D))\ (\text{addmod32 } E\ (kselect\ j));$   
 $BB = A;$   
 $CC = bvrol\ B\ 30;$   
 $DD = C;$   
 $EE = D \text{ in}$   
 $sha1compress\ n\ b\ AA\ BB\ CC\ DD\ EE)))$

**definition**  $sha1expandhelp$  **where**

$sha1expandhelp\ x\ i = (\text{let } j = (79+16-i) \text{ in } (bvrol\ (bvxor\ (bvxor\ ($   
 $\text{select } x\ (32*(j-(3::\text{nat})))\ (31+(32*(j-(3::\text{nat}))))))\ (\text{select } x\ (32*(j-(8::\text{nat})))$   
 $(31+(32*(j-(8::\text{nat}))))))\ (bvxor\ (\text{select } x\ (32*(j-(14::\text{nat})))\ (31+(32*(j-(14::\text{nat}))))))$   
 $(\text{select } x\ (32*(j-(16::\text{nat})))\ (31+(32*(j-(16::\text{nat}))))))\ 1))$

**fun**  $sha1expand$  **where**

$sha1expand\ x\ i = (\text{if } (i < 16) \text{ then } x \text{ else}$   
 $\text{let } y = sha1expandhelp\ x\ i \text{ in}$

$sha1expand (x @ y) (i - 1)$

**definition** *sha1compressstart* **where**

*sha1compressstart*:  $sha1compressstart\ r\ b\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E = sha1compress\ r\ (sha1expand\ b\ 79)\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E$

**function** (*sequential*) *sha1block* **where**

$sha1block\ b\ []\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E = (let\ H = sha1compressstart\ 79\ b\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E;$

$AA = addmod32\ A\ (select\ H\ 0\ 31);$

$BB = addmod32\ B\ (select\ H\ 32\ 63);$

$CC = addmod32\ C\ (select\ H\ 64\ 95);$

$DD = addmod32\ D\ (select\ H\ 96\ 127);$

$EE = addmod32\ E\ (select\ H\ 128\ 159)$

$in\ AA@BB@CC@DD@EE)$

$| sha1block\ b\ x\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E = (let\ H = sha1compressstart\ 79\ b\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E;$

$AA = addmod32\ A\ (select\ H\ 0\ 31);$

$BB = addmod32\ B\ (select\ H\ 32\ 63);$

$CC = addmod32\ C\ (select\ H\ 64\ 95);$

$DD = addmod32\ D\ (select\ H\ 96\ 127);$

$EE = addmod32\ E\ (select\ H\ 128\ 159)$

$in\ sha1block\ (getblock\ x)\ (delblock\ x)\ AA\ BB\ CC\ DD\ E)$

$\langle proof \rangle$

**termination**  $\langle proof \rangle$

**definition** *IV1* **where**

*IV1*:  $IV1 = hexvtobv [x6,x7,x4,x5,x2,x3,x0,x1]$

**definition** *IV2* **where**

*IV2*:  $IV2 = hexvtobv [xE,xF,xC,xD,xA,xB,x8,x9]$

**definition** *IV3* **where**

*IV3*:  $IV3 = hexvtobv [x9,x8,xB,xA,xD,xC,xF,xE]$

**definition** *IV4* **where**

*IV4*:  $IV4 = hexvtobv [x1,x0,x3,x2,x5,x4,x7,x6]$

**definition** *IV5* **where**

*IV5*:  $IV5 = hexvtobv [xC,x3,xD,x2,xE,x1,xF,x0]$

**definition** *sha1* **where**

*sha1*:  $sha1\ x = (let\ y = sha1padd\ x\ in$

$sha1block\ (getblock\ y)\ (delblock\ y)\ IV1\ IV2\ IV3\ IV4\ IV5)$

**lemma** *sha1blocklen*:  $length\ (sha1block\ b\ x\ A\ B\ C\ D\ E) = 160$

$\langle proof \rangle$

**lemma** *sha1len*:  $length\ (sha1\ m) = 160$

*<proof>*

**end**

## 4 Definition of rsacrypt

**theory** *Crypt*  
**imports** *Main Mod*  
**begin**

This theory defines the rsacrypt function which implements RSA using fast exponentiation. An proof, that this function calculates RSA is also given

**definition** *rsa-crypt* :: *nat*  $\Rightarrow$  *nat*  $\Rightarrow$  *nat*  $\Rightarrow$  *nat*  
**where**

*cryptcorrect*: *rsa-crypt* *M e n* =  $M \wedge e \text{ mod } n$

**lemma** *rsa-crypt-code* [*code*]:

*rsa-crypt* *M e n* = (if *e* = 0 then 1 mod *n*  
else if even *e* then *rsa-crypt* *M (e div 2) n*  $\wedge$  2 mod *n*  
else (*M* \* *rsa-crypt* *M (e div 2) n*  $\wedge$  2 mod *n*) mod *n*)

*<proof>*

**end**

## 5 Lemmata for modular arithmetic

**theory** *Mod*  
**imports** *Main*  
**begin**

**lemma** *divmultassoc*:  $a \text{ div } (b*c) * (b*c) = ((a \text{ div } (b * c)) * b)*(c::nat)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *delmod*:  $(a::nat) \text{ mod } (b*c) \text{ mod } c = a \text{ mod } c$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *timesmod1*:  $((x::nat)*(y::nat) \text{ mod } n) \text{ mod } (n::nat) = ((x*y) \text{ mod } n)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *timesmod3*:  $((a \text{ mod } (n::nat)) * b) \text{ mod } n = (a*b) \text{ mod } n$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *remainderexplemma*:  $(y \text{ mod } (a::nat) = z \text{ mod } a) \implies (x*y) \text{ mod } a = (x*z) \text{ mod } a$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *remainderexp*:  $((a \text{ mod } (n::nat)) \wedge i) \text{ mod } n = (a \wedge i) \text{ mod } n$   
*<proof>*

end

## 6 Positive differences

**theory** *Pdifference*  
**imports** *HOL-Computational-Algebra.Primes Mod*  
**begin**

**definition**

*pdifference* :: *nat*  $\Rightarrow$  *nat*  $\Rightarrow$  *nat* **where**  
[*simp*]: *pdifference* *a b* = (if *a* < *b* then (*b*-*a*) else (*a*-*b*))

**lemma** *timesdistributesoverpdifference*:

$m*(pdifference\ a\ b) = pdifference\ (m*(a::nat))\ (m*\ (b::nat))$   
(*proof*)

**lemma** *addconst*:  $a = (b::nat) \Longrightarrow c+a = c+b$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *invers*:  $a \leq x \Longrightarrow (x::nat) = x - a + a$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *invers2*:  $\llbracket a \leq b; (b-a) = p*q \rrbracket \Longrightarrow (b::nat) = a+p*q$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *modadd*:  $\llbracket b = a+p*q \rrbracket \Longrightarrow (a::nat) \bmod p = b \bmod p$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *equalmodstrick1*:  $pdifference\ a\ b \bmod p = 0 \Longrightarrow a \bmod p = b \bmod p$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *diff-add-assoc*:  $b \leq c \Longrightarrow c - (c - b) = c - c + (b::nat)$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *diff-add-assoc2*:  $a \leq c \Longrightarrow c - (c - a + b) = (c - c + (a::nat) - b)$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *diff-add-diff*:  $x \leq b \Longrightarrow (b::nat) - x + y - b = y - x$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *equalmodstrick2*:

**assumes**  $a \bmod p = b \bmod p$   
**shows**  $pdifference\ a\ b \bmod p = 0$

(*proof*)

**lemma** *primekeyrewrite*:

**fixes**  $p::nat$  **shows**  $\llbracket prime\ p; p\ dvd\ (a*b); \sim(p\ dvd\ a) \rrbracket \Longrightarrow p\ dvd\ b$

(*proof*)



**lemma** *multzero*:  $\llbracket 0 < m \text{ mod } p; m * a = 0 \rrbracket \implies (a :: nat) = 0$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *primekeytrick*:  
**fixes**  $A B :: nat$   
**assumes**  $(M * A) \text{ mod } P = (M * B) \text{ mod } P$   
**assumes**  $M \text{ mod } P \neq 0$  **and** *prime*  $P$   
**shows**  $A \text{ mod } P = B \text{ mod } P$   
 <proof>

**end**

## 7 Lemmata for modular arithmetic with primes

**theory** *Productdivides*  
**imports** *Pdifference*  
**begin**

**lemma** *productdivides*:  $\llbracket x \text{ mod } a = (0 :: nat); x \text{ mod } b = 0; \text{prime } a; \text{prime } b; a \neq b \rrbracket \implies x \text{ mod } (a * b) = 0$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *specializedtoprimes1*:  
**fixes**  $p :: nat$   
**shows**  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; p \neq q; a \text{ mod } p = b \text{ mod } p; a \text{ mod } q = b \text{ mod } q \rrbracket$   
 $\implies a \text{ mod } (p * q) = b \text{ mod } (p * q)$   
 <proof>

**lemma** *specializedtoprimes1a*:  
**fixes**  $p :: nat$   
**shows**  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; p \neq q; a \text{ mod } p = b \text{ mod } p; a \text{ mod } q = b \text{ mod } q; b < p * q \rrbracket$   
 $\implies a \text{ mod } (p * q) = b$   
 <proof>

**end**

## 8 Correctness proof for RSA

**theory** *Cryptinverts*  
**imports** *Crypt Productdivides HOL-Number-Theory.Residues*  
**begin**

In this theory we show, that a RSA encrypted message can be decrypted

**primrec** *pred*:  $nat \Rightarrow nat$   
**where**  
 $pred\ 0 = 0$

|  $\text{pred } (\text{Suc } a) = a$

**lemma** *pred-unfold*:

$\text{pred } n = n - 1$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *fermat*:

**assumes**  $\text{prime } p \ m \ \text{mod } p \neq 0$   
**shows**  $m^{\wedge}(p-(1::\text{nat})) \ \text{mod } p = 1$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *cryptinverts-hilf1*:  $\text{prime } p \implies (m * m^{\wedge}(k * \text{pred } p)) \ \text{mod } p = m \ \text{mod } p$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *cryptinverts-hilf2*:  $\text{prime } p \implies m * (m^{\wedge}(k * (\text{pred } p) * (\text{pred } q))) \ \text{mod } p = m \ \text{mod } p$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *cryptinverts-hilf3*:  $\text{prime } q \implies m * (m^{\wedge}(k * (\text{pred } p) * (\text{pred } q))) \ \text{mod } q = m \ \text{mod } q$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *cryptinverts-hilf4*:

$m^{\wedge} x \ \text{mod } (p * q) = m$  **if**  $\text{prime } p \ \text{prime } q \ p \neq q$   
 $m < p * q \ x \ \text{mod } (\text{pred } p * \text{pred } q) = 1$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *primmultgreater*: **fixes**  $p::\text{nat}$  **shows**  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; p \neq 2; q \neq 2 \rrbracket \implies 2 < p * q$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *primmultgreater2*: **fixes**  $p::\text{nat}$  **shows**  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; p \neq q \rrbracket \implies 2 < p * q$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *cryptinverts*:  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; p \neq q; n = p * q; m < n; e * d \ \text{mod } ((\text{pred } p) * (\text{pred } q)) = 1 \rrbracket \implies \text{rsa-crypt } (\text{rsa-crypt } m \ e \ n) \ d \ n = m$   
*<proof>*

**end**

## 9 Extensions to the Word theory required for PSS

**theory** *Wordarith*

**imports** *WordOperations HOL-Computational-Algebra.Primes*

**begin**

**definition**

*nat-to-bv-length* ::  $\text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{bv}$  **where**

*nat-to-bv-length:*  
*nat-to-bv-length*  $n\ l = (\text{if } \text{length}(\text{nat-to-bv } n) \leq l \text{ then } \text{bv-extend } l\ \mathbf{0}\ (\text{nat-to-bv } n) \text{ else } \square)$

**lemma** *length-nat-to-bv-length:*  
*nat-to-bv-length*  $x\ y \neq \square \implies \text{length} (\text{nat-to-bv-length } x\ y) = y$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *bv-to-nat-nat-to-bv-length:*  
*nat-to-bv-length*  $x\ y \neq \square \implies \text{bv-to-nat} (\text{nat-to-bv-length } x\ y) = x$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**definition**

*roundup* ::  $\text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat}$  **where**  
*roundup*:  $\text{roundup } x\ y = (\text{if } (x \bmod y = 0) \text{ then } (x \text{ div } y) \text{ else } (x \text{ div } y) + 1)$

**lemma** *rnddivd*:  $b \text{ dvd } a \implies \text{roundup } a\ b * b = a$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *bv-to-nat-zero-prepend*:  $\text{bv-to-nat } a = \text{bv-to-nat } (\mathbf{0}\#a)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**primrec** *remzero*::  $\text{bv} \Rightarrow \text{bv}$  **where**  
*remzero*  $\square = \square$   
 |  $\text{remzero } (a\#b) = (\text{if } a = \mathbf{1} \text{ then } (a\#b) \text{ else } \text{remzero } b)$

**lemma** *remzeroeq*:  $\text{bv-to-nat } a = \text{bv-to-nat} (\text{remzero } a)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *len-nat-to-bv-pos*: **assumes**  $x: 1 < a$  **shows**  $0 < \text{length} (\text{nat-to-bv } a)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *remzero-replicate*:  $\text{remzero} ((\text{replicate } n\ \mathbf{0})\@l) = \text{remzero } l$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-bvxor-bound*:  $a \leq \text{length } l \implies a \leq \text{length} (\text{bxor } l\ l2)$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *nat-to-bv-helper-legacy-induct*:  
 $(\bigwedge n. n \neq (0::\text{nat}) \longrightarrow P (n \text{ div } 2) \implies P n) \implies P x$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *len-lower-bound*:  
**assumes**  $0 < n$   
**shows**  $2^{\text{length} (\text{nat-to-bv } n) - \text{Suc } 0} \leq n$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-lower*: **assumes**  $a$ :  $\text{length } a < \text{length } b$  **and**  $b$ :  $(\text{hd } b) \sim = \mathbf{0}$  **shows**  
 $\text{bv-to-nat } a < \text{bv-to-nat } b$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *nat-to-bv-non-empty*: **assumes**  $a$ :  $0 < n$  **shows**  $\text{nat-to-bv } n \sim = []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *hd-append*:  $x \sim = [] \implies \text{hd } (x @ xs) = \text{hd } x$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *hd-one*:  $0 < n \implies \text{hd } (\text{nat-to-bv-helper } n []) = \mathbf{1}$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prime-hd-non-zero*:  
**fixes**  $p::\text{nat}$  **assumes**  $a$ : *prime*  $p$  **and**  $b$ : *prime*  $q$  **shows**  $\text{hd } (\text{nat-to-bv } (p*q)) \sim =$   
 $\mathbf{0}$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *primerew*: **fixes**  $p::\text{nat}$  **shows**  $[[m \text{ dvd } p; m \sim = 1; m \sim = p]] \implies \sim \text{ prime } p$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *two-dvd-exp*:  $0 < x \implies (2::\text{nat}) \text{ dvd } 2^{\wedge}x$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *exp-prod1*:  $[[1 < b; 2^{\wedge}x = 2*(b::\text{nat})]] \implies 2 \text{ dvd } b$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *exp-prod2*:  $[[1 < a; 2^{\wedge}x = a*2]] \implies (2::\text{nat}) \text{ dvd } a$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *odd-mul-odd*:  $[[\sim (2::\text{nat}) \text{ dvd } p; \sim 2 \text{ dvd } q]] \implies \sim 2 \text{ dvd } p*q$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *prime-equal*: **fixes**  $p::\text{nat}$  **shows**  $[[\text{prime } p; \text{prime } q; 2^{\wedge}x = p*q]] \implies (p=q)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *nat-to-bv-length-bv-to-nat*:  
 $\text{length } xs = n \implies xs \neq [] \implies \text{nat-to-bv-length } (\text{bv-to-nat } xs) n = xs$   
*<proof>*

**end**

## 10 EMSA-PSS encoding and decoding operation

**theory** *EMSA\_PSS*  
**imports** *SHA1 Wordarith*

**begin**

We define the encoding and decoding operations for the probabilistic signature scheme. Finally we show, that encoded messages always can be verified

**definition** *show-rightmost-bits*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *show-rightmost-bits* *bvec* *n* = *rev* (*take* *n* (*rev* *bvec*))

**definition** *BC*::  $bv$   
**where** *BC* = [*One*, *Zero*, *One*, *One*, *One*, *One*, *Zero*, *Zero*]

**definition** *salt*::  $bv$   
**where** *salt* = []

**definition** *sLen*::  $nat$   
**where** *sLen* = *length* *salt*

**definition** *generate-M'*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-M'* *mHash* *salt-new* = *bv-prepend* *64* **0** [] @ *mHash* @ *salt-new*

**definition** *generate-PS*::  $nat \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-PS* *emBits* *hLen* = *bv-prepend* ((*roundup* *emBits* *8*)\**8* - *sLen* - *hLen* - *16*) **0** []

**definition** *generate-DB*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-DB* *PS* = *PS* @ [*Zero*, *Zero*, *Zero*, *Zero*, *Zero*, *Zero*, *Zero*, *One*] @ *salt*

**definition** *maskedDB-zero*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *maskedDB-zero* *maskedDB* *emBits* = *bv-prepend* ((*roundup* *emBits* *8*) \* *8* - *emBits*) **0** (*drop* ((*roundup* *emBits* *8*)\**8* - *emBits*) *maskedDB*)

**definition** *generate-H*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-H* *EM* *emBits* *hLen* = *take* *hLen* (*drop* ((*roundup* *emBits* *8*)\**8* - *hLen* - *8*) *EM*)

**definition** *generate-maskedDB*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-maskedDB* *EM* *emBits* *hLen* = *take* ((*roundup* *emBits* *8*)\**8* - *hLen* - *8*) *EM*

**definition** *generate-salt*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *generate-salt* *DB-zero* = *show-rightmost-bits* *DB-zero* *sLen*

**primrec** *MGF2*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where**  
*MGF2* *Z* *0* = *sha1* (*Z*@(*nat-to-bv-length* *0* *32*))  
| *MGF2* *Z* (*Suc* *n*) = (*MGF2* *Z* *n*)@(sha1 (*Z*@(*nat-to-bv-length* (*Suc* *n*) *32*)))

**definition** *MGF1*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$   
**where** *MGF1* *Z* *n* *l* = *take* *l* (*MGF2* *Z* *n*)

**definition** *MGF*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where**

$MGF\ Z\ l = (if\ l = 0 \vee 2^{32} * (length\ (sha1\ Z)) < l$   
    then  $\square$   
    else  $MGF1\ Z\ (roundup\ l\ (length\ (sha1\ Z)) - 1)\ l)$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help8*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help8*  $DBzero\ H = DBzero\ @\ H\ @\ BC$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help7*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help7*  $maskedDB\ H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-encode-help8*  $(maskedDB-zero\ maskedDB\ emBits)\ H$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help6*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help6*  $DB\ dbMask\ H\ emBits =$   
    (if  $dbMask = \square$   
    then  $\square$   
    else *emsapss-encode-help7*  $(bvxor\ DB\ dbMask)\ H\ emBits)$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help5*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help5*  $DB\ H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-encode-help6*  $DB\ (MGF\ H\ (length\ DB))\ H\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help4*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help4*  $PS\ H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-encode-help5*  $(generate-DB\ PS)\ H\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help3*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help3*  $H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-encode-help4*  $(generate-PS\ emBits\ (length\ H))\ H\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help2*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help2*  $M'\ emBits = emsapss-encode-help3\ (sha1\ M')\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-encode-help1*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode-help1*  $mHash\ emBits =$   
    (if  $emBits < length\ (mHash) + sLen + 16$   
    then  $\square$   
    else *emsapss-encode-help2*  $(generate-M'\ mHash\ salt)\ emBits)$

**definition** *emsapss-encode*::  $bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bv$

**where** *emsapss-encode*  $M\ emBits =$   
    (if  $(2^{64} \leq length\ M \vee 2^{32} * 160 < emBits)$   
    then  $\square$   
    else *emsapss-encode-help1*  $(sha1\ M)\ emBits)$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help11*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help11*  $H' H = (if\ H' \neq H\ then\ False\ else\ True)$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help10*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help10*  $M' H = emsapss-decode-help11\ (sha1\ M')\ H$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help9*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help9*  $mHash\ salt-new\ H =$   
*emsapss-decode-help10*  $(generate-M'\ mHash\ salt-new)\ H$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help8*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help8*  $mHash\ DB-zero\ H =$   
*emsapss-decode-help9*  $mHash\ (generate-salt\ DB-zero)\ H$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help7*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help7*  $mHash\ DB-zero\ H\ emBits =$   
 $(if\ (take\ ((roundup\ emBits\ 8)*8 - (length\ mHash) - sLen - 16)\ DB-zero \neq$   
 $bv-prepend\ ((roundup\ emBits\ 8)*8 - (length\ mHash) - sLen - 16)\ \mathbf{0}\ []) \vee (take$   
 $8\ (drop\ ((roundup\ emBits\ 8)*8 - (length\ mHash) - sLen - 16)\ DB-zero) \neq$   
 $[Zero,\ Zero,\ Zero,\ Zero,\ Zero,\ Zero,\ Zero,\ One])$   
 $then\ False$   
 $else\ emsapss-decode-help8\ mHash\ DB-zero\ H)$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help6*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help6*  $mHash\ DB\ H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-decode-help7*  $mHash\ (maskedDB-zero\ DB\ emBits)\ H\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help5*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help5*  $mHash\ maskedDB\ dbMask\ H\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-decode-help6*  $mHash\ (bvxor\ maskedDB\ dbMask)\ H\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help4*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help4*  $mHash\ maskedDB\ H\ emBits =$   
 $(if\ take\ ((roundup\ emBits\ 8)*8 - emBits)\ maskedDB \neq\ bv-prepend\ ((roundup$   
 $emBits\ 8)*8 - emBits)\ \mathbf{0}\ []$   
 $then\ False$   
 $else\ emsapss-decode-help5\ mHash\ maskedDB\ (MGF\ H\ ((roundup\ emBits\ 8)*8$   
 $- (length\ mHash) - 8))\ H\ emBits)$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help3*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help3*  $mHash\ EM\ emBits =$   
*emsapss-decode-help4*  $mHash\ (generate-maskedDB\ EM\ emBits\ (length\ mHash))$   
 $(generate-H\ EM\ emBits\ (length\ mHash))\ emBits$

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help2*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help2*  $mHash\ EM\ emBits =$   
 $(if\ show-rightmost-bits\ EM\ 8 \neq\ BC$   
 $then\ False$

*else emsapss-decode-help3 mHash EM emBits)*

**definition** *emsapss-decode-help1*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode-help1 mHash EM emBits* =  
    *(if emBits < length (mHash) + sLen + 16*  
      *then False*  
      *else emsapss-decode-help2 mHash EM emBits)*

**definition** *emsapss-decode*::  $bv \Rightarrow bv \Rightarrow nat \Rightarrow bool$   
**where** *emsapss-decode M EM emBits* =  
    *(if ( $2^{64} \leq \text{length } M \vee 2^{32} * 160 < \text{emBits}$ )*  
      *then False*  
      *else emsapss-decode-help1 (sha1 M) EM emBits)*

**lemma** *roundup-positiv*:  $0 < \text{emBits} \implies 0 < \text{roundup emBits } 160$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-ge-emBits*:  $0 < \text{emBits} \implies 0 < x \implies \text{emBits} \leq (\text{roundup emBits } x) * x$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-ge-0*:  $0 < \text{emBits} \implies 0 < x \implies 0 \leq \text{roundup emBits } x * x - \text{emBits}$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-le-7*:  $0 < \text{emBits} \implies \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8 - \text{emBits} \leq 7$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-nat-ge-8-help*:  
     $\text{length (sha1 M) + sLen + 16} \leq \text{emBits} \implies 8 \leq \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8 - (\text{length (sha1 M) + 8})$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-nat-ge-8*:  
     $\text{length (sha1 M) + sLen + 16} \leq \text{emBits} \implies 8 \leq \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8 - (\text{length (sha1 M) + 8})$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-le-ub*:  
     $\llbracket 176 + \text{sLen} \leq \text{emBits}; \text{emBits} \leq 2^{32} * 160 \rrbracket \implies (\text{roundup emBits } 8) * 8 - 168 \leq 2^{32} * 160$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *modify-roundup-ge1*:  $\llbracket 8 \leq \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8 - 168 \rrbracket \implies 176 \leq \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8$   
    *<proof>*

**lemma** *modify-roundup-ge2*:  $\llbracket 176 \leq \text{roundup emBits } 8 * 8 \rrbracket \implies 21 < \text{roundup emBits } 8$



*<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-help1*:  $\llbracket 0 < \text{roundup } l \ 160 \rrbracket \implies (\text{roundup } l \ 160 - 1) + 1 = (\text{roundup } l \ 160)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-help1-new*:  $\llbracket 0 < l \rrbracket \implies (\text{roundup } l \ 160 - 1) + 1 = (\text{roundup } l \ 160)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *roundup-help2*:  $\llbracket 176 + sLen \leq emBits \rrbracket \implies \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - 160 - sLen - 16$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-prepend-equal*:  $\text{bv-prepend } (Suc \ n) \ b \ l = b\#\text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ l$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-bv-prepend*:  $\text{length } (\text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ l) = n + \text{length } l$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-bv-prepend-drop*:  $a \leq \text{length } xs \implies \text{length } (\text{bv-prepend } a \ b \ (\text{drop } a \ xs)) = \text{length } xs$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *take-bv-prepend*:  $\text{take } n \ (\text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ x) = \text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *take-bv-prepend2*:  $\text{take } n \ (\text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ xs@ys@zs) = \text{bv-prepend } n \ b \ []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-prepend-append*:  $\text{bv-prepend } a \ b \ x = \text{bv-prepend } a \ b \ [] \ @ \ x$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-prepend-append2*:  
 $x < y \implies \text{bv-prepend } y \ b \ xs = (\text{bv-prepend } x \ b \ []) \ @ (\text{bv-prepend } (y-x) \ b \ []) \ @ xs$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *drop-bv-prepend-help2*:  $\llbracket x < y \rrbracket \implies \text{drop } x \ (\text{bv-prepend } y \ b \ []) = \text{bv-prepend } (y-x) \ b \ []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *drop-bv-prepend-help3*:  $\llbracket x = y \rrbracket \implies \text{drop } x \ (\text{bv-prepend } y \ b \ []) = \text{bv-prepend } (y-x) \ b \ []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *drop-bv-prepend-help4*:  $\llbracket x \leq y \rrbracket \implies \text{drop } x \ (\text{bv-prepend } y \ b \ []) = \text{bv-prepend } (y-x) \ b \ []$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-prepend-add*:  $bv-prepend\ x\ b\ []\ @\ bv-prepend\ y\ b\ [] = bv-prepend\ (x + y)\ b\ []$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *bv-prepend-drop*:  $x \leq y \longrightarrow bv-prepend\ x\ b\ (drop\ x\ (bv-prepend\ y\ b\ [])) = bv-prepend\ y\ b\ []$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *bv-prepend-split*:  $bv-prepend\ x\ b\ (left\ @\ right) = bv-prepend\ x\ b\ left\ @\ right$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-generate-DB*:  $length\ (generate-DB\ PS) = length\ PS + 8 + sLen$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-generate-PS*:  $length\ (generate-PS\ emBits\ 160) = (roundup\ emBits\ 8) * 8 - sLen - 160 - 16$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-bv-xor*:  $length\ a = length\ b \implies length\ (bv-xor\ a\ b) = length\ a$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-MGF2*:  $length\ (MGF2\ Z\ m) = Suc\ m * length\ (sha1\ (Z\ @\ nat-to-bv-length\ m\ 32))$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-MGF1*:  $l \leq (Suc\ n) * 160 \implies length\ (MGF1\ Z\ n\ l) = l$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-MGF*:  $0 < l \implies l \leq 2^{32} * length\ (sha1\ x) \implies length\ (MGF\ x\ l) = l$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *solve-length-generate-DB*:  
 [  $0 < emBits; length\ (sha1\ M) + sLen + 16 \leq emBits$  ]  
 $\implies length\ (generate-DB\ (generate-PS\ emBits\ (length\ (sha1\ x)))) = (roundup\ emBits\ 8) * 8 - 168$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *length-maskedDB-zero*:  
 [  $roundup\ emBits\ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq length\ maskedDB$  ]  
 $\implies length\ (maskedDB-zero\ maskedDB\ emBits) = length\ maskedDB$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *take-equal-bv-prepend*:  
 [  $176 + sLen \leq emBits; roundup\ emBits\ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq 7$  ]  
 $\implies take\ (roundup\ emBits\ 8 * 8 - length\ (sha1\ M) - sLen - 16)\ (maskedDB-zero\ (generate-DB\ (generate-PS\ emBits\ 160)))\ emBits =$   
 $bv-prepend\ (roundup\ emBits\ 8 * 8 - length\ (sha1\ M) - sLen - 16)\ \mathbf{0}\ []$   
 ⟨proof⟩

**lemma** *lastbits-BC*:  $BC = \text{show-rightmost-bits } (xs @ ys @ BC) \ 8$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *equal-zero*:

$176 + sLen \leq emBits \implies \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - (176 + sLen)$

$\implies 0 = \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits - (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - (176 + sLen))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *get-salt*:  $\llbracket 176 + sLen \leq emBits; \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq 7 \rrbracket \implies (\text{generate-salt } (\text{maskedDB-zero } (\text{generate-DB } (\text{generate-PS } emBits \ 160)) \ emBits)) = \text{salt}$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *generate-maskedDB-elim*:  $\llbracket \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq \text{length } x; (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8) * 8 - (\text{length } (\text{sha1 } M)) - 8 = \text{length } (\text{maskedDB-zero } x \ emBits) \rrbracket \implies \text{generate-maskedDB } (\text{maskedDB-zero } x \ emBits @ y @ z) \ emBits (\text{length } (\text{sha1 } M)) = \text{maskedDB-zero } x \ emBits$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *generate-H-elim*:  $\llbracket \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq \text{length } x; \text{length } (\text{maskedDB-zero } x \ emBits) = (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8) * 8 - 168; \text{length } y = 160 \rrbracket \implies \text{generate-H } (\text{maskedDB-zero } x \ emBits @ y @ z) \ emBits \ 160 = y$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-bv-prepend-drop-special*:  $\llbracket \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - (176 + sLen); \text{length } (\text{generate-PS } emBits \ 160) = \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - (176 + sLen) \rrbracket \implies \text{length } (\text{bv-prepend } (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits) \ \mathbf{0} (\text{drop } (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits) (\text{generate-PS } emBits \ 160))) = \text{length } (\text{generate-PS } emBits \ 160)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *x01-elim*:  $\llbracket 176 + sLen \leq emBits; \text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - emBits \leq 7 \rrbracket \implies \text{take } 8 (\text{drop } (\text{roundup } emBits \ 8 * 8 - (\text{length } (\text{sha1 } M)) + sLen + 16)) (\text{maskedDB-zero } (\text{generate-DB } (\text{generate-PS } emBits \ 160)) \ emBits) = [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}]$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *drop-bv-mapzip*:

**assumes**  $n \leq \text{length } x \ \text{length } x = \text{length } y$

**shows**  $\text{drop } n (\text{bv-mapzip } f \ x \ y) = \text{bv-mapzip } f (\text{drop } n \ x) (\text{drop } n \ y)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** [*simp*]:

**assumes**  $\text{length } a = \text{length } b$

**shows**  $\text{bvxor } (\text{bvxor } a \ b) \ b = a$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv XOR XOR-elim-help*:  
**assumes**  $x \leq \text{length } a$  **and**  $\text{length } a = \text{length } b$   
**shows**  $\text{bv-prepend } x \mathbf{0} (\text{drop } x (\text{bv XOR } (\text{bv-prepend } x \mathbf{0} (\text{drop } x (\text{bv XOR } a b)))) b) =$   
 $\text{bv-prepend } x \mathbf{0} (\text{drop } x a)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv XOR XOR-elim*:  $\llbracket \text{roundup } \text{emBits } 8 * 8 - \text{emBits} \leq \text{length } a; \text{length } a = \text{length } b \rrbracket \implies (\text{maskedDB-zero } (\text{bv XOR } (\text{maskedDB-zero } (\text{bv XOR } a b) \text{emBits}) b) \text{emBits}) = \text{bv-prepend } (\text{roundup } \text{emBits } 8 * 8 - \text{emBits}) \mathbf{0} (\text{drop } (\text{roundup } \text{emBits } 8 * 8 - \text{emBits}) a)$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *verify*:  $\llbracket (\text{emsapss-encode } M \text{emBits}) \neq \llbracket; EM = (\text{emsapss-encode } M \text{emBits}) \rrbracket \rrbracket \implies \text{emsapss-decode } M EM \text{emBits} = \text{True}$   
*<proof>*

**end**

## 11 RSS-PSS encoding and decoding operation

**theory** *RSAPSS*  
**imports** *EMSAPSS Cryptinverts*  
**begin**

We define the RSA-PSS signature and verification operations. Moreover we show, that messages signed with RSA-PSS can always be verified

**definition** *rsapss-sign-help1*::  $\text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{bv}$   
**where** *rsapss-sign-help1*  $\text{em-nat } e \text{ n} =$   
 $\text{nat-to-bv-length } (\text{rsa-crypt } \text{em-nat } e \text{ n}) (\text{length } (\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n}))$

**definition** *rsapss-sign*::  $\text{bv} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{bv}$   
**where** *rsapss-sign*  $m \text{ e } \text{n} =$   
 $(\text{if } (\text{emsapss-encode } m (\text{length } (\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n}) - 1)) = \llbracket$   
 $\text{then } \llbracket$   
 $\text{else } (\text{rsapss-sign-help1 } (\text{bv-to-nat } (\text{emsapss-encode } m (\text{length } (\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n}) - 1))) \text{ e } \text{n}))$

**definition** *rsapss-verify*::  $\text{bv} \Rightarrow \text{bv} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
**where** *rsapss-verify*  $m \text{ s } d \text{ n} =$   
 $(\text{if } (\text{length } s) \neq \text{length}(\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n})$   
 $\text{then } \text{False}$   
 $\text{else let } \text{em} = \text{nat-to-bv-length } (\text{rsa-crypt } (\text{bv-to-nat } s) d \text{ n}) ((\text{roundup } (\text{length}(\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n}) - 1) 8) * 8) \text{ in } \text{emsapss-decode } m \text{ em } (\text{length}(\text{nat-to-bv } \text{n}) - 1))$

**lemma** *length-emsapss-encode*:  
 $\text{emsapss-encode } m \text{ x} \neq \llbracket \implies \text{length } (\text{emsapss-encode } m \text{ x}) = \text{roundup } x 8 * 8$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-to-nat-emsapss-encode-le*:  $\text{emsapss-encode } m \ x \neq [] \implies \text{bv-to-nat } (\text{emsapss-encode } m \ x) < 2^{\lceil \text{roundup } x \ 8 \ * \ 8 \rceil}$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-helper1*: **shows** *length*

(*bxor*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))  
(*MGF* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))  
(*length*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))@  
*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*)) @ *BC*)  
= *length*  
(*bxor*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))  
(*MGF* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))  
(*length*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*)))))) + 168  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *MGFLen-helper*:  $\text{MGF } z \ l \ \sim = [] \implies l \leq 2^{32} * (\text{length } (\text{sha1 } z))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-helper2*: **assumes** *p*: prime *p* **and** *q*: prime *q*

**and** *mgf*: (*MGF* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))

(*length*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))  $\sim = []$   
**and** *len*:  $\text{length } (\text{sha1 } M) + \text{sLen} + 16 \leq (\text{length } (\text{nat-to-bv } (p * q))) - \text{Suc } 0$   
**shows** *length*  
(  
(*bxor*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))  
(*MGF* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))  
(*length*  
*generate-DB*  
*generate-PS* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*)  
(*length* (*sha1* (*generate-M'* (*sha1 m salt*))))))  
) = (*roundup* (*length* (*nat-to-bv* (*p \* q*)) - *Suc 0*) 8) \* 8 - 168

*<proof>*

**lemma** *emBits-roundup-cancel*:  $emBits \bmod 8 \sim = 0 \implies (roundup\ emBits\ 8) * 8 - emBits = 8 - (emBits \bmod 8)$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *emBits-roundup-cancel2*:  $emBits \bmod 8 \sim = 0 \implies (roundup\ emBits\ 8) * 8 - (8 - (emBits \bmod 8)) = emBits$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-bound*:  $\llbracket emBits \bmod 8 \sim = 0; 8 \leq (length\ maskedDB) \rrbracket \implies length\ (remzero\ ((maskedDB-zero\ maskedDB\ emBits)\ @a\ @b)) \leq length\ (maskedDB\ @a\ @b) - (8 - (emBits \bmod 8))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-bound2*:  $8 \leq length\ ( (bvxor\ (generate-DB\ (generate-PS\ (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0)\ (length\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))))\ (MGF\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))\ (length\ (generate-DB\ (generate-PS\ (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0)\ (length\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))))))))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-helper*: **assumes** *p*: prime *p* **and** *q*: prime *q* **and** *x*:  $(length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0) \bmod 8 \sim = 0$  **and** *mgf*:  $(MGF\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))) \sim = \llbracket$

$(length$

$(generate-DB$

$(generate-PS\ (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0)$

$(length\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt)))))) \sim = \llbracket$

**and** *len*:  $length\ (sha1\ M) + sLen + 16 \leq (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0$

**shows**  $length$

$(remzero$

$(maskedDB-zero$

$(bvxor$

$(generate-DB$

$(generate-PS\ (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0)$

$(length\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))))$

$(MGF\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))$

$(length$

$(generate-DB$

$(generate-PS\ (length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0)$

$(length\ (sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt))))))$

$(length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q)) - Suc\ 0) @$

$sha1\ (generate-M'\ (sha1\ m)\ salt) @ BC))$

$< length\ (nat-to-bv\ (p * q))$

*<proof>*

**lemma** *length-emsapss-smaller-pq*:  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{ prime } q; \text{ emsapss-encode } m \text{ (length (nat-to-bv } (p * q)) - \text{Suc } 0) \neq []; \text{ (length (nat-to-bv } (p * q)) - \text{Suc } 0) \bmod 8 \sim = 0 \rrbracket \implies \text{length (remzero (emsapss-encode } m \text{ (length (nat-to-bv } (p * q)) - \text{Suc } 0)) < \text{length (nat-to-bv } (p * q))$   
*<proof>*

**lemma** *bv-to-nat-emsapss-smaller-pq*: **assumes** *a*: prime *p* **and** *b*: prime *q* **and** *pneq*:  $p \sim = q$  **and** *c*: *emsapss-encode* *m* (length (nat-to-bv (p \* q)) - Suc 0)  $\neq []$  **shows** *bv-to-nat* (emsapss-encode *m* (length (nat-to-bv (p \* q)) - Suc 0)) < p\*q  
*<proof>*

**lemma** *rsa-pss-verify*:  $\llbracket \text{prime } p; \text{ prime } q; p \neq q; n = p * q; e * d \bmod ((\text{pred } p) * (\text{pred } q)) = 1; \text{ rsapss-sign } m \ e \ n \neq []; s = \text{rsapss-sign } m \ e \ n \rrbracket \implies \text{rsapss-verify } m \ s \ d$   
*n = True*  
*<proof>*

**end**

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