

Conservation of CSP Noninterference Security under Sequential Composition

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March 17, 2025

Abstract

In his outstanding work on Communicating Sequential Processes, Hoare has defined two fundamental binary operations allowing to compose the input processes into another, typically more complex, process: sequential composition and concurrent composition. Particularly, the output of the former operation is a process that initially behaves like the first operand, and then like the second operand once the execution of the first one has terminated successfully, as long as it does.

This paper formalizes Hoare's definition of sequential composition and proves, in the general case of a possibly intransitive policy, that CSP noninterference security is conserved under this operation, provided that successful termination cannot be affected by confidential events and cannot occur as an alternative to other events in the traces of the first operand. Both of these assumptions are shown, by means of counterexamples, to be necessary for the theorem to hold.

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1 Propaedeutic definitions and lemmas

theory *Propaedeutics*

imports *Noninterference-Ipurge-Unwinding.DeterministicProcesses*

begin

*To our Lord Jesus Christ, my dear parents, and my "little" sister,
for the immense love with which they surround me.*

In his outstanding work on Communicating Sequential Processes [1], Hoare has defined two fundamental binary operations allowing to compose the input processes into another, typically more complex, process: sequential composition and concurrent composition. Particularly, the output of the former operation is a process that initially behaves like the first operand, and then like the second operand once the execution of the first one has terminated successfully, as long as it does. In order to distinguish it from deadlock, successful termination is regarded as a special event in the process alphabet (required to be the same for both the input processes and the output one).

This paper formalizes Hoare's definition of sequential composition and proves, in the general case of a possibly intransitive policy, that CSP noninterference security [8] is conserved under this operation, viz. the security of both of the input processes implies that of the output process.

This property is conditional on two nontrivial assumptions. The first assumption is that the policy do not allow successful termination to be affected by confidential events, viz. by other events not allowed to affect some event in the process alphabet. The second assumption is that successful termination do not occur as an alternative to other events in the traces of the first operand, viz. that whenever the process can terminate successfully, it cannot engage in any other event. Both of these assumptions are shown, by means of counterexamples, to be necessary for the theorem to hold.

From the above sketch of the sequential composition of two processes P and Q , notwithstanding its informal character, it clearly follows that any failure of the output process is either a failure of P (case A), or a pair $(xs @ ys, Y)$, where xs is a trace of P and (ys, Y) is a failure of Q (case B). On the other hand, according to the definition of security given in [8], the output process is secure just in case, for each of its failures, any event x contained in the failure trace can be removed from the trace, or inserted into the trace of another failure after the same previous events as in the original trace, and the resulting pair is still a failure of the process, provided that the future of x is deprived of the events that may be affected by x .

In case A, this transformation is performed on a failure of process P ; being it secure, the result is still a failure of P , and then of the output process. In case B, the transformation may involve either ys alone, or both xs and ys , depending on the position at which x is removed or inserted. In the former subcase, being Q secure, the result has the form $(xs @ ys', Y')$ where (ys', Y') is a failure of Q , thus it is still a failure of the output process. In the latter subcase, ys has to be deprived of the events that may be affected by x , as well as by any event affected by x in the involved portion of xs , and a similar transformation applies to Y . In order that the output process be secure, the resulting pair (ys'', Y'') must still be a failure of Q , so that the pair $(xs' @ ys'', Y'')$, where xs' results from the transformation of xs , be a failure of the output process.

The transformations bringing from ys and Y to ys'' and Y'' are implemented by the functions *ipurge-tr-aux* and *ipurge-ref-aux* defined in [9]. Therefore, the proof of the target security conservation theorem requires that of the following lemma: given a process P , a noninterference policy I , and an event-domain map D , if P is secure with respect to I and D and (xs, X) is a failure of P , then $(ipurge-tr-aux I D U xs, ipurge-ref-aux I D U xs X)$ is still a failure of P . In other words, the lemma states that the failures of a secure process are closed under intransitive purge. This section contains a proof of such closure lemma, as well as further definitions and lemmas required for the proof of the target theorem.

Throughout this paper, the salient points of definitions and proofs are commented; for additional information, cf. Isabelle documentation, particularly [6], [4], [3], and [2].

$(\exists w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D U xs). (w, D x) \in I)$
by *blast*
thus *?thesis*
using *A* **and** *True* **by** (*cases* $\exists w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs. (w, D x) \in I, \text{simp-all}$)
next
case *False*
hence $\neg (\exists w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs \cup$
 $\text{sinks-aux } I D V (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D U xs). (w, D x) \in I)$
using *A* **by** *simp*
hence $\neg (\exists w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs. (w, D x) \in I) \wedge$
 $\neg (\exists w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D U xs). (w, D x) \in I)$
by *blast*
thus *?thesis*
using *A* **and** *False* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *sinks-aux-subset-dom*:

assumes *A*: $U \subseteq V$
shows $\text{sinks-aux } I D U xs \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs$
proof (*induction xs rule: rev-induct, simp add: A, rule subsetI*)
fix *x xs w*
assume
 $B: \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs$ **and**
 $C: w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (xs @ [x])$
show $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x])$
proof (*cases* $\exists u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs. (u, D x) \in I$)
case *True*
hence $w = D x \vee w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs$
using *C* **by** *simp*
moreover {
assume *D*: $w = D x$
obtain *u* **where** *E*: $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs$ **and** *F*: $(u, D x) \in I$
using *True* ..
have $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs$ **using** *B* **and** *E* ..
with *F* **have** $\exists u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (u, D x) \in I$..
hence *?thesis* **using** *D* **by** *simp*
}
moreover {
assume $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs$
with *B* **have** $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs$..
hence *?thesis* **by** *simp*
}
ultimately show *?thesis* ..
next
case *False*
hence $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs$
using *C* **by** *simp*
with *B* **have** $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs$..

qed
ultimately show $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I' D' U' xs)$
by *simp*
qed
with A **show** $w \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs \dots$
qed
qed

lemma *sinks-aux-subset-ipurge-tr*:
 $\text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr } I' D' u' xs) \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs$
by (*simp add: ipurge-tr-aux-single-dom [symmetric] sinks-aux-subset-ipurge-tr-aux*)

lemma *sinks-aux-member-ipurge-tr-aux* [rule-format]:

$u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs \longrightarrow$
 $(u, w) \in I \longrightarrow$
 $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (v, w) \in I) \longrightarrow$
 $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$
proof (*induction xs arbitrary: u w rule: rev-induct, (rule-tac [!] impI)+, simp*)

fix $u w$
assume
 $A: (u, w) \in I$ **and**
 $B: \forall v \in V. (v, w) \notin I$
assume $u \in U \vee u \in V$
moreover {
 $\text{assume } u \in U$
}
moreover {
 $\text{assume } u \in V$
with B **have** $(u, w) \notin I \dots$
hence $u \in U$ **using** A **by** *contradiction*
}
ultimately show $u \in U \dots$

next

fix $x xs u w$
assume
 $A: \bigwedge u w. u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs \longrightarrow$
 $(u, w) \in I \longrightarrow$
 $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (v, w) \in I) \longrightarrow$
 $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$ **and**
 $B: u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) (xs @ [x])$ **and**
 $C: (u, w) \in I$ **and**
 $D: \neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]). (v, w) \in I)$
show $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]))$
proof (*cases* $\exists u' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs. (u', D x) \in I$)
case *True*
hence $u = D x \vee u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs$
using B **by** *simp*
moreover {
 $\text{assume } E: u = D x$

obtain u' **where** $u' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs$ **and** $F: (u', D x) \in I$
using *True* ..
moreover have $u' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs \longrightarrow$
 $(u', D x) \in I \longrightarrow$
 $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (v, D x) \in I) \longrightarrow$
 $u' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$
(is $\longrightarrow - \longrightarrow \neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$) **using** *A* .
ultimately have $\neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$
by *simp*
moreover have $\neg ?P$
proof
have $(D x, w) \in I$ **using** *C* **and** *E* **by** *simp*
moreover assume $?P$
hence $D x \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x])$ **by** *simp*
ultimately have $\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]). (v, w) \in I$..
moreover have $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]). (v, w) \in I)$
using *D* **by** *simp*
ultimately show *False* **by** *contradiction*
qed
ultimately have $?Q$..
with *F* **have** $\exists u' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$.
 $(u', D x) \in I$..
hence $D x \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs @ [x])$
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs @ [x] =$
 $\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V (xs @ [x])$
using $\langle \neg ?P \rangle$ **by** *simp*
ultimately have $?thesis$ **using** *E* **by** *simp*
}
moreover {
assume $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs$
moreover have $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs \longrightarrow$
 $(u, w) \in I \longrightarrow$
 $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (v, w) \in I) \longrightarrow$
 $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$
(is $\longrightarrow - \longrightarrow \neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$) **using** *A* .
ultimately have $\neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$
using *C* **by** *simp*
moreover have $\neg ?P$
proof
assume $?P$
hence $\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]). (v, w) \in I$
by *simp*
thus *False* **using** *D* **by** *contradiction*
qed
ultimately have $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$..
hence $?thesis$ **by** *simp*
}
ultimately show $?thesis$..

next
case *False*
hence $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs$
using *B* **by** *simp*
moreover have $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup V) xs \longrightarrow$
 $(u, w) \in I \longrightarrow$
 $\neg (\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V xs. (v, w) \in I) \longrightarrow$
 $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs)$
(is $\longrightarrow \neg \longrightarrow \neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$ **using** *A* **.**
ultimately have $\neg ?P \longrightarrow ?Q$
using *C* **by** *simp*
moreover have $\neg ?P$
proof
assume $?P$
hence $\exists v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D V (xs @ [x]). (v, w) \in I$
by *simp*
thus *False* **using** *D* **by** *contradiction*
qed
ultimately have $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D V xs) ..$
thus *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *sinks-aux-member-ipurge-tr*:
assumes
A: $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } v U) xs$ **and**
B: $(u, w) \in I$ **and**
C: $\neg ((v, w) \in I \vee (\exists v' \in \text{sinks } I D v xs. (v', w) \in I))$
shows $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (\text{ipurge-tr } I D v xs)$
proof (*subst ipurge-tr-aux-single-dom [symmetric]*,
rule-tac w = w **in** *sinks-aux-member-ipurge-tr-aux*)
show $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (U \cup \{v\}) xs$
using *A* **by** *simp*
next
show $(u, w) \in I$
using *B* **.**
next
show $\neg (\exists v' \in \text{sinks-aux } I D \{v\} xs. (v', w) \in I)$
using *C* **by** (*simp add: sinks-aux-single-dom*)
qed

Here below is the proof of some properties of functions *ipurge-tr-aux* and *ipurge-ref-aux*.

lemma *ipurge-tr-aux-append*:
 $\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D U (xs @ ys) =$
 $\text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D U xs @ \text{ipurge-tr-aux } I D (\text{sinks-aux } I D U xs) ys$
proof (*induction ys* *rule: rev-induct, simp, subst append-assoc [symmetric]*)

thus *?thesis*
using *A and False by simp*
qed
qed

lemma *ipurge-tr-aux-insert:*
ipurge-tr-aux I D (insert v U) xs =
ipurge-tr-aux I D U (ipurge-tr I D v xs)
by (*subst insert-is-Un, simp only: ipurge-tr-aux-union ipurge-tr-aux-single-dom*)

lemma *ipurge-ref-aux-subset:*
ipurge-ref-aux I D U xs X \subseteq X
by (*subst ipurge-ref-aux-def, rule subsetI, simp*)

1.2 Intransitive purge of event sets with trivial base case

Here below are the definitions of variants of functions *sinks-aux* and *ipurge-ref-aux*, respectively named *sinks-aux-less* and *ipurge-ref-aux-less*, such that their base cases in correspondence with an empty input list are trivial, viz. such that *sinks-aux-less I D U [] = {}* and *ipurge-ref-aux-less I D U [] X = X*. These functions will prove to be useful in what follows.

function *sinks-aux-less* ::
*('d \times 'd) set \Rightarrow ('a \Rightarrow 'd) \Rightarrow 'd set \Rightarrow 'a list \Rightarrow 'd set **where***
sinks-aux-less - - - [] = {} |
sinks-aux-less I D U (xs @ [x]) =
(if $\exists v \in U \cup$ sinks-aux-less I D U xs. (v, D x) \in I
then insert (D x) (sinks-aux-less I D U xs)
else sinks-aux-less I D U xs)
proof (*atomize-elim, simp-all add: split-paired-all*)
qed (*rule rev-cases, rule disjI1, assumption, simp*)
termination by *lexicographic-order*

definition *ipurge-ref-aux-less* ::
*('d \times 'd) set \Rightarrow ('a \Rightarrow 'd) \Rightarrow 'd set \Rightarrow 'a list \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow 'a set **where***
ipurge-ref-aux-less I D U xs X \equiv
{x \in X. $\forall v \in$ sinks-aux-less I D U xs. (v, D x) \notin I}

Here below is the proof of some properties of function *sinks-aux-less* used in what follows.

lemma *sinks-aux-sinks-aux-less:*
sinks-aux I D U xs = U \cup sinks-aux-less I D U xs
by (*induction xs rule: rev-induct, simp-all*)

lemma *sinks-aux-less-single-dom:*
sinks-aux-less I D {u} xs = sinks I D u xs

by (rule sinks-aux-subset-ipurge-tr)
 moreover have $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U$ (ipurge-tr $I D (D x) xs$)
 using D by (simp add: sinks-aux-sinks-aux-less)
 ultimately have $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U xs ..$
 moreover have $U \subseteq \text{insert } (D x) U$
 by (rule subset-insertI)
 hence $\text{sinks-aux } I D U xs \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs$
 by (rule sinks-aux-subset-dom)
 ultimately have $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs ..$
 hence $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (x \# xs)$
 using A by (simp add: sinks-aux-cons)
 hence $v \in U \cup \text{sinks-aux-less } I D U (x \# xs)$
 by (simp add: sinks-aux-sinks-aux-less)
 with E have $\exists v \in U \cup \text{sinks-aux-less } I D U (x \# xs). (v, D x') \in I ..$
 thus *False* using C by contradiction
 qed
 thus ?thesis by (simp add: ipurge-ref-aux-less-last)
 qed
 also have ... =
 ipurge-ref-aux-less $I D U$ (ipurge-tr $I D (D x) (xs @ [x'])$)
 (ipurge-ref $I D (D x) (xs @ [x']) X$)
 proof -
 have $\neg ((D x, D x') \in I \vee (\exists v \in \text{sinks } I D (D x) xs. (v, D x') \in I))$
 (is $\neg ?P$)
 proof (rule notI, erule disjE)
 assume $D: (D x, D x') \in I$
 have $\text{insert } (D x) U \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs$
 by (rule sinks-aux-subset)
 moreover have $D x \in \text{insert } (D x) U$
 by simp
 ultimately have $D x \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs ..$
 hence $D x \in \text{sinks-aux } I D U (x \# xs)$
 using A by (simp add: sinks-aux-cons)
 hence $D x \in U \cup \text{sinks-aux-less } I D U (x \# xs)$
 by (simp add: sinks-aux-sinks-aux-less)
 with D have $\exists v \in U \cup \text{sinks-aux-less } I D U (x \# xs). (v, D x') \in I ..$
 thus *False* using C by contradiction
 next
 assume $\exists v \in \text{sinks } I D (D x) xs. (v, D x') \in I$
 then obtain v where
 $D: v \in \text{sinks } I D (D x) xs$ and
 $E: (v, D x') \in I ..$
 have $\{D x\} \subseteq \text{insert } (D x) U$
 by simp
 hence $\text{sinks-aux } I D \{D x\} xs \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs$
 by (rule sinks-aux-subset-dom)
 moreover have $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D \{D x\} xs$
 using D by (simp add: sinks-aux-single-dom)
 ultimately have $v \in \text{sinks-aux } I D (\text{insert } (D x) U) xs ..$

In fact, in each recursive step, any item allowed to be affected by U either directly, or through the effect of some item preceding x within xs , has already been removed from the set (in the initial step and in subsequent steps, respectively). Thus, it is sufficient to check whether x may be directly affected by U , and remove any residual item allowed to be affected by x if this is the case.

Assume that the two computations be performed simultaneously by a single function, which will then take as input an event list-event set pair and return as output another such pair. Then, if the input pair is a failure of a secure process, the output pair is still a failure. In fact, for each item x of xs allowed to be affected by U , if ys is the partial output list for the sublist of xs preceding x , then $(ys @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D x) xs', \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D x) xs' X')$ is a failure provided that such is $(ys @ x \# xs', X')$, by virtue of the definition of CSP noninterference security [8]. Hence, the property of being a failure is conserved upon each recursive call by the event list-event set pair such that the list matches the concatenation of the partial output list with the residual input list, and the set matches the residual input set. This holds until the residual input list is nil, which is the base case determining the end of the computation.

As shown by this argument, a proof by induction that the output event list-event set pair, under the aforesaid assumptions, is still a failure, requires that the partial output list be passed to the function as a further argument, in addition to the residual input list, in the recursive calls contained within the definition of the function. Therefore, the output list has to be accumulated into a parameter of the function, viz. the function needs to be tail-recursive. This suggests to prove the properties of interest of the function by applying the ten-step proof method for theorems on tail-recursive functions described in [7].

The starting point is to formulate a naive definition of the function, which will then be refined as specified by the proof method. A slight complication is due to the preliminary replacement of the input event set X with $\text{ipurge-ref-aux } I D U [] X$, to be performed before the items of the input event list start to be consumed recursively. A simple solution to this problem is to nest the accumulator of the output list within data type *option*. In this way, the initial state can be distinguished from the subsequent one, in which the input event list starts to be consumed, by assigning the distinct values *None* and *Some []*, respectively, to the accumulator.

Everything is now ready for giving a naive definition of the function under consideration:

function (*sequential*) *ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive* ::
 $('d \times 'd) \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a \Rightarrow 'd) \Rightarrow 'd \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ list} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ list option} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow$
 $'a \text{ failure}$

where

```

ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U xs None X =
  ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U xs (Some []) (ipurge-ref-aux I D U [] X) |
ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U (x # xs) (Some ys) X =
  (if ∃ u ∈ U. (u, D x) ∈ I
   then ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U
    (ipurge-tr I D (D x) xs) (Some ys) (ipurge-ref I D (D x) xs X)
   else ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U
    xs (Some (ys @ [x])) X) |
ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive - - - (Some ys) X = (ys, X)
oops

```

The parameter into which the output list is accumulated is the last but one. As shown by the above informal argument, function *ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive* enjoys the following properties:

$$fst (ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U xs None X) = ipurge-tr-aux I D U xs$$

$$snd (ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U xs None X) = ipurge-ref-aux I D U xs X$$

$$\llbracket secure P I D; (xs, X) \in failures P \rrbracket \implies ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive I D U xs None X \in failures P$$

which altogether imply the target lemma, viz. the closure of the failures of a secure process under intransitive purge.

In what follows, the steps provided for by the aforesaid proof method will be dealt with one after the other, with the purpose of proving the target closure lemma in the final step. For more information on this proof method, cf. [7].

1.3.1 Step 1

In the definition of the auxiliary tail-recursive function *ipurge-fail-aux-t-aux*, the Cartesian product of the input parameter types of function *ipurge-fail-aux-t-naive* will be implemented as the following record type:

```

record ('a, 'd) ipurge-rec =
  Pol :: ('d × 'd) set
  Map :: 'a ⇒ 'd
  Doms :: 'd set
  List :: 'a list
  ListOp :: 'a list option
  Set :: 'a set

```



```

    using A by (simp add: sinks-aux-single-dom)
next
  fix x
  assume x ∈ X
  with B show (v, D x) ∈ I ..
qed

```

Finally, in what follows, properties *process-prop-1*, *process-prop-5*, and *process-prop-6* of processes (cf. [8]) are put into the form of introduction rules.

```

lemma process-rule-1:
  ([], {}) ∈ failures P
proof (simp add: failures-def)
  have Rep-process P ∈ process-set (is ?P' ∈ -)
    by (rule Rep-process)
  thus ( [], {} ) ∈ fst ?P'
    by (simp add: process-set-def process-prop-1-def)
qed

```

```

lemma process-rule-5 [rule-format]:
  xs ∈ divergences P → xs @ [x] ∈ divergences P
proof (simp add: divergences-def)
  have Rep-process P ∈ process-set (is ?P' ∈ -)
    by (rule Rep-process)
  hence ∀ xs x. xs ∈ snd ?P' → xs @ [x] ∈ snd ?P'
    by (simp add: process-set-def process-prop-5-def)
  thus xs ∈ snd ?P' → xs @ [x] ∈ snd ?P'
    by blast
qed

```

```

lemma process-rule-6 [rule-format]:
  xs ∈ divergences P → (xs, X) ∈ failures P
proof (simp add: failures-def divergences-def)
  have Rep-process P ∈ process-set (is ?P' ∈ -)
    by (rule Rep-process)
  hence ∀ xs X. xs ∈ snd ?P' → (xs, X) ∈ fst ?P'
    by (simp add: process-set-def process-prop-6-def)
  thus xs ∈ snd ?P' → (xs, X) ∈ fst ?P'
    by blast
qed

```

end

2 Sequential composition and noninterference security

theory *SequentialComposition*

have $\forall xs \in traces\ P.$ $None \notin set\ (butlast\ xs)$
using WS **by** (*simp add: weakly-sequential-def*)
moreover have $xs\ @\ [x] \in traces\ P$
using A **by** (*rule failures-traces*)
ultimately have $None \notin set\ (butlast\ (xs\ @\ [x]))$..
hence $None \notin set\ xs$ **by** *simp*
with $False$ **and** A' **show** *?thesis*
by (*rule SCF-R1*)
next
case $True$
have $([], \{\}) \in failures\ Q$
by (*rule process-rule-1*)
with $True$ **and** A' **have** $(xs, \{None\} \cap \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by (*rule SCF-R2*)
thus *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed
next
fix $xs'\ ys\ Y$
assume
 $A: xs' @ ys = xs @ [x]$ **and**
 $B: xs' \in sentences\ P$ **and**
 $C: (ys, Y) \in failures\ Q$ **and**
 $D: ys \neq []$
have $\exists y\ ys'.\ ys = ys' @ [y]$
using D **by** (*rule-tac xs = ys in rev-cases, simp-all*)
then obtain y **and** ys' **where** $D': ys = ys' @ [y]$
by *blast*
hence $xs = xs' @ ys'$
using A **by** *simp*
thus $(xs, \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
proof (*cases ys' = [], simp-all*)
case $True$
have $xs' @ [None] \in traces\ P$
using B **by** (*simp add: sentences-def*)
hence $xs' \in traces\ P$
by (*rule process-rule-2-traces*)
hence $(xs', \{\}) \in failures\ P$
by (*rule traces-failures*)
moreover have $([], \{\}) \in failures\ Q$
by (*rule process-rule-1*)
ultimately have $(xs', \{None\} \cap \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by (*rule SCF-R2 [OF B]*)
thus $(xs', \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by *simp*
next
case $False$
have $(ys' @ [y], Y) \in failures\ Q$
using C **and** D' **by** *simp*
hence $C': (ys', \{\}) \in failures\ Q$


```

    by (rule failures-traces)
  have (drop (Suc (length xs) - n) xs @ [None], W) ∈ failures Q
  using I ..
  hence drop (Suc (length xs) - n) xs @ [None] ∈ traces Q
  by (rule failures-traces)
  hence drop (Suc (length xs) - n) xs ∈ sentences Q
  by (simp add: sentences-def)
  with B show ?thesis
  using P by (rule seq-sentences-none)
qed
qed
qed

```

2.4 Conservation of noninterference security under sequential composition

Everything is now ready for proving the target security conservation theorem. The two closure properties that the definition of noninterference security requires process futures to satisfy, one for the addition of events into traces and the other for the deletion of events from traces (cf. [8]), will be faced separately; here below is the proof of the former property. Unsurprisingly, rule induction on set *seq-comp-failures* is applied, and the closure of the failures of a secure process under intransitive purge (proven in the previous section) is used to meet the proof obligations arising from rule *SCF-R3*.

lemma *seq-comp-secure-aux-1-case-1*:

```

assumes
  A: secure-termination I D and
  B: sequential P and
  C: secure P I D and
  D:  $xs @ y \# ys \notin \text{sentences } P$  and
  E:  $(xs @ y \# ys, X) \in \text{failures } P$  and
  F: None ≠ y and
  G: None ∉ set xs and
  H: None ∉ set ys
shows  $(xs @ ipurge-tr I D (D y) ys, ipurge-ref I D (D y) ys X)$ 
  ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
proof –
  have  $(y \# ys, X) \in \text{futures } P xs$ 
  using E by (simp add: futures-def)
  hence  $(ipurge-tr I D (D y) ys, ipurge-ref I D (D y) ys X) \in$ 
  futures P xs
  using C by (simp add: secure-def)
  hence  $I: (xs @ ipurge-tr I D (D y) ys, ipurge-ref I D (D y) ys X) \in$ 
  failures P
  by (simp add: futures-def)

```



```

proof (rule ipurge-tr-aux-nil [of u], simp add: O)
  fix x
  have (D w, D None) ∈ I ∧ w ≠ None → (∀ v ∈ range D. (D w, v) ∈ I)
    using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
  moreover have (D w, D None) ∈ I
    using P and R by simp
  ultimately have ∀ v ∈ range D. (D w, v) ∈ I
    using S by simp
  thus (u, D x) ∈ I
    using R by simp
qed
next
moreover have ipurge-ref-aux I D ?U ys' Y = {}
proof (rule disjE [OF M], erule-tac [2] bexE)
  assume O: (D y, D None) ∈ I
  show ?thesis
proof (rule ipurge-ref-aux-empty [of D y])
  have ?U ⊆ sinks-aux I D ?U ys'
    by (rule sinks-aux-subset)
  moreover have D y ∈ ?U
    by simp
  ultimately show D y ∈ sinks-aux I D ?U ys' ..
next
fix x
  have (D y, D None) ∈ I ∧ y ≠ None → (∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I)
    using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
  moreover have y ≠ None
    using N by (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
  ultimately have ∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I
    using O by simp
  thus (D y, D x) ∈ I
    by simp
qed
next
fix u
  assume
    O: u ∈ sinks I D (D y) ?ws' and
    P: (u, D None) ∈ I
  have ∃ w ∈ set ?ws'. u = D w
    using O by (rule sinks-elim)
  then obtain w where Q: w ∈ set ?ws' and R: u = D w ..
  have S: w ≠ None
proof
  assume w = None
  hence None ∈ set ?ws'
    using Q by simp
  moreover have None ∉ set ?ws'
    using N by simp
  ultimately show False

```

by contradiction
qed
show *?thesis*
proof (*rule ipurge-ref-aux-empty [of u]*)
 have $?U \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D ?U \text{ys}'$
 by (*rule sinks-aux-subset*)
 moreover have $u \in ?U$
 using *O* by *simp*
 ultimately show $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D ?U \text{ys}' ..$
next
fix *x*
have $(D w, D None) \in I \wedge w \neq None \longrightarrow (\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D w, v) \in I)$
 using *A* by (*simp add: secure-termination-def*)
 moreover have $(D w, D None) \in I$
 using *P* and *R* by *simp*
 ultimately have $\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D w, v) \in I$
 using *S* by *simp*
 thus $(u, D x) \in I$
 using *R* by *simp*
qed
qed
ultimately show *?thesis*
proof *simp*
 have $D None \in \text{sinks } I D (D y) (?ws' @ [None])$
 using *M* by (*simp only: sinks-interference-eq*)
 hence $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws', \{\}) \in \text{failures } Q$
 using *L* by *simp*
 moreover have $None \notin \text{set } (xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws')$
 proof –
 show *?thesis*
 using *N*
 proof (*simp, (erule-tac conjE)+*)
 have $\text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws') \subseteq \text{set } ?ws'$
 by (*rule ipurge-tr-set*)
 moreover assume $None \notin \text{set } ?ws'$
 ultimately show $None \notin \text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws')$
 by (*rule contra-subsetD*)
 qed
 qed
 ultimately show $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws', \{\})$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } Q R$
 by (*rule SCF-R1 [OF J]*)
qed
next
assume $\neg ((D y, D None) \in I \vee$
 $(\exists u \in \text{sinks } I D (D y) ?ws'. (u, D None) \in I))$
hence $D None \notin \text{sinks } I D (D y) (?ws' @ [None])$
 by (*simp only: sinks-interference-eq, simp*)
hence $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' @ [None], \{\}) \in \text{failures } Q$

```

    using L by simp
  hence  $xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' @ [None] \in \text{traces } Q$ 
    by (rule failures-traces)
  hence  $xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' \in \text{sentences } Q$ 
    by (simp add: sentences-def)
  thus ?thesis
    using J by contradiction
qed
qed
next
case False
have  $\text{drop } (\text{length } ws) (ws @ ys') = \text{drop } (\text{length } ws) (xs @ y \# ys)$ 
  using H by simp
hence  $ys' = \text{drop } (\text{length } ws) xs @ y \# ys$ 
  (is  $- = ?xs' @ -$ )
  using False by simp
hence  $(?xs' @ y \# ys, Y) \in \text{failures } R$ 
  using G by simp
hence  $(y \# ys, Y) \in \text{futures } R ?xs'$ 
  by (simp add: futures-def)
hence  $(\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{futures } R ?xs'$ 
  using E by (simp add: secure-def)
hence  $I: (?xs' @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{failures } R$ 
  by (simp add: futures-def)
have  $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) xs @ ?xs'$ 
  by simp
hence  $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) (xs @ y \# ys) @ ?xs'$ 
  using False by simp
hence  $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) (ws @ ys') @ ?xs'$ 
  using H by simp
hence  $J: xs = ws @ ?xs'$ 
  by simp
show ?thesis
proof (cases  $?xs' @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys = []$ , insert I, subst J, simp)
  have  $(ws, \{x. x \neq \text{None}\}) \in \text{failures } Q$ 
    using B and C and F by (rule seq-sentences-ref)
  moreover assume  $([], \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{failures } R$ 
  ultimately have  $(ws, \text{insert None } \{x. x \neq \text{None}\} \cap \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } Q R$ 
    by (rule SCF-R2 [OF F])
  moreover have  $\text{insert None } \{x. x \neq \text{None}\} \cap \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y = \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y$ 
    by blast
  ultimately show  $(ws, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } Q R$ 
    by simp
next
  assume  $?xs' @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys \neq []$ 

```

with F and I have
 $(ws \ @ \ ?xs' \ @ \ ipurge\text{-}tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys, \ ipurge\text{-}ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys \ Y)$
 $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ Q \ R$
by (rule *SCF-R3*)
hence $((ws \ @ \ ?xs') \ @ \ ipurge\text{-}tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys, \ ipurge\text{-}ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys \ Y)$
 $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ Q \ R$
by *simp*
thus *?thesis*
using J **by** *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *seq-comp-secure-aux-1* [rule-format]:
assumes
 $A: \text{secure-termination } I \ D$ **and**
 $B: \text{ref-union-closed } P$ **and**
 $C: \text{sequential } P$ **and**
 $D: \text{secure } P \ I \ D$ **and**
 $E: \text{secure } Q \ I \ D$
shows $(ws, Y) \in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ P \ Q \implies$
 $ws = xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys \longrightarrow$
 $(xs \ @ \ ipurge\text{-}tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys, \ ipurge\text{-}ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys \ Y)$
 $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ P \ Q$

proof (erule *seq-comp-failures.induct*, rule-tac [!] *impI*, *simp-all*, (erule *conjE*)+)

fix X
assume
 $xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys \notin \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys, X) \in \text{failures } P$ **and**
 $None \neq y$ **and**
 $None \notin \text{set } xs$ **and**
 $None \notin \text{set } ys$
thus $(xs \ @ \ ipurge\text{-}tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys, \ ipurge\text{-}ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys \ X)$
 $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ P \ Q$
by (rule *seq-comp-secure-aux-1-case-1* [OF $A \ C \ D$])

next
fix $X \ Y$
assume
 $xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys \in \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys, X) \in \text{failures } P$ **and**
 $([], Y) \in \text{failures } Q$
thus $(xs \ @ \ ipurge\text{-}tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys,$
 $\ ipurge\text{-}ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ys \ (\text{insert } None \ X \cap Y)) \in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures \ P \ Q$
by (rule *seq-comp-secure-aux-1-case-2* [OF $A \ C \ D \ E$])

next
fix $ws \ ys' \ Y$
assume
 $ws \in \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(ys', Y) \in \text{failures } Q$ **and**
 $ws \ @ \ ys' = xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ys$

thus ($xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y$)
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*rule seq-comp-secure-aux-1-case-3 [OF A B C D E]*)
next
fix $X Y$
assume
 $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys X)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$ **and**
 $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
hence $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys,$
 $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys X \cup \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*rule SCF-R4*)
thus $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys (X \cup Y))$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*simp add: ipurge-ref-distrib-union*)
qed

lemma *seq-comp-secure-1:*

assumes
 $A: \text{secure-termination } I D$ **and**
 $B: \text{ref-union-closed } P$ **and**
 $C: \text{sequential } P$ **and**
 $D: \text{secure } P I D$ **and**
 $E: \text{secure } Q I D$
shows $(xs @ y \# ys, Y) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q \implies$
 $(xs @ \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*rule seq-comp-secure-aux-1 [OF A B C D E, where $ws = xs @ y \# ys$],*
simp-all)

This completes the proof that the former requirement for noninterference security is satisfied, so it is the turn of the latter one. Again, rule induction on set *seq-comp-failures* is applied, and the closure of the failures of a secure process under intransitive purge is used to meet the proof obligations arising from rule *SCF-R3*. In more detail, rule induction is applied to the trace into which the event is inserted, and then a case distinction is performed on the trace from which the event is extracted, using the expression of its refusal as union of a set of refusals derived previously.

lemma *seq-comp-secure-aux-2-case-1:*

assumes
 $A: \text{secure-termination } I D$ **and**
 $B: \text{sequential } P$ **and**
 $C: \text{secure } P I D$ **and**
 $D: xs @ zs \notin \text{sentences } P$ **and**

$E: (xs @ zs, X) \in failures P$ **and**
 $F: None \notin set xs$ **and**
 $G: None \notin set zs$ **and**
 $H: (xs @ [y], \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures P Q$
shows $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X)$
 $\in seq-comp-failures P Q$

proof –

have $\exists R. \{\} = (\bigcup n \in \{..length (xs @ [y])\}. \bigcup W \in R n. W) \wedge$
 $(\forall W \in R 0.$
 $xs @ [y] \notin sentences P \wedge None \notin set (xs @ [y]) \wedge$
 $(xs @ [y], W) \in failures P \vee$
 $xs @ [y] \in sentences P \wedge (\exists U V. (xs @ [y], U) \in failures P \wedge$
 $([], V) \in failures Q \wedge W = insert None U \cap V)) \wedge$
 $(\forall n \in \{0 < ..length (xs @ [y])\}. \forall W \in R n.$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in sentences P \wedge$
 $(drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]), W) \in failures Q) \wedge$
 $(\exists n \in \{..length (xs @ [y])\}. \exists W. W \in R n)$
 $(is \exists R. ?T R)$
using H **by** (*rule seq-comp-refusals-1*)
then obtain R **where** $I: ?T R ..$
hence $\exists n \in \{..length (xs @ [y])\}. \exists W. W \in R n$
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall n \in \{0 < ..length (xs @ [y])\}. R n = \{\}$
proof (*rule ballI, rule equalsOI*)
fix $n W$
assume $J: n \in \{0 < ..length (xs @ [y])\}$
hence $\forall W \in R n. take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in sentences P$
using I **by** *simp*
moreover assume $W \in R n$
ultimately have $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in sentences P ..$
moreover have $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) =$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
using J **by** *simp*
ultimately have $K: take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) \in sentences P$
by *simp*
show *False*
proof (*cases drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)*)
case *Nil*
hence $xs @ zs \in sentences P$
using K **by** *simp*
thus *False*
using D **by** *contradiction*
next
case (*Cons v vs*)
moreover have $xs @ zs = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @$
 $drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
by (*simp only: append-take-drop-id*)
ultimately have $L: xs @ zs =$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ v \# vs$

by (*simp del: take-append*)
hence (*take* (*length* (*xs @ [y]*) - *n*) (*xs @ zs*) @ *v # vs, X*)
 ∈ *failures P*
using *E* by (*simp del: take-append*)
hence *take* (*length* (*xs @ [y]*) - *n*) (*xs @ zs*) @ *v # vs* ∈ *traces P*
by (*rule failures-traces*)
with *B* and *K* have *v = None*
by (*rule seq-sentences-none*)
moreover have *None* ∉ *set* (*xs @ zs*)
using *F* and *G* by *simp*
hence *None* ∉ *set* (*take* (*length* (*xs @ [y]*) - *n*) (*xs @ zs*) @ *v # vs*)
by (*subst (asm) L*)
hence *v ≠ None*
by (*rule-tac not-sym, simp*)
ultimately show *False*
by *contradiction*
qed
qed
ultimately have ∃ *W. W ∈ R 0*
proof *simp*
assume ∃ *n ∈ {..Suc (length xs)}*. ∃ *W. W ∈ R n*
then obtain *n* where *J: n ∈ {..Suc (length xs)}* and *K: ∃ W. W ∈ R n ..*
assume *L: ∀ n ∈ {0<..Suc (length xs)}. R n = {}*
show ?*thesis*
proof (*cases n*)
case *0*
thus ?*thesis*
using *K* by *simp*
next
case (*Suc m*)
obtain *W* where *W ∈ R n*
using *K ..*
moreover have *0 < n*
using *Suc* by *simp*
hence *n ∈ {0<..Suc (length xs)}*
using *J* by *simp*
with *L* have *R n = {} ..*
hence *W ∉ R n*
by (*rule equals0D*)
ultimately show ?*thesis*
by *contradiction*
qed
qed
then obtain *W* where *J: W ∈ R 0 ..*
have ∀ *W ∈ R 0*.
xs @ [y] ∉ sentences P ∧
None ∉ set (*xs @ [y]*) ∧ (*xs @ [y], W*) ∈ *failures P* ∨
xs @ [y] ∈ sentences P ∧
 (∃ *U V. (xs @ [y], U) ∈ failures P* ∧ (*[]*, *V*) ∈ *failures Q* ∧

$W = \text{insert None } U \cap V$
(is $\forall W \in R \ 0. \ ?T \ W$)
using I **by** *simp*
hence $?T \ W$ **using** $J \ ..$
hence $K: (xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in \text{failures } P \wedge \text{None} \neq y$
proof (*cases* $xs \ @ \ [y] \in \text{sentences } P$, *simp-all del: ex-simps*,
(erule-tac exE)+, *(erule-tac [] conjE)+*, *simp-all*)
case *False*
assume $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ W) \in \text{failures } P$
moreover have $\{\} \subseteq W \ ..$
ultimately show $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$
by (*rule process-rule-3*)
next
fix U
case *True*
assume $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ U) \in \text{failures } P$
moreover have $\{\} \subseteq U \ ..$
ultimately have $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$
by (*rule process-rule-3*)
moreover have *weakly-sequential* P
using B **by** (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
hence $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (xs \ @ \ [y])$
using *True* **by** (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)
hence $\text{None} \neq y$
by *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis* $..$
qed
have $(zs, \ X) \in \text{futures } P \ xs$
using E **by** (*simp add: futures-def*)
moreover have $([y], \ \{\}) \in \text{futures } P \ xs$
using K **by** (*simp add: futures-def*)
ultimately have $(y \ \# \ \text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs, \ \text{ipurge-ref } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs \ X) \in$
futures } P \ xs
using C **by** (*simp add: secure-def*)
hence $L: (xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ \text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs, \ \text{ipurge-ref } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs \ X) \in$
failures } P
by (*simp add: futures-def*)
show *?thesis*
proof (*cases* $xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ \text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs \in \text{sentences } P$,
cases $(D \ y, \ D \ \text{None}) \in I \vee (\exists u \in \text{sinks } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs. (u, \ D \ \text{None}) \in I)$,
simp-all)
assume $xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ \text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs \notin \text{sentences } P$
thus *?thesis* **using** L
proof (*rule SCF-R1*, *simp add: F K*)
have $\text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs) \subseteq \text{set } zs$
by (*rule ipurge-tr-set*)
thus $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs)$
using G **by** (*rule contra-subsetD*)
qed

```

next
  assume
    M: xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs ∈ sentences P and
    N: (D y, D None) ∈ I ∨ (∃ u ∈ sinks I D (D y) zs. (u, D None) ∈ I)
  have ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X = {}
  proof (rule disjE [OF N], erule-tac [2] bexE)
    assume O: (D y, D None) ∈ I
    show ?thesis
    proof (rule ipurge-ref-empty [of D y], simp)
      fix x
      have (D y, D None) ∈ I ∧ y ≠ None → (∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I)
        using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
      moreover have y ≠ None
        using K by (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
      ultimately have ∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I
        using O by simp
      thus (D y, D x) ∈ I
        by simp
    qed
  next
  fix u
  assume
    O: u ∈ sinks I D (D y) zs and
    P: (u, D None) ∈ I
  have ∃ z ∈ set zs. u = D z
    using O by (rule sinks-elem)
  then obtain z where Q: z ∈ set zs and R: u = D z ..
  have S: z ≠ None
  proof
    assume z = None
    hence None ∈ set zs
      using Q by simp
    thus False
      using G by contradiction
  qed
  show ?thesis
  proof (rule ipurge-ref-empty [of u], simp add: O)
    fix x
    have (D z, D None) ∈ I ∧ z ≠ None → (∀ v ∈ range D. (D z, v) ∈ I)
      using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
    moreover have (D z, D None) ∈ I
      using P and R by simp
    ultimately have ∀ v ∈ range D. (D z, v) ∈ I
      using S by simp
    thus (u, D x) ∈ I
      using R by simp
  qed
  thus ?thesis

```

proof *simp*
have $([], \{\}) \in failures\ Q$
by (*rule process-rule-1*)
with M **and** L **have** $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs,$
 $insert\ None\ (ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ X) \cap \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by (*rule SCF-R2*)
thus $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs, \{\}) \in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by *simp*
qed
next
assume
 $M: xs @ y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs \in sentences\ P$ **and**
 $N: (D\ y, D\ None) \notin I \wedge (\forall u \in sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs. (u, D\ None) \notin I)$
have $xs @ zs \in sentences\ P$
proof (*simp add: sentences-def,*
rule ipurge-tr-del-traces [OF C, where u = D y], simp add: N)
have $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None] \in traces\ P$
using M **by** (*simp add: sentences-def*)
hence $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None], \{\}) \in failures\ P$
by (*rule traces-failures*)
hence $(y \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None], \{\}) \in futures\ P\ xs$
by (*simp add: futures-def*)
hence $(ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None]),$
 $ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None]) \{\}) \in futures\ P\ xs$
using C **by** (*simp add: secure-def del: ipurge-tr.simps*)
hence $(xs @ ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None]), \{\})$
 $\in failures\ P$
by (*simp add: futures-def ipurge-ref-def*)
moreover **have** $sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs) = \{\}$
by (*rule sinks-idem*)
hence $\neg ((D\ y, D\ None) \in I \vee$
 $(\exists u \in sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs). (u, D\ None) \in I))$
using N **by** *simp*
hence $D\ None \notin sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None])$
by (*simp only: sinks-interference-eq, simp*)
ultimately **have** $(xs @ ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs)$
 $@ [None], \{\}) \in failures\ P$
by *simp*
hence $(xs @ ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None], \{\}) \in failures\ P$
by (*simp add: ipurge-tr-idem*)
thus $xs @ ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs @ [None] \in traces\ P$
by (*rule failures-traces*)
next
show $xs @ zs \in traces\ P$
using E **by** (*rule failures-traces*)
qed
thus *?thesis*
using D **by** *contradiction*
qed

qed

lemma *seq-comp-secure-aux-2-case-2:*

assumes

A: secure-termination I D and

B: sequential P and

C: secure P I D and

D: secure Q I D and

E: xs @ zs ∈ sentences P and

F: (xs @ zs, X) ∈ failures P and

G: ([], Y) ∈ failures Q and

H: (xs @ [y], { }) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q

shows *(xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs,*

ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs (insert None X ∩ Y)) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q

proof –

have $\exists R. \{ \} = (\bigcup n \in \{ ..length (xs @ [y]) \}. \bigcup W \in R n. W) \wedge$
 $(\forall W \in R 0.$

$xs @ [y] \notin sentences P \wedge None \notin set (xs @ [y]) \wedge$

$(xs @ [y], W) \in failures P \vee$

$xs @ [y] \in sentences P \wedge (\exists U V. (xs @ [y], U) \in failures P \wedge$

$([], V) \in failures Q \wedge W = insert None U \cap V)) \wedge$

$(\forall n \in \{ 0 < ..length (xs @ [y]) \}. \forall W \in R n.$

$take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in sentences P \wedge$

$(drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]), W) \in failures Q) \wedge$

$(\exists n \in \{ ..length (xs @ [y]) \}. \exists W. W \in R n)$

$(is \exists R. ?T R)$

using *H* **by** (*rule seq-comp-refusals-1*)

then obtain *R* **where** *I: ?T R ..*

hence $\exists n \in \{ ..length (xs @ [y]) \}. \exists W. W \in R n$

by *simp*

then obtain *n* **where** *J: n ∈ { ..length (xs @ [y]) }* **and** *K: ∃ W. W ∈ R n ..*

have *weakly-sequential P*

using *B* **by** (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)

hence *L: None ∉ set (xs @ zs)*

using *E* **by** (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)

have $n = 0 \vee n \in \{ 0 < ..length (xs @ [y]) \}$

using *J* **by** *auto*

thus *?thesis*

proof

assume $n = 0$

hence $\exists W. W \in R 0$

using *K* **by** *simp*

then obtain *W* **where** *M: W ∈ R 0 ..*

have $\forall W \in R 0.$

$xs @ [y] \notin sentences P \wedge$

$None \notin set (xs @ [y]) \wedge (xs @ [y], W) \in failures P \vee$

$xs @ [y] \in sentences P \wedge$

$(\exists U V. (xs @ [y], U) \in failures P \wedge ([], V) \in failures Q \wedge$

$W = insert None U \cap V)$

(is $\forall W \in R$ 0. ?T W)
 using *I* by *simp*
 hence ?T W using *M* ..
 hence *N*: $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in failures P \wedge None \notin set xs \wedge None \neq y$
 proof (cases $xs @ [y] \in sentences P$, *simp-all del: ex-simps*,
 (*erule-tac exE*)+, (*erule-tac [!] conjE*)+, *simp-all*)
 case *False*
 assume $(xs @ [y], W) \in failures P$
 moreover have $\{\} \subseteq W$..
 ultimately show $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in failures P$
 by (*rule process-rule-3*)
 next
 fix *U*
 case *True*
 assume $(xs @ [y], U) \in failures P$
 moreover have $\{\} \subseteq U$..
 ultimately have $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in failures P$
 by (*rule process-rule-3*)
 moreover have *weakly-sequential P*
 using *B* by (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
 hence $None \notin set (xs @ [y])$
 using *True* by (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)
 hence $None \notin set xs \wedge None \neq y$
 by *simp*
 ultimately show ?thesis ..
 qed
 have $(zs, X) \in futures P xs$
 using *F* by (*simp add: futures-def*)
 moreover have $([y], \{\}) \in futures P xs$
 using *N* by (*simp add: futures-def*)
 ultimately have $(y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X)$
 $\in futures P xs$
 using *C* by (*simp add: secure-def*)
 hence *O*: $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X)$
 $\in failures P$
 by (*simp add: futures-def*)
 show ?thesis
 proof (cases $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs \in sentences P$,
case-tac [2] (D y, D None) \in I \vee
 ($\exists u \in sinks I D (D y) zs. (u, D None) \in I$),
simp-all)
 assume *P*: $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs \in sentences P$
 have $ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y \subseteq Y$
 by (*rule ipurge-ref-subset*)
 with *G* have $([], ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y) \in failures Q$
 by (*rule process-rule-3*)
 with *P* and *O* have $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs,$
*insert None (ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X) \cap ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y)
 $\in seq-comp-failures P Q$*

by (rule *SCF-R2*)
moreover have
 $ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ (insert\ None\ X) \cap ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ Y \subseteq$
 $insert\ None\ (ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ X) \cap ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ Y$
proof (rule *subsetI*, *simp del: insert-iff*, *erule conjE*)
fix x
have $ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ (insert\ None\ X) \subseteq$
 $insert\ None\ (ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ X)$
by (rule *ipurge-ref-subset-insert*)
moreover assume $x \in ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ (insert\ None\ X)$
ultimately show $x \in insert\ None\ (ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ X) ..$
qed
ultimately have $(xs\ @\ y\ \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs,$
 $ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ (insert\ None\ X) \cap ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ Y)$
 $\in seq-comp-failures\ P\ Q$
by (rule *seq-comp-prop-3*)
thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add: ipurge-ref-distrib-inter*)
next
assume
 $P: xs\ @\ y\ \# ipurge-tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs \notin sentences\ P$ **and**
 $Q: (D\ y, D\ None) \in I \vee (\exists u \in sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs. (u, D\ None) \in I)$
have $ipurge-ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs\ (insert\ None\ X \cap Y) = \{\}$
proof (rule *disjE [OF Q]*, *erule-tac [2] bexE*)
assume $R: (D\ y, D\ None) \in I$
show *?thesis*
proof (rule *ipurge-ref-empty [of D y]*, *simp*)
fix x
have $(D\ y, D\ None) \in I \wedge y \neq None \longrightarrow (\forall u \in range\ D. (D\ y, u) \in I)$
using A **by** (*simp add: secure-termination-def*)
moreover have $y \neq None$
using N **by** (*rule-tac not-sym*, *simp*)
ultimately have $\forall u \in range\ D. (D\ y, u) \in I$
using R **by** *simp*
thus $(D\ y, D\ x) \in I$
by *simp*
qed
next
fix u
assume
 $R: u \in sinks\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ zs$ **and**
 $S: (u, D\ None) \in I$
have $\exists z \in set\ zs. u = D\ z$
using R **by** (*rule sinks-elem*)
then obtain z **where** $T: z \in set\ zs$ **and** $U: u = D\ z ..$
have $V: z \neq None$
proof
assume $z = None$
hence $None \in set\ zs$

```

    using  $T$  by simp
    moreover have  $None \notin \text{set } zs$ 
    using  $L$  by simp
    ultimately show False
    by contradiction
  qed
  show ?thesis
  proof (rule ipurge-ref-empty [of  $u$ ], simp add: R)
    fix  $x$ 
    have  $(D z, D None) \in I \wedge z \neq None \longrightarrow (\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D z, v) \in I)$ 
    using  $A$  by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
    moreover have  $(D z, D None) \in I$ 
    using  $S$  and  $U$  by simp
    ultimately have  $\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D z, v) \in I$ 
    using  $V$  by simp
    thus  $(u, D x) \in I$ 
    using  $U$  by simp
  qed
  qed
  thus ?thesis
  proof simp
    have  $\{\} \subseteq \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs X ..$ 
    with  $O$  have  $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    by (rule process-rule-3)
    with  $P$  show  $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \{\})$ 
       $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$ 
    proof (rule SCF-R1, simp add: N)
      have  $\text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs) \subseteq \text{set } zs$ 
      by (rule ipurge-tr-set)
      moreover have  $None \notin \text{set } zs$ 
      using  $L$  by simp
      ultimately show  $None \notin \text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs)$ 
      by (rule contra-subsetD)
    qed
  qed
  next
  assume
     $P: xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs \notin \text{sentences } P$  and
     $Q: (D y, D None) \notin I \wedge (\forall u \in \text{sinks } I D (D y) zs. (u, D None) \notin I)$ 
  have  $xs @ zs @ [None] \in \text{traces } P$ 
  using  $E$  by (simp add: sentences-def)
  hence  $(xs @ zs @ [None], \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
  by (rule traces-failures)
  hence  $(zs @ [None], \{\}) \in \text{futures } P xs$ 
  by (simp add: futures-def)
  moreover have  $([y], \{\}) \in \text{futures } P xs$ 
  using  $N$  by (simp add: futures-def)
  ultimately have  $(y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) (zs @ [None]),$ 
     $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) (zs @ [None]) \{\}) \in \text{futures } P xs$ 

```

(is $(-, ?Z) \in -$)
 using C by (simp add: secure-def del: ipurge-tr.simps)
 hence $(xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) (zs @ [None]), ?Z) \in failures P$
 by (simp add: futures-def)
 hence $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) (zs @ [None]) \in traces P$
 by (rule failures-traces)
 moreover have $\neg ((D y, D None) \in I \vee$
 $(\exists u \in sinks I D (D y) zs. (u, D None) \in I))$
 using Q by simp
 hence $D None \notin sinks I D (D y) (zs @ [None])$
 by (simp only: sinks-interference-eq, simp)
 ultimately have $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs @ [None] \in traces P$
 by simp
 hence $xs @ y \# ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs \in sentences P$
 by (simp add: sentences-def)
 thus ?thesis
 using P by contradiction
 qed
 next
 assume $M: n \in \{0 < .. length (xs @ [y])\}$
 have $\forall n \in \{0 < .. length (xs @ [y])\}. \forall W \in R n.$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in sentences P \wedge$
 $(drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]), W) \in failures Q$
 $(is \forall n \in -. \forall W \in -. ?T n W)$
 using I by simp
 hence $\forall W \in R n. ?T n W$
 using M ..
 moreover obtain W where $W \in R n$
 using K ..
 ultimately have $N: ?T n W$..
 moreover have $O: take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) =$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
 using M by simp
 ultimately have $P: take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) \in sentences P$
 by simp
 have $Q: drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) = []$
 proof (cases drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs), simp)
 case (Cons v vs)
 moreover have $xs @ zs = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @$
 $drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
 by (simp only: append-take-drop-id)
 ultimately have $R: xs @ zs =$
 $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ v \# vs$
 by (simp del: take-append)
 hence $(take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ v \# vs, X)$
 $\in failures P$
 using F by (simp del: take-append)
 hence $take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ v \# vs \in traces P$
 by (rule failures-traces)

with B and P have $v = \text{None}$
by (*rule seq-sentences-none*)
moreover have
 $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ v \# vs)$
using L by (*subst (asm) R*)
hence $v \neq \text{None}$
by (*rule-tac not-sym, simp*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by *contradiction*
qed
hence R : $zs = []$
using M by *simp*
moreover have $xs @ zs = \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @$
 $\text{drop } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
by (*simp only: append-take-drop-id*)
ultimately have $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) = xs$
using Q by *simp*
hence $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) = xs$
using O by *simp*
moreover have $xs @ [y] = \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) @$
 $\text{drop } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y])$
by (*simp only: append-take-drop-id*)
ultimately have $\text{drop } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) = [y]$
by *simp*
hence S : $([y], W) \in \text{failures } Q$
using N by *simp*
show *?thesis using E and R*
proof (*rule-tac SCF-R3, simp-all*)
have $\forall xs y ys Y zs Z.$
 $(y \# ys, Y) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge (zs, Z) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge xs \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ys, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) ys Y) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge$
 $(y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Z) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge xs$
using D by (*simp add: secure-def*)
hence $([y], W) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge ([], Y) \in \text{futures } Q \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) [], \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) [] W) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge$
 $(y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) [], \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) [] Y) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge []$
by *blast*
moreover have $([y], W) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge []$
using S by (*simp add: futures-def*)
moreover have $([], Y) \in \text{futures } Q \wedge []$
using G by (*simp add: futures-def*)
ultimately have $([y], \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) [] Y) \in \text{failures } Q$
 $(\text{is } (-, ?Y') \in -)$
by (*simp add: futures-def*)
moreover have $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) [] (\text{insert None } X) \cap ?Y' \subseteq ?Y'$
by *simp*
ultimately have $([y], \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) [] (\text{insert None } X) \cap ?Y')$
 $\in \text{failures } Q$
by (*rule process-rule-3*)

using J by *simp*
 moreover have $n \notin \{0 < .. \text{length } (xs @ [y])\}$
 proof
 assume $N: n \in \{0 < .. \text{length } (xs @ [y])\}$
 hence $\forall W \in R n. \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in \text{sentences } P$
 using J by *simp*
 moreover obtain W where $W \in R n$
 using $L ..$
 ultimately have $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in \text{sentences } P ..$
 moreover have $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) =$
 $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
 using N by *simp*
 ultimately have $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) \in \text{sentences } P$
 by *simp*
 hence $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (ws @ ys) \in \text{sentences } P$
 using I by *simp*
 moreover have $\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n \leq \text{length } xs$
 using N by (*simp, arith*)
 hence $O: \text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n < \text{length } ws$
 using *True* by *simp*
 ultimately have $P: \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws \in \text{sentences } P$
 by *simp*
 show *False*
 proof (*cases drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) ws*)
 case *Nil*
 thus *False*
 using O by *simp*
 next
 case (*Cons v ws*)
 moreover have $ws = \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @$
 $\text{drop } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws$
 by *simp*
 ultimately have $Q: ws = \text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @ v \# ws$
 by *simp*
 hence $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @ v \# ws \in \text{sentences } P$
 using F by *simp*
 hence $(\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @ v \# ws) @ [None] \in \text{traces } P$
 by (*simp add: sentences-def*)
 hence $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @ v \# ws \in \text{traces } P$
 by (*rule process-rule-2-traces*)
 with C and P have $v = None$
 by (*rule seq-sentences-none*)
 moreover have *weakly-sequential P*
 using C by (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
 hence $None \notin \text{set } ws$
 using F by (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)
 hence $None \notin \text{set } (\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @ v \# ws)$
 by (*subst (asm) Q*)
 hence $v \neq None$

```

    by (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
  ultimately show False
    by contradiction
qed
hence  $n = 0$ 
  using  $M$  by blast
hence  $\exists W. W \in R \ 0$ 
  using  $L$  by simp
then obtain  $W$  where  $W \in R \ 0 \ ..$ 
ultimately have  $?T \ W \ ..$ 
hence  $N: (xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in failures \ P \wedge None \notin set \ xs \wedge None \neq y$ 
proof (cases  $xs \ @ \ [y] \in sentences \ P$ , simp-all del: ex-simps,
  (erule-tac exE)+, (erule-tac [!] conjE)+, simp-all)
  case False
    assume  $(xs \ @ \ [y], W) \in failures \ P$ 
    moreover have  $\{\} \subseteq W \ ..$ 
    ultimately show  $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in failures \ P$ 
      by (rule process-rule-3)
  next
    fix  $U$ 
    case True
    assume  $(xs \ @ \ [y], U) \in failures \ P$ 
    moreover have  $\{\} \subseteq U \ ..$ 
    ultimately have  $(xs \ @ \ [y], \ \{\}) \in failures \ P$ 
      by (rule process-rule-3)
    moreover have weakly-sequential  $P$ 
      using  $C$  by (rule seq-implies-weakly-seq)
    hence  $None \notin set \ (xs \ @ \ [y])$ 
      using True by (rule weakly-seq-sentences-none)
    hence  $None \notin set \ xs \wedge None \neq y$ 
      by simp
    ultimately show  $?thesis \ ..$ 
qed
have  $drop \ (length \ xs) \ (xs \ @ \ zs) = drop \ (length \ xs) \ (ws \ @ \ ys)$ 
  using  $I$  by simp
hence  $O: zs = drop \ (length \ xs) \ ws \ @ \ ys$ 
  (is  $- = ?ws' \ @ \ -$ )
  using True by simp
let  $?U = insert \ (D \ y) \ (sinks \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ?ws')$ 
have  $ipurge-tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs =$ 
   $ipurge-tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ?ws' \ @ \ ipurge-tr-aux \ I \ D \ ?U \ ys$ 
  using  $O$  by (simp add: ipurge-tr-append)
moreover have  $ipurge-ref \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ zs \ Y = ipurge-ref-aux \ I \ D \ ?U \ ys \ Y$ 
  using  $O$  by (simp add: ipurge-ref-append)
ultimately show  $?thesis$ 
proof (cases  $xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ipurge-tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ?ws' \in sentences \ P$ , simp-all)
  assume  $P: xs \ @ \ y \ \# \ ipurge-tr \ I \ D \ (D \ y) \ ?ws' \in sentences \ P$ 
  have  $Q: (ipurge-tr-aux \ I \ D \ ?U \ ys, ipurge-ref-aux \ I \ D \ ?U \ ys \ Y) \in failures \ Q$ 

```

using E **and** G **by** (rule $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\text{-}failures$)
show $(xs @ y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws' @ ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys,$
 $ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y) \in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P\ Q$
proof (cases $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys$)
case Nil
have $(xs @ y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws', \{x. x \neq None\}) \in failures\ P$
using B **and** C **and** P **by** (rule $seq\text{-}sentences\text{-}ref$)
moreover **have** $([], ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y) \in failures\ Q$
using Q **and** Nil **by** $simp$
ultimately **have** $(xs @ y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws',$
 $insert\ None\ \{x. x \neq None\} \cap ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y)$
 $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P\ Q$
by (rule $SCF\text{-}R2$ [$OF\ P$])
moreover **have** $insert\ None\ \{x. x \neq None\} \cap$
 $ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y = ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y$
by $blast$
ultimately **show** $?thesis$
using Nil **by** $simp$
next
case $Cons$
hence $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys \neq []$
by $simp$
with P **and** Q **have**
 $((xs @ y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws') @ ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys,$
 $ipurge\text{-}ref\text{-}aux\ I\ D\ ?U\ ys\ Y) \in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P\ Q$
by (rule $SCF\text{-}R3$)
thus $?thesis$
by $simp$
qed
next
assume $P: xs @ y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws' \notin sentences\ P$
have $ws = take\ (length\ xs)\ ws @ ?ws'$
by $simp$
moreover **have** $take\ (length\ xs)\ (ws @ ys) = take\ (length\ xs)\ (xs @ zs)$
using I **by** $simp$
hence $take\ (length\ xs)\ ws = xs$
using $True$ **by** $simp$
ultimately **have** $xs @ ?ws' \in sentences\ P$
using F **by** $simp$
hence $xs @ ?ws' @ [None] \in traces\ P$
by ($simp\ add: sentences\text{-}def$)
hence $(xs @ ?ws' @ [None], \{\}) \in failures\ P$
by (rule $traces\text{-}failures$)
hence $(?ws' @ [None], \{\}) \in futures\ P\ xs$
by ($simp\ add: futures\text{-}def$)
moreover **have** $([y], \{\}) \in futures\ P\ xs$
using N **by** ($simp\ add: futures\text{-}def$)
ultimately **have** $(y \# ipurge\text{-}tr\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (?ws' @ [None]),$
 $ipurge\text{-}ref\ I\ D\ (D\ y)\ (?ws' @ [None])\ \{\}) \in futures\ P\ xs$

```

    using D by (simp add: secure-def del: ipurge-tr.simps)
  hence Q: (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) (?ws' @ [None]), {}) ∈ failures P
  by (simp add: futures-def ipurge-ref-def)
  have set ?ws' ⊆ set ws
  by (rule set-drop-subset)
  moreover have weakly-sequential P
  using C by (rule seq-implies-weakly-seq)
  hence None ∉ set ws
  using F by (rule weakly-seq-sentences-none)
  ultimately have R: None ∉ set ?ws'
  by (rule contra-subsetD)
  show (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) ?ws' @ ipurge-tr-aux I D ?U ys,
        ipurge-ref-aux I D ?U ys Y) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
  proof (cases (D y, D None) ∈ I ∨
             (∃ u ∈ sinks I D (D y) ?ws'. (u, D None) ∈ I))
    assume S: (D y, D None) ∈ I ∨
              (∃ u ∈ sinks I D (D y) ?ws'. (u, D None) ∈ I)
    have ipurge-tr-aux I D ?U ys = []
    proof (rule disjE [OF S], erule-tac [2] bexE)
      assume T: (D y, D None) ∈ I
      show ?thesis
      proof (rule ipurge-tr-aux-nil [of D y], simp)
        fix x
        have (D y, D None) ∈ I ∧ y ≠ None → (∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I)
        using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
        moreover have y ≠ None
        using N by (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
        ultimately have ∀ u ∈ range D. (D y, u) ∈ I
        using T by simp
        thus (D y, D x) ∈ I
        by simp
      qed
    next
    fix u
    assume
      T: u ∈ sinks I D (D y) ?ws' and
      U: (u, D None) ∈ I
    have ∃ w ∈ set ?ws'. u = D w
    using T by (rule sinks-elem)
    then obtain w where V: w ∈ set ?ws' and W: u = D w ..
    have X: w ≠ None
    proof
      assume w = None
      hence None ∈ set ?ws'
      using V by simp
      moreover have None ∉ set ?ws'
      using R by simp
      ultimately show False
      by contradiction
    qed
  qed

```

```

qed
show ?thesis
proof (rule ipurge-tr-aux-nil [of u], simp add: T)
  fix x
  have  $(D\ w, D\ None) \in I \wedge w \neq None \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D\ w, v) \in I)$ 
  using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
  moreover have  $(D\ w, D\ None) \in I$ 
  using U and W by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D\ w, v) \in I$ 
  using X by simp
  thus  $(u, D\ x) \in I$ 
  using W by simp
qed
qed
moreover have ipurge-ref-aux I D ?U ys Y = {}
proof (rule disjE [OF S], erule-tac [2] bexE)
  assume T:  $(D\ y, D\ None) \in I$ 
  show ?thesis
  proof (rule ipurge-ref-aux-empty [of D y])
    have  $?U \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I\ D\ ?U\ ys$ 
    by (rule sinks-aux-subset)
    moreover have  $D\ y \in ?U$ 
    by simp
    ultimately show  $D\ y \in \text{sinks-aux } I\ D\ ?U\ ys ..$ 
  next
  fix x
  have  $(D\ y, D\ None) \in I \wedge y \neq None \longrightarrow (\forall u \in \text{range } D. (D\ y, u) \in I)$ 
  using A by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
  moreover have  $y \neq None$ 
  using N by (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
  ultimately have  $\forall u \in \text{range } D. (D\ y, u) \in I$ 
  using T by simp
  thus  $(D\ y, D\ x) \in I$ 
  by simp
qed
next
fix u
assume
  T:  $u \in \text{sinks } I\ D\ (D\ y)\ ?ws'$  and
  U:  $(u, D\ None) \in I$ 
have  $\exists w \in \text{set } ?ws'. u = D\ w$ 
using T by (rule sinks-elem)
then obtain w where V:  $w \in \text{set } ?ws'$  and W:  $u = D\ w ..$ 
have X:  $w \neq None$ 
proof
  assume  $w = None$ 
  hence  $None \in \text{set } ?ws'$ 
  using V by simp

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    moreover have  $\text{None} \notin \text{set } ?ws'$ 
      using  $R$  by simp
    ultimately show False
      by contradiction
  qed
  show ?thesis
  proof (rule ipurge-ref-aux-empty [of  $u$ ])
    have  $?U \subseteq \text{sinks-aux } I D ?U ys$ 
      by (rule sinks-aux-subset)
    moreover have  $u \in ?U$ 
      using  $T$  by simp
    ultimately show  $u \in \text{sinks-aux } I D ?U ys ..$ 
  next
  fix  $x$ 
  have  $(D w, D \text{None}) \in I \wedge w \neq \text{None} \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D w, v) \in I)$ 
    using  $A$  by (simp add: secure-termination-def)
  moreover have  $(D w, D \text{None}) \in I$ 
    using  $U$  and  $W$  by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall v \in \text{range } D. (D w, v) \in I$ 
    using  $X$  by simp
  thus  $(u, D x) \in I$ 
    using  $W$  by simp
  qed
  qed
  ultimately show ?thesis
  proof simp
    have  $D \text{None} \in \text{sinks } I D (D y) (?ws' @ [\text{None}])$ 
      using  $S$  by (simp only: sinks-interference-eq)
    hence  $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws', \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
      using  $Q$  by simp
    moreover have  $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws')$ 
    proof (simp add: N)
      have  $\text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws') \subseteq \text{set } ?ws'$ 
        by (rule ipurge-tr-set)
      thus  $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (\text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws')$ 
        using  $R$  by (rule contra-subsetD)
    qed
    ultimately show  $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws', \{\})$ 
       $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$ 
      by (rule SCF-R1 [OF  $P$ ])
  qed
  next
  assume  $\neg ((D y, D \text{None}) \in I \vee$ 
     $(\exists u \in \text{sinks } I D (D y) ?ws'. (u, D \text{None}) \in I))$ 
  hence  $D \text{None} \notin \text{sinks } I D (D y) (?ws' @ [\text{None}])$ 
    by (simp only: sinks-interference-eq, simp)
  hence  $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' @ [\text{None}], \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    using  $Q$  by simp

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hence  $xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' @ [None] \in \text{traces } P$ 
by (rule failures-traces)
hence  $xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) ?ws' \in \text{sentences } P$ 
by (simp add: sentences-def)
thus ?thesis
using  $P$  by contradiction
qed
qed
next
case False
have  $\forall n \in \{0 < .. \text{length } (xs @ [y])\}. \forall W \in R n.$ 
   $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in \text{sentences } P \wedge$ 
   $(\text{drop } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]), W) \in \text{failures } Q$ 
  (is  $\forall n \in -. \forall W \in -. ?T n W$ )
using  $J$  by simp
moreover have  $n \neq 0$ 
proof
  have  $\forall W \in R 0.$ 
     $xs @ [y] \notin \text{sentences } P \wedge$ 
     $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (xs @ [y]) \wedge (xs @ [y], W) \in \text{failures } P \vee$ 
     $xs @ [y] \in \text{sentences } P \wedge$ 
     $(\exists U V. (xs @ [y], U) \in \text{failures } P \wedge ([], V) \in \text{failures } Q \wedge$ 
     $W = \text{insert } \text{None } U \cap V)$ 
    (is  $\forall W \in -. ?T' W$ )
  using  $J$  by blast
moreover assume  $n = 0$ 
hence  $\exists W. W \in R 0$ 
using  $L$  by simp
then obtain  $W$  where  $W \in R 0 ..$ 
ultimately have  $?T' W ..$ 
hence  $N: xs @ [y] \in \text{traces } P \wedge \text{None} \notin \text{set } (xs @ [y])$ 
proof (cases  $xs @ [y] \in \text{sentences } P$ , simp-all del: ex-simps,
(erule-tac exE)+, (erule-tac [] conjE)+, simp-all)
  case False
    assume  $(xs @ [y], W) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    moreover have  $\{\} \subseteq W ..$ 
    ultimately have  $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    by (rule process-rule-3)
    thus  $xs @ [y] \in \text{traces } P$ 
    by (rule failures-traces)
  next
    fix  $U$ 
    case True
    assume  $(xs @ [y], U) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    moreover have  $\{\} \subseteq U ..$ 
    ultimately have  $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{failures } P$ 
    by (rule process-rule-3)
    hence  $xs @ [y] \in \text{traces } P$ 
    by (rule failures-traces)

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moreover have *weakly-sequential* P
using C **by** (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
hence $None \notin set (xs @ [y])$
using *True* **by** (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)
hence $None \neq y \wedge None \notin set xs$
by *simp*
ultimately show $xs @ [y] \in traces P \wedge None \neq y \wedge None \notin set xs ..$
qed
have $take (length xs) (xs @ zs) @ [y] = take (length xs) (ws @ ys) @ [y]$
using I **by** *simp*
hence $xs @ [y] = ws @ take (length xs - length ws) ys @ [y]$
using *False* **by** *simp*
moreover have $\exists v vs. take (length xs - length ws) ys @ [y] = v \# vs$
by (*cases take (length xs - length ws) ys @ [y], simp-all*)
then obtain v **and** vs **where**
 $take (length xs - length ws) ys @ [y] = v \# vs$
by *blast*
ultimately have $O: xs @ [y] = ws @ v \# vs$
by *simp*
hence $ws @ v \# vs \in traces P$
using N **by** *simp*
with C **and** F **have** $v = None$
by (*rule seq-sentences-none*)
moreover have $v \neq None$
using N **and** O **by** (*rule-tac not-sym, simp*)
ultimately show *False*
by *contradiction*
qed
hence $N: n \in \{0 <..length (xs @ [y])\}$
using M **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\forall W \in R n. ?T n W ..$
moreover obtain W **where** $W \in R n$
using $L ..$
ultimately have $O: ?T n W ..$
have $P: length (xs @ [y]) - n \leq length xs$
using N **by** (*simp, arith*)
have $length (xs @ [y]) - n = length ws$
proof (*rule ccontr, simp only: neq-iff, erule disjE*)
assume $Q: length (xs @ [y]) - n < length ws$
moreover have $ws = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @$
 $drop (length (xs @ [y]) - n) ws$
 $(is - = - @ ?ws')$
by *simp*
ultimately have $ws = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (ws @ ys) @ ?ws'$
by *simp*
hence $ws = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs) @ ?ws'$
using I **by** *simp*
hence $ws = take (length (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) @ ?ws'$
using P **by** *simp*

moreover have $?ws' \neq []$
using Q **by** *simp*
hence $\exists v \text{ vs. } ?ws' = v \# \text{ vs}$
by (*cases ?ws', simp-all*)
then obtain v **and** vs **where** $?ws' = v \# \text{ vs}$
by *blast*
ultimately have S : $ws = \text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) @ v \# \text{ vs}$
by *simp*
hence $(\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) @ v \# \text{ vs}) @ [None]$
 $\in \text{traces } P$
using F **by** (*simp add: sentences-def*)
hence T : $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) @ v \# \text{ vs} \in \text{traces } P$
by (*rule process-rule-2-traces*)
have $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in \text{sentences } P$
using $O ..$
with C **have** $v = None$
using T **by** (*rule seq-sentences-none*)
moreover have *weakly-sequential* P
using C **by** (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
hence $None \notin \text{set } ws$
using F **by** (*rule weakly-seq-sentences-none*)
hence $v \neq None$
using S **by** (*rule-tac not-sym, simp*)
ultimately show *False*
by *contradiction*

next

assume Q : $\text{length } ws < \text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n$
have $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) =$
 $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ zs)$
using P **by** *simp*
also have $\dots = \text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (ws @ ys)$
using I **by** *simp*
also have $\dots = \text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) ws @$
 $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n - \text{length } ws) ys$
 $(\text{is } - = - @ ?ys')$
by *simp*
also have $\dots = ws @ ?ys'$
using Q **by** *simp*
finally have $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) = ws @ ?ys'$.
moreover have $?ys' \neq []$
using Q **and** H **by** *simp*
hence $\exists v \text{ vs. } ?ys' = v \# \text{ vs}$
by (*cases ?ys', simp-all*)
then obtain v **and** vs **where** $?ys' = v \# \text{ vs}$
by *blast*
ultimately have S : $\text{take} (\text{length} (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) = ws @ v \# \text{ vs}$
by *simp*
hence $(ws @ v \# \text{ vs}) @ [None] \in \text{traces } P$
using O **by** (*simp add: sentences-def*)

hence $ws @ v \# vs \in \text{traces } P$
by (rule process-rule-2-traces)
with C and F **have** $T: v = \text{None}$
by (rule seq-sentences-none)
have weakly-sequential P
using C **by** (rule seq-implies-weakly-seq)
moreover **have** $\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]) \in \text{sentences } P$
using $O ..$
ultimately **have** $\text{None} \notin \text{set } (\text{take } (\text{length } (xs @ [y]) - n) (xs @ [y]))$
by (rule weakly-seq-sentences-none)
hence $v \neq \text{None}$
using S **by** (rule-tac not-sym, simp)
thus False
using T **by** contradiction
qed
hence $(\text{drop } (\text{length } ws) (xs @ [y]), W) \in \text{failures } Q$
using O **by** simp
hence $(\text{drop } (\text{length } ws) xs @ [y], W) \in \text{failures } Q$
(is $(?xs' @ -, -) \in -$)
using False **by** simp
hence $([y], W) \in \text{futures } Q ?xs'$
by (simp add: futures-def)
moreover **have** $\text{drop } (\text{length } ws) (ws @ ys) = \text{drop } (\text{length } ws) (xs @ zs)$
using I **by** simp
hence $ys = ?xs' @ zs$
using False **by** simp
hence $(?xs' @ zs, Y) \in \text{failures } Q$
using G **by** simp
hence $(zs, Y) \in \text{futures } Q ?xs'$
by (simp add: futures-def)
ultimately **have** $(y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Y)$
 $\in \text{futures } Q ?xs'$
using E **by** (simp add: secure-def)
hence $(?xs' @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Y)$
 $\in \text{failures } Q$
by (simp add: futures-def)
moreover **have** $?xs' @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs \neq []$
by simp
ultimately **have** $(ws @ ?xs' @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs,$
 $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Y) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (rule SCF-R3 [OF F])
hence $((ws @ ?xs') @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs,$
 $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Y) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by simp
moreover **have** $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) xs @ ?xs'$
by simp
hence $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) (xs @ zs) @ ?xs'$
using False **by** simp
hence $xs = \text{take } (\text{length } ws) (ws @ ys) @ ?xs'$

using I **by** *simp*
hence $xs = ws @ ?xs'$
by *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by *simp*
qed
qed

lemma *seq-comp-secure-aux-2* [*rule-format*]:
assumes
 A : *secure-termination* $I D$ **and**
 B : *ref-union-closed* P **and**
 C : *sequential* P **and**
 D : *secure* $P I D$ **and**
 E : *secure* $Q I D$
shows $(ws, Z) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q \implies$
 $ws = xs @ zs \longrightarrow$
 $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q \longrightarrow$
 $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs Z)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
proof (*erule seq-comp-failures.induct*, (*rule-tac* [*!*] *impI*) $+$, *simp-all*, (*erule conjE*) $+$)
fix X
assume
 $xs @ zs \notin \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(xs @ zs, X) \in \text{failures } P$ **and**
 $\text{None} \notin \text{set } xs$ **and**
 $\text{None} \notin \text{set } zs$ **and**
 $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
thus $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs, \text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs X)$
 $\in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*rule seq-comp-secure-aux-2-case-1* [*OF A C D*])
next
fix $X Y$
assume
 $xs @ zs \in \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(xs @ zs, X) \in \text{failures } P$ **and**
 $([], Y) \in \text{failures } Q$ **and**
 $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
thus $(xs @ y \# \text{ipurge-tr } I D (D y) zs,$
 $\text{ipurge-ref } I D (D y) zs (\text{insert None } X \cap Y)) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$
by (*rule seq-comp-secure-aux-2-case-2* [*OF A C D E*])
next
fix $ws ys Y$
assume
 $ws \in \text{sentences } P$ **and**
 $(ys, Y) \in \text{failures } Q$ **and**
 $ys \neq []$ **and**
 $ws @ ys = xs @ zs$ **and**
 $(xs @ [y], \{\}) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P Q$

```

thus (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y)
  ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
by (rule seq-comp-secure-aux-2-case-3 [OF A B C D E])
next
fix X Y
assume
  (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X)
    ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q and
  (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y)
    ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
hence (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs,
  ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs X ∪ ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Y)
    ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
by (rule SCF-R4)
thus (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs (X ∪ Y))
  ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
by (simp add: ipurge-ref-distrib-union)
qed

```

lemma *seq-comp-secure-2*:

assumes

- A*: *secure-termination I D* **and**
- B*: *ref-union-closed P* **and**
- C*: *sequential P* **and**
- D*: *secure P I D* **and**
- E*: *secure Q I D*

shows (*xs* @ *zs*, *Z*) ∈ *seq-comp-failures P Q* ⇒

- (*xs* @ [*y*], {*z*}) ∈ *seq-comp-failures P Q* ⇒
- (*xs* @ *y* # *ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs*, *ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Z*)
- ∈ *seq-comp-failures P Q*

by (*rule seq-comp-secure-aux-2 [OF A B C D E, where ws = xs @ zs], simp-all*)

Finally, the target security conservation theorem can be enunciated and proven, which is done here below. The theorem states that for any two processes P , Q defined over the same alphabet containing successful termination, to which the noninterference policy I and the event-domain map D apply, if:

- I and D enforce termination security,
- P is refusals union closed and sequential, and
- both P and Q are secure with respect to I and D ,

then $P ; Q$ is secure as well.

theorem *seq-comp-secure*:

```

assumes
  A: secure-termination I D and
  B: ref-union-closed P and
  C: sequential P and
  D: secure P I D and
  E: secure Q I D
shows secure (P ; Q) I D
proof (simp add: secure-def seq-comp-futures seq-implies-weakly-seq [OF C],
(rule allI)+, rule impI, erule conjE)
fix xs y ys Y zs Z
assume
  F: (xs @ y # ys, Y) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q and
  G: (xs @ zs, Z) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
show
  (xs @ ipurge-tr I D (D y) ys, ipurge-ref I D (D y) ys Y)
    ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q ∧
  (xs @ y # ipurge-tr I D (D y) zs, ipurge-ref I D (D y) zs Z)
    ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
  (is ?A ∧ ?B)
proof
  show ?A
    by (rule seq-comp-secure-1 [OF A B C D E F])
  next
    have H: weakly-sequential P
      using C by (rule seq-implies-weakly-seq)
    hence ((xs @ [y]) @ ys, Y) ∈ failures (P ; Q)
      using F by (simp add: seq-comp-failures)
    hence (xs @ [y], {}) ∈ failures (P ; Q)
      by (rule process-rule-2-failures)
    hence (xs @ [y], {}) ∈ seq-comp-failures P Q
      using H by (simp add: seq-comp-failures)
    thus ?B
      by (rule seq-comp-secure-2 [OF A B C D E G])
  qed
qed

```

2.5 Generalization of the security conservation theorem to lists of processes

The target security conservation theorem, in the basic version just proven, applies to the sequential composition of a pair of processes. However, given an arbitrary list of processes where each process satisfies its assumptions, the theorem could be orderly applied to the composition of the first two processes in the list, then to the composition of the resulting process with the third process in the list, and so on, until the last process is reached. The final outcome would be that the sequential composition of all the processes in the list is secure.

Of course, this argument works provided that the assumptions of the theo-

rem keep being satisfied by the composed processes produced in each step of the recursion. But this is what indeed happens, by virtue of the conservation of refusals union closure and sequentiality under sequential composition, proven previously, and of the conservation of security under sequential composition, ensured by the target theorem itself.

Therefore, the target security conservation theorem can be generalized to an arbitrary list of processes, which is done here below. The resulting theorem states that for any nonempty list of processes defined over the same alphabet containing successful termination, to which the noninterference policy I and the event-domain map D apply, if:

- I and D enforce termination security,
- each process in the list, with the possible exception of the last one, is refusals union closed and sequential, and
- each process in the list is secure with respect to I and D ,

then the sequential composition of all the processes in the list is secure as well.

As a precondition, the above conservation lemmas for weak sequentiality, refusals union closure, and sequentiality are generalized, too.

lemma *seq-comp-list-weakly-sequential* [rule-format]:

$(\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# PS). \text{weakly-sequential } X) \longrightarrow$
 $\text{weakly-sequential } (\text{foldl } (;) P PS)$

proof (induction PS rule: rev-induct, simp, rule impI, simp, (erule conjE)+)

qed (rule seq-comp-weakly-sequential)

lemma *seq-comp-list-ref-union-closed* [rule-format]:

$(\forall X \in \text{set } (\text{butlast } (P \# PS)). \text{weakly-sequential } X) \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# PS). \text{ref-union-closed } X) \longrightarrow$
 $\text{ref-union-closed } (\text{foldl } (;) P PS)$

proof (induction PS rule: rev-induct, simp, (rule impI)+, simp, split if-split-asm, simp, rule seq-comp-ref-union-closed, assumption+)

fix PS **and** $Q :: 'a \text{ option process}$

assume

$A: \text{weakly-sequential } P$ **and**

$B: \forall X \in \text{set } PS. \text{weakly-sequential } X$ **and**

$C: \text{ref-union-closed } Q$ **and**

$D: (\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# \text{butlast } PS). \text{weakly-sequential } X) \longrightarrow$
 $\text{ref-union-closed } (\text{foldl } (;) P PS)$

have $\text{weakly-sequential } (\text{foldl } (;) P PS)$

proof (rule seq-comp-list-weakly-sequential, simp, erule disjE, simp add: A)

fix X

assume $X \in \text{set } PS$

with B **show** $\text{weakly-sequential } X \ ..$

qed
moreover have $\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# \text{butlast } PS)$. *weakly-sequential* X
proof (*rule ballI, simp, erule disjE, simp add: A*)
fix X
assume $X \in \text{set } (\text{butlast } PS)$
hence $X \in \text{set } PS$
by (*rule in-set-butlastD*)
with B **show** *weakly-sequential* X ..
qed
with D **have** *ref-union-closed* (*foldl* (;) P PS) ..
ultimately show *ref-union-closed* (*foldl* (;) P PS ; Q)
using C **by** (*rule seq-comp-ref-union-closed*)
qed

lemma *seq-comp-list-sequential* [*rule-format*]:
 $(\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# PS)$. *sequential* X) \longrightarrow
sequential (*foldl* (;) P PS)
proof (*induction PS rule: rev-induct, simp, rule impI, simp, (erule conjE)+*)
qed (*rule seq-comp-sequential*)

theorem *seq-comp-list-secure* [*rule-format*]:
assumes A : *secure-termination* I D
shows
 $(\forall X \in \text{set } (\text{butlast } (P \# PS)))$. *ref-union-closed* $X \wedge$ *sequential* X \longrightarrow
 $(\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# PS))$. *secure* X I D \longrightarrow
secure (*foldl* (;) P PS) I D
proof (*induction PS rule: rev-induct, simp, (rule impI)+, simp, split if-split-asm,*
simp, rule seq-comp-secure [OF A], assumption+)
fix PS Q
assume
 B : $PS \neq []$ **and**
 C : *ref-union-closed* P **and**
 D : *sequential* P **and**
 E : $\forall X \in \text{set } PS$. *ref-union-closed* $X \wedge$ *sequential* X **and**
 F : *secure* Q I D **and**
 G : $(\forall X \in \text{set } (P \# \text{butlast } PS))$. *ref-union-closed* $X \wedge$ *sequential* X \longrightarrow
secure (*foldl* (;) P PS) I D
have *ref-union-closed* (*foldl* (;) P PS)
proof (*rule seq-comp-list-ref-union-closed, simp-all add: B, erule-tac [!] disjE,*
simp-all add: C)
show *weakly-sequential* P
using D **by** (*rule seq-implies-weakly-seq*)
next
fix X
assume $X \in \text{set } (\text{butlast } PS)$
hence $X \in \text{set } PS$
by (*rule in-set-butlastD*)
with E **have** *ref-union-closed* $X \wedge$ *sequential* X ..
hence *sequential* X ..

```

    thus weakly-sequential X
      by (rule seq-implies-weakly-seq)
  next
  fix X
  assume X ∈ set PS
  with E have ref-union-closed X ∧ sequential X ..
  thus ref-union-closed X ..
qed
moreover have sequential (foldl (;) P PS)
proof (rule seq-comp-list-sequential, simp, erule disjE, simp add: D)
  fix X
  assume X ∈ set PS
  with E have ref-union-closed X ∧ sequential X ..
  thus sequential X ..
qed
moreover have ∀ X ∈ set (P # butlast PS). ref-union-closed X ∧ sequential X
proof (rule ballI, simp, erule disjE, simp add: C D)
  fix X
  assume X ∈ set (butlast PS)
  hence X ∈ set PS
  by (rule in-set-butlastD)
  with E show ref-union-closed X ∧ sequential X ..
qed
with G have secure (foldl (;) P PS) I D ..
ultimately show secure (foldl (;) P PS ; Q) I D
  using F by (rule seq-comp-secure [OF A])
qed

end

```

3 Necessity of nontrivial assumptions

```

theory Counterexamples
imports SequentialComposition
begin

```

The security conservation theorem proven in this paper contains two non-trivial assumptions; namely, the security policy must satisfy predicate *secure-termination*, and the first input process must satisfy predicate *sequential* instead of *weakly-sequential* alone. This section shows, by means of counterexamples, that both of these assumptions are necessary for the theorem to hold.

In more detail, two counterexamples will be constructed: the former drops the termination security assumption, whereas the latter drops the process sequentiality assumption, replacing it with weak sequentiality alone. In both cases, all the other assumptions of the theorem keep being satisfied.

Both counterexamples make use of reflexive security policies, which is the case for any policy of practical significance, and are based on trace set processes as defined in [9]. The security of the processes input to sequential composition, as well as the insecurity of the resulting process, are demonstrated by means of the Ipurge Unwinding Theorem proven in [9].

3.1 Preliminary definitions and lemmas

Both counterexamples will use the same type *event* as native type of ordinary events, as well as the same process Q as second input to sequential composition. Here below are the definitions of these constants, followed by few useful lemmas on process Q .

datatype *event* = *a* | *b*

definition $Q :: \text{event option process}$ **where**
 $Q \equiv \text{ts-process } \{\ [], [Some\ b] \}$

lemma *trace-set-snd*:
 $\text{trace-set } \{\ [], [Some\ b] \}$
by (*simp add: trace-set-def*)

lemmas *failures-snd* = *ts-process-failures* [*OF trace-set-snd*]

lemmas *traces-snd* = *ts-process-traces* [*OF trace-set-snd*]

lemmas *next-events-snd* = *ts-process-next-events* [*OF trace-set-snd*]

lemmas *unwinding-snd* = *ts-ipurge-unwinding* [*OF trace-set-snd*]

3.2 Necessity of termination security

The reason why the conservation of noninterference security under sequential composition requires the security policy to satisfy predicate *secure-termination* is that the second input process cannot engage in its events unless the first process has terminated successfully. Thus, the ordinary events of the first process can indirectly affect the events of the second process by affecting the successful termination of the first process. Therefore, if an ordinary event is allowed to affect successful termination, then the policy must allow it to affect any other event as well, which is exactly what predicate *secure-termination* states.

A counterexample showing the necessity of this assumption can then be constructed by defining a reflexive policy I_1 that allows event *Some a* to affect *None*, but not *Some b*, and a deterministic process P_1 that can engage in *None* only after engaging in *Some a*. The resulting process $P_1 ; Q$ will

number $[Some\ a, Some\ b]$, but not $[Some\ b]$, among its traces, so that event $Some\ a$ affects the occurrence of event $Some\ b$ in contrast with policy I_1 , viz. $P_1 ; Q$ is not secure with respect to I_1 .

Here below are the definitions of constants I_1 and P_1 , followed by few useful lemmas on process P_1 .

definition $I_1 :: (event\ option \times event\ option)\ set\ \mathbf{where}$
 $I_1 \equiv \{(Some\ a, None)\}^=$

definition $P_1 :: event\ option\ process\ \mathbf{where}$
 $P_1 \equiv ts\text{-}process\ \{\[], [Some\ a], [Some\ a, None]\}$

lemma $trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1:$
 $trace\text{-}set\ \{\[], [Some\ a], [Some\ a, None]\}$
by ($simp\ add:$ $trace\text{-}set\text{-}def$)

lemmas $failures\text{-}fst\text{-}1 = ts\text{-}process\text{-}failures\ [OF\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1]$

lemmas $traces\text{-}fst\text{-}1 = ts\text{-}process\text{-}traces\ [OF\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1]$

lemmas $next\text{-}events\text{-}fst\text{-}1 = ts\text{-}process\text{-}next\text{-}events\ [OF\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1]$

lemmas $unwinding\text{-}fst\text{-}1 = ts\text{-}ipurge\text{-}unwinding\ [OF\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1]$

Here below is the proof that policy I_1 does not satisfy predicate $secure\text{-}termination$, whereas the remaining assumptions of the security conservation theorem keep being satisfied. For the sake of simplicity, the identity function is used as event-domain map.

lemma $not\text{-}secure\text{-}termination\text{-}1:$
 $\neg\ secure\text{-}termination\ I_1\ id$
proof ($simp\ add:$ $secure\text{-}termination\text{-}def\ I_1\text{-}def$, $rule\ exI\ [\mathbf{where}\ x = Some\ a]$,
 $simp$)
qed ($rule\ exI\ [\mathbf{where}\ x = Some\ b]$, $simp$)

lemma $ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed\text{-}fst\text{-}1:$
 $ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed\ P_1$
by ($rule\ d\text{-}implies\text{-}ruc$, $subst\ P_1\text{-}def$, $rule\ ts\text{-}process\text{-}d$, $rule\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}fst\text{-}1$)

lemma $sequential\text{-}fst\text{-}1:$
 $sequential\ P_1$
proof ($simp\ add:$ $sequential\text{-}def\ sentences\text{-}def\ P_1\text{-}def\ traces\text{-}fst\text{-}1$)
qed ($simp\ add:$ $set\text{-}eq\text{-}iff\ next\text{-}events\text{-}fst\text{-}1$)

lemma $secure\text{-}fst\text{-}1:$
 $secure\ P_1\ I_1\ id$

$\{x. u = x \wedge xs = [] \wedge x = \text{Some } b\} = \{x. u = x \wedge ys = [] \wedge x = \text{Some } b\}$
by (*simp add: None, rule impI, (erule conjE)+,*
((erule disjE)+)?, simp)+)
next
case (*Some v*)
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [\text{Some } b]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [\text{Some } b]) \wedge$
 $\text{ipurge-tr-rev } I_1 \text{ id } u \text{ xs} = \text{ipurge-tr-rev } I_1 \text{ id } u \text{ ys} \longrightarrow$
 $\{x. u = x \wedge xs = [] \wedge x = \text{Some } b\} = \{x. u = x \wedge ys = [] \wedge x = \text{Some } b\}$
by (*simp add: I₁-def Some, rule impI, (erule conjE)+, cases v,*
((erule disjE)+)?, simp)+)
qed
qed

In what follows, the insecurity of process $P_1 ; Q$ is demonstrated by proving that event list $[\text{Some } a, \text{Some } b]$ is a trace of the process, whereas $[\text{Some } b]$ is not.

lemma *traces-comp-1:*

$\text{traces } (P_1 ; Q) = \text{Domain } (\text{seq-comp-failures } P_1 \ Q)$
by (*subst seq-comp-traces, rule seq-implies-weakly-seq, rule sequential-fst-1, simp*)

lemma *ref-union-closed-comp-1:*

$\text{ref-union-closed } (P_1 ; Q)$
proof (*rule seq-comp-ref-union-closed, rule seq-implies-weakly-seq,*
rule sequential-fst-1, rule ref-union-closed-fst-1)
qed (*rule d-implies-ruc, subst Q-def, rule ts-process-d, rule trace-set-snd*)

lemma *not-secure-comp-1-aux-aux-1:*

$(xs, X) \in \text{seq-comp-failures } P_1 \ Q \implies xs \neq [\text{Some } b]$
proof (*rule notI, erule rev-mp, erule seq-comp-failures.induct, (rule-tac [!] impI)+,*
simp-all add: P₁-def Q-def sentences-def)
qed (*simp-all add: failures-fst-1 traces-fst-1*)

lemma *not-secure-comp-1-aux-1:*

$[\text{Some } b] \notin \text{traces } (P_1 ; Q)$
proof (*simp add: traces-comp-1 Domain-iff, rule allI, rule notI*)
qed (*drule not-secure-comp-1-aux-aux-1, simp*)

lemma *not-secure-comp-1-aux-2:*

$[\text{Some } a, \text{Some } b] \in \text{traces } (P_1 ; Q)$
proof (*simp add: traces-comp-1 Domain-iff, rule exI [where x = {}]*)
have $[\text{Some } a] \in \text{sentences } P_1$
by (*simp add: P₁-def sentences-def traces-fst-1*)
moreover have $([\text{Some } b], \{\}) \in \text{failures } Q$
by (*simp add: Q-def failures-snd*)
moreover have $[\text{Some } b] \neq []$

by *simp*
ultimately have ($[Some\ a] @ [Some\ b], \{\}$) $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P_1\ Q$
by (*rule SCF-R3*)
thus ($[Some\ a, Some\ b], \{\}$) $\in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P_1\ Q$
by *simp*
qed

lemma not-secure-comp-1:
 $\neg secure\ (P_1 ; Q)\ I_1\ id$
proof (*subst ipurge-unwinding, rule ref-union-closed-comp-1, simp*
add: fc-equals-wfc-rel-ipurge [symmetric] future-consistent-def rel-ipurge-def
del: disj-not1, rule exI [where x = Some b], rule exI [where x = []], rule conjI)
show $[] \in traces\ (P_1 ; Q)$
by (*rule failures-traces [where X = {}], rule process-rule-1*)
next
show $\exists ys. ys \in traces\ (P_1 ; Q) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_1\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [] = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_1\ id\ (Some\ b)\ ys \wedge$
 $(next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [] \neq$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ ys \vee$
 $ref\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [] \neq$
 $ref\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ ys)$
proof (*rule exI [where x = [Some a]], rule conjI, rule-tac [2] conjI,*
rule-tac [3] disjI1)
have $[Some\ a] @ [Some\ b] \in traces\ (P_1 ; Q)$
by (*simp add: not-secure-comp-1-aux-2*)
thus $[Some\ a] \in traces\ (P_1 ; Q)$
by (*rule process-rule-2-traces*)
next
show $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_1\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [] = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_1\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [Some\ a]$
by (*simp add: I1-def*)
next
show
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [] \neq$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (P_1 ; Q)\ id\ (Some\ b)\ [Some\ a]$
proof (*simp add: next-dom-events-def next-events-def set-eq-iff,*
rule exI [where x = Some b], simp)
qed (*simp add: not-secure-comp-1-aux-1 not-secure-comp-1-aux-2*)
qed
qed

Here below, the previous results are used to show that constants I_1 , P_1 , Q , and id indeed constitute a counterexample to the statement obtained by removing termination security from the assumptions of the security conservation theorem.

lemma counterexample-1:
 $\neg (ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed\ P_1 \wedge$
 $sequential\ P_1 \wedge$

```

    secure P1 I1 id ∧
    secure Q I1 id →
    secure (P1 ; Q) I1 id
proof (simp, simp only: conj-assoc [symmetric], (rule conjI)+)
  show ref-union-closed P1
  by (rule ref-union-closed-fst-1)
next
  show sequential P1
  by (rule sequential-fst-1)
next
  show secure P1 I1 id
  by (rule secure-fst-1)
next
  show secure Q I1 id
  by (rule secure-snd-1)
next
  show ¬ secure (P1 ; Q) I1 id
  by (rule not-secure-comp-1)
qed

```

3.3 Necessity of process sequentiality

The reason why the conservation of noninterference security under sequential composition requires the first input process to satisfy predicate *sequential*, instead of the more permissive predicate *weakly-sequential*, is that the possibility for the first process to engage in events alternative to successful termination entails the possibility for the resulting process to engage in events alternative to the initial ones of the second process. Namely, the resulting process would admit some state in which events of the first process can occur in alternative to events of the second process. But neither process, though being secure on its own, will in general be prepared to handle securely the alternative events added by the other process. Therefore, the first process must not admit alternatives to successful termination, which is exactly what predicate *sequential* states in addition to *weakly-sequential*.

A counterexample showing the necessity of this assumption can then be constructed by defining a reflexive policy I_2 that does not allow event *Some b* to affect *Some a*, and a deterministic process P_2 that can engage in *Some a* in alternative to *None*. The resulting process $P_2 ; Q$ will number both $[Some\ b]$ and $[Some\ a]$, but not $[Some\ b, Some\ a]$, among its traces, so that event *Some b* affects the occurrence of event *Some a* in contrast with policy I_2 , viz. $P_2 ; Q$ is not secure with respect to I_2 .

Here below are the definitions of constants I_2 and P_2 , followed by few useful lemmas on process P_2 .

definition $I_2 :: (\text{event option} \times \text{event option}) \text{ set where}$
 $I_2 \equiv \{(None, Some\ a)\}^=$

definition $P_2 ::$ *event option process where*
 $P_2 \equiv ts\text{-process } \{\ [], [None], [Some\ a], [Some\ a,\ None] \}$

lemma *trace-set-fst-2:*
 $trace\text{-set } \{\ [], [None], [Some\ a], [Some\ a,\ None] \}$
by (*simp add: trace-set-def*)

lemmas $failures\text{-fst-2} = ts\text{-process-failures } [OF\ trace\text{-set-fst-2}]$

lemmas $traces\text{-fst-2} = ts\text{-process-traces } [OF\ trace\text{-set-fst-2}]$

lemmas $next\text{-events-fst-2} = ts\text{-process-next-events } [OF\ trace\text{-set-fst-2}]$

lemmas $unwinding\text{-fst-2} = ts\text{-ipurge-unwinding } [OF\ trace\text{-set-fst-2}]$

Here below is the proof that process P_2 does not satisfy predicate *sequential*, but rather predicate *weakly-sequential* only, whereas the remaining assumptions of the security conservation theorem keep being satisfied. For the sake of simplicity, the identity function is used as event-domain map.

lemma *secure-termination-2:*
 $secure\text{-termination } I_2\ id$
by (*simp add: secure-termination-def I_2-def*)

lemma *ref-union-closed-fst-2:*
 $ref\text{-union-closed } P_2$
by (*rule d-implies-ruc, subst P_2-def, rule ts-process-d, rule trace-set-fst-2*)

lemma *weakly-sequential-fst-2:*
 $weakly\text{-sequential } P_2$
by (*simp add: weakly-sequential-def P_2-def traces-fst-2*)

lemma *not-sequential-fst-2:*
 $\neg sequential\ P_2$
proof (*simp add: sequential-def, rule disjI2, rule bexI [where x = []]*)
show $next\text{-events } P_2\ [] \neq \{None\}$
proof (*rule notI, drule eqset-imp-iff [where x = Some a], simp*)
qed (*simp add: P_2-def next-events-fst-2*)
next
show $[] \in sentences\ P_2$
by (*simp add: sentences-def P_2-def traces-fst-2*)
qed

lemma *secure-fst-2:*
 $secure\ P_2\ I_2\ id$
proof (*simp add: P_2-def unwinding-fst-2 dfc-equals-dwfc-rel-ipurge [symmetric] d-future-consistent-def rel-ipurge-def traces-fst-2, (rule allI)+*)

fix $u\ xs\ ys$
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [None] \vee xs = [Some\ a] \vee xs = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [None] \vee ys = [Some\ a] \vee ys = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (ts\text{-}process\ \{[], [None], [Some\ a], [Some\ a,\ None]\})\ id\ u\ xs =$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (ts\text{-}process\ \{[], [None], [Some\ a], [Some\ a,\ None]\})\ id\ u\ ys$
proof (*simp add: next-dom-events-def next-events-fst-2, cases u*)
case *None*
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [None] \vee xs = [Some\ a] \vee xs = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [None] \vee ys = [Some\ a] \vee ys = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $\{x.\ u = x \wedge (xs = [] \wedge x = None \vee xs = [] \wedge x = Some\ a \vee$
 $xs = [Some\ a] \wedge x = None)\} =$
 $\{x.\ u = x \wedge (ys = [] \wedge x = None \vee ys = [] \wedge x = Some\ a \vee$
 $ys = [Some\ a] \wedge x = None)\}$
by (*simp add: I₂-def None, rule impI, (erule conjE)+,*
((erule disjE)+)?, simp, blast?)+)
next
case (*Some v*)
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [None] \vee xs = [Some\ a] \vee xs = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [None] \vee ys = [Some\ a] \vee ys = [Some\ a,\ None]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $\{x.\ u = x \wedge (xs = [] \wedge x = None \vee xs = [] \wedge x = Some\ a \vee$
 $xs = [Some\ a] \wedge x = None)\} =$
 $\{x.\ u = x \wedge (ys = [] \wedge x = None \vee ys = [] \wedge x = Some\ a \vee$
 $ys = [Some\ a] \wedge x = None)\}$
by (*simp add: I₂-def Some, rule impI, (erule conjE)+, cases v,*
((erule disjE)+)?, simp, blast?)+)
qed
qed

lemma *secure-snd-2:*
 $secure\ Q\ I_2\ id$
proof (*simp add: Q-def unwinding-snd dfc-equals-dwfc-rel-ipurge [symmetric]*
d-future-consistent-def rel-ipurge-def traces-snd, (rule allI)+)
fix $u\ xs\ ys$
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [Some\ b]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [Some\ b]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (ts\text{-}process\ \{[], [Some\ b]\})\ id\ u\ xs =$
 $next\text{-}dom\text{-}events\ (ts\text{-}process\ \{[], [Some\ b]\})\ id\ u\ ys$
proof (*simp add: next-dom-events-def next-events-snd, cases u*)
case *None*
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [Some\ b]) \wedge$

$(ys = [] \vee ys = [Some\ b]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $\{x. u = x \wedge xs = [] \wedge x = Some\ b\} = \{x. u = x \wedge ys = [] \wedge x = Some\ b\}$
by ($simp\ add: None$, $rule\ impI$, $(erule\ conjE)^+$,
 $((erule\ disjE)^+)?$, $simp)^+$)
next
case ($Some\ v$)
show
 $(xs = [] \vee xs = [Some\ b]) \wedge$
 $(ys = [] \vee ys = [Some\ b]) \wedge$
 $ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ xs = ipurge\text{-}tr\text{-}rev\ I_2\ id\ u\ ys \longrightarrow$
 $\{x. u = x \wedge xs = [] \wedge x = Some\ b\} = \{x. u = x \wedge ys = [] \wedge x = Some\ b\}$
by ($simp\ add: I_2\text{-}def\ Some$, $rule\ impI$, $(erule\ conjE)^+$, $cases\ v$,
 $((erule\ disjE)^+)?$, $simp)^+$)
qed
qed

In what follows, the insecurity of process P_2 ; Q is demonstrated by proving that event lists $[Some\ b]$ and $[Some\ a]$ are traces of the process, whereas $[Some\ b, Some\ a]$ is not.

lemma *traces-comp-2:*

$traces\ (P_2\ ;\ Q) = Domain\ (seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P_2\ Q)$
by ($subst\ seq\text{-}comp\text{-}traces$, $rule\ weakly\text{-}sequential\text{-}fst\text{-}2$, $simp$)

lemma *ref-union-closed-comp-2:*

$ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed\ (P_2\ ;\ Q)$
proof ($rule\ seq\text{-}comp\text{-}ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed$, $rule\ weakly\text{-}sequential\text{-}fst\text{-}2$,
 $rule\ ref\text{-}union\text{-}closed\text{-}fst\text{-}2$)
qed ($rule\ d\text{-}implies\text{-}ruc$, $subst\ Q\text{-}def$, $rule\ ts\text{-}process\text{-}d$, $rule\ trace\text{-}set\text{-}snd$)

lemma *not-secure-comp-2-aux-aux-1:*

$(xs, X) \in seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ P_2\ Q \Longrightarrow xs \neq [Some\ b, Some\ a]$
proof ($rule\ notI$, $erule\ rev\text{-}mp$, $erule\ seq\text{-}comp\text{-}failures\ induct$, $(rule\ tac\ [!]\ impI)^+$,
 $simp\text{-}all\ add: P_2\text{-}def\ Q\text{-}def\ sentences\text{-}def$)
qed ($simp\text{-}all\ add: failures\text{-}fst\text{-}2\ traces\text{-}fst\text{-}2\ failures\text{-}snd$)

lemma *not-secure-comp-2-aux-1:*

$[Some\ b, Some\ a] \notin traces\ (P_2\ ;\ Q)$
proof ($simp\ add: traces\text{-}comp\text{-}2\ Domain\text{-}iff$, $rule\ allI$, $rule\ notI$)
qed ($drule\ not\text{-}secure\text{-}comp\text{-}2\text{-}aux\text{-}aux\text{-}1$, $simp$)

lemma *not-secure-comp-2-aux-2:*

$[Some\ a] \in traces\ (P_2\ ;\ Q)$
proof ($simp\ add: traces\text{-}comp\text{-}2\ Domain\text{-}iff$, $rule\ exI\ [where\ x = \{\}]$)
have $[Some\ a] \in sentences\ P_2$
by ($simp\ add: P_2\text{-}def\ sentences\text{-}def\ traces\text{-}fst\text{-}2$)
moreover have $([Some\ a], \{\}) \in failures\ P_2$

by (simp add: P₂-def failures-fst-2)
 moreover have ([], {}) ∈ failures Q
 by (simp add: Q-def failures-snd)
 ultimately have ([Some a], insert None {} ∩ {}) ∈ seq-comp-failures P₂ Q
 by (rule SCF-R2)
 thus ([Some a], {}) ∈ seq-comp-failures P₂ Q
 by simp
 qed

lemma not-secure-comp-2-aux-3:

[Some b] ∈ traces (P₂ ; Q)
 proof (simp add: traces-comp-2 Domain-iff, rule exI [where x = {}])
 have [] ∈ sentences P₂
 by (simp add: P₂-def sentences-def traces-fst-2)
 moreover have ([Some b], {}) ∈ failures Q
 by (simp add: Q-def failures-snd)
 moreover have [Some b] ≠ []
 by simp
 ultimately have ([] @ [Some b], {}) ∈ seq-comp-failures P₂ Q
 by (rule SCF-R3)
 thus ([Some b], {}) ∈ seq-comp-failures P₂ Q
 by simp
 qed

lemma not-secure-comp-2:

¬ secure (P₂ ; Q) I₂ id
 proof (subst ipurge-unwinding, rule ref-union-closed-comp-2, simp
 add: fc-equals-wfc-rel-ipurge [symmetric] future-consistent-def rel-ipurge-def
 del: disj-not1, rule exI [where x = Some a], rule exI [where x = []], rule conjI)
 show [] ∈ traces (P₂ ; Q)
 by (rule failures-traces [where X = {}], rule process-rule-1)
 next
 show ∃ ys. ys ∈ traces (P₂ ; Q) ∧
 ipurge-tr-rev I₂ id (Some a) [] = ipurge-tr-rev I₂ id (Some a) ys ∧
 (next-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) [] ≠
 next-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) ys ∨
 ref-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) [] ≠
 ref-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) ys)
 proof (rule exI [where x = [Some b]], rule conjI, rule-tac [2] conjI,
 rule-tac [3] disjI1)
 show [Some b] ∈ traces (P₂ ; Q)
 by (rule not-secure-comp-2-aux-3)
 next
 show ipurge-tr-rev I₂ id (Some a) [] = ipurge-tr-rev I₂ id (Some a) [Some b]
 by (simp add: I₂-def)
 next
 show
 next-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) [] ≠
 next-dom-events (P₂ ; Q) id (Some a) [Some b]

```

proof (simp add: next-dom-events-def next-events-def set-eq-iff,
        rule exI [where x = Some a], simp)
qed (simp add: not-secure-comp-2-aux-1 not-secure-comp-2-aux-2)
qed
qed

```

Here below, the previous results are used to show that constants I_2 , P_2 , Q , and id indeed constitute a counterexample to the statement obtained by replacing process sequentiality with weak sequentiality in the assumptions of the security conservation theorem.

```

lemma counterexample-2:
  ¬ (secure-termination  $I_2$   $id$  ∧
     ref-union-closed  $P_2$  ∧
     weakly-sequential  $P_2$  ∧
     secure  $P_2$   $I_2$   $id$  ∧
     secure  $Q$   $I_2$   $id$  →
     secure ( $P_2$  ;  $Q$ )  $I_2$   $id$ )
proof (simp, simp only: conj-assoc [symmetric], (rule conjI)+)
  show secure-termination  $I_2$   $id$ 
    by (rule secure-termination-2)
  next
    show ref-union-closed  $P_2$ 
      by (rule ref-union-closed-fst-2)
  next
    show weakly-sequential  $P_2$ 
      by (rule weakly-sequential-fst-2)
  next
    show secure  $P_2$   $I_2$   $id$ 
      by (rule secure-fst-2)
  next
    show secure  $Q$   $I_2$   $id$ 
      by (rule secure-snd-2)
  next
    show ¬ secure ( $P_2$  ;  $Q$ )  $I_2$   $id$ 
      by (rule not-secure-comp-2)
qed

end

```

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