LOFT — Verified Migration of Linux Firewalls to SDN

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Abstract

We present LOFT — Linux firewall OpenFlow Translator, a system that transforms the main routing table and FORWARD chain of iptables of a Linux-based firewall into a set of static OpenFlow rules. Our implementation is verified against a model of a simplified Linux-based router and we can directly show how much of the original functionality is preserved.

Please note that this document is organized in two distinct parts. The first part contains the necessary definitions, helper lemmas and proofs in all their technicality as made in the theory code. The second part reiterates the most important definitions and proofs in a manner that is more suitable for human readers and enriches them with detailed explanations in natural language. Any interested reader should start from there.

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Many of the considerations that have led to the definitions made here have been explained in [8].

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Part I Code

theory OpenFlow-Matches imports IP-Addresses.Prefix-Match Simple-Firewall.Simple-Packet HOL-Library.Monad-Syntax

> HOL-Library.List-Lexorder HOL-Library. Char-ord

begin

}

datatype of-match-field = IngressPort string EtherSrc 48 word EtherDst 48 word EtherType 16 word VlanId 16 word VlanPriority 16 word IPv4Src 32 prefix-match IPv4Dst 32 prefix-match IPv4Proto 8 word | L4Src 16 word 16 word | L4Dst 16 word 16 word schematic-goal of-match-field-typeset: (field-match :: of-match-field) \in { IngressPort (?s::string), EtherSrc (?as::48 word), EtherDst (?ad::48 word), EtherType (?t::16 word), VlanId (?i::16 word), VlanPriority (?p::16 word), IPv4Src (?pms::32 prefix-match), IPv4Dst (?pmd::32 prefix-match), IPv4Proto (?ipp :: 8 word), L4Src (?ps :: 16 word) (?ms :: 16 word), L4Dst (?pd :: 16 word) (?md :: 16 word) proof((cases field-match;clarsimp),goal-cases) **next case** (IngressPort s) **thus** $s = (case field-match of IngressPort <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ **unfolding** IngressPort of-match-field.simps by rule **next case** (*EtherSrc* s) **thus** $s = (case field-match of EtherSrc <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ unfolding EtherSrc of-match-field.simps by rule **thus** $s = (case field-match of EtherDst <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ unfolding EtherDst of-match-field.simps by **next case** (*EtherDst s*) ruleunfolding EtherType of-match-field.simps **next case** (*EtherType s*) **thus** $s = (case field-match of EtherType <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ by rule **next case** (VlanId s) **thus** $s = (case field-match of VlanId <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ unfolding VlanId of-match-field.simps by rule **next case** (VlanPriority s) **thus** $s = (case field-match of VlanPriority <math>s \Rightarrow s)$ unfolding VlanPriority of-match-field.simps by rule

```
next case (IPv4Src s)
                                 thus s = (case field-match of IPv4Src s \Rightarrow s)
                                                                                           unfolding IPv4Src of-match-field.simps by
rule
 next case (IPv4Dst s)
                                 thus s = (case field-match of IPv4Dst <math>s \Rightarrow s)
                                                                                           by simp
 next case (IPv4Proto s)
                                 thus s = (case field-match of IPv4Proto <math>s \Rightarrow s)
                                                                                           by simp
 next case (L4Src \ p \ l)
                                 thus p = (case field-match of L4Src \ p \ m \Rightarrow p) \land l = (case field-match of L4Src \ p \ m \Rightarrow m) by
simp
                                 thus p = (case field-match of L4Dst p m \Rightarrow p) \land l = (case field-match of L4Dst p m \Rightarrow m) by
 next case (L4Dst \ p \ l)
simp
```

```
qed
```

function prerequisites :: of-match-field \Rightarrow of-match-field set \Rightarrow bool where prerequisites (IngressPort -) - = True |

prerequisites (EtherDst -) - = $True \mid$

prerequisites (EtherSrc -) - = $True \mid$

prerequisites (EtherType -) - = $True \mid$

prerequisites (VlanId -) - = True |

prerequisites (VlanPriority -) $m = (\exists id. let v = VlanId id in v \in m \land prerequisites v m)$

prerequisites (IPv4Proto -) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800 \ in \ v \in m \land prerequisites \ v \ m)$

prerequisites (IPv4Src -) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800 \ in \ v \in m \land prerequisites \ v \ m)$

prerequisites (IPv4Dst -) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800 \ in \ v \in m \land prerequisites \ v \ m) \mid$

prerequisites (L4Src - -) $m = (\exists proto \in \{TCP, UDP, L4-Protocol.SCTP\}.$ let $v = IPv4Proto proto in v \in m \land prerequisites v m) \mid$ prerequisites (L4Dst - -) m = prerequisites (L4Src undefined undefined) mby pat-completeness auto

fun match-sorter :: of-match-field \Rightarrow nat where match-sorter (IngressPort -) = 1 | match-sorter (VlanId -) = 2 | match-sorter (VlanPriority -) = 3 | match-sorter (EtherType -) = 4 | match-sorter (EtherSrc -) = 5 | match-sorter (EtherDst -) = 6 | match-sorter (IPv4Proto -) = 7 | match-sorter (IPv4Src -) = 8 | match-sorter (IPv4Dst -) = 9 | match-sorter (L4Src - -) = 10 | match-sorter (L4Dst - -) = 11

termination prerequisites by (relation measure (match-sorter \circ fst), simp-all)

 $\textbf{definition} \textit{ less-eq-of-match-field1} :: \textit{of-match-field} \Rightarrow \textit{of-match-field} \Rightarrow \textit{bool}$

where less-eq-of-match-field1 (a::of-match-field) (b::of-match-field) \longleftrightarrow (case (a, b) of (IngressPort a, IngressPort b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (VlanId a, VlanId b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (EtherDst a, EtherDst b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (EtherSrc a, EtherSrc b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (EtherType a, EtherType b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (VlanPriority a, VlanPriority b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (IPv4Proto a, IPv4Proto b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (IPv4Dst a, IPv4Dst b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (IPv4Dst a, IPv4Dst b) $\Rightarrow a \leq b \mid$ (L4Src a1 a2, L4Dst b1 b2) \Rightarrow if a2 = b2 then a1 \leq b1 else a2 \leq b2 \mid (a, b) \Rightarrow match-sorter a < match-sorter b)

instantiation of-match-field :: linorder begin

definition

 $less-eq-of-match-field ~(a::of-match-field) ~(b::of-match-field) ~\longleftrightarrow ~ less-eq-of-match-field1 ~a~ b ~(b::of-match-field1) ~(b::of-$

definition

instance

by standard (auto simp add: less-eq-of-match-field-def less-of-match-field-def less-eq-of-match-field1-def split: prod.splits of-match-field.splits if-splits)

\mathbf{end}

definition match-prereq :: of-match-field \Rightarrow of-match-field set \Rightarrow (32, 'a) simple-packet-ext-scheme \Rightarrow bool option where match-prereq i s p = (if prerequisites i s then Some (match-no-prereq i p) else None)

definition set-seq $s \equiv if \ (\forall x \in s. x \neq None)$ then Some (the 's) else None definition all-true $s \equiv \forall x \in s. x$ term map-option definition OF-match-fields :: of-match-field set $\Rightarrow (32, 'a)$ simple-packet-ext-scheme \Rightarrow bool option where OF-match-fields $m \ p = map-option \ all-true \ (set-seq \ ((\lambda f. match-prereq \ f m \ p) \ 'm))$ definition OF-match-fields-unsafe :: of-match-field set $\Rightarrow (32, 'a) \ simple-packet-ext-scheme \Rightarrow bool \ where <math>OF$ -match-fields-unsafe m $p = (\forall f \in m. match-no-prereq \ f \ p)$ definition OF-match-fields-safe $m \equiv the \circ OF$ -match-fields m **definition** all-prerequisites $m \equiv \forall f \in m$. prerequisites f m

lemma

all-prerequisites $p \implies$ $L4Src \ x \ y \in p \implies$ $IPv4Proto ` \{TCP, UDP, L4-Protocol.SCTP\} \cap p \neq \{\}$ unfolding all-prerequisites-def by auto

lemma of-safe-unsafe-match-eq: all-prerequisites $m \Longrightarrow OF$ -match-fields m p = Some (OF-match-fields-unsafe m p) **unfolding** OF-match-fields-def OF-match-fields-unsafe-def comp-def set-seq-def match-prereq-def all-prerequisites-def **proof** goal-cases

case 1

have 2: $(\lambda f. if prerequisites f m then Some (match-no-prereq f p) else None)$ ' $m = (\lambda f. Some (match-no-prereq f p))$ ' m using 1 by fastforce

have $3: \forall x \in (\lambda f. Some (match-no-prereq f p))$ 'm. $x \neq None$ by blast show ?case

 $\mbox{unfolding 2 unfolding $eqTrueI[OF 3]$ unfolding if-True unfolding image-comp comp-def unfolding option.sel by} (simp add: all-true-def)$

 \mathbf{qed}

lemma of-match-fields-safe-eq: **assumes** all-prerequisites m shows OF-match-fields-safe m = OF-match-fields-unsafe m unfolding OF-match-fields-safe-def[abs-def] fun-eq-iff comp-def unfolding of-safe-unsafe-match-eq[OF assms] unfolding option.sel by clarify

 ${\bf lemma} \ OF{\rm -}match{\rm -}fields{\rm -}alt{\rm :} \ OF{\rm -}match{\rm -}fields \ m \ p =$

(if $\exists f \in m$. \neg prerequisites f m then None else if $\forall f \in m$. match-no-prereq f p then Some True else Some False) **unfolding** OF-match-fields-def all-true-def[abs-def] set-seq-def match-prereq-def **by**(auto simp add: ball-Un)

lemma of-match-fields-safe-eq2: **assumes** all-prerequisites m shows OF-match-fields-safe $m p \leftrightarrow OF$ -match-fields m p = Some True

unfolding OF-match-fields-safe-def[abs-def] fun-eq-iff comp-def **unfolding** of-safe-unsafe-match-eq[OF assms] **unfolding** option.sel **by** simp

end theory OpenFlow-Action imports OpenFlow-Matches begin

 $datatype \ of-action = Forward \ (oiface-sel: string) \mid ModifyField-l2dst \ 48 \ word$

fun of-action-semantics **where** of-action-semantics $p \parallel = \{\} \mid$ of-action-semantics $p (a\#as) = (case \ a \ of$ Forward $i \Rightarrow insert (i,p)$ (of-action-semantics p as) | ModifyField-l2dst $a \Rightarrow$ of-action-semantics (p(p-l2dst := a)) as)

value of-action-semantics p [] **value** of-action-semantics p [ModifyField-l2dst 66, Forward "oif"]

\mathbf{end}

theory Semantics-OpenFlow imports List-Group Sort-Descending IP-Addresses.IPv4 OpenFlow-Helpers begin

datatype 'a flowtable-behavior = Action 'a | NoAction | Undefined

definition option-to-ftb $b \equiv case \ b$ of Some $a \Rightarrow$ Action $a \mid$ None \Rightarrow NoAction **definition** ftb-to-option $b \equiv case \ b$ of Action $a \Rightarrow$ Some $a \mid$ NoAction \Rightarrow None

datatype ('m, 'a) flow-entry-match = OFEntry (ofe-prio: 16 word) (ofe-fields: 'm set) (ofe-action: 'a)

find-consts $(('a \times 'b) \Rightarrow 'c) \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'c$

find-consts $(a \Rightarrow b \Rightarrow c) \Rightarrow (a \times b) \Rightarrow c$

definition split3 $f p \equiv case p \ of \ (a,b,c) \Rightarrow f \ a \ b \ c$ **find-consts** $('a \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'c \Rightarrow 'd) \Rightarrow ('a \times 'b \times 'c) \Rightarrow 'd$

type-synonym ('m, 'a) flowtable = (('m, 'a) flow-entry-match) list **type-synonym** ('m, 'p) field-matcher = ('m set \Rightarrow 'p \Rightarrow bool)

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{definition} \ OF\text{-}same\text{-}priority\text{-}match2 :: ('m, 'p) \ field\text{-}matcher \Rightarrow ('m, 'a) \ flowtable \Rightarrow 'p \Rightarrow 'a \ flowtable\text{-}behavior \ \textbf{where} \\ OF\text{-}same\text{-}priority\text{-}match2 \ \gamma \ flow\text{-}entries \ packet \equiv let \ s = \\ \{\text{ofe-action } f | f. \ f \in set \ flow\text{-}entries \ \land \ \gamma \ (ofe\text{-}fields \ f) \ packet \ \land \\ (\forall fo \in set \ flow\text{-}entries. \ ofe\text{-}prio \ fo \ > \ ofe\text{-}prio \ f \ \longrightarrow \ \neg \gamma \ (ofe\text{-}fields \ fo) \ packet)\} \ in \\ case \ card \ s \ of \ 0 \ \Rightarrow \ NoAction \\ | \ (Suc \ 0) \Rightarrow \ Action \ (the\text{-}elem \ s) \\ | \ - \ \Rightarrow \ Undefined \end{array}$

definition check-no-overlap γ ft = ($\forall a \in set ft. \forall b \in set ft. \forall p \in UNIV.$ (ofe-prio $a = ofe-prio b \land \gamma$ (ofe-fields a) $p \land a \neq b$) $\longrightarrow \neg \gamma$ (ofe-fields b) p)

definition check-no-overlap2 γ ft = ($\forall a \in set ft. \forall b \in set ft. (a \neq b \land ofe-prio a = ofe-prio b) \longrightarrow \neg(\exists p \in UNIV. \gamma (ofe-fields a) p \land \gamma (ofe-fields b) p))$

lemma check-no-overlap-alt: check-no-overlap γ ft = check-no-overlap 2γ ft

unfolding check-no-overlap2-def check-no-overlap-def

by blast

lemma no-overlap-not-unefined: check-no-overlap γ ft \implies OF-same-priority-match2 γ ft $p \neq$ Undefined **proof**

assume goal1: check-no-overlap γ ft OF-same-priority-match2 γ ft p = Undefined let $?as = \{f. f \in set ft \land \gamma (ofe-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set ft. ofe-prio f < ofe-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (ofe-fields fo) p)\}$ have fin: finite ?as by simp **note** goal1(2)[unfolded OF-same-priority-match2-def] then have $2 \leq card$ (of e-action '?as) unfolding f-Img-ex-set unfolding Let-def by(cases card (ofe-action '?as), simp) (rename-tac nat1, case-tac nat1, simp add: image-Collect, presburger) then have $2 \leq card$?as using card-image-le[OF fin, of ofe-action] by linarith then obtain a b where ab: $a \neq b$ $a \in ?as$ $b \in ?as$ using card2-eI by blast then have $ab2: a \in set ft \gamma$ (ofe-fields a) $p (\forall fo \in set ft. of e-prio a < of e-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields fo) p) $b \in set ft \gamma (of e-fields b) p (\forall fo \in set ft. of e-prio b < of e-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)$ by simp-all then have of e-prio a = of e-prio bby *fastforce* **note** goal1(1)[unfolded check-no-overlap-def] ab2(1) ab2(4) this <math>ab2(2) ab(1) ab2(5)then show False by blast qed

fun OF-match-linear :: ('m, 'p) field-matcher \Rightarrow ('m, 'a) flowtable \Rightarrow 'p \Rightarrow 'a flowtable-behavior where OF-match-linear - [] - = NoAction | OF-match-linear γ (a#as) p = (if γ (ofe-fields a) p then Action (ofe-action a) else OF-match-linear γ as p)

lemma OF-match-linear-ne-Undefined: OF-match-linear γ ft $p \neq$ Undefined **by**(induction ft) auto

lemma OF-match-linear-append: OF-match-linear γ (a @ b) $p = (case \ OF-match-linear \ \gamma \ a \ p \ of \ NoAction \Rightarrow OF-match-linear \ \gamma \ b \ p \ | \ x \Rightarrow x)$

 $\mathbf{by}(induction \ a) \ simp-all$

lemma OF-match-linear-match-allsameaction: $[gr \in set \ oms; \gamma \ gr \ p = True]$

 \implies OF-match-linear γ (map ($\lambda x.$ split3 OFEntry (pri, x, act)) oms) p = Action act

by(*induction oms*) (*auto simp add: split3-def*)

lemma OF-lm-noa-none-iff: OF-match-linear γ ft $p = NoAction \leftrightarrow (\forall e \in set ft. \neg \gamma (ofe-fields e) p)$ **by**(induction ft) (simp-all split: if-splits)

lemma set-eq-rule: $(\bigwedge x. \ x \in a \Longrightarrow x \in b) \Longrightarrow (\bigwedge x. \ x \in b \Longrightarrow x \in a) \Longrightarrow a = b$ by (rule antisym[OF subsetI subsetI])

lemma unmatching-insert-agnostic: $\neg \gamma$ (ofe-fields a) $p \implies OF$ -same-priority-match2 γ (a # ft) p = OF-same-priority-match2 γ ft p

proof –

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{let } ?as = \{f. \ f \in set \ ft \land \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ f) \ p \land (\forall fo \in set \ ft. \ ofe-prio \ f < ofe-prio \ fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fo) \ p)\} \\ \textbf{let } ?aas = \{f \ |f. \ f \in set \ (a \ \# \ ft) \land \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ f) \ p \land (\forall fo \in set \ (a \ \# \ ft). \ ofe-prio \ f < ofe-prio \ fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fo) \ p)\} \\ p)\} \end{array}$

assume $nm: \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields a) p

have aa: ?aas = ?as

proof(rule set-eq-rule)

fix x

assume $x \in \{f \mid f. f \in set (a \# ft) \land \gamma (ofe-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio f < of e-prio f \rightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)\}$

hence as: $x \in set (a \# ft) \land \gamma (ofe-fields x) p \land (\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio x < of e-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)$ by simp

with nm have $x \in set ft$ by fastforce

moreover from as have $(\forall fo \in set ft. of e-prio x < of e-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)$ by simp ultimately show $x \in \{f \in set ft. \gamma (of e-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set ft. of e-prio f < of e-prio fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)\}$ using as by force next

fix x

 $\mathbf{n}\mathbf{x}$

assume $x \in \{f \in set ft. \gamma (ofe-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set ft. ofe-prio f < ofe-prio f <math>\rightarrow \neg \gamma (ofe-fields fo) p)\}$ **hence** $as: x \in set ft \gamma (ofe-fields x) p (\forall fo \in set ft. ofe-prio x < ofe-prio f <math>\rightarrow \neg \gamma (ofe-fields fo) p)$ **by** simp-all **from** as(1) **have** $x \in set (a \# ft)$ **by** simp**moreover from** as(3) **have** $(\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). ofe-prio x < ofe-prio f <math>\rightarrow \neg \gamma (ofe-fields fo) p)$ **using** nm **by** simp

moreover from as(3) **nave** $(\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio x < of e-prio fo <math>\longrightarrow \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields fo) p) using nm by simp ultimately show $x \in \{f \mid f. f \in set (a \# ft) \land \gamma (of e-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio f < of e-prio fo <math>\longrightarrow \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields fo) p)} using as(2) by blast

qed

note uf = arg-cong[OF aa, of (') of e-action, unfolded image-Collect]

 $\mathbf{show}~? thesis~\mathbf{unfolding}~OF\-same\-priority\-match2\-def~\mathbf{using}~uf~\mathbf{by}~presburger$

 \mathbf{qed}

lemma OF-match-eq: sorted-descending (map of e-prio ft) \implies check-no-overlap γ ft \implies OF-same-priority-match2 γ ft p = OF-match-linear γ ft p**proof**(*induction ft*) **case** (Cons a ft) have 1: sorted-descending (map of e-prio ft) using Cons(2) by simp have 2: check-no-overlap γ ft using Cons(3) unfolding check-no-overlap-def using set-subset-Cons by fast note $mIH = Cons(1)[OF \ 1 \ 2]$ show ?case (is ?kees) **proof**(cases γ (ofe-fields a) p) case False thus ?kees $by(simp only: OF-match-linear.simps if-False mIH[symmetric] unmatching-insert-agnostic[of <math>\gamma$, OF False]) \mathbf{next} **note** sorted-descending-split[OF Cons(2)] then obtain m n where mn: $a \# ft = m @ n \forall e \in set m. of e-prio a = of e-prio e \forall e \in set n. of e-prio e < of e-prio a$ unfolding *list.sel* by *blast* hence $aem: a \in set m$ **by** (*metis* UnE less-imp-neq list.set-intros(1) set-append) have mover: check-no-overlap γ m using Cons(3) unfolding check-no-overlap-def by (metis Un-iff mn(1) set-append) let $?fc = (\lambda s.$ $\{f. f \in set \ s \land \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ f) \ p \land \}$ $(\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio f < of e-prio f \rightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)\})$ case True have $?fc (m @ n) = ?fc m \cup ?fc n$ by auto moreover have $?fc n = \{\}$ **proof**(*rule set-eq-rule*, *rule ccontr*, *goal-cases*) case (1 x)hence g1: $x \in set \ n \ \gamma$ (of e-fields x) p $(\forall fo \in set \ m. \ of e-prio \ x < of e-prio \ fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma \ (of e-fields \ fo) \ p)$ $(\forall fo \in set \ n. \ of e-prio \ x < of e-prio \ fo \longrightarrow \neg \gamma \ (of e-fields \ fo) \ p)$

unfolding mn(1) by(simp-all) from g1(1) mn(3) have le: of e-prio x < of e-prio a by simp **note** le g1(3) aem True then show False by blast qed simp ultimately have cc: ?fc (m @ n) = ?fc m by blast **have** *cm*: ?*fc* $m = \{a\}$ proof - $\mathbf{have} \ \forall f \in set \ m. \ (\forall \textit{fo} \in set \ (a \ \# \ ft). \ ofe-\textit{prio} \ f < ofe-\textit{prio} \ fo \longrightarrow \neg \ \gamma \ (ofe-\textit{fields} \ fo) \ p)$ by (metis UnE less-asym mn set-append) hence 1: ?fc $m = \{f \in set m. \gamma (ofe-fields f) p\}$ by blast **show** $\{f \in set m. \gamma (ofe-fields f) p \land (\forall fo \in set (a \# ft). of e-prio f < of e-prio f o \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fo) p)\} = \{a\}$ unfolding 1 proof(rule set-eq-rule, goal-cases fwd bwd) case (bwd x)have $a \in \{f \in set \ m. \ \gamma \ (of e-fields \ f) \ p\}$ using True aem by simp thus ?case using bwd by simp \mathbf{next} **case** (*fwd x*) **show** ?*case* **proof**(*rule ccontr*) assume $x \notin \{a\}$ hence $ne: x \neq a$ by simp from fwd have 1: $x \in set \ m \ \gamma$ (ofe-fields x) p by simp-all have 2: of e-prio $x = of e-prio \ a using \ 1(1) \ mn(2)$ by simp show False using 1 ne mover aem True 2 unfolding check-no-overlap-def by blast qed qed qed show ?kees unfolding mn(1)unfolding OF-same-priority-match2-def **unfolding** *f*-*Img*-ex-set **unfolding** cc[unfolded mn(1)]**unfolding** cm[unfolded mn(1)]unfolding Let-def **by**(*simp only: mn*(1)[*symmetric*] *OF-match-linear.simps True if-True, simp*) qed **qed** (*simp add: OF-same-priority-match2-def*) **lemma** overlap-sort-invar[simp]: check-no-overlap γ (sort-descending-key k ft) = check-no-overlap γ ft unfolding check-no-overlap-def unfolding sort-descending-set-inv ••• **lemma** *OF-match-eq2*: **assumes** check-no-overlap γ ft shows OF-same-priority-match2 γ ft p = OF-match-linear γ (sort-descending-key of e-prior ft) pproof have sorted-descending (map of e-prio (sort-descending-key of e-prio ft)) by (simp add: sorted-descending-sort-descending-key) **note** ceq = OF-match-eq[OF this, unfolded overlap-sort-invar, OF (check-no-overlap γ ft), symmetric] show ?thesis unfolding ceq unfolding OF-same-priority-match2-def unfolding sort-descending-set-inv \mathbf{qed}

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by(*auto simp add: Let-def*)

${\bf definition} \ OF\mbox{-}priority\mbox{-}match \ {\bf where}$

 $\begin{array}{l} OF\text{-priority-match } \gamma \text{ flow-entries packet} \equiv \\ let \ m \ = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ f) \ packet) \ flow-entries; \\ m' = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \forall \ fo \in set \ m. \ ofe-prio \ fo \ \leq \ ofe-prio \ f) \ m \ in \\ case \ m' \ of \ [] \ \Rightarrow \ NoAction \\ & | \ [s] \ \Rightarrow \ Action \ (ofe-action \ s) \\ & | \ - \ \Rightarrow \ Undefined \end{array}$

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{definition} \ OF\text{-}priority\text{-}match\text{-}ana \ \textbf{where} \\ OF\text{-}priority\text{-}match\text{-}ana \ \gamma \ flow\text{-}entries \ packet \equiv \\ let \ m \ = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \gamma \ (ofe\text{-}fields \ f) \ packet) \ flow\text{-}entries; \\ m' \ = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \forall \ fo \ \in \ set \ m. \ ofe\text{-}prio \ fo \ \leq \ ofe\text{-}prio \ f) \ m \ in \\ case \ m' \ of \ [] \ \Rightarrow \ NoAction \\ & | \ [s] \ \Rightarrow \ Action \ s \\ & | \ - \ \Rightarrow \ Undefined \end{array}$

lemma filter-singleton: $[x \leftarrow s. f x] = [y] \implies f y \land y \in set s$ by (metis filter-eq-Cons-iff in-set-conv-decomp)

lemma *OF-spm3-get-fe: OF-priority-match* γ *ft* $p = Action \ a \Longrightarrow \exists fe. \ of e-action \ fe = a \land fe \in set \ ft \land OF-priority-match-ana$ γ *ft* $p = Action \ fe$ **unfolding** *OF-priority-match-def OF-priority-match-ana-def*

by(*clarsimp split: flowtable-behavior.splits list.splits*) (*drule filter-singleton; simp*)

fun no-overlaps **where** no-overlaps - [] = True | no-overlaps γ (a#as) = (no-overlaps γ as \wedge ($\forall b \in set as. of e-prio \ a = of e-prio \ b \longrightarrow \neg(\exists p \in UNIV. \gamma (of e-fields \ a) \ p \land \gamma (of e-fields \ b) \ p)))$

lemma no-overlap-ConsI: check-no-overlap2 γ (x#xs) \implies check-no-overlap2 γ xs unfolding check-no-overlap2-def by simp

lemma no-overlapsI: check-no-overlap γ t \Longrightarrow distinct t \Longrightarrow no-overlaps γ t **unfolding** check-no-overlap-alt **proof**(induction t) **case** (Cons a t) **from** no-overlap-ConsI[OF Cons(2)] Cons(3,1)

have no-overlaps γ t by simp thus ?case using Cons(2,3) unfolding check-no-overlap2-def by auto **qed** (simp add: check-no-overlap2-def) **lemma** check-no-overlapI: no-overlaps γ t \Longrightarrow check-no-overlap γ t unfolding check-no-overlap-alt proof(induction t)case (Cons a t) **from** Cons(1)[OF conjunct1[OF Cons(2)[unfolded no-overlaps.simps]]] show ?case using conjunct2[OF Cons(2)[unfolded no-overlaps.simps]] unfolding check-no-overlap2-def by auto qed (simp add: check-no-overlap2-def) **lemma** ($\bigwedge e \ p. \ e \in set \ t \Longrightarrow \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields e) p) \Longrightarrow no-overlaps $\gamma \ t$ $\mathbf{by}(induction \ t) \ simp-all$ **lemma** no-overlaps-append: no-overlaps γ (x @ y) \Longrightarrow no-overlaps γ y $\mathbf{by}(induction \ x) \ simp-all$ **lemma** no-overlaps-ne1: no-overlaps γ (x @ a # y @ b # z) \Longrightarrow (($\exists p. \gamma$ (ofe-fields a) p) \lor ($\exists p. \gamma$ (ofe-fields b) p)) \Longrightarrow a $\neq b$ **proof** (rule notI, goal-cases contr) case contr from contr(1) no-overlaps-append have no-overlaps γ (a # y @ b # z) by blast **note** this [unfolded no-overlaps.simps] with contr(3) have $\neg (\exists p \in UNIV, \gamma (ofe-fields a) p \land \gamma (ofe-fields b) p)$ by simp with contr(2) show False unfolding contr(3) by simp qed **lemma** no-overlaps-defeq: no-overlaps γ fe \implies OF-same-priority-match2 γ fe p = OF-priority-match γ fe p unfolding OF-same-priority-match2-def OF-priority-match-def unfolding *f*-Img-ex-set ${\bf unfolding} \ prio-match-matcher-alt$ unfolding prio-match-matcher-alt2 **proof** (goal-cases uf) case uf let $?m' = let \ m = [f \leftarrow fe \ . \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ f) \ p] \ in \ [f \leftarrow m \ . \ \forall fo \in set \ m. \ ofe-prio \ fo \leq ofe-prio \ f]$ let ?s = ofe-action ' set ?m'from uf show ?case proof(cases ?m') $\mathbf{case}~\textit{Nil}$ moreover then have card ?s = 0 by force ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: Let-def) next **case** (Cons a as) have as = []**proof**(*rule ccontr*) assume $as \neq []$ then obtain b bs where bbs: as = b # bs by (meson neq-Nil-conv) **note** no = Cons[unfolded Let-def filter-filter]have $f1: a \in set ?m' b \in set ?m'$ unfolding bbs local. Cons by simp-all hence of e-prio a = of e-prio b by (simp add: antisym) **moreover have** $ms: \gamma$ (ofe-fields a) $p \gamma$ (ofe-fields b) p using no[symmetric] unfolding bbs by(blast dest: Cons-eq-filterD)+ **moreover have** *abis:* $a \in set fe \ b \in set fe$ **using** f1 **by** *auto*

moreover have $a \neq b$ proof(cases $\exists x \ y \ z$. fe = x @ a # y @ b # z) case True then obtain x y z where xyz: fe = x @ a # y @ b # z by blast **from** no-overlaps-ne1 ms(1) uf [unfolded xyz] show ?thesis by blast \mathbf{next} case False then obtain x y z where xyz: fe = x @ b # y @ a # zusing no unfolding bbs **by** (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) Cons-eq-filterD) **from** no-overlaps-ne1 ms(1) uf [unfolded xyz] show ?thesis by blast qed ultimately show False using check-no-overlap I[OF uf, unfolded check-no-overlap-def] by blast qed then have oe: a # as = [a] by simp show ?thesis using Cons[unfolded oe] by force qed qed **lemma** distinct $fe \implies$ check-no-overlap γ $fe \implies$ OF-same-priority-match 2γ fe = OF-priority-match γ fe p**by**(rule no-overlaps-defeq) (drule (2) no-overlapsI) theorem OF-eq: assumes no: no-overlaps γf and so: sorted-descending (map of e-prio f) shows OF-match-linear $\gamma f p = OF$ -priority-match $\gamma f p$ unfolding no-overlaps-defeq[symmetric, OF no] OF-match-eq[OF so check-no-overlapI[OF no]] •• corollary *OF-eq-sort*: assumes no: no-overlaps γf shows OF-priority-match $\gamma f p = OF$ -match-linear γ (sort-descending-key of e-prior f) p using OF-match-eq2 check-no-overlapI no no-overlaps-defeq by fastforce **lemma** OF-lm-noa-none: OF-match-linear γ ft $p = NoAction \implies \forall e \in set ft. \neg \gamma$ (of e-fields e) p **by**(*induction ft*) (*simp-all split: if-splits*) lemma OF-spm3-noa-none: assumes no: no-overlaps γ ft shows OF-priority-match γ ft $p = NoAction \implies \forall e \in set ft. \neg \gamma (ofe-fields e) p$ unfolding OF-eq-sort[OF no] by(drule OF-lm-noa-none) simp **lemma** no-overlaps-not-unefined: no-overlaps γ ft \implies OF-priority-match γ ft $p \neq$ Undefined using check-no-overlapI no-overlap-not-unefined no-overlaps-defeq by fastforce \mathbf{end} theory OpenFlow-Serialize

theory OpenFlow-Serialize imports OpenFlow-Matches OpenFlow-Action Semantics-OpenFlow Simple-Firewall.Primitives-toString

IP-Addresses.Lib-Word-toString

begin

definition serialization-test-entry \equiv OFEntry 7 {EtherDst 0x1, IPv4Dst (PrefixMatch 0xA000201 32), IngressPort "s1-lan", L4Dst 0x50 0, L4Src 0x400 0x3FF, IPv4Proto 6, EtherType 0x800} [ModifyField-l2dst 0xA641F185E862, Forward "s1-wan"]

value $(map \ ((<<) \ (1::48 \ word) \circ (*) \ 8) \circ rev) \ [0..<6]$

definition serialize-mac (m::48 word) \equiv (intersperse (CHR ":") \circ map (hex-string-of-word 1 \circ (λ h. (m >> h * 8) && 0xff)) \circ rev) [0..<6] lemma serialize-mac 0xdeadbeefcafe = "de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe" by eval

definition serialize-action pids $a \equiv (case \ a \ of Forward \ oif \Rightarrow "output:" @ pids \ oif |$ $ModifyField-l2dst na <math>\Rightarrow$ "mod-dl-dst:" @ serialize-mac na)

definition serialize-actions pids $a \equiv if \text{ length } a = 0 \text{ then } "drop" \text{ else (intersperse (CHR ",")} \circ map (serialize-action pids))} a$

lemma serialize-actions (λoif . "42") (ofe-action serialization-test-entry) = "mod-dl-dst:a6:41:f1:85:e8:62,output:42" by eval **lemma** serialize-actions anything [] = "drop" by(simp add: serialize-actions-def)

definition prefix-to-string $pfx \equiv ipv4$ -cidr-toString (pfxm-prefix pfx, pfxm-length pfx)

primrec serialize-of-match where serialize-of-match pids (IngressPort p) = "in-port=" @ pids p | serialize-of-match - (VlanId i) = "dl-vlan=" @ dec-string-of-word0 i | serialize-of-match - (VlanPriority -) = undefined | serialize-of-match - (EtherType i) = "dl-type=0x" @ hex-string-of-word0 i | serialize-of-match - (EtherSrc m) = "dl-src=" @ serialize-mac m | serialize-of-match - (EtherDst m) = "dl-dst=" @ serialize-mac m | serialize-of-match - (EtherDst m) = "dl-dst=" @ dec-string-of-word0 i | serialize-of-match - (IPv4Proto i) = "nw-proto=" @ dec-string-of-word0 i | serialize-of-match - (IPv4Src p) = "nw-src=" @ prefix-to-string p | serialize-of-match - (IPv4Dst p) = "nw-dst=" @ prefix-to-string p | serialize-of-match - (L4Src i m) = "tp-src=" @ dec-string-of-word0 i @ (if m = - 1 then [] else "/0x" @ hex-string-of-word 3 m) | serialize-of-match - (L4Dst i m) = "tp-dst=" @ dec-string-of-word0 i @ (if m = - 1 then [] else "/0x" @ hex-string-of-word 3 m)

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{definition} \ serialize\ of\ matches :: (string \Rightarrow string) \Rightarrow of\ match-field \ set \Rightarrow string \\ \textbf{where} \end{array}$

serialize-of-matches pids \equiv (@) "hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0," \circ intersperse (CHR ",") \circ map (serialize-of-match pids) \circ sorted-list-of-set

lemma serialize-of-matches pids of-matches=

(List.append "hard-timeout=0,idle-timeout=0,") (intersperse (CHR ",") (map (serialize-of-match pids) (sorted-list-of-set of-matches))) by (simp add: serialize-of-matches-def) export-code serialize-of-matches checking SML

lemma serialize-of-matches (λoif . "42") (ofe-fields serialization-test-entry) = "hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=42, dl-type=0x800, dl-dst=00:00:00:00:00:00:01, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.2.1/32, tp-src=1024 by eval

definition serialize-of-entry pids $e \equiv (case \ e \ of \ (OFEntry \ p \ f \ a) \Rightarrow "priority=" @ dec-string-of-word0 \ p @ "," @ serial-ize-of-matches pids f @ "," @ "action=" @ serialize-actions pids a)$

lemma serialize-of-entry (the \circ map-of [("s1-lan","42"),("s1-wan","1337")]) serialization-test-entry = "priority=7,hard-timeout=0,idle-timeout=0,in-port=42,dl-type=0x800,dl-dst=00:00:00:00:00:01,nw-proto=6,nw-dst=10.0.2.1/32,tp by eval

end theory Featherweight-OpenFlow-Comparison imports Semantics-OpenFlow begin

inductive guha-table-semantics :: ('m, 'p) field-matcher \Rightarrow ('m, 'a) flowtable \Rightarrow 'p \Rightarrow 'a option \Rightarrow bool where guha-matched: γ (of e-fields fe) $p = True \Longrightarrow$ $\forall fe' \in set (ft1 @ ft2). ofe-prio fe' > ofe-prio fe \longrightarrow \gamma (ofe-fields fe') p = False \Longrightarrow$ guha-table-semantics γ (ft1 @ fe # ft2) p (Some (of e-action fe)) | guha-unmatched: $\forall fe \in set ft. \gamma (ofe-fields fe) p = False \Longrightarrow$ guha-table-semantics γ ft p None **lemma** guha-table-semantics-ex2res: assumes ta: $CARD('a) \geq 2$ assumes $ms: \exists ff. \gamma ff p$ shows $\exists ft (a1 :: a) (a2 :: a) : a1 \neq a2 \land guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a1) \land guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a2)$ proof from ms obtain ff where $m: \gamma ff p$.. from to obtain all a2 :: 'a where as: $a1 \neq a2$ using card2-eI by blast let $?fe1 = OFEntry \ 0 \ ff \ a1$ let ?fe2 = OFEntry 0 ff a2let ?ft = [?fe1, ?fe2]have guha-table-semantics γ ?ft p (Some a1) guha-table-semantics γ ?ft p (Some a2) by(rule guha-table-semantics.intros(1)[of γ ?fe1 p [] [?fe2], unfolded append-Nil flow-entry-match.sel] rule guha-table-semantics.intros(1)[of γ ?fe2 p [?fe1] [], unfolded append-Nil2 flow-entry-match.sel append.simps] simp add: m)+ thus ?thesis using as by(intro exI conjI) qed **lemma** *quha-umstaendlich*: **assumes** ae: a = ofe-action fe **assumes** *ele*: $fe \in set ft$ assumes rest: γ (of e-fields fe) p $\forall fe' \in set ft. of e-prio fe' > of e-prio fe \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (of e-fields fe') p$ **shows** guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some a) proof – from ele obtain ft1 ft2 where ftspl: ft = ft1 @ fe # ft2 using split-list by fastforce

show ?thesis **unfolding** ae ftspl

```
apply(rule guha-table-semantics.intros(1))
 using rest(1) apply(simp)
 using rest(2)[unfolded ftspl] apply simp
done
qed
lemma guha-matched-rule-inversion:
assumes guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a)
shows \exists fe \in set ft. a = ofe-action fe \land \gamma (ofe-fields fe) p \land (\forall fe' \in set ft. ofe-prio fe' > ofe-prio fe \longrightarrow \neg \gamma (ofe-fields fe')
p)
proof –
ł
 fix d
 assume quha-table-semantics \gamma ft p d
 hence Some a = d \implies (\exists fe \in set ft. a = ofe-action fe \land \gamma (ofe-fields fe) p \land (\forall fe' \in set ft. ofe-prio fe' > ofe-prio fe \longrightarrow fe')
\neg \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fe') \ p))
  by(induction rule: guha-table-semantics.induct) simp-all
 }
from this[OF assms refl]
show ?thesis .
\mathbf{qed}
lemma guha-equal-Action:
assumes no: no-overlaps \gamma ft
assumes spm: OF-priority-match \gamma ft p = Action a
shows guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a)
proof -
 note spm[THEN \ OF-spm3-get-fe] then obtain fe where a: of e-action fe = a and fein: fe \in set ft and feana:
OF-priority-match-ana \gamma ft p = Action fe by blast
show ?thesis
 apply(rule guha-umstaendlich)
 apply(rule a[symmetric])
 apply(rule fein)
 using feana unfolding OF-priority-match-ana-def
 apply(auto dest!: filter-singleton split: list.splits)
done
qed
lemma guha-equal-NoAction:
assumes no: no-overlaps \gamma ft
assumes spm: OF-priority-match \gamma ft p = NoAction
shows guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p None
using spm unfolding OF-priority-match-def
by(auto simp add: filter-empty-conv OF-spm3-noa-none[OF no spm] intro: guha-table-semantics.intros(2) split: list.splits)
lemma quha-equal-hlp:
assumes no: no-overlaps \gamma ft
shows guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (ftb-to-option (OF-priority-match \gamma ft p))
unfolding ftb-to-option-def
apply(cases (OF-priority-match \gamma ft p))
apply(simp add: guha-equal-Action[OF no])
apply(simp add: guha-equal-NoAction[OF no])
```

```
apply(subgoal-tac False, simp)
```

```
apply(simp add: no no-overlaps-not-unefined)
```

done

lemma guha-deterministic1: guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some x1) $\implies \neg$ guha-table-semantics γ ft p None **by**(auto simp add: guha-table-semantics.simps)

lemma guha-deterministic2: $[no-overlaps \gamma ft; guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some x1); guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a)]$ $\implies x1 = a$ proof(rule ccontr, goal-cases) case 1 note 1(2-3)[*THEN guha-matched-rule-inversion*] then obtain *fe1 fe2* where *fes:* $fe1 \in set \ ft \ x1 = ofe-action \ fe1 \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fe1) \ p \ (\forall fe' \in set \ ft. \ ofe-prio \ fe1 < ofe-prio \ fe' \longrightarrow \neg \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fe') \ p)$ $fe2 \in set \ ft \ a = ofe-action \ fe2 \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fe2) \ p \ (\forall fe' \in set \ ft. \ ofe-prio \ fe2 < ofe-prio \ fe' \longrightarrow \neg \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields \ fe') \ p)$ **by** blast from $\langle x1 \neq a \rangle$ have fene: fe1 \neq fe2 using fes(2,6) by blast have pe: of e-prio fe1 = of e-prio fe2 using fes(1,3-4,5,7-8) less-linear by blast **note** $\langle no-overlaps \ \gamma \ ft \rangle [THEN check-no-overlapI, unfolded check-no-overlap-def]$ note this unfolded Ball-def, THEN spec, THEN mp, OF fes(1), THEN spec, THEN mp, OF fes(5), THEN spec, THEN mp, OF UNIV-I, of p] pe fene fes(3,7)thus False by blast qed **lemma** guha-equal: assumes no: no-overlaps γ ft **shows** OF-priority-match γ ft p = option-to-ftb d \leftrightarrow guha-table-semantics γ ft p d using guha-equal-hlp[OF no, of p] unfolding ftb-to-option-def option-to-ftb-def **apply**(cases OF-priority-match γ ft p; cases d) apply(simp-all) using guha-deterministic1 apply fast using guha-deterministic2[OF no] apply blast using guha-deterministic1 apply fast using no-overlaps-not-unefined[OF no] apply fastforce using no-overlaps-not-unefined[OF no] apply fastforce done **lemma** *quha-nondeterministicD*: **assumes** $\neg check$ -no-overlap γ ft **shows** $\exists fe1 fe2 p. fe1 \in set ft \land fe2 \in set ft$ \land guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some (of e-action fe1)) \land guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some (of e-action fe2)) using assms **apply**(*unfold check-no-overlap-def*) **apply**(*clarsimp*) apply(rename-tac fe1 fe2 p) $apply(rule-tac \ x = fe1 \ in \ exI)$ apply(simp) $apply(rule-tac \ x = fe2 \ in \ exI)$ apply(simp) $apply(rule-tac \ x = p \ in \ exI)$ **apply**(*rule conjI*) **apply**(subst guha-table-semantics.simps) **apply**(*rule disjI1*) **apply**(*clarsimp*) $apply(rule-tac \ x = fe1 \ in \ exI)$ **apply**(*drule split-list*)

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{apply}(clarify)\\ \textbf{apply}(rename-tac\ ft1\ ft2)\\ \textbf{apply}(rule-tac\ x=ft1\ \textbf{in}\ exI)\\ \textbf{apply}(rule-tac\ x=ft2\ \textbf{in}\ exI)\\ \textbf{apply}(simp)\\ \textbf{oops} \end{array}$

The above lemma does indeed not hold, the reason for this are (possibly partially) shadowed overlaps. This is exemplified below: If there are at least three different possible actions (necessary assumption) and a match expression that matches all packets (convenience assumption), it is possible to construct a flow table that is admonished by *check-no-overlap* but still will never run into undefined behavior.

lemma

assumes CARD('action) > 3**assumes** $\forall p. \gamma x p$ **shows** $\exists ft::('a, 'action)$ flow-entry-match list. \neg check-no-overlap γ ft \land $\neg(\exists fe1 fe2 p. fe1 \in set ft \land fe2 \in set ft \land fe1 \neq fe2 \land ofe-prio fe1 = ofe-prio fe2$ \land guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some (of e-action fe1)) \land guha-table-semantics γ ft p (Some (of e-action fe2))) proof – **obtain** adef as ab :: 'action where $anb[simp]: aa \neq ab$ adef $\neq aa$ adef $\neq ab$ using assms(1) card3-eI by blast let $?cex = [OFEntry \ 1 \ x \ adef, \ OFEntry \ 0 \ x \ aa, \ OFEntry \ 0 \ x \ ab]$ have ol: $\neg check$ -no-overlap γ ?cex unfolding check-no-overlap-def ball-simps $apply(rule \ bext[where \ x = OFEntry \ 0 \ x \ aa, \ rotated], \ (simp; fail))$ $apply(rule \ bext[where \ x = OFEntry \ 0 \ x \ ab, \ rotated], \ (simp; fail))$ **apply**(*simp add: assms*) done have df: guha-table-semantics γ ?cex p oc \Longrightarrow oc = Some adef for p oc **unfolding** guha-table-semantics.simps **apply**(*elim disjE*; *clarsimp simp*: *assms*) subgoal for fe ft1 ft2 apply(cases ft1 = [])apply(fastforce) apply(cases ft 2 = [])**apply**(*fastforce*) **apply**(subgoal-tac ft1 = [OFEntry 1 x adef] \land fe = OFEntry 0 x aa \land ft2 = [OFEntry 0 x ab]) **apply**(*simp*;*fail*) **apply**(clarsimp simp add: List.neq-Nil-conv) **apply**(*rename-tac ya ys yz*) **apply**(case-tac ys; clarsimp simp add: List.neq-Nil-conv) done done show ?thesis $apply(intro \ exI[where \ x = ?cex], intro \ conjI, fact \ ol)$ applv(clarify)**apply**(unfold set-simps) **apply**(*elim insertE*; *clarsimp*) apply((drule df)+; unfold option.inject; (elim anb[symmetric, THEN notE] | (simp; fail))?)+done qed

end

theory LinuxRouter-OpenFlow-Translation

imports IP-Addresses.CIDR-Split Automatic-Refinement.Misc Simple-Firewall.Generic-SimpleFw Semantics-OpenFlow OpenFlow-Matches OpenFlow-Action Routing.Linux-Router Pure-ex.Guess begin hide-const Misc.uncurry hide-fact Misc.uncurry-def

definition route2match r =(*iiface* = *ifaceAny*, *oiface* = *ifaceAny*, src = (0,0), dst = (pfxm-prefix (routing-match r), pfxm-length (routing-match r)),proto=ProtoAny, sports = (0, -1), ports = (0, -1))

definition toprefixmatch where to prefix match $m \equiv (let \ pm = Prefix Match \ (fst \ m) \ (snd \ m) \ in \ if \ pm = Prefix Match \ 0 \ 0 \ then \ None \ else \ Some \ pm)$ **lemma** *prefix-match-semantics-simple-match*: **assumes** some: to prefix match m = Some pmassumes vld: valid-prefix pm **shows** prefix-match-semantics pm = simple-match-ip musing some $\mathbf{by}(cases \ m)$ (clarsimp simp add: toprefixmatch-def ipset-from-cidr-def pfxm-mask-def fun-eq-iff prefix-match-semantics-ipset-from-netmask[OF vld] NOT-mask-shifted-lenword[symmetric] *split: if-splits*) definition simple-match-to-of-match-single :: (32, 'a) simple-match-scheme \Rightarrow char list option \Rightarrow protocol \Rightarrow (16 word \times 16 word) option \Rightarrow (16 word \times 16 word) option \Rightarrow of-match-field set where simple-match-to-of-match-single m iif prot sport dport \equiv uncurry L4Src ' option2set sport \cup uncurry L4Dst ' option2set dport $\cup IPv4Proto `(case prot of ProtoAny \Rightarrow \{\} | Proto p \Rightarrow \{p\}) - protocol is an 8 word option anyway...$ \cup IngressPort ' option2set iif \cup IPv4Src 'option2set (toprefixmatch (src m)) \cup IPv4Dst 'option2set (toprefixmatch (dst m)) \cup {*EtherType* 0x0800} definition simple-match-to-of-match :: 32 simple-match \Rightarrow string list \Rightarrow of-match-field set list where simple-match-to-of-match m ifs \equiv (let $npm = (\lambda p. fst \ p = 0 \land snd \ p = -1);$ $sb = (\lambda p. (if npm p then [None] else if fst p \leq snd p$ then map (Some \circ (λpfx . (pfxm-prefix pfx, Bit-Operations.not (pfxm-mask pfx)))) (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval (fst p) (snd p))) else []))in [simple-match-to-of-match-single m iif (proto m) sport dport.

 $iif \leftarrow (if \ iif ace \ m = if ace Any \ then \ [None] \ else \ [Some \ i. \ i \leftarrow ifs, \ match-if ace \ (iif ace \ m) \ i]), sport \leftarrow sb \ (sports \ m),$

 $dport \leftarrow sb \ (dports \ m)]$

)

lemma smtoms-eq-hlp: simple-match-to-of-match-single r a b c d = simple-match-to-of-match-single r f g h $i \leftrightarrow (a = f \land b = g \land c = h \land d = i)$

proof(rule iffI,goal-cases) case 1 thus ?case proof(intro conjI) have $*: \bigwedge P z x$. $[\forall x :: of-match-field. P x; z = Some x] \implies P$ (IngressPort x) by simp show a = f using 1 by(cases a; cases f) (simp add: option2set-None simple-match-to-of-match-single-def toprefixmatch-def option2set-def; subst(asm) set-eq-iff; drule (1) *; simp split: option.splits uncurry-splits protocol.splits)+ next have $*: \bigwedge P z x$. $[\forall x :: of-match-field. P x; z = Proto x] \implies P (IPv4Proto x)$ by simp show b = q using 1 by(cases b; cases q) (simp add: option2set-None simple-match-to-of-match-single-def toprefixmatch-def option2set-def; subst(asm) set-eq-iff; drule (1) *; simp split: option.splits uncurry-splits protocol.splits)+ next have $*: \bigwedge P z x$. $[\forall x :: of-match-field. P x; z = Some x] \implies P$ (uncurry L4Src x) by simp show c = h using 1 by(cases c; cases h) $(simp \ add: \ option 2 set-None \ simple-match-to-of-match-single-def \ to prefix match-def \ option 2 set-def;$ subst(asm) set-eq-iff; drule (1) *; simp split: option.splits uncurry-splits protocol.splits)+ next have $*: \bigwedge P z x$. $[\forall x :: of-match-field. P x; z = Some x]] \implies P (uncurry L4Dst x)$ by simp show d = i using 1 by(cases d; cases i) (simp add: option2set-None simple-match-to-of-match-single-def toprefixmatch-def option2set-def; subst(asm) set-eq-iff; drule (1) *; simp split: option.splits uncurry-splits protocol.splits)+ qed qed simp **lemma** simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs: simple-match-valid $m \Longrightarrow r \in set$ (simple-match-to-of-match m ifs) \Longrightarrow all-prerequisites r unfolding simple-match-to-of-match-def Let-def proof(clarsimp, goal-cases) **case** (1 xiface xsrcp xdstp) note o = thisshow ?case unfolding simple-match-to-of-match-single-def all-prerequisites-def unfolding ball-Un proof((intro conjI; ((simp;fail)| -)), goal-cases)case 1 have $e: (fst (sports m) = 0 \land snd (sports m) = -1) \lor proto m = Proto TCP \lor proto m = Proto UDP \lor proto m = -1)$ Proto L4-Protocol.SCTP using o(1)unfolding simple-match-valid-alt Let-def **by**(*clarsimp split: if-splits*) show ?case using o(3) e**by**(*elim disjE*; *simp add: option2set-def split: if-splits prod.splits uncurry-splits*) next case 2 have $e: (fst (dports m) = 0 \land snd (dports m) = -1) \lor proto m = Proto TCP \lor proto m = Proto UDP \lor proto m =$ Proto L4-Protocol.SCTP using o(1)unfolding simple-match-valid-alt Let-def

```
by(clarsimp split: if-splits)
show ?case
using o(4) e
by(elim disjE; simp add: option2set-def split: if-splits prod.splits uncurry-splits)
qed
qed
```

lemma and-assoc: $a \land b \land c \longleftrightarrow (a \land b) \land c$ by simp

 $\label{eq:lemmas} lemmas \ custom-simpset = \ Let-def \ set-concat \ set-map \ map-map \ comp-def \ concat-map-maps \ set-maps \ UN-iff \ fun-app-def \ Set.image-iff$

abbreviation simple-fw-prefix-to-wordinterval \equiv prefix-to-wordinterval \circ uncurry PrefixMatch

lemma simple-match-port-alt: simple-match-port $m \ p \leftrightarrow p \in$ wordinterval-to-set (uncurry WordInterval m) by(simp split: uncurry-splits)

lemma simple-match-src-alt: simple-match-valid $r \Longrightarrow$

 $simple-match-ip (src r) p \longleftrightarrow prefix-match-semantics (PrefixMatch (fst (src r)) (snd (src r))) p \\ \mathbf{by}(cases (src r)) (simp add: prefix-match-semantics-ipset-from-netmask2 prefix-to-wordset-ipset-from-cidr simple-match-valid-def valid-prefix-fw-def)$

lemma simple-match-dst-alt: simple-match-valid $r \Longrightarrow$

 $simple-match-ip \ (dst \ r) \ p \longleftrightarrow prefix-match-semantics \ (PrefixMatch \ (fst \ (dst \ r)) \ (snd \ (dst \ r))) \ p$

 $\mathbf{by}(cases \quad (dst \quad r)) \quad (simp \quad add: \quad prefix-match-semantics-ipset-from-netmask2 \quad prefix-to-wordset-ipset-from-cidr \\ simple-match-valid-def \ valid-prefix-fw-def)$

lemma $x \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch w) \implies valid-prefix x using wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch-all-valid-Ball[THEN bspec, THEN conjunct1].

lemma *simple-match-to-of-matchI*: assumes mv: simple-match-valid r assumes mm: simple-matches r p**assumes** *ii*: *p*-*iiface* $p \in set$ *ifs* assumes *ippkt*: p-l2type p = 0x800**shows** $eq: \exists gr \in set (simple-match-to-of-match r ifs). OF-match-fields <math>gr p = Some True$ proof let $?npm = \lambda p$. fst $p = 0 \land snd p = -1$ let $?sb = \lambda p \ r.$ (if $?npm \ p$ then None else Some r) **obtain** si where si: case si of Some ssi \Rightarrow p-sport $p \in$ prefix-to-wordset ssi | None \Rightarrow True case si of None \Rightarrow True | Some ssi \Rightarrow ssi \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (sports r))) $si = None \leftrightarrow ?npm (sports r)$ **proof**(cases ?npm (sports r), goal-cases) case 1 **hence** (case None of None \Rightarrow True | Some ssi \Rightarrow p-sport $p \in$ prefix-to-wordset ssi) \land (case None of None \Rightarrow True Some $ssi \Rightarrow ssi \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (sports r)))) by simp with 1 show ?thesis by blast next case 2**from** mm have p-sport $p \in$ wordinterval-to-set (uncurry WordInterval (sports r)) **by**(*simp only: simple-matches.simps simple-match-port-alt*) then obtain ssi where ssi:

 $ssi \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (sports r)))$

p-sport $p \in prefix$ -to-wordset ssi using wordinterval-CIDR-split-existential by fast **hence** (case Some ssi of None \Rightarrow True | Some ssi \Rightarrow p-sport $p \in$ prefix-to-wordset ssi) \land (case Some ssi of None \Rightarrow True Some $ssi \Rightarrow ssi \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (sports r)))) by simp with 2 show ?thesis by blast aed **obtain** di where di: case di of Some $ddi \Rightarrow p$ -dport $p \in prefix$ -to-wordset $ddi \mid None \Rightarrow True$ case di of None \Rightarrow True | Some ddi \Rightarrow ddi \in set ($word interval {-} CIDR{-} split{-} prefixmatch \ (uncurry \ Word Interval \ (dports \ r)))$ $di = None \leftrightarrow ?npm (dports r)$ proof(cases ?npm (dports r), goal-cases)case 1 **hence** (case None of None \Rightarrow True | Some ssi \Rightarrow p-dport $p \in prefix$ -to-wordset ssi) \land $(case None of None \Rightarrow True$ Some $ssi \Rightarrow ssi \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (dports r)))) by simp with 1 show ?thesis by blast \mathbf{next} case 2**from** mm have p-dport $p \in$ wordinterval-to-set (uncurry WordInterval (dports r)) **by**(*simp only: simple-matches.simps simple-match-port-alt*) then obtain *ddi* where *ddi*: $ddi \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (dports r)))$ p-dport $p \in prefix$ -to-wordset ddiusing wordinterval-CIDR-split-existential by fast **hence** (case Some ddi of None \Rightarrow True | Some ssi \Rightarrow p-dport $p \in$ prefix-to-wordset ssi) \land (case Some ddi of None \Rightarrow True Some $ssi \Rightarrow ssi \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (dports r)))) by simp with 2 show ?thesis by blast qed $\mathbf{show}~? thesis$ proof let $?mf = map-option (apsnd (wordNOT \circ mask \circ (-) 16) \circ prefix-match-dtor)$ let ?gr = simple-match-to-of-match-single r $(if \ iiface \ r = ifaceAny \ then \ None \ else \ Some \ (p-iiface \ p))$ (if proto r = ProtoAny then ProtoAny else Proto(p-proto p)) (?mf si) (?mf di)**note** mfu = simple-match-port.simps[of fst (sports r) snd (sports r), unfolded surjective-pairing[of sports r, symmetric]]simple-match-port.simps[of fst (dports r) snd (dports r), unfolded surjective-pairing[of dports r, symmetric]]**note** u = mm[unfolded simple-matches.simps mfu ord-class.atLeastAtMost-iff simple-packet-unext-def simple-packet.simps]**note** of-safe-unsafe-match-eq[OF simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs] **from** u have ple: fst (sports r) \leq snd (sports r) fst (dports r) \leq snd (dports r) by force+ **show** eg: $?gr \in set$ (simple-match-to-of-match r ifs) unfolding simple-match-to-of-match-def unfolding custom-simpset unfolding *smtoms-eq-hlp* proof(intro bexI, (intro conjI; ((rule refl)?)), goal-cases) case 2 thus ?case using ple(2) di **apply**(simp add: pfxm-mask-def prefix-match-dtor-def Set.image-iff *split: option.splits prod.splits uncurry-splits*) **apply**(*erule bexI*[*rotated*])

apply(*simp split: prefix-match.splits*)

done

 \mathbf{next}

case 3 thus ?case using ple(1) si **apply**(*simp add: pfxm-mask-def prefix-match-dtor-def Set.image-iff split: option.splits prod.splits uncurry-splits*) **apply**(*erule bexI*[*rotated*]) **apply**(*simp split: prefix-match.splits*) done next case 4 thus ?case using *u* ii by(clarsimp simp: set-maps split: if-splits) next case 1 thus ?case using ii u by simp-all (metis match-proto.elims(2)) qed have dpm: $di = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \Longrightarrow p$ -dport $p \&\& \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ for x1 x2proof have *: $di = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \implies prefix-match-semantics (the di) (p-dport p) \implies p-dport p \&\& \sim (mask$ (16 - x2)) = x1by (clarsimp simp: prefix-match-semantics-def pfxm-mask-def word-bw-comms;fail) have **: $pfx \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch ra) \implies prefix-match-semantics $pfx = (a \in prefix-to-wordset$ pfx) for pfx ra and a :: 16 word by (fact prefix-match-semantics-wordset[OF wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch-all-valid-Ball[THEN bspec, THEN conjunct1]]) have $[di = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2); p-dport p \in prefix-to-wordset (PrefixMatch x1 x2); PrefixMatch x1 x2 \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (dports r))) $\implies p$ -dport $p \&\& \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ using di(1,2)using * ** by auto thus $di = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \Longrightarrow p$ -dport $p \&\& \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ using di(1,2) by auto aed have spm: $si = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \Longrightarrow p$ -sport $p \&\& \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ for x1 x2using si proof – have *: $si = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \Longrightarrow prefix-match-semantics (the si) (p-sport p) \Longrightarrow p-sport p \&\& \sim (mask prefix)$ (16 - x2) = x1by (clarsimp simp: prefix-match-semantics-def pfxm-mask-def word-bw-comms;fail) have **: $pfx \in set$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch ra) \implies prefix-match-semantics $pfx = (a \in prefix-to-wordset$ pfx) for pfx ra and a :: 16 word by (fact prefix-match-semantics-wordset[OF wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch-all-valid-Ball[THEN bspec, THEN conjunct1]]) **have** $[si = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2); p-sport p \in prefix-to-wordset (PrefixMatch x1 x2); PrefixMatch x1 x2 \in set PrefixMatch x1 x2); p-sport p \in prefix-to-wordset (PrefixMatch x1 x2); PrefixMatch x1 x2)$ (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (uncurry WordInterval (sports r))) \implies p-sport p && $\sim \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ using si(1,2)using * ** by auto thus $si = Some (PrefixMatch x1 x2) \implies p$ -sport $p \&\& \sim (mask (16 - x2)) = x1$ using si(1,2) by auto qed **show** *OF*-match-fields $?qr \ p = Some \ True$ **unfolding** of-safe-unsafe-match-eq[OF simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs[OF mv eq]] **by**(cases si; cases di) (simp-all add: simple-match-to-of-match-single-def OF-match-fields-unsafe-def spm option2set-def u ippkt prefix-match-dtor-def toprefixmatch-def dpm simple-match-dst-alt[OF mv, symmetric] simple-match-src-alt[OF mv, symmetric] *split: prefix-match.splits*) \mathbf{qed}

\mathbf{qed}

```
lemma prefix-match-00[simp,intro!]: prefix-match-semantics (PrefixMatch 0 0) p
 by (simp add: valid-prefix-def zero-prefix-match-all)
lemma simple-match-to-of-matchD:
assumes eg: gr \in set (simple-match-to-of-match r ifs)
assumes mo: OF-match-fields gr p = Some True
assumes me: match-iface (oiface r) (p-oiface p)
assumes mv: simple-match-valid r
shows simple-matches r p
proof -
from mv have validpfx:
 valid-prefix (uncurry PrefixMatch (src r)) valid-prefix (uncurry PrefixMatch (dst r))
 \bigwedge pm. to prefixmatch (src r) = Some pm \implies valid-prefix pm
 \bigwedge pm. to prefixmatch (dst r) = Some pm \implies valid-prefix pm
 unfolding simple-match-valid-def valid-prefix-fw-def toprefixmatch-def
   by(simp-all split: uncurry-splits if-splits)
from mo have mo: OF-match-fields-unsafe gr p
 unfolding of-safe-unsafe-match-eq[OF simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs[OF mv eg]]
 by simp
note this[unfolded OF-match-fields-unsafe-def]
note eg[unfolded simple-match-to-of-match-def simple-match-to-of-match-single-def custom-simpset option 2set-def]
then guess x ... moreover from this(2) guess xa ... moreover from this(2) guess xb ...
note xx = calculation(1,3) this
 { fix a b xc xa
    fix pp :: 16 word
  have [pp \&\& \sim (pfxm-mask xc) = pfxm-prefix xc]
           \implies prefix-match-semantics xc (pp) for xc
    by(simp add: prefix-match-semantics-def word-bw-comms;fail)
   moreover have pp \in wordinterval-to-set (WordInterval a b) \implies a \leq pp \land pp \leq b by simp
   moreover have xc \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval a b)) \implies pp \in prefix-to-wordset xc \implies
pp \in wordinterval-to-set (WordInterval \ a \ b)
  by(subst wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch) blast
  moreover have [xc \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval a b)); xa = Some (pfxm-prefix xc, ~~
(pfxm-mask xc)); prefix-match-semantics xc <math>(pp) \implies pp \in prefix-to-wordset xc
  apply(subst(asm)(1) prefix-match-semantics-wordset)
  apply(erule wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch-all-valid-Ball[THEN bspec, THEN conjunct1];fail)
  apply assumption
  done
  ultimately have [xc \in set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval a b)); xa = Some (pfxm-prefix xc, ~~
(pfxm-mask xc));
           pp \&\& \sim (pfxm-mask xc) = pfxm-prefix xc
           \implies a \le pp \land pp \le b
   by metis
} note l4port-logic = this
show ?thesis unfolding simple-matches.simps
proof(unfold and-assoc, (rule)+)
 show match-iface (iiface r) (p-iiface p)
  apply(cases \ iiface \ r = ifaceAny)
  apply (simp add: match-ifaceAny)
  using xx(1) mo unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def
```

apply(simp only: if-False set-maps UN-iff) apply(clarify) $apply(rename-tac \ a; \ subgoal-tac \ match-iface \ (iiface \ r) \ a)$ **apply**(*clarsimp simp add: option2set-def;fail*) **apply**(*rule ccontr*,*simp*;*fail*) done \mathbf{next} show match-iface (oiface r) (p-oiface p) using me. next **show** simple-match-ip (src r) (p-src p) using mo unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def toprefixmatch-def $\mathbf{by}(clarsimp$ simp add: simple-packet-unext-def option2set-def validpfx simple-match-src-alt[OF mv] toprefixmatch-def split: *if-splits*) \mathbf{next} **show** simple-match-ip (dst r) (p-dst p)using mo unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def toprefixmatch-def **by**(*clarsimp* simp add: simple-packet-unext-def option2set-def validpfx simple-match-dst-alt[OF mv] toprefixmatch-def *split*: *if-splits*) \mathbf{next} **show** match-proto (proto r) (p-proto p)using mo unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def using xx(1) by(clarsimp simp add: singleton-iff simple-packet-unext-def option2set-def prefix-match-semantics-simple-match ball-Un *split: if-splits protocol.splits*) next **show** simple-match-port (sports r) (p-sport p) using mo xx(2) unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def $\mathbf{by}(cases$ sportsr)(clarsimp simpadd: *l*4*port-logic* simple-packet-unext-def option2set-def prefix-match-semantics-simple-match split: if-splits) \mathbf{next} **show** simple-match-port (dports r) (p-dport p) using mo xx(3) unfolding xx(4) OF-match-fields-unsafe-def $\mathbf{by}(cases$ dports(clarsimpsimpadd: *l*4*port-logic* simple-packet-unext-def option2set-def r) prefix-match-semantics-simple-match split: if-splits) qed qed primrec annotate-rlen where annotate-rlen [] = [] |annotate-rlen (a#as) = (length as, a) # annotate-rlen as**lemma** annotate-rlen "asdf" = [(3, CHR "a"), (2, CHR "s"), (1, CHR "d"), (0, CHR "f")] by simp **lemma** fst-annotate-rlen-le: $(k, a) \in set$ (annotate-rlen l) $\Longrightarrow k < length l$ **by**(*induction l arbitrary: k; simp; force*) **lemma** distinct-fst-annotate-rlen: distinct (map fst (annotate-rlen l)) using fst-annotate-rlen-le by (induction l) (simp, fastforce) **lemma** distinct-annotate-rlen: distinct (annotate-rlen l) using distinct-fst-annotate-rlen unfolding distinct-map by blast **lemma** in-annotate-rlen: $(a,x) \in set (annotate-rlen l) \Longrightarrow x \in set l$ **by**(*induction l*) (*simp-all*, *blast*)

lemma map-snd-annotate-rlen: map snd (annotate-rlen l) = l

by(*induction l*) *simp-all* **lemma** sorted-descending (map fst (annotate-rlen l)) **by**(*induction l*; *clarsimp*) (*force dest: fst-annotate-rlen-le*) **lemma** annotate-rlen l = zip (rev [0..<length l]) l**by**(*induction l*; *simp*) primrec annotate-rlen-code where annotate-rlen-code [] = (0, [])annotate-rlen-code $(a\#as) = (case annotate-rlen-code as of (r,aas) \Rightarrow (Suc r, (r, a) \# aas))$ **lemma** annotate-rlen-len: fst (annotate-rlen-code r) = length r $\mathbf{by}(induction \ r) \ (clarsimp \ split: \ prod.splits)+$ **lemma** annotate-rlen-code[code]: annotate-rlen s = snd (annotate-rlen-code s) proof(induction s)case (Cons s ss) thus ?case using annotate-rlen-len[of ss] by(clarsimp split: prod.split) qed simp **lemma** suc2plus-inj-on: inj-on (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow ('l :: len) word) {0..unat (max-word :: 'l word)} **proof**(*rule inj-onI*) $\mathbf{let} ~ ?mmw = (max\text{-}word :: 'l ~ word)$ let $?mstp = (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow 'l word)$ fix x y :: natassume $x \in \{0...unat ?mmw\} y \in \{0...unat ?mmw\}$ hence se: $x \leq unat$?mmw $y \leq unat$?mmw by simp-all **assume** eq: $?mstp \ x = ?mstp \ y$ **note** f = le-unat-uoi[OF se(1)] le-unat-uoi[OF se(2)]show x = y using eq le-unat-uoi se by metis qed **lemma** *distinct-of-nat-list*: distinct $l \Longrightarrow \forall e \in set \ l. \ e \leq unat \ (max-word :: ('l::len) \ word) \Longrightarrow distinct \ (map \ (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow 'l \ word) \ l)$ **proof**(*induction l*) let ?mmw = (max-word :: 'l word)let $?mstp = (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow 'l word)$ case (Cons a as) have distinct as $\forall e \in set as. e \leq unat ?mmw using Cons.prems by simp-all$ **note** mIH = Cons.IH[OF this]**moreover have** ?mstp $a \notin$?mstp ' set as proof have representable-set: set as $\subseteq \{0...unat ?mmw\}$ using $\forall e \in set (a \# as). e \leq unat max-word$ by fastforce have a-reprbl: $a \in \{0..unat ?mmw\}$ using $\langle \forall e \in set (a \# as). e \leq unat max-word \rangle$ by simp **assume** ?mstp $a \in$?mstp ' set as with inj-on-image-mem-iff[OF suc2plus-inj-on a-reprbl representable-set] have $a \in set as$ by simpwith $\langle distinct \ (a \ \# \ as) \rangle$ show False by simp qed ultimately show ?case by simp qed simp **lemma** annotate-first-le-hlp:

 $length \ l < unat \ (max-word :: ('l :: len) \ word) \implies \forall \ e \in set \ (map \ fst \ (annotate-rlen \ l)). \ e \leq unat \ (max-word :: 'l \ word) \\ \mathbf{by}(clarsimp) \ (meson \ fst-annotate-rlen-le \ less-trans \ nat-less-le) \\ \mathbf{lemmas} \ distinct-of-prio-hlp = \ distinct-of-nat-list[OF \ distinct-fst-annotate-rlen \ annotate-first-le-hlp]$

lemma fst-annotate-rlen: map fst (annotate-rlen l) = rev [0..<length l] **by**(induction l) (simp-all)

lemma sorted-word-upt: **defines**[simp]: won \equiv (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow ('l :: len) word) **assumes** length $l \leq$ unat (max-word :: 'l word) **shows** sorted-descending (map won (rev [0..<Suc (length l)])) **using** assms **by**(induction l rule: rev-induct;clarsimp)

(metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting) le-SucI le-unat-uoi of-nat-Suc order-refl word-le-nat-alt)

lemma sorted-annotated: **assumes** length $l \leq unat$ (max-word :: ('l :: len) word) **shows** sorted-descending (map fst (map (apfst (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow 'l word)) (annotate-rlen l))) **proof** – **let** ?won = (of-nat :: nat \Rightarrow 'l word) **have** sorted-descending (map ?won (rev [0..<Suc (length l)])) **using** sorted-word-upt[OF assms]. **hence** sorted-descending (map ?won (map fst (annotate-rlen l))) **by**(simp add: fst-annotate-rlen) **thus** sorted-descending (map fst (map (apfst ?won) (annotate-rlen l))) **by** simp **qed**

13 device to 12 forwarding

definition *lr-of-tran-s3 ifs ard* = ($[(p, b, case a of simple-action.Accept \Rightarrow [Forward c] | simple-action.Drop \Rightarrow []).$ $(p,r,(c,a)) \leftarrow ard, b \leftarrow simple-match-to-of-match r ifs])$

definition oif-ne-iif-p1 ifs \equiv [(simple-match-any(oiface := Iface oif, iiface := Iface iif), simple-action.Accept). oif \leftarrow ifs, iif \leftarrow ifs, oif \neq iif] **definition** oif-ne-iif-p2 ifs = [(simple-match-any(oiface := Iface i, iiface := Iface i), simple-action.Drop). i \leftarrow ifs] **definition** oif-ne-iif ifs = oif-ne-iif-p2 ifs @ oif-ne-iif-p1 ifs

definition *lr-of-tran-s4* and *ifs* \equiv *generalized-fw-join* and (*oif-ne-iif ifs*)

definition *lr-of-tran-s1* $rt = [(route2match r, output-iface (routing-action r)). r \leftarrow rt]$

definition lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs $\equiv let$ gfw = map simple-rule-dtor fw; — generalized simple fw, hopefully for FORWARD frt = lr-of-tran-s1 rt; — rt as fw prd = generalized-fw-join frt gfwin prd

definition pack-OF-entries ifs ard \equiv (map (split3 OFEntry) (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs ard)) **definition** no-oif-match \equiv list-all (λm . oiface (match-sel m) = ifaceAny)

definition lr-of-tran rt fw ifs \equiv

if \neg (no-oif-match fw \land has-default-policy fw \land simple-fw-valid fw \land valid-prefixes $rt \land$ has-default-route $rt \land$ distinct ifs) then Inl ''Error in creating OpenFlow table: prerequisites not satisifed'' else (

let nrd = lr - of - tran-fbs rt fw ifs;

ard = map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen nrd) — give them a priority

if length nrd < unat (-1 :: 16 word)then Inr (pack-OF-entries ifs ard) else Inl "Error in creating OpenFlow table: priority number space exhausted") **definition** is-iface-name $i \equiv i \neq [] \land \neg$ Iface.iface-name-is-wildcard i **definition** is-iface-list ifs \equiv distinct ifs \wedge list-all is-iface-name ifs **lemma** max-16-word-max[simp]: $(a :: 16 word) \leq 0xffff$ proof – have 0xFFFF = (-1 :: 16 word) by simp then show ?thesis by (simp only:) simp qed **lemma** replicate-FT-hlp: $x \leq 16 \land y \leq 16 \Longrightarrow$ replicate (16 - x) False @ replicate x True = replicate (16 - y) False @ replicate y True $\implies x = y$ proof let $?ns = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16\}$ assume $x \leq 16 \land y \leq 16$ hence $x \in ?ns \ y \in ?ns \ by(simp; presburger)+$ **moreover assume** replicate (16 - x) False @ replicate x True = replicate (16 - y) False @ replicate y True ultimately show x = y by simp (elim disjE; simp-all add: numeral-eq-Suc) qed **lemma** mask-inj-hlp1: inj-on (mask :: nat \Rightarrow 16 word) {0..16} proof(intro inj-onI, goal-cases) case (1 x y)**from** 1(3) have oe: of-bl (replicate (16 - x) False @ replicate x True) = (of-bl (replicate (16 - y) False @ replicate y True) :: 16word) unfolding mask-bl of-bl-rep-False . have $\bigwedge z. z \leq 16 \implies \text{length} (\text{replicate} (16 - z) \text{ False } @ \text{replicate } z \text{ True}) = 16$ by auto with 1(1,2)have ps: replicate (16 - x) False @ replicate x True $\in \{bl. length \ bl = LENGTH(16)\}$ replicate (16 - y) False @ replicate y True $\in \{bl. length \ bl = LENGTH(16)\}$ by simp-all **from** *inj-onD*[*OF word-bl*.*Abs-inj-on*, *OF oe ps*] **show** ?case using 1(1,2) by(fastforce intro: replicate-FT-hlp) ged **lemma** *distinct-simple-match-to-of-match-portlist-hlp*: fixes $ps :: (16 word \times 16 word)$ shows distinct ifs \Longrightarrow distinct(if fst $ps = 0 \land snd ps = max$ -word then [None] else if fst ps \leq snd psthen map (Some \circ (λpfx . (pfxm-prefix pfx, $\sim \sim$ (pfxm-mask pfx)))) (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval (fst ps) (snd ps))) else []) proof assume di: distinct ifs $\{ define wis where wis = set (wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch (WordInterval (fst ps) (snd ps))) \}$ fix x y :: 16 prefix-match **obtain** xm xn ym yn where xyd[simp]: x = PrefixMatch xm xn y = PrefixMatch ym yn by(cases x; cases y)

in

assume iw: $x \in wis \ y \in wis$ and et: $(pfxm-prefix \ x, \sim (pfxm-mask \ x)) = (pfxm-prefix \ y, \sim (pfxm-mask \ y))$ hence le16: $xn \leq 16$ $yn \leq 16$ unfolding wis-def using wordinterval-CIDR-split-prefixmatch-all-valid-Ball[unfolded] Ball-def, THEN spec, THEN mp] by force+ with et have 16 - xn = 16 - yn unfolding pfxm-mask-def by(auto intro: mask-inj-hlp1[THEN inj-onD]) hence x = y using *et le16* using *diff-diff-cancel* by *simp* } note * = thisshow ?thesis **apply**(clarsimp simp add: smtoms-eq-hlp distinct-map wordinterval-CIDR-split-distinct) **apply**(subst comp-inj-on-iff[symmetric]; intro inj-onI) using * by simp-all qed **lemma** distinct-simple-match-to-of-match: distinct ifs \implies distinct (simple-match-to-of-match m ifs) **apply**(*unfold simple-match-to-of-match-def Let-def*) **apply**(*rule distinct-3lcomprI*) **subgoal by**(*induction ifs*; *clarsimp*) **subgoal by**(*fact distinct-simple-match-to-of-match-portlist-hlp*) **subgoal by**(*fact distinct-simple-match-to-of-match-portlist-hlp*) **subgoal by**(*simp-all add: smtoms-eq-hlp*) done **lemma** inj-inj-on: inj $F \Longrightarrow$ inj-on $F \land using$ subset-inj-on by auto **lemma** no-overlaps-lroft-hlp2: distinct (map fst amr) $\implies (\Lambda r. distinct (fm r)) \implies$ distinct (concat (map $(\lambda(p, r, c, a), map (\lambda b, (p, b, fs a c)) (fm r))$ amr)) by (induction amr; force intro: injI inj-onI simp add: distinct-map split: prod.splits) **lemma** distinct-lroft-s3: $[distinct (map fst amr); distinct ifs] \implies distinct (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr)$ unfolding *lr-of-tran-s3-def* **by**(*erule no-overlaps-lroft-hlp2*, *simp add: distinct-simple-match-to-of-match*) **lemma** no-overlaps-lroft-hlp3: distinct (map fst amr) \Longrightarrow $(aa, ab, ac) \in set (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr) \Longrightarrow (ba, bb, bc) \in set (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr) \Longrightarrow$ $ac \neq bc \Longrightarrow aa \neq ba$ **apply**(*unfold lr-of-tran-s3-def*) **apply**(*clarsimp*) **apply**(clarsimp split: simple-action.splits) **apply**(*metis map-of-eq-Some-iff old.prod.inject option.inject*) apply (metis map-of-eq-Some-iff old.prod.inject option.inject simple-action.distinct(2))+ done **lemma** *no-overlaps-lroft-s3-hlp-hlp*: [distinct (map fst amr); OF-match-fields-unsafe ab p; $ab \neq ad \lor ba \neq bb$; OF-match-fields-unsafe ad p; $(ac, ab, ba) \in set (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr); (ac, ad, bb) \in set (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr)]$ \implies False proof(elim disjE, goal-cases) case 1have 4: $[distinct (map fst amr); (ac, ab, x1, x2) \in set amr; (ac, bb, x4, x5) \in set amr; ab \neq bb]$ \implies False for ab x1 x2 bb x4 x5 **by** (meson distinct-map-fstD old.prod.inject)

have conjunctSomeProtoAnyD: Some $ProtoAny = simple-proto-conjunct \ a (Proto \ b) \Longrightarrow False$ for $a \ b$ using conjunctProtoD by force

have 5:

[OF-match-fields-unsafe am p; OF-match-fields-unsafe bm p; $am \neq bm$;

```
am \in set (simple-match-to-of-match ab ifs); bm \in set (simple-match-to-of-match bb ifs); \neg ab \neq bb
      \implies False for ab bb am bm
    \mathbf{by}(clarify \mid unfold
       simple-match-to-of-match-def smtoms-eq-hlp Let-def set-concat set-map de-Morgan-conj not-False-eq-True)+
      (auto dest: conjunctSomeProtoAnyD cidrsplit-no-overlaps
          simp add: OF-match-fields-unsafe-def simple-match-to-of-match-single-def option2set-def comp-def
          split: if-splits
          cong: smtoms-eq-hlp)
 from 1 show ?case
 using 4 5 by(clarsimp simp add: lr-of-tran-s3-def) blast
qed(metis no-overlaps-lroft-hlp3)
lemma no-overlaps-lroft-s3-hlp: distinct (map fst amr) \Longrightarrow distinct ifs \Longrightarrow
no-overlaps OF-match-fields-unsafe (map (split3 OFEntry) (lr-of-tran-s3 ifs amr))
 apply(rule no-overlapsI[rotated])
 apply(subst distinct-map, rule conjI)
 subgoal by (erule (1) distinct-lroft-s3)
 subgoal
   apply(rule inj-inj-on)
   apply(rule injI)
   apply(rename-tac \ x \ y, \ case-tac \ x, \ case-tac \ y)
   apply(simp add: split3-def;fail)
 done
 subgoal
   apply(unfold check-no-overlap-def)
   apply(clarify)
   apply(unfold set-map)
   apply(clarify)
   apply(unfold split3-def prod.simps flow-entry-match.simps flow-entry-match.sel de-Morgan-conj)
   apply(clarsimp simp only:)
   apply(erule (1) no-overlaps-lroft-s3-hlp-hlp)
     apply simp
    apply assumption
   apply assumption
   apply simp
 done
done
lemma lr-of-tran-no-overlaps: assumes distinct ifs shows Inr t = (lr-of-tran rt fw ifs) \implies no-overlaps
OF-match-fields-unsafe t
apply(unfold lr-of-tran-def Let-def pack-OF-entries-def)
apply(simp split: if-splits)
apply(thin-tac t = -)
apply(drule distinct-of-prio-hlp)
apply(rule no-overlaps-lroft-s3-hlp[rotated])
subgoal by(simp add: assms)
subgoal by(simp add: o-assoc)
done
lemma sorted-lr-of-tran-s3-hlp: \forall x \in set f. fst x \leq a \implies b \in set (lr-of-tran-s3 s f) \implies fst b \leq a
```

```
by(auto simp add: lr-of-tran-s3-def)
```

lemma *lr-of-tran-s3-Cons: lr-of-tran-s3 ifs* (a # ard) = (

 $[(p, b, case a of simple-action.Accept \Rightarrow [Forward c] | simple-action.Drop \Rightarrow []).$ $(p,r,(c,a)) \leftarrow [a], b \leftarrow simple-match-to-of-match r ifs]) @ lr-of-tran-s3 ifs ard$ by(clarsimp simp: lr-of-tran-s3-def)

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{lemma sorted-lr-of-tran-s3: sorted-descending (map fst f) \implies sorted-descending (map fst (lr-of-tran-s3 s f)) \\ \textbf{apply}(induction f) \\ \textbf{subgoal by}(simp add: lr-of-tran-s3-def) \\ \textbf{apply}(clarsimp simp: lr-of-tran-s3-Cons map-concat comp-def) \\ \textbf{apply}(unfold sorted-descending-append) \\ \textbf{apply}(simp add: sorted-descending-alt rev-map sorted-lr-of-tran-s3-hlp sorted-const) \\ \textbf{done} \end{array}$

lemma sorted-lr-of-tran-hlp: $(ofe-prio \circ split3 \ OFEntry) = fst \ by(simp \ add: fun-eq-iff \ comp-def \ split3-def)$

```
lemma lr-of-tran-sorted-descending: Inr r = lr-of-tran rt fw ifs \implies sorted-descending (map ofe-prio r)
apply(unfold lr-of-tran-def Let-def)
apply(simp split: if-splits)
apply(thin-tac r = -)
apply(unfold sorted-lr-of-tran-hlp pack-OF-entries-def split3-def[abs-def] fun-app-def map-map comp-def prod.case-distrib)
apply(simp add: fst-def[symmetric])
apply(rule sorted-lr-of-tran-s3)
apply(drule sorted-annotated[OF less-or-eq-imp-le, OF disjI1])
apply(simp add: o-assoc)
done
```

lemma *lr-of-tran-s1-split: lr-of-tran-s1* (a # rt) = (*route2match a, output-iface* (*routing-action a*)) # *lr-of-tran-s1 rt* **by**(*unfold lr-of-tran-s1-def list.map, rule*)

lemma s1-correct: valid-prefixes $rt \implies has$ -default-route $(rt::('i::len) prefix-routing) \implies$ \exists rm ra. generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) $p = Some (rm, ra) \land ra = output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p))$ **apply**(*induction rt*) apply(simp;fail) **apply**(*drule valid-prefixes-split*) **apply**(*clarsimp*) $apply(erule \ disjE)$ subgoal for a rt apply(case-tac a)**apply**(*rename-tac routing-m metric routing-action*) **apply**(*case-tac routing-m*) apply(simp add: valid-prefix-def pfxm-mask-def prefix-match-semantics-def generalized-sfw-def lr-of-tran-s1-def route2match-def simple-matches.simps match-ifaceAny match-iface-refl ipset-from-cidr-0 max-word-mask[where 'a = 'i, symmetric, simplified]) done subgoal $apply(rule \ conjI)$ **apply**(*simp add: generalized-sfw-def lr-of-tran-s1-def route2match-correct;fail*) apply(simp add: route2match-def simple-matches.simps prefix-match-semantics-ipset-from-netmask2 *lr-of-tran-s1-split generalized-sfw-simps*) done

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done

```
definition to-OF-action a \equiv (case \ a \ of \ (p,d) \Rightarrow (case \ d \ of \ simple-action. Accept \Rightarrow [Forward \ p] | \ simple-action. Drop \Rightarrow []))

definition from-OF-action a = (case \ a \ of \ [] \Rightarrow (''', simple-action. Drop) | [Forward \ p] \Rightarrow (p, \ simple-action. Accept))
```

```
lemma OF-match-linear-not-noD: OF-match-linear \gamma oms p \neq NoAction \implies \exists ome. ome \in set oms \land \gamma (ofe-fields ome) p
apply(induction oms)
 apply(simp)
apply(simp split: if-splits)
 apply blast+
done
lemma s3-noaction-hlp: [simple-match-valid ac; \neg simple-matches ac p; match-iface (oiface ac) (p-oiface p)] \implies
OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe (map (\lambda x. split3 OFEntry (x1, x, case ba of simple-action. Accept \Rightarrow [Forward ad]
simple-action. Drop \Rightarrow [])) (simple-match-to-of-match ac ifs)) p = NoAction
 apply(rule ccontr)
 apply(drule OF-match-linear-not-noD)
 apply(clarsimp)
 apply(rename-tac x)
 apply(subgoal-tac \ all-prerequisites \ x)
  apply(drule simple-match-to-of-matchD)
     apply(simp add: split3-def)
     apply(subst(asm) of-match-fields-safe-eq2)
     apply(simp;fail)+
 using simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs by blast
lemma aux:
 \langle v = Some \ x \Longrightarrow the \ v = x \rangle
 by simp
lemma s3-correct:
assumes vsfwm: list-all simple-match-valid (map (fst \circ snd) ard)
assumes ippkt: p-l2type p = 0x800
assumes iiifs: p-iiface p \in set ifs
assumes oiifs: list-all (\lambda m. oiface (fst (snd m))) = ifaceAny) ard
shows OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe (pack-OF-entries ifs ard) p = Action ao \leftrightarrow (\exists r af. generalized-sfw (map snd
ard) p = (Some (r, af)) \land (if snd af = simple-action. Drop then ao = [] else ao = [Forward (fst af)]))
unfolding pack-OF-entries-def lr-of-tran-s3-def fun-app-def
using vsfwm oiifs
 apply(induction ard)
  subgoal by(simp add: generalized-sfw-simps)
 apply simp
 apply(clarsimp simp add: generalized-sfw-simps split: prod.splits)
 apply(intro conjI)
  subgoal for ard x1 ac ad ba
   apply(clarsimp simp add: OF-match-linear-append split: prod.splits)
   apply(drule simple-match-to-of-matchI[rotated])
     apply(rule iiifs)
    apply(rule ippkt)
    apply blast
   apply(clarsimp simp add: comp-def)
   apply(drule
     OF-match-linear-match-allsameaction[where
       \gamma = OF-match-fields-safe and pri = x1 and
```

```
oms = simple-match-to-of-match \ ac \ ifs \ {f and}
       act = case \ ba \ of \ simple-action. Accept \Rightarrow [Forward \ ad] \ | \ simple-action. Drop \Rightarrow []])
    apply(unfold OF-match-fields-safe-def comp-def)
   apply(erule aux)
   apply(clarsimp)
   apply(intro iffI)
   subgoal
    apply(rule \ exI[where \ x = ac])
    apply(rule \ exI[where \ x = ad])
    apply(rule \ exI[where \ x = ba])
    apply(clarsimp simp: split3-def split: simple-action.splits flowtable-behavior.splits if-splits)
   done
   subgoal
   apply(clarsimp)
    apply(rename-tac b)
    apply(case-tac \ b)
    apply(simp-all)
  done
 done
 subgoal for ard x1 ac ad ba
  apply(simp add: OF-match-linear-append OF-match-fields-safe-def comp-def)
  apply(clarify)
  apply(subgoal-tac OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe (map (\lambda x. split3 OFEntry (x1, x, case ba of simple-action. Accept
\Rightarrow [Forward ad] | simple-action.Drop \Rightarrow [])) (simple-match-to-of-match ac ifs)) p = NoAction)
   apply(simp;fail)
  apply(erule (1) s3-noaction-hlp)
  apply(simp add: match-ifaceAny;fail)
 done
done
context
 notes valid-prefix-00[simp, intro!]
begin
 lemma lr-of-tran-s1-valid: valid-prefixes rt \implies gsfw-valid (lr-of-tran-s1 rt)
   unfolding lr-of-tran-s1-def route2match-def qsfw-valid-def list-all-iff
   apply(clarsimp simp: simple-match-valid-def valid-prefix-fw-def)
   apply(intro conjI)
   apply force
   apply(simp add: valid-prefixes-alt-def)
 done
end
lemma simple-match-valid-fbs-rlen: [valid-prefixes rt; simple-fw-valid fw; (a, aa, ab, b) \in set (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt))]
fw \ ifs)) \implies simple-match-valid aa
proof(goal-cases)
 case 1
 note 1 [unfolded lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def]
 have gsfw-valid (map simple-rule-dtor fw) using gsfw-validI 1 by blast
 moreover have gsfw-valid (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) using 1 lr-of-tran-s1-valid by blast
 ultimately have gsfw-valid (generalized-fw-join (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) (map simple-rule-dtor fw)) using gsfw-join-valid by blast
```

```
qed
```

moreover have $(aa, ab, b) \in set$ (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) using 1 using in-annotate-rlen by fast ultimately show ?thesis unfolding lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def gsfw-valid-def list-all-iff by fastforce

lemma simple-match-valid-fbs: $[valid-prefixes rt; simple-fw-valid fw] \implies list-all simple-match-valid (map fst (lr-of-tran-fbs))$ rt fw ifs)) proof(goal-cases) case 1 **note** 1 [unfolded lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def] have gsfw-valid (map simple-rule-dtor fw) using gsfw-validI 1 by blast moreover have gsfw-valid (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) using 1 lr-of-tran-s1-valid by blast ultimately have gsfw-valid (generalized-fw-join (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) (map simple-rule-dtor fw)) using gsfw-join-valid by blast thus ?thesis unfolding lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def gsfw-valid-def list-all-iff by fastforce \mathbf{qed} **lemma** *lr-of-tran-prereqs: valid-prefixes* $rt \implies$ *simple-fw-valid* $fw \implies$ *lr-of-tran* rt *fw ifs* = *Inr oft* \implies list-all (all-prerequisites \circ of e-fields) of t unfolding lr-of-tran-def pack-OF-entries-def lr-of-tran-s3-def Let-def **apply**(simp add: map-concat comp-def prod.case-distrib split3-def split: if-splits) **apply**(*simp add: list-all-iff*) apply(clarsimp) **apply**(*drule simple-match-valid-fbs-rlen*[*rotated*]) **apply**(*simp add: list-all-iff;fail*) **apply**(*simp add: list-all-iff;fail*) **apply**(rule simple-match-to-of-match-generates-prereqs; assumption) done lemma OF-unsafe-safe-match3-eq: *list-all* (all-prerequisites \circ of e-fields) of t \Longrightarrow OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-unsafe of t = OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of t**unfolding** *OF-priority-match-def*[*abs-def*] **proof**(goal-cases) case 1 from 1 have \bigwedge packet. [f \leftarrow oft . OF-match-fields-unsafe (ofe-fields f) packet] = [f \leftarrow oft . OF-match-fields-safe (ofe-fields f) packet] **apply**(clarsimp simp add: list-all-iff of-match-fields-safe-eq) using of-match-fields-safe-eq by(metis (mono-tags, lifting) filter-cong) thus ?case by metis qed **lemma** OF-unsafe-safe-match-linear-eq: list-all (all-prerequisites \circ of e-fields) of t \Longrightarrow OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-unsafe of t = OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe of t unfolding fun-eq-iff **by**(*induction oft*) (*clarsimp simp add: list-all-iff of-match-fields-safe-eq*)+ **lemma** *simple-action-ne*[*simp*]: $b \neq simple-action.Accept \leftrightarrow b = simple-action.Drop$ $b \neq simple-action.Drop \leftrightarrow b = simple-action.Accept$ using *simple-action.exhaust* by *blast*+ **lemma** map-snd-apfst: map snd (map (apfst x) l) = map snd lunfolding map-map comp-def snd-apfst ...

lemma match-ifaceAny-eq: oiface $m = ifaceAny \implies simple-matches m p = simple-matches m (p(p-oiface := any))$ by(cases m) (simp add: simple-matches.simps match-ifaceAny) lemma no-oif-matchD: no-oif-match fw \implies simple-fw fw p = simple-fw fw (p(p-oiface := any))

 $\mathbf{by}(induction \ fw)$ (auto simp add: no-oif-match-def simple-fw-alt dest: match-ifaceAny-eq) lemma *lr-of-tran-fbs-acceptD*: assumes s1: valid-prefixes rt has-default-route rt assumes s2: no-oif-match fw **shows** generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) $p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Accept) \Longrightarrow$ simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = Some (p(p-oiface := oif))**proof**(goal-cases) case 1**note** 1 [unfolded lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def, THEN generalized-fw-joinD] then guess r1 ... then guess r2 ... note r12 = this**note** s1-correct[OF s1, of p] then guess rm ... then guess ra ... note rmra = thisfrom $r12 \ rmra$ have oifra: oif = ra by simpfrom r12 have sfw: simple-fw fw p = Decision FinalAllow using simple-fw-iff-generalized-fw-accept by blast **note** if update irrel = no-oif-match D[OF s2, where any = output-if ace (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p)) and <math>p = p, symmetric] **show** ?case **unfolding** simple-linux-router-nol12-def $\mathbf{by}(simp add$: Let-def ifupdate irrel sfw oifra rmra split: *Option.bind-splits option.splits*) ged **lemma** *lr-of-tran-fbs-acceptI*: assumes s1: valid-prefixes rt has-default-route rt **assumes** s2: no-oif-match fw has-default-policy fw **shows** simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw $p = Some (p(p-oiface := oif)) \Longrightarrow$ $\exists r. generalized$ -sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Accept)proof(goal-cases) from s2 have nud: Λp . simple-fw fw $p \neq Undecided$ by (metis has-default-policy state.distinct(1)) **note** *ifupdateirrel* = no-*oif-matchD*[*OF* s2(1), *symmetric*] case 1 from 1 have simple-fw fw p = Decision FinalAllow by (simp add: simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def nud ifupdate irrel *split: Option.bind-splits state.splits final-decision.splits*) then obtain r where r: generalized-sfw (map simple-rule-dtor fw) p = Some (r, simple-action.Accept) using simple-fw-iff-generalized-fw-accept by blast have oif def: oif = output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p)) using 1 by(cases p) (simp add: simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def nud ifupdateirrel split: Option.bind-splits state.splits final-decision.splits) note s1-correct[OF s1, of p] then guess rm ... then guess ra ... note rmra = thisshow ?case unfolding lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def apply(rule exI)**apply**(*rule generalized-fw-joinI*) unfolding oif-def using rmra apply simp apply(rule r)done qed **lemma** *lr-of-tran-fbs-dropD*: assumes s1: valid-prefixes rt has-default-route rt **assumes** s2: no-oif-match fw shows generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) $p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Drop) \Longrightarrow$ simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = None**proof**(goal-cases) **note** *ifupdateirrel* = no-*oif-matchD*[*OF* s2(1), *symmetric*] case 1

from 1 [unfolded lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def, THEN generalized-fw-joinD] **obtain** rr fr where generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-s1 rt) $p = Some (rr, oif) \land$ generalized-sfw (map simple-rule-dtor fw) $p = Some (fr, simple-action.Drop) \land Some r = simple-match-and rr fr by$ presburger hence fd: Λu . simple-fw fw (p(p-oiface := u)) = Decision FinalDeny unfolding ifupdateirrel using simple-fw-iff-generalized-fw-drop by blast **show** ?thesis by (clarsimp simp: simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def fd split: Option.bind-splits) \mathbf{qed} **lemma** *lr-of-tran-fbs-dropI*: assumes s1: valid-prefixes rt has-default-route rt assumes s2: no-oif-match fw has-default-policy fw **shows** simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw $p = None \Longrightarrow$ $\exists r \text{ oif. generalized-sfw} (lr \text{-} of \text{-} tran-fbs rt fw ifs) p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Drop)$ **proof**(goal-cases) **from** s2 have nucl: Λp . simple-fw fw $p \neq$ Undecided by (metis has-default-policy state.distinct(1)) **note** *ifupdateirrel* = no-*oif-matchD*[*OF* s2(1), *symmetric*] case 1 from 1 have simple-fw fw p = Decision FinalDeny by (simp add: simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def nud ifupdateirrel *split: Option.bind-splits state.splits final-decision.splits*) then obtain r where r: generalized-sfw (map simple-rule-dtor fw) p = Some (r, simple-action.Drop) using simple-fw-iff-generalized-fw-drop by blast note s1-correct[OF s1, of p] then guess rm ... then guess ra ... note rmra = thisshow ?case unfolding lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def apply(rule exI) $apply(rule \ exI[where \ x = ra])$ **apply**(*rule generalized-fw-joinI*) using *rmra* apply *simp* apply(rule r)done qed **lemma** no-oif-match-fbs: no-oif-match fw \implies list-all (λm . oiface (fst (snd m)) = ifaceAny) (map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs)))proof(goal-cases) case 1have c: $\bigwedge mr$ ar mf af f a. $[(mr, ar) \in set (lr-of-tran-s1 rt); (mf, af) \in simple-rule-dtor ' set fw; simple-match-and mr mf$ = Some a \implies oiface a = ifaceAny**proof**(goal-cases) case (1 mr ar mf af f a)have offace mr = ifaceAny using 1(1) unfolding *lr-of-tran-s1-def* route2match-def by(clarsimp simp add: Set.image-iff) moreover have offace mf = ifaceAny using 1(2) (no-oif-match fw) unfolding no-oif-match-def simple-rule-dtor-def[abs-def] **by**(*clarsimp simp: list-all-iff split: simple-rule.splits*) fastforce ultimately show ?case using 1(3) by (cases a; cases mr; cases mf) (simp add: if ace-conjunct-if aceAny split: option.splits) aed have la: list-all (λm . oiface (fst m) = ifaceAny) (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) unfolding lr-of-tran-fbs-def Let-def list-all-iff apply(clarify) **apply**(*subst*(*asm*) generalized-sfw-join-set) **apply**(*clarsimp*)

```
using c by blast
 thus ?case
 proof(goal-cases)
   case 1
   have *: (\lambda m. oiface (fst (snd m)) = ifaceAny) = (\lambda m. oiface (fst m) = ifaceAny) \circ snd unfolding comp-def ...
   show ?case unfolding * list-all-map[symmetric] map-snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen using la.
 qed
qed
lemma lr-of-tran-correct:
fixes p :: (32, 'a) simple-packet-ext-scheme
assumes nerr: lr-of-tran rt fw ifs = Inr oft
 and ippkt: p-l2type p = 0x800
 and ifvld: p-iiface p \in set ifs
shows OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of p = Action [Forward oif] \leftrightarrow simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = (Some
(p(p-oiface := oif)))
     OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action [] \leftrightarrow simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw <math>p = None
     OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p \neq NoAction OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p \neq Undefined
     OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action \ ls \longrightarrow length \ ls \le 1
     \exists ls. length ls \leq 1 \land OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of p = Action \ ls
proof -
have s1: valid-prefixes rt has-default-route rt
  and s2: has-default-policy fw simple-fw-valid fw no-oif-match fw
  and difs: distinct ifs
  using nerr unfolding lr-of-tran-def by (simp-all split: if-splits)
 have no-oif-match fw using nerr unfolding lr-of-tran-def by(simp split: if-splits)
 note s^2 = s^2 this
 have unsafe-safe-eq:
   OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-unsafe of t = OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of t
   OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-unsafe of t = OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe of t
   apply(subst OF-unsafe-safe-match3-eq; (rule lr-of-tran-prereqs s1 s2 nerr refl)+)
   apply(subst OF-unsafe-safe-match-linear-eq; (rule lr-of-tran-prereqs s1 s2 nerr refl)+)
 done
 have lin: OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of t = OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe of t
   using OF-eq[OF lr-of-tran-no-overlaps lr-of-tran-sorted-descending, OF difs nerr[symmetric] nerr[symmetric]] unfolding
fun-eq-iff unsafe-safe-eq by metis
 let ?ard = map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs))
 have oft-def: oft = pack-OF-entries ifs ?ard using nerr unfolding lr-of-tran-def Let-def by (simp split: if-splits)
 have vld: list-all simple-match-valid (map (fst \circ snd) ?ard)
            unfolding fun-app-def map-map[symmetric]
                                                                snd-apfst map-snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen
                                                                                                                         using
simple-match-valid-fbs[OF s1(1) s2(2)].
 have *: list-all (\lambda m. oiface (fst (snd m)) = ifaceAny) ?ard using no-oif-match-fbs[OF s2(3)].
 have not-under: \Lambda p. simple-fw fw p \neq Underided by (metis has-default-policy s2(1) state.simps(3))
 have w1-1: \wedge oif. OF-match-linear OF-match-fields-safe of p = Action [Forward oif] \implies simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw
p = Some (p(p-oiface := oif))
   \land oif = output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p))
 proof(intro conjI, goal-cases)
   case (1 \text{ oif})
   note s3-correct[OF vld ippkt ifvld(1) *, THEN iffD1, unfolded oft-def[symmetric], OF 1]
   hence \exists r. generalized-sfw (map snd (map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs)))) p = Some (r, (oif, f))
simple-action.Accept))
    by(clarsimp split: if-splits)
```

then obtain r where generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) p = Some (r, (oif, simple-action.Accept))unfolding map-map comp-def snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen by blast thus ?case using lr-of-tran-fbs-acceptD[OF s1 s2(3)] by metis **thus** oif = output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p)) $\mathbf{by}(cases \ p)$ (clarsimp simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def not-undec split: Option.bind-splits state.splits fi*nal-decision.splits*) qed have w_{1-2} : $\bigwedge oif$. simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw $p = Some (p(p-oiface := oif)) \Longrightarrow OF$ -match-linear OF-match-fields-safe off p = Action [Forward oif] **proof**(goal-cases) case (1 oif)note *lr-of-tran-fbs-acceptI*[OF s1 s2(3) s2(1) this, of ifs] then guess r.. note r = thishence generalized-sfw (map and (map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs)))) p = Some (r, (oif, sim-fbs, rt, fw, ifs)))ple-action.Accept)) unfolding map-snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen. **moreover note** s3-correct[OF vld ippkt ifvld(1) *, THEN iffD2, unfolded off-def[symmetric], of [Forward oif]] ultimately show ?case by simp \mathbf{qed} **show** w1: hoif. (OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe off p = Action [Forward oif]) = (simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fwp = Some (p(p-oiface := oif)))unfolding lin using w1-1 w1-2 by blast **show** w2: (*OF*-priority-match *OF*-match-fields-safe off p = Action []) = (simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = None) unfolding *lin* proof(rule iffI, goal-cases)case 1 **note** s3-correct[OF vld ippkt ifvld(1) *, THEN iffD1, unfolded oft-def[symmetric], OF 1] then obtain r oif where roif: generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Drop)**unfolding** map-snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen **by**(clarsimp split: if-splits) **note** lr-of-tran-fbs-dropD[OF s1 s2(3) this] thus ?case. next case 2note lr-of-tran-fbs-drop $I[OF \ s1 \ s2(3) \ s2(1) \ this, of \ ifs]$ then **obtain** r oif where generalized-sfw (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs) p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Drop) by blast hence generalized-sfw (map snd (map (apfst of-nat) (annotate-rlen (lr-of-tran-fbs rt fw ifs)))) p = Some (r, oif, simple-action.Drop) unfolding map-snd-apfst map-snd-annotate-rlen. **moreover note** s3-correct[OF vld ippkt ifvld(1) *, THEN iffD2, unfolded oft-def[symmetric], of []] ultimately show ?case by force qed have lr-determ: $\bigwedge a$. simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw $p = Some \ a \Longrightarrow a = p(p-oiface := output-iface (routing-table-semantics))$ rt (p-dst p))by (clarsimp simp: simple-linux-router-nol12-def Let-def not-undec split: Option.bind-splits state.splits final-decision.splits) **show** notno: OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of $p \neq NoAction$ **apply**(cases simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p) using w2 apply(*simp*) using w1[of output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p))] apply(simp)**apply**(*drule lr-determ*) apply(simp)done show notub: OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe of $p \neq Undefined$ unfolding lin using OF-match-linear-ne-Undefined

show notmult: Λ ls. OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft $p = Action \ ls \longrightarrow length \ ls \le 1$ **apply**(cases simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p)

```
using w2 apply(simp)
using w1 [of output-iface (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p))] apply(simp)
apply(drule lr-determ)
apply(clarsimp)
done
show \exists ls. length ls \leq 1 \land OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action ls
apply(cases OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p)
using notmult apply blast
using notmol apply blast
using notub apply blast
done
qed
end
theory OF-conv-test
imports
```

```
Iptables-Semantics.Parser
Simple-Firewall.SimpleFw-toString
Routing.IpRoute-Parser
../../LinuxRouter-OpenFlow-Translation
../../OpenFlow-Serialize
```

```
begin
```

parse-iptables-save SQRL-fw=iptables-save

term SQRL-fw thm SQRL-fw-def thm SQRL-fw-FORWARD-default-policy-def

value[code] map ($\lambda(c,rs)$). (c, map (quote-rewrite \circ common-primitive-rule-toString) rs)) SQRL-fw **definition** unfolded = unfold-ruleset-FORWARD SQRL-fw-FORWARD-default-policy (map-of-string-ipv4 SQRL-fw) **lemma** map (quote-rewrite \circ common-primitive-rule-toString) unfolded = [''-p icmp -j ACCEPT'', ''-i s1-lan -p tcp -m tcp --spts [1024:65535] -m tcp --dpts [80] -j ACCEPT'', ''-i s1-wan -p tcp -m tcp --spts [80] -m tcp --dpts [1024:65535] -j ACCEPT'', ''-j DROP''] **by** eval

lemma length unfolded = 4 by eval

value[code] map (quote-rewrite \circ common-primitive-rule-toString) (upper-closure unfolded) **lemma** length (upper-closure unfolded) = 4 **by** eval

value[code] upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)

lemma length (lower-closure unfolded) = 4 by eval

lemma check-simple-fw-preconditions (upper-closure unfolded) = True **by** eval **lemma** $\forall m \in get$ -match'set (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)). normalized-nnf-match m **by** eval **lemma** $\forall m \in get$ -match'set (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))). normalized-nnf-match m by eval

lemma check-simple-fw-preconditions (upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)))) by eval

lemma length (to-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))) = 4 by eval

 $lower-closure \ unfolded = upper-closure \ unfolded$

(upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)))) = up-per-closure unfolded by eval+

definition SQRL-fw-simple \equiv remdups-rev (to-simple-firewall (upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))))) value[code] SQRL-fw-simple lemma simple-fw-valid SQRL-fw-simple by eval

parse-ip-route SQRL-rtbl-main = ip-route
value SQRL-rtbl-main
lemma SQRL-rtbl-main = [(routing-match = PrefixMatch 0xA000100 24, metric = 0, routing-action = (output-iface =
''s1-lan'', next-hop = None)),
((routing-match = PrefixMatch 0xA000200 24, metric = 0, routing-action = ((output-iface = ''s1-wan'', next-hop = None))),

([routing-match = PrefixMatch 0 0, metric = 0, routing-action = ([output-iface = ''s1-wan'', next-hop = Some 0xA000201))] by eval value dotdecimal-of-ipv4addr 0xA0D2500

lemma SQRL-rtbl-main = [rr-ctor (10,0,1,0) 24 ''s1-lan'' None 0, rr-ctor (10,0,2,0) 24 ''s1-wan'' None 0, rr-ctor (0,0,0,0) 0 ''s1-wan'' (Some (10,0,2,1)) 0]

 $\mathbf{by} eval$

definition SQRL-rtbl-main-sorted \equiv rev (sort-key ($\lambda r. pfxm$ -length (routing-match r)) SQRL-rtbl-main) value SQRL-rtbl-main-sorted definition SQRL- $ifs \equiv [$ (iface-name = ''s1-lan'', iface-mac = 0x10001), (iface-name = ''s1-wan'', iface-mac = 0x10002)] value SQRL-ifs

definition SQRL-ports $\equiv [$

lemma let fw = SQRL-fw-simple in no-oif-match $fw \wedge has$ -default-policy $fw \wedge simple$ -fw-valid fw by eval **lemma** let rt = SQRL-rtbl-main-sorted in valid-prefixes $rt \wedge has$ -default-route rt by eval **lemma** let $ifs = (map \ iface$ -name SQRL-ifs) in distinct ifs by eval

definition $ofi \equiv$

case (lr-of-tran SQRL-rtbl-main-sorted SQRL-fw-simple (map iface-name SQRL-ifs)) of (Inr openflow-rules) \Rightarrow map (serialize-of-entry (the \circ map-of SQRL-ports)) openflow-rules lemma ofi = $\label{eq:priority} = 11, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = output: 2^{\prime\prime}, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0, dl-type$ 'priority = 10, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 2048/0xf800, tp-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 2048/0xf800, tp-src = 204/priority = 10, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 4096/0xf000, tp-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 4000/0xf000, tp-dst = 10.0.2.00, tp-src = 10.0.00, tp-src = 10.0.00, tp-src = 10.0.00/priority=10, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.2.0/24, tp-src=8192/0xe000, tp-dst=10.0.2.0/24, tp-src=8192/0xe000, tp-dst=10.0.2.0, tp-dst=10.0.2, tp-dst=10.0.2, tp-dst=10.0.2, tp-dst=10.0.2, tp-dst=10.0, tp-d'' priority = 10, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 32768/0x8000, tp-dst = 30000, tp-dst = 300000, tp-dst = 30000, tp-dst = 30000, tp-dst = 300000, tp-dst = $'' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 1024/0xfcC_{10}/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 1024/0xfcC_{1$ '' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048/0xf80, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048/0xf80, tp-dst = 2048/0'' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 4096/0xf00, tp-dst = 4000, tp-dst = 4'' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 8192/0xe00, t'' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 16384/0xcde ='' priority = 9, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 32768/0x80, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.2.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 32768/0x80, tp-dst = 32768/'priority=8, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-dst=10.0.2.0/24, action=drop'', dl-type=0x800, nw-dst=10, action=drop'', dl-type=0x800, nw-dst=10, action=drop'', dl-type=0x800, action=drop'', action=drop'', dl-type=0x800, action=drop'', action=drop'', dl-type=0x800, action=drop'', action='priority = 7, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = output: 1'', action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 1, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = 0, dl-type = 0, dl-type"priority=6, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=1024/0xfc00, tp-dst=800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=1024/0xfc00, tp-dst=800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=1024/0xfc00, tp-dst=800, tp-ds'priority=6, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=2048/0xf800, tp-dst=80, arcs=10, ar'priority=6, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=4096/0xf000, tp-dst=800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=4096/0xf000, tp-dst=800, tp-dst=80'priority=6, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=8192/0xe000, tp-dst=0.000, tp-'priority=6, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=32768/0x8000, tp-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=32768/0x8000, tp-dst=10.0.000, tp-dst=10.0.000, tp-dst=10.000, tp-dst=1000, tp-dst=1000,'priority=5, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=80, tp-dst=1024/0xfcdenter (10.011)/24, tp-src=80, tp-dst=100, tp-src=80, tp-dst=100, tp-src=80, t $\label{eq:priority} priority = 5, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048/0xf80, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048/0xf80, tp-dst = 2048/0xf80$ 'priority=5, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, nw-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=80, tp-dst=4096/0x600, tp-dst=10.0.1.0/24, tp-src=80, tp-dst=4096/0x600, tp-dst=10.0.0.00, tp-dst=10.0.00, tp-dst=10.00, tp-dst=10, tp-dst=10,priority = 5, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 8192/0xe0, tp-dst = 8192/0priority = 5, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 16384/0xcdent = 16'' priority = 5, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 32768/0x80, nw-proto = 6, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 32768/0x80, tp-dst = 32768/'priority = 4, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop'', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 10.0.1.0/24, action = drop '', drop = 0x800, nw-dst = 0x800, nw-"priority=3, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=1, action=output:2", action=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=1, action=0, dl-type=0, dl-t'' priority = 2, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, tp-src = 1024 / 0xfc00, tp-dst = 80, action = output: 2'', action = 0, tp-src = 1024 / 0xfc00, tp-dst = 80, action = 0, tp-src = 10, tp-src'' priority = 2, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, tp-src = 2048 / 0xf800, tp-dst = 80, action = output: 2'', action = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, tp-src = 2048 / 0xf800, tp-dst = 80, action = output: 2'', action = 0, idle-timeout ='' priority = 2, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 1, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, tp-src = 4096 / 0xf000, tp-dst = 80, action = output: 2'', the second state is a second state of the second state of the second state of the second state of the second state is a second state of the second s"priority=2, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=8192/0xe000, tp-dst=80, action=output:2'', the second sec"priority=2, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=16384 / 0xc000, tp-dst=80, action=output:2" (action=0, action=0, action=0,''priority=2, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=1, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=32768 / 0x8000, tp-dst=80, action=output:2' / 0x8000, tp-dst=80, action=0, tp-src=32768 / 0x8000, t $'priority=1, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=1024 / 0xfc00, action=output: 2^{\prime\prime}/1000, action=0, tp-dst=1000, tp-ds$ $'' priority = 1, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, in-port = 2, dl-type = 0x800, nw-proto = 6, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048 / 0xf800, action = output: 2^{\prime\prime} / 0xf800, action = 0, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048 / 0xf800, action = 0, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048 / 0xf800, action = 0, tp-src = 80, tp-src = 80, tp-dst = 2048 / 0xf800, action = 0, tp-src = 80, t$ $'priority=1, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=4096 / 0xf000, action=output: 2^{\prime\prime\prime} + 10^{\circ} + 10^{$ 'priority=1, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=8192/0xe000, action=output: 2'northernologies and the standard standard'priority=1, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=16384 / 0xc000, action=output: 2'' hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=16384 / 0xc000, action=output: 2'' hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=16384 / 0xc000, action=output: 2'' hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0''priority=1, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, in-port=2, dl-type=0x800, nw-proto=6, tp-src=80, tp-dst=32768 / 0x8000, action=output:2' / 0x8000, action=0, tp-dst=32768 / 0x800, action=0, tp-dst=32 "priority=0,hard-timeout=0,idle-timeout=0,dl-type=0x800,action=drop" by eval

value[code] ofi

end theory RFC2544 imports Iptables-Semantics.Parser Routing.IpRoute-Parser ../../LinuxRouter-OpenFlow-Translation ../../OpenFlow-Serialize begin

parse-iptables-save SQRL-fw=iptables-save

term SQRL-fw thm SQRL-fw-def thm SQRL-fw-FORWARD-default-policy-def

value[code] map ($\lambda(c,rs)$). (c, map (quote-rewrite \circ common-primitive-rule-toString) rs)) SQRL-fw **definition** unfolded = unfold-ruleset-FORWARD SQRL-fw-FORWARD-default-policy (map-of-string-ipv4 SQRL-fw)

lemma length unfolded = 26 by eval

value[code] unfolded
value[code] (upper-closure unfolded)
value[code] map (quote-rewrite \circ common-primitive-rule-toString) (upper-closure unfolded)
lemma length (upper-closure unfolded) = 26 by eval

value[code] upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)

lemma length (lower-closure unfolded) = 26 by eval

lemma check-simple-fw-preconditions (upper-closure unfolded) **by** eval **lemma** $\forall m \in get$ -match'set (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)). normalized-nnf-match m **by** eval **lemma** $\forall m \in get$ -match'set (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))). normalized-nnf-match m **by** eval **lemma** check-simple-fw-preconditions (upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)))) **by** eval

 $\mathbf{lemma} \ length \ (to-simple-firewall \ (upper-closure \ (packet-assume-new \ unfolded))) = 26 \ \mathbf{by} \ eval$

 $\label{eq:lemma} \ensuremath{ (lower-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)))) = lower-closure unfolded (lower-closure unfolded))) = lower-closure unfolded$

 $lower-closure\ unfolded = upper-closure\ unfolded$

(upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded)))) = up-per-closure unfolded by eval+

value[code] (getParts (to-simple-firewall (lower-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (lower-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))))))

```
\begin{array}{l} \textbf{definition } SQRL\text{-}\textit{fw}\text{-}\textit{simple} \equiv \textit{remdups-rev} (\textit{to-simple-firewall (upper-closure (optimize-matches abstract-for-simple-firewall (upper-closure (packet-assume-new unfolded))))))} \\ \textbf{value}[\textit{code}] \; SQRL\text{-}\textit{fw}\text{-}\textit{simple} \end{array}
```

 ${\bf lemma}\ simple-fw-valid\ SQRL-fw-simple\ {\bf by}\ eval$

parse-ip-route SQRL-rtbl-main = ip-routevalue SQRL-rtbl-main "ip1", next-hop = None)), (routing-match = PrefixMatch 0xC6130100 24, metric = 0, routing-action = ((output-iface = "op1", next-hop = None))),(routing-match = PrefixMatch 0 0, metric = 0, routing-action = ((output-iface = "op1", next-hop = Some 0xC6130102))))by eval lemma SQRL-rtbl-main = [rr-ctor (198,18,1,0) 24 "ip1" None 0, rr-ctor (198,19,1,0) 24 "op1" None 0, rr-ctor (0,0,0,0) 0 "op1" (Some (198,19,1,2)) 0 1 by eval definition SQRL-ports $\equiv [$ ("ip1", "1"), ("op1", "2")definition $ofi \equiv$ case (lr-of-tran SQRL-rtbl-main SQRL-fw-simple (map fst SQRL-ports)) of (Inr openflow-rules) \Rightarrow map (serialize-of-entry (the \circ map-of SQRL-ports)) openflow-rules lemma ofi ='priority = 27, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-dst = 198.18.1.0/24, action = drop' $'priority = 26\,, hard-timeout = 0\,, idle-timeout = 0\,, dl-type = 0x800\,, nw-dst = 198\,.19\,.1\,.0\,/\,24\,, action = drop\,''$ 'priority=24, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.2.2/32, nw-dst=192.18.102.2/32, action=drop''priority=23, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.3.3/32, nw-dst=192.18.103.3/32, action=drop''priority=22, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.4.4/32, nw-dst=192.18.104.4/32, action=drop' $priority = 21, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.5.5/32, nw-dst = 192.18.105.5/32, action = drop^{-1}, dro$ $priority = 20, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.6.6/32, nw-dst = 192.18.106.6/32, action = drop^{\prime\prime} = 0, drop^{\prime\prime} =$ '' priority = 19, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.7.7/32, nw-dst = 192.18.107.7/32, action = drop'' = 0.1212, action = 0"priority=17, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.9.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.109.9/32, action=drop'', action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.109.9/32, action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.9.9/32, action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.109.9/32, action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.109.9/32, action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.9/32, action=0.000, nw-src=192.18.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.9/32, nw-dst=192.18.9/'' priority = 16, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = drop' = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.10.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.100, nw-src = 192.18.110.10/32, nw-dst = 192.18.110.10/32, action = 0.000, nw-src = 192.18.100, nw-'' priority = 15, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.11.11/32, nw-dst = 192.18.111.11/32, action = drop'' = 0.1212, action = 0.1212, action'' priority = 14, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = drop'' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.12.12/32, nw-dst = 192.18.112.12/32, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.112, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.112, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.112, action = 0x800, action = 0x800,"priority=13, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.19.1.2/32, nw-dst=192.19.65.1/32, action=output:2'''' priority = 12, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, nw-dst = 192.18.113.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.13.13/32, action = 0x800, action'' priority = 11, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, nw-dst = 192.18.114.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, action = drop' = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, action = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.14.14/32, action = 0x800, a $'' priority = 10, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.15.15/32, nw-dst = 192.18.115.15/32, action = drop^{-1} d$ "priority=8, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.17.17/32, nw-dst=192.18.117.17/32, action=drop interval and interval and'' priority = 7, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.18.18/32, nw-dst = 192.18.118.18/32, action = drop'' no start and the start and th"priority=5, hard-timeout=0, idle-timeout=0, dl-type=0x800, nw-src=192.18.20.20/32, nw-dst=192.18.120.20/32, action=drop".

 $\label{eq:construction} i'' priority = 4, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.21.21/32, nw-dst = 192.18.121.21/32, action = drop'', i'' priority = 3, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.22.22/32, nw-dst = 192.18.122.22/32, action = drop'', i'' priority = 2, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.23.23/32, nw-dst = 192.18.123.23/32, action = drop'', i'' priority = 1, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, nw-src = 192.18.24.24/32, nw-dst = 192.18.124.24/32, action = drop'', i'' priority = 0, hard-timeout = 0, idle-timeout = 0, dl-type = 0x800, action = drop''] by eval value[code] length ofi$

 \mathbf{end}

Part II Documentation

1 Configuration Translation

All the results we present in this section are formalized and verified in Isabelle/HOL [11]. This means that their formal correctness can be trusted a level close to absolute certainty. The definitions and lemmas stated here are merely a repetition of lemmas stated in other theory files. This means that they have been directly set to this document from Isabelle and no typos or hidden assumptions are possible. Additionally, it allows us to omit various helper lemmas that do not help the understanding. However, it causes some notation inaccuracy, as type and function definitions are stated as lemmas or schematic goals.

theory OpenFlow-Documentation

1.1 Linux Firewall Model

We want to write a program that translates the configuration of a linux firewall to that of an OpenFlow switch. We furthermore want to verify that translation. For this purpose, we need a clear definition of the behavior of the two device types - we need their models and semantics. In case of a linux firewall, this is problematic because a linux firewall is a highly complex device that is ultimately capable of general purpose computation. Creating a comprehensive semantics that encompasses all possible configuration types of a linux firewall is thus highly non-trivial and not useful for the purpose of analysis. We decided to approach the problem from the other side: we created a model that includes only the most basic features. (This implies neglecting IPv6.) Fortunately, many of the highly complex features are rarely essential and even our basic model is still of some use.

We first divided the firewall into subsystems. Given a routing table rt, the firewall rules fw, the routing decision for a packet p can be obtained by *routing-table-semantics* rt (p-dst p), the firewall decision by *simple-fw fw p*. We draft the first description of our linux router model:

1. The destination MAC address of an arriving packet is checked: Does it match the MAC address of the ingress port? If it does, we continue, otherwise, the packet is discarded.

- 2. The routing decision $rd \equiv routing-table-semantics$ $rt \ p$ is obtained.
- 3. The packet's output interface is updated based on rd^1 .
- 4. The firewall is queried for a decision: *simple-fw* fw p. If the decision is to Drop, the packet is discarded.
- 5. The next hop is computed: If *rd* provides a next hop, that is used. Otherwise, the destination address of the packet is used.
- 6. The MAC address of the next hop is looked up; the packet is updated with it and sent.

We decided that this description is best formalized as an abortable program in the option monad:

lemma simple-linux-router rt fw mlf ifl $p \equiv do$ { - \leftarrow iface-packet-check ifl p; let rd — (routing decision) = routing-table-semantics rt $(p-dst \ p);$ let p = p(p-oiface := output-iface rd);let fd — (firewall decision) = simple-fw fw p; $- \leftarrow (case \ fd \ of \ Decision \ FinalAllow \Rightarrow Some \ () \mid Decision$ $FinalDeny \Rightarrow None$); let $nh = (case \ next-hop \ rd \ of \ None \Rightarrow p-dst \ p \mid Some \ a \Rightarrow$ a); $ma \leftarrow mlf nh;$ Some (p(p-l2dst := ma))} *fromMaybe-def*[*symmetric*] unfolding **by**(fact simple-linux-router-def) where mlf is a function that looks up the MAC address

where *mlf* is a function that looks up the MAC address for an IP address.

There are already a few important aspects that have not been modelled, but they are not core essential for the functionality of a firewall. Namely, there is no local traffic from/to the firewall. This is problematic since this model can not generate ARP replies — thus, an equivalent OpenFlow device will not do so, either. Furthermore, this model is problematic because it requires access to a function that looks up a MAC address, something that may not be known at the time of time running a translation to an OpenFlow configuration.

 $^{^1\}mathrm{Note}$ that we assume a packet model with input and output interfaces. The origin of this is explained in Section 1.1.2

It is possible to circumvent these problems by inserting static ARP table entries in the directly connected devices and looking up their MAC addresses *a priori*. A test-wise implementation of the translation based on this model showed acceptable results. However, we deemed the *a priori* lookup of the MAC addresses to be rather inelegant and built a second model.

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{definition simple-linux-router-altered rt fw ifl $p \equiv do $ \\ let rd = routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p); \\ let $p = p(|p-oiface := output-iface rd]); \\ - \leftarrow if p-oiface $p = p$-iiface p then None else Some (); \\ let $fd = simple-fw $fw p; \\ - \leftarrow (case $fd $of Decision FinalAllow \Rightarrow Some () | Decision $FinalDeny $\Rightarrow None); $ \\ Some p } \end{array}$

In this model, all access to the MAC layer has been eliminated. This is done by the approximation that the firewall will be asked to route a packet (i.e. be addressed on the MAC layer) iff the destination IP address of the packet causes it to be routed out on a different interface. Because this model does not insert destination MAC addresses, the destination MAC address has to be already correct when the packet is sent. This can only be achieved by changing the subnet of all connected device, moving them into one common subnet².

While a test-wise implementation based on this model also showed acceptable results, the model is still problematic. The check *p*-oiface p = p-iiface p and the firewall require access to the output interface. The details of why this cannot be provided are be elaborated in Section 1.3. The intuitive explanation is that an OpenFlow match can not have a field for the output interface. We thus simplified the model even further:

lemma simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw $p \equiv do$ { let rd = routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst p); let p = p(|p-oiface := output-iface rd|);let fd = simple-fw fw p; $- \leftarrow (case fd of Decision FinalAllow \Rightarrow Some () | Decision FinalDeny \Rightarrow None);$ Some p } **by**(fact simple-linux-router-nol12-def)

We continue with this definition as a basis for our translation. Even this strongly altered version and the original linux firewall still behave the same in a substantial amount of cases:

theorem

[*iface-packet-check ifl pii* \neq *None*;

 $\begin{array}{l} \textit{mlf (case next-hop (routing-table-semantics rt (p-dst pii))} \\ \textit{of None} \Rightarrow p-dst pii \mid \textit{Some } a \Rightarrow a) \neq \textit{None} \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \end{array}$

 $\exists x. map-option \quad (\lambda p. p(p-l2dst := x)) \\ (simple-linux-router-nol12 \ rt \ fw \ pii) = simple-linux-router \\ rt \ fw \ mlf \ ifl \ pii$

by(*fact rtr-nomac-eq*[*unfolded fromMaybe-def*])

The conditions are to be read as "The check whether a received packet has the correct destination MAC never returns *False*" and "The next hop MAC address for all packets can be looked up". Obviously, these conditions do not hold for all packets. We will show an example where this makes a difference in Section 2.1.

1.1.1 Routing Table

The routing system in linux features multiple tables and a system that can use the iptables firewall and an additional match language to select a routing table. Based on our directive, we only focused on the single most used main routing table.

We define a routing table entry to be a record (named tuple) of a prefix match, a metric and the routing action, which in turn is a record of an output interface and an optional next-hop address.

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{schematic-goal} \ (?rtbl-entry :: ('a::len) \ routing-rule) = (\\ routing-match = PrefixMatch \ pfx \ len, \ metric = met, \ rout-ing-action = (\\ output-iface = oif-string, \ next-hop = (h :: 'a \\ word \ option))) \end{array}$

A routing table is then a list of these entries:

lemma (rtbl :: ('a :: len) prefix-routing) = (rtbl :: 'a routing-rule list) by rule

Not all members of the type *prefix-routing* are sane routing tables. There are three different validity criteria that we require so that our definitions are adequate.

- The prefixes have to be 0 in bits exceeding their length.
- There has to be a default rule, i.e. one with prefix length 0. With the condition above, that implies that all its prefix bits are zero and it thus matches any address.
- The entries have to be sorted by prefix length and metric.

 $^{^2\}mathrm{There}$ are cases where this is not possible — A limitation of our system.

The first two are set into code in the following way:

lemma valid-prefix (PrefixMatch pfx len) \equiv pfx && (2 (32 - len) - 1) = (0 :: 32 word)

by (*simp* add: *valid-prefix-def pfxm-mask-def mask-eq-decr-exp* and.*commute*)

lemma has-default-route $rt \leftrightarrow (\exists r \in set rt. pfxm-length (routing-match <math>r) = 0)$

by(*fact has-default-route-alt*)

The third is not needed in any of the further proofs, so we omit it.

The semantics of a routing table is to simply traverse the list until a matching entry is found.

schematic-goal routing-table-semantics (rt-entry # rt) dst-addr = (if prefix-match-semantics (routing-match rt-entry) dst-addr then routing-action rt-entry else routing-table-semantics rt dst-addr) **by**(fact routing-table-semantics.simps)

If no matching entry is found, the behavior is undefined.

1.1.2 iptables Firewall

The firewall subsystem in a linux router is not any less complex than any of the of the other systems. Fortunately, this complexity has been dealt with in [6, 5] already and we can directly use the result.

In short, one of the results is that a complex *iptables* configuration can be simplified to be represented by a single list of matches that only support the following match conditions:

- (String) prefix matches on the input and output interfaces.
- A *prefix-match* on the source and destination IP address.
- An exact match on the layer 4 protocol.
- Interval matches on the source or destination port, e.g. $p_d \in \{1..1023\}$

The model/type of the packet is adjusted to fit that: it is a record of the fields matched on. This also means that input and output interface are coded to the packet. Given that this information is usually stored alongside the packet content, this can be deemed a reasonable model. In case the output interface is not needed (e.g., when evaluating an OpenFlow table), it can simply be left blank. Obviously, a simplification into the above match type cannot always produce an equivalent firewall, and the set of accepted packets has to be over- or underapproximated. The reader interested in the details of this is strongly referred to [6]; we are simply going to continue with the result: simple-fw.

One property of the simplification is worth noting here: The simplified firewall does not know state and the simplification approximates stateful matches by stateless ones. Thus, the overapproximation of a stateful firewall ruleset that begins with accepting packets of established connections usually begins with a rule that accepts all packets. Dealing with this by writing a meaningful simplification of stateful firewalls is future work.

1.2 OpenFlow Switch Model

In this section, we present our model of an OpenFlow switch. The requirements for this model are derived from the fact that it models devices that are the target of a configuration translation. This has two implications:

- All configurations that are representable in our model should produce the correct behavior wrt. their semantics. The problem is that correct here means that the behavior is the same that any real device would produce. Since we cannot possibly account for all device types, we instead focus on those that conform to the OpenFlow specifications. To account for the multiple different versions of the specification (e.g. [2, 3]), we tried making our model a subset of both the oldest stable version 1.0 [2] and the newest available specification version 1.5.1 [3].
- Conversely, our model does not need to represent all possible behavior of an OpenFlow switch, just the behavior that can be invoked by the result of our translation. This is especially useful regarding for controller interaction, but also for MPLS or VLANs, which we did not model in Section 1.1.

More concretely, we set the following rough outline for our model.

- A switch consists of a single flow table.
- A flow table entry consists of a priority, a match condition and an action list.

- The only possible action (we require) is to forward the packet on a port.
- We do not model controller interaction.

Additionally, we decided that we wanted to be able to ensure the validity of the flow table in all qualities, i.e. we want to model the conditions 'no overlapping flow entries appear', 'all match conditions have their necessary preconditions'. The details of this are explained in the following sections.

1.2.1 Matching Flow Table entries

Table 3 of Section 3.1 of [2] gives a list of required packet fields that can be used to match packets. This directly translates into the type for a match expression on a single field:

 $\begin{aligned} & \text{schematic-goal} (field-match :: of-match-field) \in \{ \\ & IngressPort (?s::string), \\ & EtherSrc (?as::48 word), EtherDst (?ad::48 word), \\ & EtherType (?t::16 word), \\ & VlanId (?i::16 word), \\ & VlanPriority (?p::16 word), \\ & IPv4Src (?pms::32 prefix-match), \\ & IPv4Dst (?pmd::32 prefix-match), \\ & IPv4Proto (?ipp :: 8 word), \\ & L4Src (?ps :: 16 word) (?ms :: 16 word), \\ & L4Dst (?pd :: 16 word) (?md :: 16 word) \\ & \} \\ & \mathbf{by}(fact of-match-field-typeset) \end{aligned}$

Two things are worth additional mention: L3 and L4 "addressess". The IPv4Src and IPv4Dst matches are specified as "can be subnet masked" in [2], whereras [3] states clearly that arbitrary bitmasks can be used. We took the conservative approach here. Our alteration of L4Src and L4Dst is more grave. While [2] does not state anything about layer 4 ports and masks, [3] specifically forbids using masks on them. Nevertheless, Open-VSwitch [1] and some other implementations support them. We will explain in detail why we must include bitmasks on layer 4 ports to obtain a meaningful translation in Section 1.3.

One of-match-field is not enough to classify a packet. To match packets, we thus use entire sets of match fields. As Guha et al. [7] noted³, executing a set of given of-match-fields on a packet requires careful consideration. For example, it is not meaningful to use IPv4Dst if the given packet is not actually an IP packet,

i.e. IPv4Dst has the prerequisite of EtherType 2048 being among the match fields. Guha et al. decided to use the fact that the preconditions can be arranged on a directed acyclic graph (or rather: an acyclic forest). They evaluated match conditions in a manner following that graph: first, all field matches without preconditions are evaluated. Upon evaluating a field match (e.g., *EtherType 2048*), the matches that had their precondition fulfilled by it (e.g., IPv4Src and IPv4Src in this example) are evaluated. This mirrors the faulty behavior of some implementations (see [7]). Adopting that behavior into our model would mean that any packet matches against the field match set $\{IPv4Dst\}$ (PrefixMatch 134744072 32) instead of just those destined for 8.8.8.8 or causing an error. We found this to be unsatisfactory.

To solve this problem, we made three definitions. The first, *match-no-prereq* matches an *of-match-field* against a packet without considering prerequisites. The second, *prerequisites*, checks for a given *of-match-field* whether its prerequisites are in a set of given match fields. Especially:

lemma

prerequisites (VlanPriority pri) $m = (\exists id. let v = VlanId id in v \in m \land prerequisites v m)$

prerequisites (IPv4Proto pr) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800 \ in \ v \in m \land prerequisites \ v \ m)$

prerequisites (IPv4Src a) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800$ in $v \in m \land$ prerequisites $v \ m$)

prerequisites (IPv4Dst a) $m = (let \ v = EtherType \ 0x0800$ in $v \in m \land prerequisites v m)$

prerequisites $(L4Src \ p \ msk)$ $m = (\exists proto \in \{TCP, UDP, L4-Protocol.SCTP\}.$ let $v = IPv4Proto \ proto$ in $v \in m \land$ prerequisites $v \ m$)

prerequisites (L4Dst p msk) m = prerequisites (L4Src undefined undefined) m

 $\mathbf{by}(fact \ prerequisites.simps) +$

Then, to actually match a set of *of-match-field* against a packet, we use the option type:

lemma OF-match-fields m p =(if $\exists f \in m$. \neg prerequisites f m then None else

if $\forall f \in m$. match-no-prereq f p then Some True else Some False)

 $\mathbf{by}(fact \ OF\text{-}match-fields\text{-}alt)$

1.2.2 Evaluating a Flow Table

In the previous section, we explained how we match the set of match fields belonging to a single flow entry against a packet. This section explains how the correct

³See also: $[8, \S2.3]$

flow entry from a table can be selected. To prevent to much entanglement with the previous section, we assume an arbitrary match function γ . This function γ takes the match condition *m* from a flow entry *OFEntry priority m action* and decides whether a packet matches those.

The flow table is simply a list of flow table entries *flow-entry-match*. Deciding the right flow entry to use for a given packet is explained in the OpenFlow specification [2], Section 3.4:

Packets are matched against flow entries based on prioritization. An entry that specifies an exact match (i.e., has no wildcards) is always the highest priority⁴. All wildcard entries have a priority associated with them. Higher priority entries must match before lower priority ones. If multiple entries have the same priority, the switch is free to choose any ordering.

We use the term "overlapping" for the flow entries that can cause a packet to match multiple flow entries with the same priority. Guha *et al.* [7] have dealt with overlapping. However, the semantics for a flow table they presented [7, Figure 5] is slightly different from what they actually used in their theory files. We have tried to reproduce the original inductive definition (while keeping our abstraction γ), in Isabelle/HOL⁵:

lemma γ (ofe-fields fe) $p = True \Longrightarrow$

 $\forall fe' \in set (ft1 @ ft2). ofe-prio fe' > ofe-prio fe \longrightarrow \gamma$ (ofe-fields fe') $p = False \Longrightarrow$

guha-table-semantics γ (ft1 @ fe # ft2) p (Some (of e-action fe))

 $\forall fe \in set ft. \ \gamma \ (ofe-fields fe) \ p = False \Longrightarrow$

guha-table-semantics γ ft p None **by**(fact guha-matched guha-unmatched)+

Guha *et al.* have deliberately made their semantics nondeterministic, to match the fact that the switch "may choose any ordering". This can lead to undesired results:

lemma $CARD('action) \ge 2 \Longrightarrow \exists ff. \gamma ff p \Longrightarrow \exists ft (a1 ::$ $'action) (a2 :: 'action). a1 \neq a2 \land guha-table-semantics \gamma$ $ft p (Some a1) \land guha-table-semantics \gamma ft p (Some a2)$ **by**(fact guha-table-semantics-ex2res) This means that, given at least two distinct actions exist and our matcher γ is not false for all possible match conditions, we can say that a flow table and two actions exist such that both actions are executed. This can be misleading, as the switch might choose an ordering on some flow table and never execute some of the (overlapped) actions.

Instead, we decided to follow Section 5.3 of the specification [3], which states:

If there are multiple matching flow entries, the selected flow entry is explicitly undefined.

This still leaves some room for interpretation, but it clearly states that overlapping flow entries are undefined behavior, and undefined behavior should not be invoked. Thus, we came up with a semantics that clearly indicates when undefined behavior has been invoked:

lemma

 $\begin{array}{l} OF\text{-}priority\text{-}match \ \gamma \ flow\text{-}entries \ packet = (\\ let \ m \ = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \gamma \ (ofe\text{-}fields \ f) \ packet) \ flow\text{-}entries;\\ m' \ = \ filter \ (\lambda f. \ \forall \ fo \ \in \ set \ m. \ ofe\text{-}prio \ fo \ \leq \ ofe\text{-}prio \ f)\\ m \ in\\ case \ m' \ of \ [] \ \Rightarrow \ NoAction \end{array}$

 $|[s] \Rightarrow Action (of e-action s)$ $| - \Rightarrow Undefined)$ unfolding OF-priority-match-def ..

The definition works the following way⁶:

- 1. The flow table is filtered for those entries that match, the result is called m.
- 2. m is filtered again, leaving only those entries for which no entries with lower priority could be found, i.e. the matching flow table entries with minimal priority. The result is called m'.
- 3. A case distinction on m' is made. If only one matching entry was found, its action is returned for execution. If m is empty, the flow table semantics returns *NoAction* to indicate that the flow table does not decide an action for the packet. If, not zero or one entry is found, but more, the special value *Undefined* for indicating undefined behavior is returned.

⁴This behavior has been deprecated.

 $^{^5\}mathrm{The}$ original is written in Coq [4] and we can not use it directly.

 $^{^6\}mathrm{Note}$ that the order of the flow table entries is irrelevant. We could have made this definition on sets but chose not to for consistency.

The use of *Undefined* immediately raises the question in which condition it cannot occur. We give the following definition:

lemma check-no-overlap γ ft = $(\forall a \in set ft. \forall b \in set ft. (a \neq b \land ofe-prio \ a = ofe-prio \ b) \longrightarrow \neg(\exists p. \gamma (ofe-fields a) p \land \gamma (ofe-fields \ b) p))$ unfolding check-no-overlap-alt check-no-overlap2-def by force

Together with distinctness of the flow table, this provides the abscence of $Undefined^7$:

lemma $[check-no-overlap \gamma ft; distinct ft] \implies$ OF-priority-match γ ft $p \neq$ Undefined by (simp add: no-overlapsI no-overlaps-not-unefined)

Given the absence of overlapping or duplicate flow entries, we can show two interesting equivalences. the first is the equality to the semantics defined by Guha *et al.*:

lemma [[check-no-overlap γ ft; distinct ft]] \Longrightarrow OF-priority-match γ ft p = option-to-ftb $d \leftarrow =$ guha-table-semantics γ ft p d**by** (simp add: guha-equal no-overlapsI)

where *option-to-ftb* maps between the return type of *OF-priority-match* and an option type as one would expect.

The second equality for *OF-priority-match* is one that helps reasoning about flow tables. We define a simple recursive traversal for flow tables:

lemma

OF-match-linear γ [] p = NoActionOF-match-linear γ (a # as) $p = (if \gamma (ofe-fields a) p$ then Action (ofe-action a) else OF-match-linear γ as p) **by**(fact OF-match-linear.simps)+

For this definition to be equivalent, we need the flow table to be sorted:

lemma

 $[no-overlaps \ \gamma \ f \ ; sorted-descending \ (map \ ofe-prio \ f)] \implies \\ OF-match-linear \ \gamma \ f \ p = OF-priority-match \ \gamma \ f \ p \\ \mathbf{by}(fact \ OF-eq)$

As the last step, we implemented a serialization function for flow entries; it has to remain unverified. The serialization function deals with one little inaccuracy: We have modelled the *IngressPort* match to use the interface name, but OpenFlow requires numerical interface IDs instead. We deemed that pulling this translation step into the main translation would only make the correctness lemma of the translation more complicated while not increasing the confidence in the correctness significantly. We thus made replacing interface names by their ID part of the serialization.

Having collected all important definitions and models, we can move on to the conversion.

1.3 Translation Implementation

This section explains how the functions that are executed sequentially in a linux firewall can be compressed into a single OpenFlow table. Creating this flow table in a single step would be immensely complicated. We thus divided the task into several steps using the following key insights:

- All steps that are executed in the linux router can be formulated as a firewall, more specifically, a generalization of *simple-fw* that allows arbitrary actions instead of just accept and drop.
- A function that computes the conjunction of two simple-fw matches is already present. Extending this to a function that computes the join of two firewalls is relatively simple. This is explained in Section 1.3.1

1.3.1 Chaining Firewalls

This section explains how to compute the join of two firewalls.

The basis of this is a generalization of *simple-fw*. Instead of only allowing *Accept* or *Drop* as actions, it allows arbitrary actions. The type of the function that evaluates this generalized simple firewall is *generalized-sfw*. The definition is straightforward:

lemma

generalized-sfw [] p = Nonegeneralized-sfw (a # as) $p = (if (case a of (m,-) \Rightarrow sim$ ple-matches m p) then Some a else generalized-sfw as p)**by**(fact generalized-sfw-simps)+

Based on that, we asked: if fw_1 makes the decision a (where a is the second element of the result tuple from generalized-sfw) and fw_2 makes the decision b, how can we compute the firewall that makes the decision $(a, b)^8$. One possible answer is given by the following definition:

 $^{^{7}\}mathrm{It}$ is slightly stronger than necessary, overlapping rules might be shadowed and thus never influence the behavior.

 $^{^{8}\}text{Note}$ that tuples are right-associative in Isabelle/HOL, i.e., $(a,\ b,\ c)$ is a pair of a and the pair $(b,\ c)$

lemma generalized-fw-join l1 $l2 \equiv [(u,a,b). (m1,a) \leftarrow l1, (m2,b) \leftarrow l2, u \leftarrow (case simple-match-and m1 m2 of None <math>\Rightarrow [] \mid Some \ s \Rightarrow [s])]$

 $\mathbf{by}(\textit{fact generalized-fw-join-def}[\textit{unfolded option2list-def}]) + \\$

This definition validates the following lemma:

lemma generalized-sfw (generalized-fw-join $fw_1 \ fw_2$) p =Some $(u, d_1, d_2) \longleftrightarrow (\exists r_1 \ r_2. generalized-sfw \ fw_1 \ p = Some (r_1, d_1) \land$ generalized-sfw $fw_2 \ p = Some \ (r_2, d_2) \land$ Some u = simple-match-and $r_1 \ r_2$)

by (auto dest: generalized-fw-joinD sym simp add: generalized-fw-joinI)

Thus, generalized-fw-join has a number of applications. For example, it could be used to compute a firewall ruleset that represents two firewalls that are executed in sequence.

definition simple-action-conj $a \ b \equiv (if \ a = simple-action.Accept \land b = simple-action.Accept then simple-action.Accept else simple-action.Drop)$

definition simple-rule-conj \equiv (uncurry SimpleRule \circ apsnd (uncurry simple-action-conj))

theorem simple-fw $rs_1 \ p = Decision \ FinalAllow \land simple-fw \ rs_2 \ p = Decision \ FinalAllow \longleftrightarrow$

simple-fw (map simple-rule-conj (generalized-fw-join (map simple-rule-dtor rs_1) (map simple-rule-dtor rs_2))) p = Decision FinalAllow

unfoldingsimple-rule-conj-defsimple-action-conj-def[abs-def]usingsimple-fw-joinby(force simp add: comp-def apsnd-def map-prod-defcase-prod-unfold uncurry-def[abs-def])

Using the join, it should be possible to compute any n-ary logical operation on firewalls. We will use it for something somewhat different in the next section.

1.3.2 Translation Implementation

This section shows the actual definition of the translation function, in Figure 1. Before beginning the translation. the definition checks whether the necessary preconditions are valid. This first two steps are to convert fw and rt to lists that can be evaluated by *generalized-sfw*. For fw, this is done by mapsimple-rule-dtor, which just deconstructs simple-rules into tuples of match and action. For rt, we made a firewall rules that use prefix matches on the destination IP address. The next step is to join the two rulesets. The result of the join is a ruleset with rules r that only match if both, the corresponding firewall rule fwr and the corresponding routing rule rrmatches. The data accompanying r is the port from rr and the firewall decision from fwr. Next, descending priorities are added to the rules using map (apfst $word-of-nat) \circ annotate-rlen$. If the number of rules is too large to fit into the 2^{16} priority classes, an error is returned. Otherwise, the function pack-OF-entries is used to convert the $(16 \ word \times 32 \ simple-match \times char \ list \times simple-action)$ list to an OpenFlow table. While converting the char list $\times \ simple-action$ tuple is straightforward, converting the simple-match to an equivalent list of of-match-field set is non-trivial. This is done by the function simple-match-to-of-match.

The main difficulties for *simple-match-to-of-match* lie in making sure that the prerequisites are satisfied and in the fact that a *simple-match* operates on slightly stronger match expressions.

- A *simple-match* allows a (string) prefix match on the input and output interfaces. Given a list of existing interfaces on the router *ifs*, the function has to insert flow entries for each interface matching the prefix.
- A simple-match can match ports by an interval. Now it becomes obvious why Section 1.2.1 added bitmasks to L4Src and L4Dst. Using the algorithm to split word intervals into intervals that can be represented by prefix matches from [6], we can efficiently represent the original interval by a few (32 in the worst case) prefix matches and insert flow entries for each of them.⁹

The following lemma characterizes simple-match-to-of-match:

lemma *simple-match-to-of-match*: assumes simple-match-valid r *p*-*iiface* $p \in set$ *ifs* match-iface (oiface r) (p-oiface p) p-l2type p = 0x800shows simple-matches rp \longleftrightarrow $(\exists gr$ \in set $(simple-match-to-of-match \ r \ ifs). \ OF-match-fields \ gr \ p =$ Some True)

using assms simple-match-to-of-matchD simple-match-to-of-matchI by blast

The assumptions are to be read as follows:

 $^{^{9}}$ It might be possible to represent the interval match more efficiently than a split into prefixes. However, that would produce overlapping matches (which is not a problem if we assing separate priorities) and we did not have a verified implementation of an algorithm that does so.

lemma lr-of-tran rt fw ifs \equiv if \neg (no-oif-match fw \land has-default-policy fw \land simple-fw-valid fw \land valid-prefixes rt \land has-default-route rt \land distinct ifs) then Inl "Error in creating OpenFlow table: prerequisites not satisifed" else (let nfw = map simple-rule-dtor fw;frt = map (λr . (route2match r, output-iface (routing-action r))) rt; nrd = generalized-fw-join frt nfw; $ard = (map (apfst of-nat) \circ annotate-rlen) nrd$ in if length nrd < unat (-1 :: 16 word)then Inr (pack-OF-entries ifs ard) else Inl "Error in creating OpenFlow table: priority number space exhausted") unfolding Let-def lr-of-tran-def lr-of-tran-fbs-def lr-of-tran-s1-def comp-def route2match-def by force

Figure 1: Function for translating a 'i simple-rule list, a 'i routing-rule list, and a list of interfaces to a flow table.

- The match r has to be valid, i.e. it has to use valid-prefix matches, and it cannot use anything other than 0-65535 for the port matches unless its protocol match ensures TCP, UDP or L4-Protocol.SCTP.
- *simple-match-to-of-match* cannot produce rules for packets that have input interfaces that are not named in the interface list.
- The output interface of p has to match the output interface match of r. This is a weakened formulation of *oiface* r = ifaceAny, since

match-iface ifaceAny i

. We require this because OpenFlow field matches cannot be used to match on the output port — they are supposed to match a packet and decide an output port.

• The *simple-match* type was designed for IP(v4) packets, we limit ourselves to them.

The conclusion then states that the *simple-match* r matches iff an element of the result of *simple-match-to-of-match* matches. The third assumption is part of the explanation why we did not use *simple-linux-router-altered*: *simple-match-to-of-match* cannot deal with output

interface matches. Thus, before passing a generalized simple firewall to *pack-OF-entries*, we would have to set the output ports to *ifaceAny*. A system replace output interface matches with destination IP addresses has already been formalized and will be published in a future version of [5]. For now, we limit ourselves to firewalls that do not do output port matching, i.e., we require *no-oif-match fw*.

Given discussed properties, we present the central theorem for our translation in Figure 2. The first two assumptions are limitations on the traffic we make a statement about. Obviously, we will never see any packets with an input interface that is not in the interface list. Furthermore, we do not state anything about non-IPv4 traffic. (The traffic will remain unmatched in by the flow table, but we have not verified that.) The last assumption is that the translation does not return a run-time error. The translation will return a run-time error if the rules can not be assigned priorities from a 16 bit integer, or when one of the following conditions on the input data is not satisifed:

lemma

- \neg no-oif-match fw \lor
- $\neg \textit{ has-default-policy fw } \lor$
- $\neg \textit{ simple-fw-valid fw } \lor$
- $\neg \textit{ valid-prefixes } rt ~\lor~$
- \neg has-default-route rt \lor
- $\neg \textit{ distinct ifs} \Longrightarrow$

theorem fixes p :: (32, 'a) simple-packet-ext-schemeassumes p-iiface $p \in$ set ifs and p-l2type p = 0x800 lr-of-tran rt fw ifs = Inr oftshows OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action [Forward oif] \leftrightarrow simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = (Some (p(p-oiface := oif))) OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action [] \leftrightarrow simple-linux-router-nol12 rt fw p = None OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft $p \neq$ NoAction OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft $p \neq$ Undefined OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action ls \rightarrow length ls ≤ 1 \exists ls. length ls $\leq 1 \land$ OF-priority-match OF-match-fields-safe oft p = Action ls using assms lr-of-tran-correct by simp-all

Figure 2: Central theorem on *lr-of-tran*

 \exists err. lr-of-tran rt fw ifs = Inl err **unfolding** lr-of-tran-def **by**(simp split: if-splits)

1.3.3 Comparison to Exodus

We are not the first researchers to attempt automated static migration to SDN. The (only) other attempt we are aware of is *Exodus* by Nelson *et al.* [10].

There are some fundamental differences between Exodus and our work:

- Exodus focuses on Cisco IOS instead of linux.
- Exodus does not produce OpenFlow rulesets, but FlowLog [9] controller programs.
- Exodus is not limited to using a single flow table.
- Exodus requires continuous controller interaction for some of its functions.
- Exodus attempts to support as much functionality as possible and has implemented support for dynamic routing, VLANs and NAT.
- Nelson *et al.* reject the idea that the translation could or should be proven correct.

2 Evaluation

In Section 1, we have made lots of definitions and created lots of models. How far these models are in accordance with the real world has been up to the vigilance of the reader. This section attemts to leviate this burden by providing some examples.

2.1 Mininet Examples

The first example is designed to be minimal while still showing the most important properties of our conversion. For this purpose, we used a linux firewall F, that we want to convert. We gave it two interfaces, and connected one client each. Its original configuration and the ruleset resulting from the translation is shown in Figure 3. (The list of interfaces can be extracted from the routing table; s1-lan received port number 1.) While the configuration does not fulfil any special function (especially, no traffic from the interface s1wan is permitted), it is small enough to let us have a detailed look. More specifically, we can see how the only firewall rule (Line 2) got combined with the first rule of the routing table to form Line 1 of the OpenFlow rules. This also shows why the bitmasks on the layer 4 ports are necessary. If we only allowed exact matches, we would have 2^{15} rules instead of just one. Line 2 of the OpenFlow ruleset has been formed by combining the default drop policy with Line 1 of the routing table.

```
      1
      :FORWARD DROP [0:0]

      2
      -A FORWARD -d 10.0.2.0/24 -i s1-lan -p tcp - m tcp --sport 32768:65535 --dport 80 -j ACCEPT

      (a) FORWARD chain

      1
      10.0.2.0/24 dev s1-wan proto kernel scope link src 10.0.2.4

      2
      -A FORWARD -d 10.0.2.0/24 -i s1-lan -p tcp - m tcp --sport 32768:65535 --dport 80 -j

      ACCEPT
      10.0.1.0/24 dev s1-lan proto kernel scope link src 10.0.1.1

      3
      default via 10.0.2.1 dev s1-wan

      (a) FORWARD chain
      (b) Routing table (sorted)
```

```
priority=4,hard_timeout=0,idle_timeout=0,in_port=1,dl_type=0x800,nw_proto=6,nw_dst=10.0.2.0/24,
        tp_src=32768/0x8000,tp_dst=80,action=output:2
priority=3,hard_timeout=0,idle_timeout=0,dl_type=0x800,nw_dst=10.0.2.0/24,action=drop
priority=2,hard_timeout=0,idle_timeout=0,dl_type=0x800,nw_dst=10.0.1.0/24,action=drop
priority=1,hard_timeout=0,idle_timeout=0,in_port=1,dl_type=0x800,nw_proto=6,nw_dst=10.0.2.0/24,
        tp_src=32768/0x8000,tp_dst=80,action=output:2
priority=0,hard_timeout=0,idle_timeout=0,dl_type=0x800,action=drop
```

(c) Resulting OpenFlow rules

Figure 3: Example Network 1 – Configuration

In a similar fashion, Line 2 of the routing rules has also been combined with the two firewall rules. However, as 10.0.2.0/24 from the firewall and 10.0.1.0/24 from the routing table have no common elements, no rule results from combining Line 2 and Line 2. In a similar fashion, the rest of the OpenFlow ruleset can be explained.

We feel that it is also worth noting again that it is necessary to change the IP configuration of the two devices attached to F. Assuming they are currently configured with, e.g., 10.0.1.100/24 and 10.0.2.1/24, the subnet would have to be changed from 24 to 22 or lower to ensure that a common subnet is formed and the MAC layer can function properly.

Next, we show a somewhat more evolved example. Its topology is depicted in Figure 4a. As before, we called the device to be replaced F. It is supposed to implement the simple policy that the clients H1 and H2 are allowed to communicate with the outside world via HTTP, ICMP is generally allowed, any other traffic is to be dropped (we neglected DNS for this example). We used the iptables configuration that is shown in Figure 4b. The routing table is the same as in the first example network.

The topology has been chosen for a number of reasons: we wanted one device which is not inside a common subnet with F and thus requires no reconfiguration for the translation. Moreover, we wanted two devices in a network that can communicate with each other while being overheard by F. For this purpose, we added two clients H1 and H2 instead of just one. We connected them with a broadcasting device. 10

Executing our conversion function results in 36 rules^{11} , we decided not to include them here. Comparing to the first example network, the size of the ruleset seems relatively high. This can be explained by the port matches: 1024-65535 has to be expressed by 6 different matches, tp_src=1024/0xfc00, tp_src=2048/0xf800, ..., tp_src=32768/0x8000 (or tp_dst respectively). When installing these rules, we also have to move all of H1, H2 and S1 into a common subnet. We chose 10.0.0.0/16 and updated the IP configuration of the three hosts accordingly. As discussed, the configuration of S2 did not have to be updated, as it does not share any subnet with F. We then tested reachability for TCP 22 and 80 and ICMP. The connectivity between all pairs of hosts (H1,H2,S1 and S2) remained the same compared to before the conversion. This shows that the concept can be made to work.

However, the example also reveals a flaw: When substituting the more complete model of a linux firewall with the simple one in Section 1.1, we assumed that the check whether the correct MAC address is set and the packets are destined for the modelled device would never fail we assumed that all traffic arriving at a device is actually destined for it. Obviously, this network violates

 $^{^{10}\}mathrm{For}$ the lack of a hub in mininet, we emulated one with an OpenFlow switch.

¹¹If we had implemented some spoofing protection by adding ! -s 10.0.1.0/24 to the respective rule, the number of rules would have been increased to 312. This is because a cross product of two prefix splits would occur.



(a) Topology

H1

Figure 4: Example Network 2

this assumption. We can trigger this in many ways, for example by sending an ICMP ping from H1 to H2. This will cause the generated rule priority=7, icmp, nw_dst=10.0.1.0/24 actions=output:1 (where port 1 is the port facing H1 and H2) to be activated twice. This is obviously not desired behavior. Dealing with this is, as mentioned, future work.

2.2 Performance Evaluation

Unfortunately, we do not have any real-world data that does not use output port matches as required in Section 1.3. There is thus no way to run the translation on the real-world firewall rulesets we have available and obtain a meaningful result. Nevertheless, we can use a real-world ruleset to evaluate the performance of our translation. For this purpose, we picked the largest firewall from the firewall collection from [6]. A significant amount of time is necessary to convert its FORWARD chain including 4946 rules^{12} to the required simplified firewall form. Additionally to the simplified firewall, we acquired the routing table (26 entries) from the same machine. We then evaluated the time necessary to complete the translation and the size of the resulting ruleset when using only the first n simple firewall rules and the full routing table. The result is shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Benchmark

Given the time necessary to complete the conversion of the iptables firewall to a simple firewall, it is reasonable to say that the translation function is efficient enough. At first glance, size of the resulting ruleset seems high. This can be explained by two facts:

- The firewall contains a large number of rules with port matches that allow the ports 1-65535, which requires 16 OpenFlow rules.
- Some combinations of matches from the firewall and the routing table cannot be ruled out, since

 $^{^{12}}$ In the pre-parsed and already normalized version we used for this benchmark, it took 45s. The full required time lies closer to 11min as stated in [6].

the firewall match might only contain an output port and the rule can thus only apply for the packets matching a few routing table entries. However, the translation is not aware of that and can thus not remove the combination of the firewall rule and other routing table entries.

In some rules, the conditions above coincede, resulting in 416 (= $16 \cdot 26$) rules. To avoid the high number of rules resulting from the port matches, rules that forbids packets with source or destination port 0 could be added to the start of the firewall and the 1-65535 could be removed; dealing with the firewall / routing table problem is part of the future work on output interfaces.

3 Conclusion and Future Work

We believe that we have shown that it is possible to translate at least basic configurations of a linux firewall into OpenFlow rulesets while preserving the most important aspects of the behavior. We recognize that our system has limited practical applicability. One possible example would be a router or firewall inside a company network whose state tables have been polluted by special attack traffic. Our translation could provide an OpenFlow based stateless replacement. However, given the current prerequisites the implementation has on the configuration, this application is relatively unlikely.

For the configuration translation, we have contributed formal models of a linux firewall and of an OpenFlow switch. Furthermore, the function that joins two firewalls and the function that translates a simplified match from [6] to a list of equivalent OpenFlow field match sets are contributions that we think are likely to be of further use.

We want to explicitly formulate the following two goals for our future work:

- We want to deal with output interface matches. The idea is to formulate and verify a destination interface / destination IP address rewriting that can exchange output interfaces and destination IP addressed in a firewall, based on the information from the routing table.¹³
- We want to develop a system that can provide a stricter approximation of stateful matches so our translation will be applicable in more cases.

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 $^{^{13}\}mathrm{As}$ of now this has already been implemented, but is not yet fully ready.